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Foreword
The economies of developing Asia are maintaining their impressive 
growth trajectories. Yet the global backdrop in 2012 is one of uncertainty: 
the eurozone is grappling with its sovereign debt crisis; and more 
generally, stagnation in the major industrial economies of the United 
States, Europe, and Japan—developing Asia’s main trading partners—
is stunting demand for Asia’s products. For these reasons, the Asian 
Development Outlook 2012 forecasts that growth in developing Asia will 
ease to 6.9% in 2012 (from 7.2% in 2011) before coming back to 7.3% in 2013. 
Developing Asia will have to adjust to lower export demand from 
the advanced economies for some time to come. These economies are 
expected to expand by just 1.1% in 2012 and 1.7% in 2013, as austerity 
measures, fiscal consolidation, and weak private domestic demand stall 
their growth for the next 2 years—at least. Increased local demand in 
Asia has offset some of this lost trade, but it will need to take up more of 
the slack.
Fortunately, the commodity price pressures that built up in early 2011 
are subsiding. Inflation in the region is expected to slow to 4.7% in 2012 
and 4.4% in 2013. Political instability in the Middle East, however, could 
lead to sudden cuts in oil supplies, resulting in temporary spikes in the 
price of this critical commodity and reviving inflation in developing Asia.
The greatest risk to Asia’s enviable growth rates in the near term is 
the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone. Although a second international 
bailout of Greece in March 2012 prevented a disorderly default and 
diminished the risk of a liquidity crunch in the short run, the crisis is 
far from over—and the eurozone is teetering on the brink of recession. 
Europe’s problems are having global repercussions, but Asia is fairly well 
placed to weather the storm. 
Developing Asia’s policy makers cannot, however, be complacent. 
They need to be ready to respond if the eurozone deteriorates, particularly 
as global value chains—Asia’s growth-generating cross-border production 
networks—and sudden reductions in trade finance can magnify an 
external shock.
Even if a major external risk to the forecasts materializes, developing 
Asia has some scope for macroeconomic policy responses. Since the last 
global crisis eased, budget deficits have been narrowed, policy interest 
rates have been raised, and regional and global safety nets for liquidity 
support have been strengthened.
The eurozone crisis highlights the need for developing Asia to 
rebalance its economies toward domestic and regional demand and from 
dependence on exports destined for advanced countries. It also provides 
added urgency to efforts to broaden and deepen regional cooperation, 
reduce trade barriers, and promote intraregional trade.
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Of perhaps greater threat to developing Asia’s long-term growth and 
stability is the widening disparity in the region between the “haves” and 
“have nots”—an issue of growing concern explored in this year’s theme 
chapter. Despite the region’s rapid growth, the last two decades have 
witnessed widening income disparities. Most people in the region—about 
four-fifths of them—live in countries that are becoming more unequal.
Inequitable access to new technology, education, infrastructure, and 
investment are fueling the divide, particularly between rural and urban 
areas and between coastal and inland provinces. Bridging this growing 
gap is essential to promote inclusive growth, and to make growth 
sustainable. The social and political consequences of an Asia left to divide 
itself by wealth can no longer be ignored.
It is time for governments in Asia to focus on policies that share the 
benefits of development fairly, and that maintain healthy growth rates. 
These policies include fiscal policy enhancements such as increases in 
spending on education and health, conditional cash transfers for the 
poor, and more equitable revenue mobilization; more investment in 
infrastructure to reduce imbalances between developed and lagging areas; 
and employment-friendly measures to encourage the creation of high-
quality jobs.
Haruhiko Kuroda
President
Asian Development Bank
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Definitions
The economies discussed in the Asian Development Outlook 2012 (ADO 2012) are classified by major 
analytic or geographic groupings. For purposes of ADO 2012, the following apply:
•	 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) comprises Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Viet Nam.
•	 Developing Asia refers to the 44 developing member countries of the Asian Development Bank and 
Brunei Darussalam, an unclassified regional member. 
•	 Central Asia comprises Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 
•	 East Asia comprises the People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea; 
Mongolia; and Taipei,China.
•	 South Asia comprises Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and 
Sri Lanka. 
•	 Southeast Asia comprises Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam.
•	 The Pacific comprises the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of 
Micronesia, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, 
and Vanuatu.
•	 Unless otherwise specified, the symbol “$” and the word “dollar” refer to US dollars.
ADO 2012 is generally based on data available up to 16 March 2012.
ADO 2012—Highlights
Developing Asia will largely maintain its growth momentum in the next couple of 
years despite weak global demand. From a moderate 7.2% in 2011, growth in the 
region will ease to 6.9% in 2012 before picking up to 7.3% in 2013. 
Inflation for most regional economies subsided in the second half of 2011 as 
international commodity price rises slackened, but threats of oil supply disruptions 
risk further price spikes. Volatile foreign capital flows remain a concern as investors 
shift their risk perceptions in response to the changing global environment.
The greatest risk to the outlook is uncertainty surrounding the resolution of 
sovereign debt problems in the eurozone. But in the absence of any sudden shocks, 
developing Asia can manage the effects on its financial markets and trade flows. 
There is no clear case for policy makers in the region to pursue short-term fiscal or 
monetary stimulus measures.
Developing Asia has made great strides in raising living standards and reducing 
poverty, but swelling income disparities threaten to undermine that success. Regional 
policy makers need to ensure that the benefits of growth are widely shared.
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Key messages
• Despite the weak global environment, developing Asia’s growth momentum 
continues. The region’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth will cool 
somewhat to 6.9% in 2012, from 7.2% in 2011, and then edge back up to 7.3% 
in 2013. The region is generally adjusting toward a more sustainable long-run 
growth path. 
• Strong domestic demand provided necessary support in 2011, and this will 
need to continue in light of the soft export demand expected from the 
major industrial economies of the United States (US), eurozone, and Japan. 
Collectively, they are expected to expand by only 1.1% in 2012 and 1.7% in 2013.
• The greatest risk to the outlook is the continued uncertainty over resolving 
the sovereign debt problems in the eurozone. The “orderly default” on Greece’s 
debt in March 2012 diminished the risk of a liquidity crunch in the short run, 
but calls for fiscal austerity across the eurozone will act as a drag on growth. 
• The effects on developing Asia’s financial stability and trade flows can be 
managed if there are no future shocks, but policy makers need to be ready 
to respond if the eurozone situation worsens. Global value chains—the cross-
border production networks of developing Asia—and sudden reductions in 
trade finance tend to magnify external shocks.
• Even if a major external risk to the forecasts materializes, developing Asia 
has some scope for a macroeconomic policy response. Although the policy 
stimulus that it adopted in response to the global economic crisis has used 
up some of its policy space, the region has since regained some of that space. 
Budget deficits have come down, policy interest rates have been raised, and 
regional and global safety nets for liquidity support have been strengthened.
• In the absence of further global shocks, there is no clear case for developing Asia 
to make short-term countercyclical macroeconomic policy responses. The gap 
between potential production and the actual level of output in most developing 
Asian economies—unlike the advanced economies—is not large enough to 
warrant aggressive stimulus measures. Instead, policy makers may need to focus 
on maintaining price stability while sustaining the growth momentum. 
• Inflation is not an immediate threat for most regional economies—decelerating 
international commodity price rises from late 2011 have eased some of the 
pressures. Consumer prices in developing Asia are forecast to rise by 4.6% 
in 2012 and 4.4% in 2013, down from 5.9% in 2011. However, the unstable 
geopolitical situation in the Middle East could trigger further oil price spikes, 
reviving inflation in developing Asia.
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• Many economies had been normalizing their accommodative monetary policy 
in early 2011, but they stopped or even reversed the process in the second half, 
as uncertainties in the major industrial countries damped global demand, and 
as pressures from international commodity price rises eased. If inflationary 
pressures build again and capital inflows resume, there may be a need to 
readjust monetary policy to maintain price stability.
• Volatile capital flows remain a concern. Widely shifting risk perceptions among 
foreign investors in 2011 affected capital flows to developing Asia as funds 
flowed out toward risk-free assets. If changing investor sentiment causes large 
swings in capital flows again—building up inflationary pressures or making 
exchange rates more volatile—policy makers have various measures of 
capital flow management at their disposal, but such measures need regional 
coordination to be effective. Greater exchange rate flexibility may also damp 
speculative capital movements.
• Fiscal policy must balance the pursuit of long-term macroeconomic stability 
and support for growth. Debt-to-GDP ratios spiked in the region after the 
massive fiscal responses to the global crisis, but they are now trending 
downward, although lower growth or higher interest rates could quickly 
undermine this position. Moreover, the region faces additional sources of fiscal 
strain in the years ahead, such as adjusting to aging populations and building 
adequate social safety nets.
• Developing Asia’s economies need to push through growth-supportive 
expenditure policies without undermining their fiscal positions. They can 
do this by adjusting the composition of government expenditure toward 
education, health, and social safety nets and by expanding expenditure 
alongside revenue enhancements. Such shifts in fiscal policy will be 
increasingly important as the region confronts rising income inequality while 
fostering continued economic expansion.
• In the last two decades, income disparities widened in the 
11 economies that account for more than four-fifths of the region’s population. 
Rising inequality can damp the poverty impact of economic growth, and even 
undermine the basis of growth itself.
• The forces of technological progress, globalization, and market-oriented 
reform—the primary drivers of the region’s rapid growth—are putting a wedge 
between the incomes of the rich and poor. These factors tend to favor owners 
of capital over labor, high-skilled over low-skilled workers, and urban and 
coastal centers over rural and inland areas.
• Policy makers must meet the challenge of rising inequality without hindering 
future growth. They can do this through policies that put in place efficient 
fiscal measures, that promote regional balance, and that make growth more 
employment friendly.
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Maintaining growth in an uncertain world
Developing Asia’s outlook
• Developing Asia’s growth is feeling the effects of weak global demand. 
Expansion in the region’s GDP moderated to 7.2% in 2011 from 2010’s post–
global crisis rebound of 9.1%. Growth in developing Asia is expected to ease 
further to 6.9% in 2012 before coming back to 7.3% in 2013. These growth 
projections are still strong compared with other regions of the world, and are 
part of the adjustment toward a more sustainable long-run growth path in the 
more advanced regional economies.
• Developing Asia’s main trading partners have yet to return to their 
precrisis growth rates. Growth in the major industrial countries of the US, 
eurozone, and Japan was subdued in 2011, with GDP growing collectively by 
a disappointing 1.2%. Their prospects are also uninspiring, with growth set to 
stall at 1.1% in 2012 before gaining some lift to 1.7% in 2013. Fiscal consolidation 
efforts and insipid private domestic demand growth will stay a drag on these 
economies, and the slipstream from the eurozone’s sovereign debt crisis is 
buffeting that bloc back into recession. Developing Asia should expect relatively 
weak demand for its exports from these three economies in the near term.
• That is why domestic demand, which is providing increasing support for 
the region’s producers, is welcome. Private consumption continues to be 
a major factor in the region’s growth. Yet investment weakened appreciably 
toward end-2011, weighing on the outlook for the coming quarters, particularly 
for export-led economies such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC); Hong 
Kong, China; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; and Taipei,China.
• The shift toward domestic demand is apparent in further declines in 
developing Asia’s current account surplus. The surplus continued to narrow 
to 2.6% of GDP in 2011 from 4.0% in 2010, reflecting moderating demand for 
exports, solid domestic demand pushing imports upward, and higher prices for 
imported oil and commodities. Steady, real exchange rate appreciation in many 
regional economies has supported this shift. The current account surplus is 
forecast to be trimmed further in 2012 to 1.9% of GDP, given continued growth 
in import demand in most economies while exports face soft global demand.
• Inflation is set to recede, but volatile commodity prices are a potential 
threat. Higher food and fuel prices drove up inflation in developing Asia to 
5.9% in 2011 from 4.4% in 2010. With relatively stable (but elevated) oil prices, 
some respite offered by easing food prices, and lower demand for the region’s 
exports, inflation in the region is forecast to slow to 4.6% in 2012 and 4.4% in 
2013. However, continued instability in the Middle East, including threats of oil 
supply disruptions, could lead to another round of temporary price spikes, in 
turn fanning the embers of inflation in developing Asia.
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• Volatile capital flows remain a concern. Net capital inflows to developing 
Asia increased from the second half of 2010 and into the first half of 2011. 
The PRC was the main beneficiary of the influx, much in the form of foreign 
direct investment. At the onset of the eurozone turmoil and the ratings 
downgrade of US long-term sovereign credit in the second half of 2011, 
global investors sharply curtailed their risk appetite. Consequently, regional 
capital inflows slowed, even switching to outflows for some countries. 
Major industrial countries are likely to maintain accommodative monetary 
policies over the forecast period, and so policy makers in developing Asia 
will need to be prepared for potentially large swings in capital flows based 
on fluctuations in global investors’ risk appetites.
Eurozone uncertainties and developing Asia
• Continued uncertainties in the eurozone present the greatest risk 
to the global outlook. Despite recent progress easing the eurozone’s 
sovereign debt problems somewhat, the weaker growth momentum in 
Europe poses risks. The voluntary private sector participation agreement 
reached in March 2012 helped restructure Greece’s government debt, 
thus removing the immediate risk of a disorderly default that could 
have sparked a global liquidity crisis. As the nature of the primary risk 
to developing Asia has shifted from financial contagion to slower export 
growth, developing Asia’s policy makers need to prepare for the possibility 
of an extended period of low European demand for exports.
• In the absence of any sudden shocks, the effects on developing Asia’s 
financial stability and trade flows can be managed. The region’s direct 
exposure to eurozone banks is relatively small, and reserves are sufficient to 
cover short-term external debt repayments, helping shield the region from 
financial contagion. The region is more vulnerable to the risk of a trade 
shock, the main channel through which Asia was affected by the global 
financial crisis. Europe is a key export market for Asia, and will remain so 
in the near future despite its declining share in recent years. But as long as 
the slowdown is confined to the eurozone—as opposed to a synchronized 
advanced-country recession—developing Asia should be able to absorb 
the impact of lower export demand.
• If the situation in the eurozone worsens to the extent of undermining 
global recovery, developing Asia’s policy makers need to be prepared 
to act quickly. Recent history shows that two areas in particular—global 
value chains and trade finance—interact with an external trade shock to 
intensify its impact.
» Global value chains—the production model behind East and 
Southeast Asia’s export success—amplify external shocks. The 
2008–2009 global trade collapse highlighted this vulnerability, as 
external demand for final goods dried up and the impact rippled 
through the region’s supply chains. Asia’s export production structure 
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and demand sources have changed little since then, and a steep drop in 
final goods demand from the major industrial countries would still strongly 
compress aggregate demand for exports throughout the region. This 
vulnerability underscores the need to diversify the destinations for the 
region’s final goods and to accelerate the shift to more reliance on domestic 
demand.
 » Trade finance shortages exacerbate the impact of an export demand 
shock that is accompanied by a credit squeeze. Trade finance is generally 
short term and low risk, and in noncrisis periods mainly takes the form of 
credits between firms. But during a severe crisis, these interfirm credits may 
dry up, raising firms’ need for bank lending. However, the deleveraging of 
European banks, which are traditionally active in supporting trade in Asia, 
could cut into the supply of trade finance. In addition, Basel III regulations 
could skew bank incentives away from trade finance. Policy makers may 
need to pay special attention to trade finance when credit is squeezed, 
especially for small and medium-sized enterprises.
Responding to the unsettled global environment
• Developing Asia has some scope for a macroeconomic policy response if a 
major downside risk to the outlook materializes.
The stimulus measures adopted in response to the global crisis were 
a departure from the prudent fiscal and monetary policy that regional 
authorities had generally pursued. Budget deficits, though not back to precrisis 
levels, have narrowed and policy interest rates have been raised, providing 
room for a new policy response if needed. Further, regional and global safety 
nets for liquidity support have been strengthened.
• However, there is no clear case for a short-term countercyclical policy 
response to the current global economic environment. Although the 
slowdown in Europe is putting a brake on the region’s growth, the impact 
is manageable. Output gaps of most Asian economies, unlike the advanced 
economies’, are not large enough to warrant aggressive countercyclical 
support. 
• The region can fine-tune monetary policy to support growth while 
keeping a focus on stabilizing inflationary expectations. In the face of 
inflationary pressures, the relatively accommodative monetary policy that 
began in late 2008 was tightened until mid-2011. However, in the second half of 
the year, many countries stopped—and in some cases reversed—the course of 
monetary tightening as uncertainties in the major industrial countries damped 
global demand and pressures from international commodity price rises eased. 
If inflationary pressures build again and capital inflows resume, there may be a 
need to readjust monetary policy to maintain price stability.
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• Foreign capital flows will need to be managed to mitigate the impact of 
their fluctuations. Investors’ assessments of global market risks swung widely 
after the onset of the global crisis in 2008, and the continued global economic 
uncertainty suggests that moves may be similarly volatile in the forecast 
period. If large swings of capital flows to the region reoccur, various measures 
of capital flow management may be deployed, but they require regional 
coordination to be effective. Greater exchange rate flexibility may also help 
deter speculative capital flows. 
• Fiscal policy must balance the pursuit of long-term macroeconomic 
stability with support to growth momentum. Debt-to-GDP ratios in the 
region spiked due to the fiscal response to the global crisis, but they are 
now generally on a downward path. However, governments have no room 
for complacency, since sustained falling debt ratios depend on continued 
favorable growth and interest rates, which are subject to sudden reversal in the 
case of a renewed global economic downturn or a financial crisis. Moreover, 
the region faces additional sources of fiscal strain in the years ahead, such as 
adjusting to aging populations and building adequate social safety nets.
• Growth-supportive expenditure policies can be achieved without 
undermining fiscal positions. This can be done with budget-neutral measures 
that shift the composition of government spending to education, health, 
and social safety nets, and by expanding expenditure alongside revenue 
enhancements. Such shifts in fiscal policy will be increasingly important as the 
region confronts rising income inequality while fostering continued economic 
expansion—an issue analyzed in the theme chapter of Asian Development 
Outlook 2012.
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Outlook by subregion
• Global factors have given way to country-specific issues in developing 
Asia’s outlook. In the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
the third quarter of 2008, most regional economies were affected by the 
sharp drop in global demand and subsequent recovery. But as the global 
environment has become less volatile—although growth is still slower than 
before the global crisis—country- or subregion-specific shocks are playing a 
bigger role, leading to wider variation among economic trends at those levels. 
Factors include natural disasters, the availability of resources, and the strength 
of domestic demand.
• East Asia’s growth will moderate to 7.4% in 2012 but will still lead the 
other subregions. Growth has decelerated markedly since the 9.8% rebound 
in 2010, dropping to 8.0% in 2011 as the deteriorating global outlook in the 
second half of 2011 affected directly the contribution to growth of net exports 
and indirectly investment and consumption. An uptick to 7.7% is forecast for 
2013. Growth for the PRC is forecast to moderate to 8.5% and 8.7% in the next 
2 years (though this still exceeds the growth envisaged in the 12th Five-Year 
Plan). East Asia’s inflation is forecast to slow to 3.7% in the next 2 years. 
The exception is Mongolia, where double-digit rates will prevail as surging 
government and private spending boosts domestic demand.
• South Asia will see growth improve a shade in 2012 to 6.6%. Growth in 2011 
fell sharply to 6.4%, mainly reflecting slumping investment and India’s marked 
monetary tightening in the face of persistent inflation. Growth in Pakistan 
declined because of disastrous flooding, while Bangladesh and Sri Lanka did 
well on brisk exports. The pace of India’s growth is projected to edge up to 
7.0% in 2012 and 7.5% in 2013, providing most of the lift for subregional growth 
to reach 7.1% in 2013. Pakistan’s growth will advance only slightly in both years 
because electricity will remain a bottleneck on the supply side. South Asia’s 
inflation is expected to fall from 9.4% last year to 7.7% in 2012 and further to 
6.9% in 2013. Some cutbacks in the heavy fuel and electricity subsidies in most 
countries are expected, and will set a floor to how far inflation can fall. 
• Growth in Southeast Asia for 2012 is seen picking up to 5.2%. Overall 
GDP growth decelerated to 4.6% in 2011, as Southeast Asia was hard hit by 
weakened export markets, domestic policy tightening, and natural disasters 
that disrupted trade and production—only partly redeemed by strong growth 
in the subregion’s largest economy, Indonesia. The pickup in growth in 2012 
largely reflects recovery in Thailand from major flooding as its growth rate 
rebounds from 0.1% in 2011 to 5.5% in 2012. Subregional growth is forecast to 
climb to 5.7% in 2013. Indonesia will continue its solid growth performance, 
expanding by 6.4% in 2012 and 6.7% in 2013. Higher food and fuel prices drove 
up aggregate inflation to 5.5% in 2011, but assumed relatively steady global oil 
prices and easing food prices in 2012 seem likely to slow inflation to 4.4% over 
the next 2 years.
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• Central Asia should just about keep up the momentum at 6.1% in 
2012 and 6.2% in 2013. This year’s outturn reflects the combination of a 
weak eurozone and slower growth in the Russian Federation, offset by a 
bounceback in growth in Azerbaijan. In 2011, strong demand for petroleum 
boosted growth in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, but Azerbaijan’s minimal 
growth, due to temporary closure of some oil production facilities, dragged 
down the subregional rate. Inflation accelerated in 2011 to 9.0%, mainly on 
rapid increases in world fuel and food prices. More moderate food price 
inflation and expected stable oil prices are seen helping slow inflation to 
7.2% in 2012 and 7.3% in 2013. 
• The Pacific economies are relatively insulated from developments in 
the eurozone. Robust expansion in the resource-exporting economies 
of Papua New Guinea (which accounts for roughly 60% of Pacific GDP), 
Timor-Leste, and Solomon Islands, and strong growth in the tourism-
oriented economies of the Cook Islands, Fiji, Palau, and Vanuatu, lifted 
subregional growth to 7.0% in 2011—making this the only subregion to 
post faster growth in 2011 than 2010. Yet the Pacific is forecast to slow to 
6.0% and 4.1% over the next 2 years due to lower resource export revenue, 
the winding down of infrastructure projects that stimulated growth in 2011 
(Papua New Guinea, the Marshall Islands, and Vanuatu), lower international 
agricultural prices, and flooding impacts (Fiji). Inflation is expected to fall to 
6.6% in 2012 from 8.6% in 2011.
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Special theme: Confronting rising inequality in Asia
Asia’s rising inequality
• Developing Asia’s impressive growth continues, but is paced by a new 
challenge—inequality on the rise. Over the last few decades, the region 
has lifted people out of poverty at an unprecedented rate. But more recent 
experience contrasts with the “growth with equity” story that characterized 
the transformation of the newly industrialized economies in the 1960s and 
1970s. In the 11 economies that account for more than four-fifths of the region’s 
population, income disparities expanded during the last two decades—despite 
the region’s world-beating performance in raising average incomes and 
reducing poverty.
» Inequality widened in 11 of the 28 economies with comparable data, 
including the three most populous countries and drivers of the region’s 
rapid growth—the PRC, India, and Indonesia. From the early 1990s to 
the late 2000s, the Gini coefficient—a common measure of inequality—
worsened from 32 to 43 in the PRC, from 33 to 37 in India, and from 29 to 39 
in Indonesia. Treating developing Asia as a single unit, its Gini coefficient 
went from 39 to 46 in that period.
» Although Asia’s inequality levels are generally below those in other 
developing regions—the average Gini coefficient across developing Asian 
economies was 37 compared with an average of 52 for Latin American 
economies—incomes are becoming more equitable elsewhere. 
• Inequality of opportunity is also prevalent in developing Asia. Disparities 
in the means to raise one’s living standards—such as physical assets (e.g., 
capital and land), human capital (e.g., education and health), and market 
access (e.g., labor and finance)—are common. Unequal access to public 
services, especially education and health, is central to generating inequality of 
opportunity. National household surveys conducted in the mid- to late 2000s 
revealed many facets of diverging opportunities:
» School-age children from households in the poorest income quintile were 
three to five times as likely to be out of primary and secondary school as 
their peers in the richest quintile in some countries. The situation was even 
more dire for tertiary education where poorer college-age individuals were 
10–20 times more likely not to attend college than their better-off peers.
» Infant mortality rates among the poorest households in some countries 
were double or treble the rates among the richest households. In the most 
extreme examples, the chance of a poor infant dying at birth was more 
than 10 times higher than for an infant born to a rich family. 
» With few exceptions, the region’s economies have made significant progress 
toward gender parity in primary and secondary education. Yet high gender 
disparities in tertiary education remain in South Asia and the Pacific.
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• Inequality of opportunity is a crucial factor in widening income inequality 
in developing Asia. Moreover, these two forms of inequality can lead to a 
vicious circle as unequal opportunities create income disparities, which in turn 
lead to differences in future opportunities for individuals and households.
Why inequality matters
• Rising inequality can damp the poverty impact of economic growth. If 
inequality had remained stable in the Asian economies where it increased, the 
same growth in 1990–2010 would have taken about 240 million more people 
out of poverty—equivalent to 6.5% of developing Asia’s population in 2010 
and 8.0% of those countries with rising inequality.
• Inequality can weaken the basis of growth itself. High and rising inequality 
can curb medium-term growth by reducing social cohesion, undermining the 
quality of governance, and increasing pressure for inefficient populist policies.
• Asian policy makers are becoming more concerned about inequality. In 
an informal, web-based survey of Asian policy makers in January–February 
2012, over 65% of respondents agreed that income inequality in their countries 
was high or very high. Almost all felt that incomes in their countries were 
becoming more unequal. Moreover, a majority believed that success in 
reducing poverty was insufficient to justify widening inequality. This concern is 
increasingly being addressed through development plans across the region, as 
they include explicit goals to make growth more inclusive.
Drivers of inequality
• Technological progress, globalization, and market-oriented reform—the 
primary drivers of the region’s growth—are the key forces behind the 
rise in inequality. These forces combined have opened new opportunities 
for economies to prosper, but have not benefited all people equally. Together, 
these drivers explain not only the increase in overall inequality, but also the 
sharply rising incomes of the very rich in some countries.
• These forces affect income differences through three channels: capital, 
skill, and spatial bias. The bias toward physical capital reduces labor’s share 
of national income while increasing the income share of the owners of capital. 
Similarly, the heightened demand for better skilled workers raises the premium 
on their earnings. And spatial disparities are becoming more acute: locations 
with superior infrastructure, market access, and scale economies—such as 
urban centers and coastal areas—are better able to benefit from changing 
circumstances.
» Labor’s share of total income is falling in many economies in the region. 
Between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s, labor income as a share of 
manufacturing output in the formal sector fell from 48% to 42% in the PRC 
and from 37% to 22% in India. The employment intensity of growth in Asia 
is lower than the global average and has declined in recent decades.
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 » Differences in educational attainment can explain 25%–35% of inequality 
between households in many regional economies, and the earnings 
premium for skills and tertiary education has increased in recent years.
 » The combined contribution of rural–urban and interprovincial differences 
to total inequality ranges from 13% in Sri Lanka to 54% in the PRC. The gaps 
between urban and rural incomes in developing Asia have increased, as 
have those between prosperous and lagging areas.
Policy priorities for confronting rising inequality
• Because the forces behind rising inequality are also the engines of 
productivity and income growth, policy makers should not hinder 
their progress. A distinction needs to be made between the income 
differences that arise as economies take advantage of the new opportunities 
of technology, trade, and efficiency-enhancing reforms; and those that are 
generated by unequal access to market opportunities and public services. This 
latter source of inequality requires a policy response since it gets magnified by 
the forces, leads to inefficiency, and undermines the sustainability of growth.
• Governments can address rising inequalities through several policy 
channels, three of which are highlighted in the theme chapter:
» Efficient fiscal policies. These include: 
◆ spending more on education  and health, especially for poorer 
households;
◆ developing and spending more on better targeted social protection 
schemes, including conditional cash transfers that target income to the 
poorest but also incentivize the buildup of human capital; 
◆ reducing or eliminating general price subsidies (such as on fuel) and 
compensating the impact on the poor by targeted transfers; and 
◆ broadening the tax base and strengthening tax administration for 
greater and more equitable revenue mobilization.
» Interventions to improve regional balance. These include:
◆ improving transport and communications networks between 
developed and poor regions; 
◆ creating growth poles in lagging areas; 
◆ using fiscal transfers to poorer areas in order to accelerate investment 
in human capital and improve access to public services there; and
◆ removing barriers to within-country migration.
» Policies to make growth more employment friendly. These include:
◆ encouraging structural transformation to create a greater number of 
productive jobs, and maintaining a balanced sectoral composition of 
growth between manufacturing, services, and agriculture;
◆ supporting development of small and medium-sized enterprises;
◆ removing factor market distortions that favor capital over labor;
◆ establishing or strengthening labor market institutions; and 
◆ introducing public employment schemes as a temporary bridge to 
address pockets of unemployment and underemployment.
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• Developing Asia must turn back the tide of rising inequality. The region has 
enjoyed a remarkable period of growth and poverty reduction, but the new 
global realities of technological progress, more globally integrated markets, 
and greater market orientation are magnifying the effects of inequalities in 
physical and human capital. Asian policy makers need to redouble their efforts 
to equalize opportunities in employment, education, and health to make 
growth more inclusive. Without such policies of job creation and efficient 
redistribution to enhance growth, Asia may be pulled into inefficient populist 
policies, which would help neither growth nor equity.
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                                         Table 1 Growth rate of GDP (% per year)
Subregion/Economy 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Central Asia 3.2 6.6 6.2 6.1 6.2
Azerbaijan 9.3 5.0 0.1 4.1 3.5
Kazakhstan 1.2 7.0 7.5 6.0 6.5
East Asia 6.7 9.8 8.0 7.4 7.7
China, People’s Rep. of 9.2 10.4 9.2 8.5 8.7
Hong Kong, China -2.6 7.0 5.0 3.0 4.5
Korea, Rep. of 0.3 6.2 3.6 3.4 4.0
Taipei,China -1.8 10.7 4.0 3.4 4.6
South Asia 7.5 7.8 6.4 6.6 7.1
Bangladesh 5.7 6.1 6.7 6.2 6.0
India 8.4 8.4 6.9 7.0 7.5
Pakistan 1.7 3.8 2.4 3.6 4.0
Sri Lanka 3.5 8.0 8.3 7.0 8.0
Southeast Asia 1.4 7.9 4.6 5.2 5.7
Indonesia 4.6 6.2 6.5 6.4 6.7
Malaysia -1.6 7.2 5.1 4.0 5.0
Philippines 1.1 7.6 3.7 4.8 5.0
Singapore -1.0 14.8 4.9 2.8 4.5
Thailand -2.3 7.8 0.1 5.5 5.5
Viet Nam 5.3 6.8 5.9 5.7 6.2
The Pacific 4.2 5.5 7.0 6.0 4.1
Fiji -1.3 -0.2 2.1 1.0 1.2
Papua New Guinea 6.0 7.4 8.9 7.5 4.5
Developing Asia 6.0 9.1 7.2 6.9 7.3
Notes: Developing Asia refers to 44 developing member countries of the Asian Development Bank 
and Brunei Darussalam, an unclassified regional member; East Asia comprises the People’s Republic 
of China; Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea; Mongolia; and Taipei,China; Southeast Asia 
comprises Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam; South Asia comprises Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka;  
(continued on the next page)
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                                                       Table 2 Inflation (% per year)
Subregion/Economy 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Central Asia 5.9 7.0 9.0 7.2 7.3
Azerbaijan 1.5 5.7 7.9 9.0 8.5
Kazakhstan 7.3 7.1 8.3 6.5 6.8
East Asia -0.1 3.1 5.0 3.7 3.7
China, People’s Rep. of -0.7 3.3 5.4 4.0 4.0
Hong Kong, China 0.6 2.3 5.3 3.8 3.3
Korea, Rep. of 2.8 3.0 4.0 3.0 3.0
Taipei,China -0.9 1.0 1.4 1.5 1.6
South Asia 5.2 9.4 9.4 7.7 6.9
Bangladesh 6.7 7.3 8.8 11.0 8.5
India 3.8 9.6 9.0 7.0 6.5
Pakistan 17.0 10.1 13.7 12.0 10.0
Sri Lanka 3.5 6.2 6.7 8.0 7.0
Southeast Asia 2.7 4.1 5.5 4.4 4.4
Indonesia 4.8 5.1 5.4 5.5 5.0
Malaysia 0.6 1.7 3.2 2.4 2.8
Philippines 4.2 3.8 4.8 3.7 4.1
Singapore 0.6 2.8 5.2 3.0 2.5
Thailand -0.9 3.3 3.8 3.4 3.3
Viet Nam 6.9 9.2 18.6 9.5 11.5
The Pacific 5.3 5.5 8.6 6.6 5.4
Fiji 3.7 7.8 8.7 5.1 3.0
Papua New Guinea 6.9 6.0 8.7 7.0 6.0
Developing Asia 1.4 4.4 5.9 4.6 4.4
(continued from the previous page)
Central Asia comprises Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan; and The Pacific comprises the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Republic of 
the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Palau, 
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. 
Data for Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan are recorded on a fiscal-year basis. For India, the fiscal year 
spans the current year’s April through the next year’s March. For Bangladesh and Pakistan, the fiscal 
year spans the previous year’s July through the current year’s June. 
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Maintaining growth in an 
uncertain world
This chapter was written by Arief Ramayandi, Martin Bodenstein, Benno Ferrarini, 
Shikha Jha, Minsoo Lee, Donghyun Park, Pilipinas Quising, Changyong Rhee, Lea 
Sumulong, Akiko Terada-Hagiwara, and Joseph E. Zveglich, Jr. of the Economics 
and Research Department, ADB, Manila. Background materials from Steven Beck are 
gratefully acknowledged.
In 2011, the world’s recovery from the 2008–2009 global financial 
crisis proceeded in fits and starts. The cautious optimism expressed by 
pundits in the early part of the year gave way to warnings of a “double 
dip” by midyear.
First, March’s earthquake and nuclear disaster in Japan devastated 
its already faltering economy. Then the sovereign debt crisis in the 
eurozone periphery erupted, generating inadequate responses that were 
unable to convince financial markets that the situation would not get 
out of hand. Finally, partisan brinksmanship in the United 
States (US) over the national debt ceiling led to the first-ever 
loss of the triple-A rating on its long-term sovereign credit.
In the early months of 2012, caution rather than optimism 
is the more dominant sentiment for global prospects. The 
workout of Greece’s sovereign debt in March 2012 did not 
convince investors that the crisis was fully resolved, as 
evidenced by continued elevated credit default spreads for 
other eurozone countries (Figure 1.1.1).
Developing Asia is feeling the weight of these weaknesses 
among the major industrial countries. Yet it has managed 
to grow, steadily. The worst of the global crisis may be past, 
but as 2011 demonstrated, policy makers need to be prepared 
for any eventuality. But the appropriate policy response is 
less clear than in the financial crisis years, given the current 
uncertain environment.
1.1.1 Ten-year US dollar-denominated credit default swaps 
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Steady growth amid global 
weakness
With sustained impulse from the major industrial economies unlikely for 
some time to come, economic growth in developing Asia will depend on 
its capacity to strengthen domestic demand and deepen trade ties with 
other fast-growing economies. Policy makers will need to navigate risks of 
commodity price spikes and volatile capital flows. But more importantly, 
they need to follow the only half-resolved eurozone debt problems closely, 
and be ready to act.
Major industrial economies: Erratic recovery
The disappointing growth performance of the major industrial countries 
in 2011, when growth of gross domestic product (GDP) fell to 1.2%, is 
expected to extend further into 2012 and even 2013 (Table 1.1.1). Fiscal 
consolidation efforts and weak private domestic demand growth will 
remain a drag on them. Japan’s recovery from the March disaster has been 
uninspiring and developments overseas have also slowed the economy. In 
Europe, woes from the eurozone’s sovereign debt crisis have given rise to a 
1.1.1 Baseline assumptions for the international economy
2010
Actual
2011
Actual
2012
ADO 2012 
projection
2013
ADO 2012 
projection
GDP growth (%)
Major industrial economies a 2.8 1.2 1.1 1.7
United States 3.0 1.7 2.0 2.3
Eurozone 1.9 1.4 -0.5 1.0
Japan 4.4 -0.7 1.9 1.5
World trade (% change)
Merchandise exports 14.5 5.8 3.8 5.4
Prices and inflation
Brent crude spot prices (average, US$ per barrel) 79.6 110.9 111.0 106.0
Energy price index (2005=100, % change) 26.4 29.9 3.1 -3.1
Food index (2005=100, % change) 8.9 23.9 -9.0 5.0
CPI inflation (major industrial economy 
average, %)
1.2 2.4 1.6 1.8
Interest rates
United States Federal funds rate (average, %) 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
European Union refinancing rate (average, %) 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.0
Japan interest rate (average, %) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
US$ Libor b (%) 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3
CPI = consumer price index.
a Average growth rates are weighted by gross national income, Atlas method (current US dollars). 
b Average interbank quotations on 1-month loans.
Sources: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, http://www.bea.gov; Eurostat, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu; Economic and Social Research Institute of Japan, http://www.esri.cao.
go.jp; World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org; Consensus Forecasts; Bloomberg; International 
Monetary Fund, Primary Commodity Prices, http://www.imf.org; World Bank, Global Commodity Markets, 
http://www.worldbank.org; ADB estimates.
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renewed recession. Positive news for these economies has come 
only from the US, which seems to have overcome a soft patch 
at the start of 2011 with late-year momentum expected to carry 
forward further into 2012. Yet even there, growth prospects are 
modest for the next 2 years.
The expansion in world trade (measured by merchandise 
exports) is expected to be modest, at around 3.8% in 2012, 
before picking up to 5.4% in 2013. Weak demand in several key 
economies remains the main factor in the slow growth. The 
anxieties felt after the global crisis hit, that economies would 
resort to protectionist measures, have largely quieted.
Looking at each economy in turn, budget cuts will strongly 
affect the US outlook. While the recovery in private demand 
will be able to offset them, it still lacks the momentum to take 
growth back up to precrisis rates. The housing market, though, is 
turning in some good news, as housing starts and permits have 
started to rise.
Against this, the unemployment rate is staying stubbornly 
high (Figure 1.1.2), despite some decline, and high household 
debt is crimping private consumption spending. Similarly, firms 
are reluctant to invest, given the modest growth outlook and 
significant spare production capacity. Still, inflation appears 
set to stay low and stable, suggesting that the Federal Reserve 
is unlikely to change the direction of monetary policy over the 
forecast period.
The eurozone, where GDP contracted in the last quarter of 
2011, is the main global concern. Political controversy about the 
right approach to resolve the sovereign debt crisis (discussed 
in detail in Box 1.2.1, below), an interest rate increase by the 
European Central Bank (ECB) in July, as well as deep fiscal cuts 
across the bloc, all played a role. 
In 2012, the eurozone is on course to see recession because 
of the implementation of fiscal consolidation measures, although 
with major differences among countries. The expected loss 
in momentum is reflected in softening industrial confidence 
(Figure 1.1.3). In sharp contrast to 2011, however, the ECB, by 
bringing interest rates back down and pumping about €1 trillion 
into eurozone banks, has removed doubts about its willingness 
and ability to act as lender of last resort, easing the impact of 
political disagreement among member countries on the course of 
the debt crisis.
In Japan, although reconstruction efforts started to be 
felt in the second half of 2011, supply-chain disruptions after 
Thailand’s floods in August–November 2011, a persistently strong 
yen (Figure 1.1.4), and faltering foreign demand contributed to 
stymie any real improvement in macroeconomic conditions.
Japan’s 2012 performance should be somewhat better because 
of the low base last year (when the economy contracted) and 
continued reconstruction expenditure. Growth will taper off to 
1.5% in 2013, which is close to the economy’s potential growth 
rate, as no further supplementary budgets are likely.
1.1.2 Unemployment, United States 
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1.1.3 Economic sentiment index and subindexes, eurozone 
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1.1.4 Exchange rate indexes, Japan
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Growth in developing Asia: 
Moderating, but persistent
Developing Asia started to feel the impact of the most recent 
global slowdown late in 2011. Its growth moderated to 7.2% 
for the full year—down from the post–global financial crisis 
rebound of 9.1%. This was partly the effect of the higher 
base after the strong growth in 2010, but also the impact of 
normalizing fiscal and monetary policy. This moderating 
trend is expected to continue into the near future, taking 
regional growth to 6.9% in 2012, before it picks up to 7.3% in 
2013 (Figure 1.1.5). Domestic private demand is driving growth, 
helping narrow current account surpluses, while inflation 
pressures are currently in check.
Importance of private domestic demand
As the global recovery seemed to be taking hold in late 
2010 and early 2011, authorities in developing Asia began to 
normalize monetary and fiscal policy. Consequently, the effects 
of the policy stimulus—launched to cushion the global crisis 
impacts—dissipated, and the role of domestic private demand 
became more important in driving developing Asia.
However, the slowdown in the major industrial countries in 
mid-2011 (especially the heightened uncertainty emanating from 
the eurozone) and the deteriorating terms of trade from elevated 
oil prices helped slow the region’s growth. As a result, the engines 
of growth in 2011 were not as uniform and robust as those in 
2010. Among 10 leading economies, which account for 93% of 
the region’s output, investment’s contribution to growth dropped 
sharply in seven (Figure 1.1.6).
Investment weakened sharply toward end-2011, weighing 
on the outlook for the coming quarters, particularly in open 
economies such as Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea; 
Malaysia; Taipei,China; and Thailand. The fading contribution 
of investments in 2011 is characterized by inventory destocking 
in four out of six economies (Figure 1.1.7), a trend that resembles 
the path in the immediate postcrisis year.
Assuming that the global economy gradually picks up toward 
end-2012, private investment and restocking of inventories are 
expected to drive capital formation this year, though moderately. 
(In Thailand, it will be public investment, to support post-flood 
reconstruction.) The PRC economy is set to make a soft landing 
after growth averaged above 10% in the 5 years 2007–2011—
steadily declining credit growth suggests investment will likely 
moderate—unless the authorities push through a further stimulus 
to mitigate the effects of the decline in trade.
Backed by the steady improvement in labor markets, 
however, private consumption appeared to hold up well in 2011, 
albeit to a lesser degree. Unlike the previous year, it became the 
one common growth driver in 2011.
Up-to-date unemployment data are sparse, but among nine 
1.1.5 GDP growth, developing Asia
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1.1.6 GDP growth, developing Asia
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1.1.7 Contribution to growth in investments
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East and Southeast Asian economies, unemployment has declined 
to closer to pre–global crisis rates, if not below (Figure 1.1.8). While 
rising real wages in some countries may continue lifting consumer 
sentiment a little, the chances appear slim.
Indeed, retail sales—showing signs of deceleration in four 
economies in East Asia that account for around two-thirds of 
developing Asia’s GDP—suggest that private consumption may 
slow this year (Figure 1.1.9). Of the nine economies, relatively bright 
spots for retail sales are in Southeast Asia: Indonesia and Viet Nam 
are forecast to maintain growth this year and to accelerate further 
next year. Thailand showed a sharp deterioration in retail sales 
after the devastating flooding, but is expected to join the relatively 
resilient economies of the subregion this year in recovery. Other 
more open economies in Southeast Asia, however—Malaysia and 
Singapore—may follow the East Asian economies.
Varying growth drivers across subregions
From the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 
through the initial stages of the global recovery in 2010, external 
factors generally dominated developing Asia’s outlook such that 
countries and subregions largely moved in sync. In contrast, 
2011 has seen general factors give way to country-specific factors 
driving the outlook.
As external demand has swung less widely—although it is 
still softer than before the global crisis—country- or subregion-
specific shocks are playing an important role, leading to 
variation among economic trends at those levels. Factors include 
natural disasters, the availability of resources, and the strength 
of domestic demand.
The deteriorating global outlook in the second half of 2011 
affected directly the contribution to growth of net exports and 
indirectly investment and consumption. The deteriorating terms 
of trade from elevated oil prices also contributed (Figure 1.1.10). 
East Asia’s vulnerability to slowing external demand—especially 
from major industrialized countries—is well illustrated by the 
Republic of Korea’s slump. That country’s growth rate in 2011 
fell by a full percentage point below what had been forecast but 
consistent with altered expectations concerning the eurozone, 
the US, and Japanese economies. Investment was flat, as 
businesses and investors became much more cautious. Despite 
the uncertain global context, exports increased by 20% and 
accounted for more than 50% of GDP growth.
This is generally the storyline for all five countries in East 
Asia. In some cases negative net exports (e.g., the PRC) or a 
narrowing of a positive net export position (Hong Kong, China) 
are seen. In Taipei,China, a sharp drop in the growth of exports 
was more than offset by an even bigger drop in import growth. 
East Asia’s exports of goods and services, or the buildup for a surge 
in exports, as with Mongolia’s mining sector, were—and remain—the 
dominant factor in growth. East Asia’s growth projections for 2012 and 2013 
rest importantly on the outlook for external demand.
1.1.8 Unemployment
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1.1.9 Retail sales
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1.1.10 Terms of trade, East and Southeast Asia
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1.1.11 GDP growth, by subregion
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East Asia’s growth will moderate to 7.4% in 2012 but will 
still lead the other subregions (Figure 1.1.11). An uptick to 7.7% 
is forecast for 2013. Growth for the PRC is forecast to moderate 
to 8.5% and 8.7% in the next 2 years (though this still exceeds 
the growth envisaged in the 12th Five-Year Plan). Hong Kong, 
China; the Republic of Korea; and Taipei,China are all expected 
to experience continued growth below their potential growth, 
which for these countries is in the range of 4–5%.
In Southeast Asia, GDP growth decelerated to 4.6% in 
2011, hard hit by weakened export markets (as in East Asia), 
domestic policy tightening, and natural disasters disrupting 
trade and production—only partly redeemed by strong growth 
in the largest economy, Indonesia. Rising inflation in the first half of 2011 
prompted monetary policy tightening in most countries. Furthermore, 
fiscal stimulus instituted during the global recession continued to be 
withdrawn in several countries. In particular, government outlays fell 
steeply in the Philippines, in part because an introduction of governance 
reforms delayed decisions and disbursements, hurting GDP growth.
Growth in Southeast Asia is seen picking up to 5.2% for 2012 and to 
5.7% in 2013. The pickup in 2012 largely reflects recovery in Thailand from 
major flooding as growth rebounds from 0.1% in 2011 to 5.5% in 2012. The 
Philippines will also contribute by picking up from bouts of weakness last 
year in electronics and government investment. Indonesia will continue 
its solid performance, expanding by 6.4% in 2012 and 6.7% in 2013. 
Economies in Southeast Asia would generally benefit for much of 2012 
from space for easing monetary policies, and fiscal stimulus if 
global trade and financial conditions deteriorate further. Still, 
slowing world trade and international financial uncertainties will 
damp economic activity, notably in trade-dependent Malaysia and 
Singapore, where growth is set to slow this year.
For South Asia, growth in 2011 fell sharply to 6.4% from 7.8% 
in 2010. The fall was largely determined by the marked slowdown 
in India where growth fell to 6.9% from 8.4% in 2010, mainly 
reflecting its marked monetary tightening in the face of persistent 
inflation and slumping investment. Growth in Pakistan declined 
in 2011 because of disastrous flooding, although Bangladesh and 
Sri Lanka did well on brisk exports.
South Asia will see growth improve a shade in 2012 to 6.6%. 
The pace of India’s growth is projected to edge up to 7.0% in 2012 
and 7.5% in 2013, providing most of the lift for subregional growth 
to reach 7.1% in 2013. Despite recovery from flooding, Pakistan’s growth will 
advance only slightly in both years as electricity will remain a bottleneck 
on the supply side. Growth in Bangladesh is expected to be limited to about 
6%, well below the government’s objective, as policies will need to contain 
inflation and a deterioration in the balance of payments. 
In Central Asia, growth declined in 2011 to 6.2% from 6.6% in 2010, 
as a drop in oil production led to virtually zero growth in Azerbaijan, 
where closure of one of its three oil platforms for safety reasons caused a 
drop in oil output. Yet six of the eight countries saw higher growth, on 
continued economic recovery in the Russian Federation and the US, plus 
stronger eurozone demand for commodities. For Kazakhstan, the economy 
Maintaining growth in an uncertain world  9
expanded by 7.5% as a steep rise in natural gas exports offset a decline in oil 
production, and good weather more than doubled its grain output.
Central Asia should just about keep up the momentum at 6.1% in 
2012 and 6.2% in 2013. This year’s outturn reflects the combination of a 
weak eurozone and slower growth in the Russian Federation, offset by a 
bounceback in growth in Azerbaijan. In 2013, a more favorable outlook for 
the global economy, including the Russian Federation, is expected to raise 
growth rates in five countries, balanced by declining growth in three.
Pacific countries are quite insulated from events in the eurozone. Robust 
expansion in the resource-exporting economies of Papua New Guinea 
(accounting for roughly half of Pacific GDP), Timor-Leste, and Solomon 
Islands, and strong growth in the tourism-oriented economies of Cook 
Islands, Fiji, Palau, and Vanuatu, lifted subregional growth to 7.0% in 2011—
making this the only subregion to post faster growth in 2011 than 2010.
Yet the Pacific is forecast to slow to 6.0% and 4.1% over the next 
2 years due to lower resource export revenue, the winding 
down of infrastructure projects that stimulated growth in 2011 
(Papua New Guinea, the Marshall Islands, and Vanuatu), lower 
international agricultural prices, and flooding impacts (Fiji). 
While tourism is expected to continue to support growth, 
remittances are not expected to recover in the near future in 
view of the weak economic outlook.
Narrowing current account surplus
Developing Asia’s current account surplus continued 
narrowing, to 2.6% of GDP in 2011 from 4.0% the previous year. 
Contributing factors were a moderation in demand for exports 
and the upward impact on imports of solid domestic demand 
and higher prices for imported oil and commodities. The 
surplus is expected to decline further in 2012 to 1.9% of GDP, 
marking the combined impact of most regional economies’ continued 
growth in demand for consumer and capital imports and of soft global 
demand for exports (Figure 1.1.12).
Global imbalances further widened as a share of global GDP in 2011, 
though they remain well below their precrisis peaks (Figure 1.1.13). On the 
deficit side, the rise in saving and fall in investment in the US 
was offset by the widening deficit in major eurozone economies.
On the surplus side, resource-rich economies in the Middle 
East as well as the Russian Federation expanded their current 
account surpluses, backed by the surges in oil and commodity 
prices. Although declining as a share of its own GDP, 
developing Asia’s robust growth increased the relative size of 
the region such that it continued to account for about half the 
global current account surplus (1.6% of world GDP) in 2011.
This suggests, then, that efforts for structural adjustments 
in various sectors are needed. With a more favorable growth 
outlook vis-à-vis the US, eurozone, and Japan, developing Asia 
could take the opportunity of further strengthening its domestic 
policies to support the structural adjustments toward a better 
balance between domestic and external demand, leading to more 
sustainable growth.
1.1.12 Current accounts, developing Asia
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Inflation subdued—but oil could give a nasty shock
The recent rising trend in global commodity prices is expected to pause, 
tempering inflationary pressures (Box 1.1.1). Despite the recent surge in 
crude oil prices driven by Middle East political instability, the average 
oil price is forecast at $111 per barrel in 2012, roughly its 2011 average.
Continued slow recovery in industrial countries and decelerating economic 
growth in emerging economies will damp growth in oil demand.
In 2013, oil prices are forecast to diminish a little to $106 per barrel.
Although staying high, food prices are projected to decline in 2012 and 
2013 from their 2011 peak, reflecting improved supply prospects and weak 
demand growth.
Across subregions, higher food and fuel prices drove up 
inflation in developing Asia to 5.9% in 2011 from 4.4% in 2010 
(Figure 1.1.14). In Central Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific, 
average inflation rates reached around 9% in 2011 while it was 
more moderate in East and Southeast Asia, where inflation 
continued to be contained at around 5%. Among the five 
subregions, though still at a relatively higher level at 9.4%, South 
Asia was the only subregion that managed to avoid the hike last 
year. This was due to India’s sustained monetary tightening (at 
a cost to economic growth) to combat persistent high inflation, 
which damped inflation from 9.6% in 2010 to 9% 2011 and 
managed to offset the climb in Maldives and Pakistan.
In Central Asia during 2011, average inflation increased 
from 7.0% in 2010 to 9.0%. Prices climbed faster in every 
country except Armenia, where monetary tightening and an 
improved harvest restrained them. The increases were especially sharp in 
the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, where spikes in food prices during 
the first half of the year caused average inflation rates roughly to double. 
For the Pacific, the rise in inflation in Papua New Guinea and Timor-
Leste drove up the subregional average from 5.5% to 8.6% in 2011.
For East Asia as a whole, inflation was 5% in 2011, up from 3.1% in 2010. 
The rebound of growth in East Asia in 2010, tying over into the early part 
of 2011, alongside rising food, oil, and other commodity prices, sparked 
the inflation resurgence. Highly accommodative monetary policies and the 
residue of fiscal stimulus were other factors. Likewise in Southeast Asia, 
higher food and fuel prices drove up inflation to 5.5% from 4.1%. Average 
inflation exceeded 5% in half the 10 countries.
Inflation in developing Asia is set to recede as economic 
activity softens. Assuming relatively steady global oil prices and 
easing food prices in 2012, regional average inflation is forecast 
to slow to 4.6%. Besides the external price developments, 
domestic policies may play a role in, for example, South Asia, 
where some reduction in heavy fuel and power subsidies are 
expected, and will set a floor for any reduction in inflation. For 
2013, further deceleration is expected in South Asia and the 
Pacific, while other subregions are seen continuing flat, taking 
the regional average down to 4.4% (Figure 1.1.15).
Still, policy makers cannot take this favorable trend in 
inflation for granted, and among the three main risks to the 
outlook, the risk of a spike in inflation looms.
1.1.15 Inflation by subregion
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Risks to the outlook
Commodity price spikes
Despite the nominal heights discussed above, commodity prices are well 
below their 1970s’ real terms levels—even the 2007–2008 price spike failed 
to take them back. Recent price volatility, though, as measured by the 
standard deviation of price movements, is higher. Indeed, commodity 
prices are becoming more volatile and, as such, disruptive, heavily affecting 
poor households (too many subsidies are mistargeted or are slow to come 
into play), as well as low-income countries that are heavy food and fuel 
importers.
Commodity price spikes by themselves will not produce 
sustained inflation, but they can hinder economic growth by raising 
macroeconomic vulnerability, eroding producer profits, or hitting 
household incomes. With non-OPEC oil supply providing little cushion 
to total supply (and the ever-present possibility of unplanned outages), 
the relatively benign view of near-term oil price movements could switch 
overnight if geopolitical tensions blow up. For food, market sentiment is 
affected not so much by low production prospects but more by 
uncertainty on the sufficiency of supply to meet ever-increasing 
demand under extreme weather disturbances. 
Food price spikes as well are a key risk to the inflation 
outlook, given the weight of food in the region’s consumer 
price indexes. In addition to the knock-on effects of oil price 
movements, natural disasters—the frequency of which has 
multiplied 10-fold between 1960 and 2010—play havoc on food 
price expectations. With greater uncertainty about the sufficiency 
of supply to meet ever-increasing demand under extreme weather 
disturbances, market sentiments can shift abruptly.
Volatile capital flows
Investor uncertainty over the advanced economies’ recovery 
prospects intensified capital-flow volatility—capital tends to 
flee the region when global risk aversion intensifies, and to 
return when it eases. Inflows to Asia rebounded strongly after 
their huge drop during the last global economic downturn 
(Figure 1.1.16), but the movements are erratic.
The trend slowed in the first 3 quarters of 2010, then surged 
again through the first half of 2011. This pickup was driven 
by huge increase in net inflows of currency and deposits 
(Figure 1.1.17), as regional policy makers raised interest rates to 
deal with inflationary pressures. But the worsening debt crisis 
in Europe and the downgrade by Standard and Poor’s of US 
long-term sovereign credit rating in the third quarter of 2011 
caused investor sentiment to swing. As investors became much 
more risk averse, net capital inflows to the region plunged 
(though just stayed positive).
Trends vary among the countries of developing Asia. 
Flows to the PRC—with its high inflows of FDI—tend to 
dominate regional figures. Although trends in the components 
contributing to the net inflows are similar, the spike in the 
1.1.16 Semiannual capital flows, emerging Asia
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Recent oil price movements
Wide gyrations characterized the oil price path in 2011. 
The promise of a firming global recovery in the early part 
of the year led to an initial spike, but prices fell back as 
the optimism faded. Political instability in the Middle East 
clouded oil supply expectations, adding further volatility to 
prices. The spot-market price of Brent crude ended the year 
14% higher than it began it, averaging $111 a barrel for the 
year. The annual average price far exceeded the previous 
record of $98 set in 2008—the year of the inflating and 
bursting of the oil price bubble. 
The first quarter of 2012 has seen another spike in 
prices, of more than 15% (Box figure 1). Oil futures prices 
have been as volatile as spot prices, amid heightened 
political and economic tensions.
Supply factors drive oil price volatility
Supply-side constraints are the primary factors behind 
the recent upsurge in oil prices. Supply interruptions have 
surfaced in South Sudan, Yemen, Syria, and Libya. Conflict 
has exacerbated the existing tight supply conditions by 
creating geopolitical nervousness. Moreover, the output of 
Iran, the world’s third-largest crude oil exporter, has fallen 
to a 10-year low, crippled by US sanctions against financial 
institutions that deal with Iran. It may fall further as the EU 
embargo on Iranian oil imports takes full effect by mid-2012.
Spare capacity is quite tight. According to the International 
Energy Agency, Saudi Arabia’s was only 1.9 million barrels per 
day (mb/d) in February 2012, against 11.9 mb/d of declared 
capacity. More widely, OPEC’s spare oil production capacity 
declined to an average of 2.8 mb/d in the first 2 months of 
2012 from an average of 4.5 million for the same period a 
year earlier. 
In mid-March, the agency lowered its full-year 2012 
non-OPEC production forecast from 0.9 mb/d to 0.73 mb/d. 
Strategic petroleum reserves have not been used to mitigate 
supply constraints as countries such as France, Germany, 
and the US are trying to boost (or maintain) their reserves. 
Moreover, output of the petroleum substitute, ethanol, is on 
the decline.
Despite this, supply conditions are expected to improve in 
2012. Global oil supply is projected to rise by about 2 mb/d, 
more from OPEC than non-OPEC countries. Saudi Arabia 
has increased its production to counter the reduction from 
other countries, and its output is at a 30-year high, though 
this comes at the expense of further squeezes on spare 
capacity. Libyan output is rapidly recovering to prewar levels. 
Output is also expected to rise in Angola, Iraq, and Nigeria, 
as tensions ease there. Many producing countries are adopting 
modern technology to extract more oil from the fields. These 
changes should counter shortages arising from Iran.
Demand factors dominate the oil price outlook
Oil demand had been picking up in 2010 as the world 
economy bounced back from the trough of the global 
economic crisis, but slowed sharply in 2011 to only 0.8% 
growth. Soft demand in advanced economies affected 
commodity demand directly and indirectly by tempering the 
growth of emerging markets (and hence their energy demand). 
1.1.1 Key commodity price trends and prospects
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total net capital inflows was not observed elsewhere in Asia 
(Figure 1.1.18). Further, driven by massive portfolio outflows, 
net capital inflows to developing Asia (excluding the PRC) 
dived deep into a negative territory in the third quarter of 2011 
as global risk aversion intensified. Some slowing indication in 
the strength of the net capital inflows was also apparent for the 
PRC, particularly due to much slower inflows of portfolio and 
other investments (the more volatile part of capital inflows).
Given the likely prolonged period of loose monetary policy 
in the major industrial countries, an easing of global risk 
aversion could cause another round of strong capital flows to 
developing Asia. This could complicate regional policy makers’ 
efforts by once again stoking inflation and pressuring exchange 
rate appreciation. Yet the risk of sudden and massive outflows 
also remains if global risk aversion becomes acute. Such an 
1.1.18 Net capital flows, PRC and other emerging Asia
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So while prices are expected to remain elevated above $100 per 
barrel in 2012 and 2013 because of the relatively tight supply 
conditions, soft demand will suppress oil price growth.
The oil price is expected to remain around its 2011 level 
in 2012 (about $111 per barrel), slipping to $106 in 2013 
(Table 1.1.1 above), as continued soft demand growth in the 
major industrial countries and some increase in supply eases 
market conditions a little.
Recent food price developments
Food is usually the main contributor to agricultural price 
movements (Box figure 2). Generally flat after the collapse in 
2008, prices surged in 2011 to average 24% more than a year 
earlier. Although slowing by year-end, the benchmark food 
price index of the World Bank lingered at levels seen in the 
2008 peak, especially after the pickup in early 2012.
Grain prices (including corn, rice, and wheat) led other 
food prices. From the third quarter of 2011 corn and wheat 
prices retreated, reflecting improved supply from better 
weather. Rice prices, however, gained strength, mainly due 
to policy changes in Thailand, the world’s top exporter. 
Rice prices rose in July as Thai farmers withheld rice from 
the export market following a 
government pledge to pay farmers 
above the market rate. International 
prices then stayed firm as the 
government implemented the policy 
in early October. 
This, coupled with the harmful 
effects of floods in several countries 
in Southeast Asia (including 
Thailand itself and Viet Nam) 
supported rice prices. On the 
other hand, India relaxed export 
restrictions, which helped check 
price increases.
Food price prospects
The food price pickup in early 2012 stemmed from worries 
about poor weather in South America and Europe, renewing 
concerns about food security: March 2012’s food price index 
was barely 6% below its February 2011 peak. Notwithstanding 
elevated and volatile prices in the short term, the full-year 
projection for 2012 shows a more comfortable picture.
According to the February 2012 World Agricultural Supply 
and Demand Estimates of the US Department of Agriculture, 
global production and stocks are generally stronger as 
harvests of major cereals are at record levels. Increased 
production of wheat is expected from major exporters 
(Australia, Canada, and EU-27), as well as from smaller 
producers. Corn production is also projected to increase. 
India, Pakistan, the PRC, and Egypt are expected to produce 
more rice, developing Asia’s major staple crop. 
Taken together, food prices in 2012 are projected to decline 
by 9% from 2011’s levels on improved supply prospects and 
weak demand growth resulting from slowdowns in emerging 
and advanced economies. But a pickup in demand in 2013 
should lead prices to rebound somewhat.
1.1.1 (continued)
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event could squeeze international capital markets and local financial 
systems, sharply undercutting economic activity.
The biggest shadow: How will the eurozone debt crisis play out?
Even with developing Asia’s growing weight in the world economy, the 
global crisis offered a vivid reminder of the region’s vulnerability to 
the major industrial economies’ downturns. And just a few years after 
that crisis, developing Asia now faces another major external threat to 
its growth—this time from Europe. The sovereign debt crisis afflicting 
Greece and other eurozone economies is the single biggest downside risk 
to the current global outlook. If the worst case materializes, is developing 
Asia in a position to counteract the effects?
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Eurozone uncertainties and 
developing Asia
The eurozone sovereign debt crisis still awaits a fundamental 
resolution, despite signs of progress made by the key players—
the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and its 
planned replacement, the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM), and the European Central Bank (ECB) (Box 1.2.1). As 
agreement was reached on an orderly solution for Greece’s 
debt, the immediate risk of disorderly default appears to be 
receding, and with it, the risk that the situation could morph 
into full-fledged financial instability, in tandem with a global 
liquidity crisis.
Almost all member countries of the eurozone have adopted 
fiscal austerity measures, to secure fiscal sustainability in the 
bloc and to affirm their long-term commitment to the euro. 
These measures, coupled with banks’ moves to repair their 
balance sheets, have changed the nature of the eurozone’s 
problems from immediate crisis and financial instability to 
protracted, feeble growth.
For developing Asia, the nature of the primary risk has 
changed as well, from financial contagion to slower export 
growth. The eurozone—and the EU more broadly—is an 
important trade partner for the region and a major source of 
its FDI and other capital inflows. As discussed throughout this 
part of Asian Development Outlook 2012, the on-off nature of 
the euro crisis has been a factor in developing Asia’s slower 
growth in 2011 and is clouding its near-term outlook.
Although continued weakness in the eurozone has been 
factored into the forecasts, what if the situation worsens? 
Examining the nature of developing Asia’s finance and 
trade links with the eurozone will help identify where the 
vulnerabilities lie.
Vulnerability to finance and trade shocks 
from the eurozone
Developing Asia is in a good position to withstand another 
external shock. Foreign exchange reserves exceed the 3-month 
import coverage rule of thumb in almost all economies 
(Figure 1.2.1). For the PRC, the figure is a whopping 20 months. 
Taipei,China as well has reserves equivalent to more than a 
year’s worth of imports. The global crisis had little impact 
on these levels, and most economies—except for India, the 
Republic of Korea, and Viet Nam—have maintained or further 
bolstered their reserves since then.
1.2.1 Foreign exchange reserves, selected developing Asian 
economies, 2007 and 2011
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1.2.2 Short-term debt-to-reserves ratio, selected developing 
Asian economies
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External debt indicators in developing Asia are also quite 
low (Figure 1.2.2). For most economies, short-term debt is less 
than 30% of foreign exchange reserves, and as low as 11% in 
the Philippines and 16% in the PRC. The exceptions are Hong 
Kong, China (250%) and Singapore (200%)—the region’s global 
financial hubs—as well as the Republic of Korea (46%) and 
Viet Nam (58%). Similarly, other than the two financial centers, 
external debt is low as a share of GDP (Figure 1.2.3). Further, 
the ratios of both short-term external debt to reserves and of 
external debt to GDP have fallen in several countries from 
their precrisis levels in 2007. The low external debt exposure—
particularly short-term debt—shows that the region is well 
placed to see out a temporary credit crunch.
Looking at some standard indicators of banking soundness, 
developing Asia’s commercial banks—the largest component 
of its finance sector—are generally strong. Risk-weighted 
capital-adequacy ratios ranged from 11.8% in PRC to 20.4% in 
Armenia (Figure 1.2.4) (versus an average of 15.5% in the US 
and 17–18% in Brazil and the Russian Federation). The region’s 
banks also generally have low rates of nonperforming loans. In 
Hong Kong, China and Taipei,China, less than 1% of loans are 
nonperforming (Figure 1.2.5). The average for the region is about 
4%, similar to levels in the US.
Yet the 2008–2009 global crisis demonstrated that a strong 
enough shock emanating from the major industrial countries can still 
have heavy consequences for developing Asia’s stability.
1.2.3 External debt-to-GDP ratio, selected developing Asian 
economies
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1.2.4 Risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio, selected 
developing Asian economies, 2011
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1.2.5 Bank nonperforming loans to total loans ratio, 
selected developing Asian economies, 2011
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The eurozone sovereign debt crisis was a constant theme in 
2011, keeping global financial markets on edge. High-level 
meetings among European policy makers, and with their US 
counterparts and IMF representatives, were all too frequent, 
but the markets usually felt the outcomes were inadequate, 
as reflected in rising bond yield spreads (Box figure 1). 
Whenever fears about a Greek default or a contagion to 
Spain or Italy intensified, European policy makers were 
forced to embrace increasingly bold measures.
By the beginning of 2012, Greek government debt had 
been restructured successfully and the European banking 
system granted enough liquidity to weather additional market 
turmoil and to satisfy the refinancing needs of the large and 
vulnerable Spanish and Italian economies.
In addition, the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF) has been strengthened, and fiscal austerity measures 
are to be implemented to help guarantee the euro’s long-term 
sustainability. Starting mid-2012, the EFSF will be replaced 
1.2.1 Palliatives not permanence for the eurozone crisis
If, in this instance, the eurozone crisis were to worsen, with a 
consequent tightening in global credit conditions, there could be 
knock-on effects to the region’s banking system, but the impact may 
be moderate. As has already occurred to some extent, eurozone 
banks would further cut bank lending abroad to repair balance sheets 
back home. This could affect developing Asia because eurozone is 
an important source of its foreign bank loans: its borrowings from 
eurozone banks amounted to around $440 billion in September 2011,
equivalent to 14% of the region’s total foreign bank financing, though the 
impact would also depend on how much an economy relies on external 
borrowing (Table 1.2.1).
East Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia get about 12–17% of their 
total foreign bank borrowings from eurozone banks, Central Asia and the 
Pacific around 50%. Just five economies—the PRC; Hong Kong, China; 
Bond yield spreads and key events in the eurozone crisis
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by the permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM), 
which will have €700 billion in its armory.
Although it was already apparent in the first half of 
2011 that Greece would need further funding and, possibly, 
debt relief, restructuring only saw the light of day in 2012. 
Germany and other northern European countries were 
seeking active private involvement while other countries 
demanded more support through the EFSF.
In March 2012, voluntary private sector participation in 
the restructuring of Greek government debt reached 95.7%. 
Thus about €197 billion of government debt held by private 
investors was exchanged into new bonds, reducing the net 
present value of its debt by €107 billion through reduced 
interest costs and deferred maturities.
Soon after the agreement with private debt holders was 
secured, the European Union approved the second bailout 
package for Greece, amounting to €109 billion from the 
EFSF. The IMF subsequently approved new support to Greece 
of €28 billion in March 2012 through its Extended Fund 
Facility, a mechanism designed for countries undertaking 
reforms to address deep-seated structural weaknesses, and 
disbursed €1.65 billion ($2.2 billion).
In light of the losses imposed on private bondholders, 
it will take time for Greece to regain access to bond 
markets. Until then, the country will depend on IMF/
EU loans. As Greece has fallen into a deep recession 
with high unemployment and few signs of improving 
its competitiveness, relationships with other European 
countries—who envisage pushing down Greek debt from 
164% of GDP in 2011 to 120.5% by 2020—will likely remain 
tense.
Over the year, pressure also built on Portugal, Spain, 
and Italy, but while news in March 2012 from Italy seems 
encouraging, that from Spain and Portugal appears more 
troublesome.
Plagued by stubbornly high budget deficits, Spain may 
experience increasing pressure from its eurozone partners to 
pursue stronger fiscal consolidation efforts. With the country 
already in recession, social and economic pressure will 
continue to build, making further consolidation politically 
difficult.
Portugal has been in a difficult economic situation for a 
long time. In April 2011, it lost access to financial markets 
and has received funding from the EFSF and the IMF since 
then. Portuguese government debt has been downgraded to 
junk status, as investors have become increasingly skeptical of 
the government’s ability to rein in its fiscal deficits.
Although the EFSF and ESM have received much 
attention in public discussion, the major player in this crisis 
has been the European Central Bank (ECB). As leveraging 
the EFSF has turned out to be difficult and direct debt 
purchases by the ECB were politically very controversial, the 
ECB moved toward its own version of quantitative easing to 
mitigate pressures in European sovereign debt markets and 
difficulties in the continent’s banking sector.
In its two, 3-year, long-term refinancing operations 
(LTROs), the ECB pumped about €1 trillion into the banking 
system, which narrowed interest-rate spreads on eurozone 
sovereign debt. While LTROs have always been part of the 
ECB’s monetary policy tool kit, repo auctions normally 
play the dominant role. The two LTROs in December 2011 
and February 2012 differ from earlier ones in their time 
period (3 years instead of 3 months) and the conduct of the 
bidding, as the ECB decided to fix the interest rate and leave 
the volume of the operation adjust to the liquidity demand. 
They have been successful—the credit default swap rates 
on European sovereign debts fell steeply after they were 
announced.
After going through many phases, no one is arguing 
the problems have been solved: a fundamental long-term 
solution to the euro crisis will require yet stronger political 
commitment from all member countries.
1.2.1 (continued) 
Republic of Korea; India, and Singapore—account for about three-fourths 
of developing Asia’s total borrowing from eurozone banks.
A better measure of vulnerability is the ratio of external bank 
borrowing to domestic credit because this gives an indication of the 
importance of outside financing in domestic financial intermediation. 
Borrowings from eurozone banks are equivalent to 4–8% of domestic 
credit in India; Indonesia; Republic of Korea; Taipei,China; the 
Philippines; and Viet Nam. The shares in Asia’s two major financial 
centers—Hong Kong, China and Singapore—are much higher.
Yet despite the likely financial impact, as in the 2008–2009 crisis, the 
main channel of impact will be trade—financial linkages between the 
eurozone and the region are indeed substantial, but pale in comparison 
to the extensive trade linkages.1 The eurozone is a major market for 
the region’s exports, accounting for 12.0% of the total—about the same 
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share as the US (12.5%). During the global downturn, the 
synchronized recession of the advanced economies had a 
pronounced effect on developing Asia’s exports (Figure 1.2.6), 
pulling back growth (Figure 1.2.7).
Yes, the region is shifting its exports from the major 
industrial economies: since 2005, developing Asia’s exports to 
the eurozone and US have declined from about 30% of the total 
to about 24% in 2011 (up to September). And it is strengthening 
trade ties with Latin America and Africa—but even combined 
they still only account for 7.1% of total exports. The contribution 
of regional demand to export growth, too, has increased, with 
intraregional trade rising from 39.5% to 42.1% between 2005 and 
2011, but a good portion of this is still a reflection of the cross-
border production networks rather than final goods. So while 
there has been a shift toward greater diversification in export 
destinations, the eurozone is still large enough to do damage to 
developing Asia.
The ratio of exports to the eurozone to GDP is another 
marker of developing Asia’s exposure to a recession in 
the eurozone. The ratio varies greatly across subregions 
(Figure 1.2.8). Exposure is higher for East and Southeast 
Asia than it is for the other subregions, reflecting those two 
subregions’ role as major exporters of manufactured goods. 
Export exposure to the eurozone (and the US) declined in 2005–
2010, pointing to its diminishing vulnerability to a eurozone 
slowdown.
The industrial composition of exports is another important 
factor. For example, the exports of East and Southeast Asia, 
Asia’s traditional manufacturing hubs, are heavily skewed 
1.2.1 Developing Asia’s borrowings from eurozone banks, September 2011
Region/Economy Amount ($ billion) Share by each region/
economy (%)
Share of borrowings from eurozone 
in total foreign bank borrowings
Borrowings from eurozone banks 
as share of domestic credit
Central Asia  13.3  3.0  49.2  -
East Asia  228.9  51.9  12.4  -
People’s Rep. of China  96.4  21.9  14.1  0.9
Hong Kong, China  63.8  14.5  9.8  12.4
Korea, Rep. of  44.0  10.0  13.0  4.1
Taipei,China  24.7  5.6  14.2  4.1
South Asia  60.4  13.7  17.2  -
India  57.5  13.0  17.9  4.4
Southeast Asia  114.8  26.0  14.3  -
Indonesia  18.8  4.3  16.2  6.6
Malaysia  10.2  2.3  7.0  3.0
Philippines  8.2  1.9  20.7  7.7
Singapore  63.6  14.4  16.9  27.4
Thailand  7.1  1.6  7.5  1.5
Viet Nam  6.4  1.5  26.2  4.6
The Pacific  23.5  5.3  49.8  -
Developing Asia  440.9  100.0  14.3  2.9
- = data not available.
Note: Data cover nine eurozone countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) with individual country data on 
developing Asia. Data for developing Asia in column 5 are based on the 11 economies with data.
Source: ADB calculations based on Table 9b (Consolidated foreign claims, immediate borrower basis), Bank for International Settlements and CEIC Data Company 
(both accessed 26 March 2012).
1.2.6 Growth of exports, developing Asia and major 
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1.2.7 GDP growth, selected developing Asian economies
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toward manufactured goods (97% and 82%, respectively) and 
hence more vulnerable to a eurozone recession (Figure 1.2.9). 
During the global crisis, highly open exporters of manufactured 
goods—such as the four newly industrialized economies, as well 
as Malaysia and Thailand—were hit harder than other groups of 
countries. 
The above data show that the eurozone is a key export 
market for Asia, and will remain so for the near future despite 
its declining share in recent years. But they also suggest that, 
as long as the slowdown is confined to the eurozone—and does 
not become a synchronized advanced-country recession—
developing Asia should be able to absorb the impact of lower 
export demand.
The risk, though, is that the current armistice in the 
eurozone sovereign debt crisis may be short-lived. If the shock 
to the eurozone periphery were to spread more broadly through 
financial markets there and push the eurozone further into 
recession, the global impacts would be much larger than the 
Asian Development Outlook’s global baseline assumptions. And 
if matters in the eurozone worsen to the extent of undermining 
global recovery, developing Asia’s policy makers will need to 
be ready to act quickly. Recent history shows that two areas in 
particular—global value chains and trade finance—interact with 
an external trade shock to intensify its impact.
Factors intensifying external shocks
Global value chains
The integration of emerging East and Southeast Asian economies 
and Japan in global value chains (GVCs)—the division of production 
processes among multiple firms and countries—helps explain the region’s 
vulnerability to external demand shocks (Box 1.2.2).2 Under this type 
of production framework, which predominate the global manufacture 
of durable goods such as electronics and automobiles, the volume of 
exports is magnified as components move multiple times across national 
boundaries before becoming final goods.
Because the import content of durable goods is larger than 
for nondurable goods and services, the rise of GVCs gives 
durable goods greater weight as a share of trade than their 
weight in GDP. One estimate shows that durable goods before 
the 2008–2009 global crisis had grown to almost 40% of trade, 
but amounted to only 10% of final demand.3 Since consumers 
tend to first cutback purchases of durables in a recession, the 
transmission of demand shocks along GVCs can induce a 
disproportionate drop in trade relative to GDP.
Trade finance
Trade finance, broadly speaking, includes various forms of 
short-term funding to facilitate international trade transactions. 
The majority of such finance involves transactions between 
1.2.8 Export exposure to the eurozone (% of GDP), 
developing Asia
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An implication of the rise of global value chains (GVCs) 
in the past few decades is that international trade is 
increasingly dominated by trade in tasks, which are 
embodied in intermediate goods crossing borders multiple 
times for further processing within the GVCs. Currently, 
trade in intermediate inputs accounts for roughly two-
thirds of international trade. GVCs have expanded 
asymmetrically across industries, predominantly emerging 
in durable goods such as electronics and automobiles.
East and Southeast Asian economies (including Japan) 
have taken on a key role in the GVCs of durable goods, 
effectively turning the region into the “factory of the 
world.” From 2000 to 2007, their share in world durable 
goods exports grew from 35% to 42%. The exports of the 
economies along GVCs are more heavily concentrated in 
durable goods than those of the rest of the world (Box 
figure 1). This is largely due to these economies’ key role 
in the electronics GVCs: electronics constituted more than 
half durable goods exports in 2007 for the region (except 
for Viet Nam, Indonesia, and Japan).
While durable goods trade has clustered in East and 
Southeast Asia, the final consumption of such goods 
remains concentrated in North America and Europe. In 
2007, 61% of their intermediate durables were traded 
within the East and Southeast Asian GVCs, but 55% of its 
exports of final durable goods went to non-Asian OECD 
countries.
Economies play different roles in GVCs depending on 
their level of economic development. Box figure 2 plots 
countries according to their position in GVCs and their 
level of development. Upstream stages such as design, 
R&D and production of sophisticated components 
are generally located in developed countries, while 
manufacturing and especially final assembly activities are 
relocated to developing countries. Finally, the downstream 
activities marketing and consumption once again take 
place in developed countries.
Japan thus specializes in the upstream production 
and exports of sophisticated intermediate goods such as 
semiconductors.
The high-income newly industrialized economies 
economies (Hong Kong China; the Republic of Korea; 
Singapore; and Taipei,China) as well as Malaysia and the 
Philippines are located in the middle of the chain where 
they specialize in processing intermediate goods. While 
they disproportionately import intermediate durables, 
intermediate goods also make up a larger-than-average 
share of their durable goods exports.
The middle-income countries—the PRC and Thailand—
specialize in the downstream assembly of final durable 
goods. They disproportionately import intermediate 
durables, and specialize in the export of final durable 
goods.
Finally, the high-income Western economies—mainly 
US and EU—serve as dominant markets for final goods, 
intensively importing durable goods.
The transmission of external shocks is further amplified 
1.2.2 Asia and global value chains
1 Share of durable goods and electronics 
products in total exports, selected Asian 
economies, 2007
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firms, but an estimated 40% is intermediated by banks. The availability 
of such financing is critical for the region, given the important role that 
trade plays for many developing Asian economies. While the 2008–2009 
trade collapse coincided with a tightening of global credit conditions, the 
extent that shrinking trade finance contributed to the fall in trade is not 
clear, in part because of incomplete data.
This is because most trade finance transactions are not reported. 
Interfirm transactions (involving open accounts and cash-in-advance 
trade finance, for example) are largely undisclosed, and the bank-
intermediated portion of trade credits is notably an area of finance 
that mainly involves relationship banking and does not take place in 
organized markets.
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by the strongly synchronized, just-in-time nature of 
intermediate goods trade and the adjustment of inventories 
along supply chains. To see this, consider Box figure 2 and 
suppose that there is a sudden decline EU demand for 
final durable goods. This decreases the demand for imports 
from the final assembly platforms PRC and Thailand. 
In turn, since these final assembly platforms heavily 
rely on imported components, they react to the negative 
demand shock by importing fewer components from 
countries like Malaysia or the Philippines. The latter react 
to the shock by importing fewer inputs from the next 
upstream stage, Japan. As a result, the negative demand 
shock leads to a sudden, synchronized regional trade 
decline.
The demand shock further 
amplifies as it moves up 
the GVC due to inventory 
adjustments. The logic for 
such a “bullwhip effect” is 
that businesses typically face 
forecast errors in their sales 
against which they try to shelter 
by building safety stocks of 
inventories. When a downstream 
firm is confronted with a drop 
in demand for its final products, 
its first reaction is then to run 
down its inventories, therefore 
more than proportionally 
reducing its orders of upstream 
components. 
As this inventory adjustment 
process propagates upstream, 
the demand shock continues 
to amplify. East and Southeast 
Asia’s heavy involvement in 
GVCs helps explain why some 
of its economies saw their trade 
drop up to 40% (year on year) in the trough of the global 
downturn in first quarter of 2009.
Lessons can thus be drawn for the region’s vulnerability 
to global demand shocks, such a deepening recession 
among European countries. Although Asia’s reliance on 
EU demand for its exports has declined in recent years, a 
European recession can yet again amplify along the GVCs, 
leading to a slowdown in regional trade. Such a demand 
shock would be further intensified if accompanied by a 
contraction in credit markets or spikes in protectionism.
Source: A. Ma and A. Van Assche “Is East Asia’s Economic Faith 
Chained to the West?” (forthcoming). ADB Economics Working Paper 
Series.
1.2.2 (continued)
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Information about trade finance and the impact of global financial 
and economic developments comes primarily from surveys of 
commercial banks. The International Monetary Fund, for instance, has 
collaborated with the Bankers’ Association for Finance and Trade and the 
International Chamber of Commerce to conduct surveys during 2008–
2010, interviewing banks in supplier and buyer countries.
It found that data reported from banks generally show that the 
decline in trade finance during the crisis was not as severe as the 
decline in trade volumes. However, bank data may understate the 
impact of the crisis on trade finance for two reasons. Monetary stimulus 
and programs from international financial institutions targeting trade 
finance would have softened the blow. Moreover, bank surveys cannot 
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show the impact on interfirm trade finance transactions since they do 
not cover this segment.
Other data on the importance of trade finance come from surveys of 
businesses, such as two World Bank surveys, also carried out in 2008–
2010, in 14 developing countries (two in Asia). The surveys focused on 
firms’ perceptions.
Firm perception survey results, in contrast to bank survey results, 
do suggest some important connections. Those interviewed felt that 
the driving factor behind lower trade levels was the drop in demand 
during the 2008–2009 global recession rather than an inability to secure 
financing. But there was an important shift from inter-firm transactions 
to bank intermediated trade finance as firms tried to shift counter-party 
risk during that period of heightened uncertainty. Banks themselves 
adopted stricter risk management and greater client differentiation, 
raising both collateral requirements and margins. Those firms that were 
able to get bank financing faced higher pricing margins. This hampered 
trade by raising transaction costs.
The effect of this squeeze was most pronounced in developing 
countries. The World Bank surveys found that developing countries’ 
firms did suffer from constrained trade finance. Firms relying chiefly 
on inter-firm or self-financed trade credit were most strongly affected 
by the global drop in trade, the compression of export revenues, the 
cancellation of orders, as well as payment delays. Firms relying mainly 
on the banking sector for trade credit were affected by banks’ risk 
aversion and discrimination. For example, in the Philippines, firms 
still felt as late of April 2010—when the second of the two surveys was 
conducted—that eligibility criteria imposed by banks continued to be 
overly stringent.
Small and medium-sized enterprises were affected more strongly 
than large ones by the strains to trade finance. These firms faced larger 
increases in the price of trade finance, due to their weaker capital base to 
stem against revenues compression, and their disadvantage in bargaining 
with the larger corporations and banks in the global markets.
Looking ahead, there are several factors that may tighten trade finance 
conditions in developing Asia. First is the ongoing bank deleveraging 
in advanced economies. The sharpening of the eurozone crisis in 2011 
added pressure on banks to increase their capital, reducing capacity in 
the market. Consequently, many European banks, traditionally active in 
supporting trade in Asia, have retrenched, leaving a larger gap for trade 
finance. The potential impact of reduced lending by eurozone banks is 
significant, since they are estimated to provide about 30% of total trade 
finance in the region.
Second, the Basel III accord—as important as it is to help place 
the global financial system on a more sound footing—has unintended 
consequences. By treating the cost of capital the same for a high-risk 
high-margin activity, compared with a relatively low-risk lower-margin 
activity such as trade finance, Basel III encourages financial institutions 
toward higher return (and higher risk) lending away from trade finance. 
This is despite the strong evidence showing that trade finance carries 
a relatively low probability of default and loss because it is highly 
collateralized.
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Finally, for developing economies, trade finance is not just about 
access to credit, but rather access to international liquidity. Advanced 
economies can use expansionary monetary policy to provide liquidity to 
markets in currencies accepted in international transactions. The analogy 
for developing Asian economies would be to draw down foreign reserves 
with central banks supplying dollars to local banks through repurchasing 
agreements, but this could put the exchange rate at risk.
The confluence of these factors may squeeze trade finance 
availability—especially if the situation in the eurozone were to worsen. 
Policy makers need to closely monitor trade finance availability, especially 
for small and medium-sized enterprises.
They need to be ready to act—on a wider field than trade finance—
and have the capacity to do so.
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1.3.1 What is policy space?
Policy space refers to the scope for using fiscal and monetary policy to counter 
the effects of shocks to the economic environment. For example, relatively low 
public debt to GDP ratios allow governments to increase spending and cut 
taxes without triggering adverse reactions from financial markets about fiscal 
sustainability.
Likewise, a history of anti-inflationary policies builds credibility and 
expands the scope for interest rate cuts. Further, the presence of a clearly 
defined lender of last resort strengthens the effectiveness of monetary policy 
during a crisis.
1.3.1 Benchmark policy rates, selected Asian economies
0
2
4
6
8
10
PhilippinesMalaysia
Indonesia
Korea, Rep. of
IndiaPRC
Feb
12
JulJan
11
JulJan
10
JulJan
09
JulJan
2008
%
PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Source: CEIC Data Company (accessed 15 March 2012).
Click here for figure data
Macro-policy directions for 
developing Asia
Enough policy space for a major external shock
Responding to the global economic downturn in 2008–2009, countries 
in developing Asia adopted policy stimulus measures, which though 
effective, absorbed some of the region’s monetary and fiscal policy space 
(Box 1.3.1) that was earned through earlier prudent macroeconomic 
management. Many countries reduced their benchmark policy interest 
rates to record lows and saw their ratio of public debt to GDP spike as 
they expanded government spending substantially.
As countries started to unwind the stimulus measures in 2010, they 
began to claw back some of this hard-earned policy space. But, given 
the global outlook, can developing Asia pursue another round of such 
measures if the downside risks materialize?
In an attempt to answer this question, it is useful to look 
in more detail at the earlier measures. Since the crisis eased, 
regional central banks have tightened their monetary policy 
stance to stem rising inflationary pressures, most of them due 
to food price increases. Benchmark policy rates in the region 
rose in the 2 years to around mid-2011 (Figure 1.3.1), as the crisis 
in the eurozone slowed global economic activity and inflation 
pressures moderated in developing Asia. Unlike the advanced 
economies (with near zero rates), developing Asia now has 
room to cut rates, although benchmark rates in most economies 
are still lower than before the downturn, suggesting less room 
to tighten.
Regional inflation—reflecting normalizing monetary policy 
and stabilizing global commodity prices—has come down 
since the last quarter of 2011 (Figure 1.3.2). As discussed much 
earlier, the risk of such prices, especially for oil, picking up 
again remains high, however, making possible a reversal of the recent 
downward trend in headline inflation in developing Asia.
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The CMIM is an evolution of the framework for providing 
liquidity support for the ASEAN+3 countries (the 10 
ASEAN member countries plus the PRC, Japan, and the 
Republic of Korea) conceived through the Chiang Mai 
initiative in 2000. CMIM, which took effect in March 2010, 
is a US$120 billion multilateral currency swap facility 
designed to address short-term liquidity difficulties in the 
region and supplement international financial arrangements.
As a reserve pooling arrangement, CMIM members 
committed their contribution to the facility but continue 
to manage their own reserves. Each member is eligible to 
access the facility up to a certain approved multiple of its 
contribution. When a member’s request for a swap facility 
is approved, each of the contributing members extends its 
contribution prorated to its commitment.
To support CMIM operations, the ASEAN+3 
Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) was established 
in April 2011 to act as the regional surveillance unit of 
CMIM. AMRO monitors and analyzes regional economies. 
It also contributes to early detection of risks and swift 
implementation of remedial actions to ensure for an 
effective decision-making of the CMIM.
1.3.2 Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization
1.3.2 Inflation, selected Asian economies
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1.3.3 Fiscal balances, selected Asian economies
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The region’s monetary authorities have maintained enough 
foreign exchange reserves to overcome shortages of international 
liquidity if a major financial shock hits. This is costly as reserves 
are typically invested in low-interest assets at the same time 
as governments pay higher rates on their outstanding debt, 
but uncertainties in Europe and the lack of global financial 
safety nets have prompted most Asian economies to follow this 
practice, which also allows for exchange rate management.
Common management of pooled reserves under a regional 
coordination mechanism would be the best way to use these 
reserves in combating international liquidity shortages. Thus 
strengthening the Chiang Mai Initiative Multeralization 
(CMIM) mechanism as a regional platform—with support from 
the newly established AMRO for ASEAN+3 for harnessing 
regional macro and exchange rate policy coordination—could 
offer substantial returns (Box 1.3.2).
Developing Asia also has enough fiscal space for short-term stimulus 
if it is hit by a shock. Although fiscal deficits are still fairly high in, 
for example, India, Malaysia, and Pakistan, fiscal balances of many 
regional countries remain healthy as they are not likely to 
lead to increases in public debt to GDP ratios. In the PRC, 
India, the Republic of Korea, Philippines and Viet Nam, fiscal 
positions have also improved in 2011 from the previous 3 years 
as the stimulus put through during the global crisis was 
unwound (Figure 1.3.3). Public debt-to-GDP ratios are fairly low 
internationally and are projected to decline even further in the 
medium term (Box 1.3.3).
No clear case for short-term countercyclical 
policy
The agreements reached on an orderly workout of Greece’s 
debt removed the immediate risk of a disorderly default that 
could lead to a new global liquidity crisis. As a result, investors’ risk 
appetite and confidence toward the region has generally improved. 
Since escalating in October 2011 sovereign spreads have declined. This 
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Fiscal intervention by governments in developing Asia 
to stem the 2008–2009 crisis raised regional public debt 
ratios by an average of 5% in 2009, thus breaking a trend 
of fiscal consolidation that most countries had followed 
since the late 1990s’ Asian financial crisis. The 2009 spike 
in debt ratios was highest in Central and East Asia. All 
ratios resumed their downward trend in 2010 and 2011, 
as fiscal stimulus measures gradually faded and economic 
growth in the region returned.
The outlook on debt dynamics for the region is 
generally benign, and most public debt ratios are 
projected to decline in the medium term. This is shown 
in Box figure 1, which shows debt ratios averaged by 
subregion over a historical period (2000–2010) and 
projected period (2011–2016), as well as for seven major 
Asian economies. 
Apart from the baseline projection—the lines in 
red—also shown is a historical scenario—the dashed 
lines in blue—that projects debt ratios with key 
variables kept at their 2000–2010 historical averages. A 
comparison between the two scenarios suggests that the 
macroeconomic and fiscal assumptions underlying the 
baseline are not overly optimistic when compared with 
historical track records.1
Favorable debt dynamics in the region in 2011–2016 
are premised mainly on the assumption that low real 
interest rates and high growth rates will prevail, against 
the backdrop of a progressive strengthening of fiscal 
balances. In line with the historical pattern observed in 
large parts of the region during the past 2 decades or so, 
higher economic than interest-rate growth is expected 
to continue eroding debt ratios faster than they will 
rise because of primary deficits or other factors, such as 
exchange rate movements increasing the value of foreign 
currency–denominated public debt.
For example, in relation to the aggregate for the seven 
economies, Box figure 2 shows that strong economic 
growth of around 6% a year is expected to cause the debt 
ratio to shrink by roughly 2% each year between 2011 
and 2016, which will more than outweigh the increase 
in debt due to the combined impact of narrowing 
primary deficits, a positive real interest rate, and slightly 
unfavorable exchange rate movements. As a result, the 
average debt ratio of the seven economies is expected to 
fall to about 34% in 2016, from nearly 40% in 2011.
Premised on these assumptions, standard debt-
1.3.3 Public debt in developing Asia after the global crisis
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sustainability analysis finds public debt in the region 
to be broadly sustainable, in that expected future 
macroeconomic and fiscal performances are likely to 
enable governments to smoothly finance their budgets 
and service debt without generating explosive increases 
in public debt ratios. Moreover, falling debt ratios are 
associated with a gradual expansion of the fiscal policy 
space that was temporarily compressed by the global 
crisis. To some extent, this would enable governments in 
the region to intervene again, if necessary.
By contrast, fiscal space—and with it the feasibility 
of heavy government intervention—would quickly 
shrink in the event of a particularly severe or 
prolonged deterioration in the region’s macroeconomic 
environment. An example is another major global crisis, 
such as triggered by an international financial crisis that 
would spike interest rates, dry up international capital 
markets, and derail economic growth in the region.
Put differently, in terms of Box figure 2, any large 
internal or external shock that would largely invalidate 
the key assumption as regards the continuing presence 
of a higher than interest rate growth favoring debt 
dynamics in the region would inevitably complicate debt 
management and, if sufficiently severe, could jeopardize 
debt sustainability in many countries of the region.
Risks to public debt sustainability also arise out of the 
intrinsic vulnerabilities to macroeconomic stability, in 
some countries particularly. Stochastic debt-sustainability 
analyses2 discussed in Ferrarini, Jha, and Ramayandi 
(forthcoming) show that, when the frequency and entity 
of historical shocks as well as co-movements of the 
variables affecting the debt ratio are fully accounted 
for, debt projections for the more vulnerable Asian 
economies display a broad range of likely outcomes, some 
of which have the potential to undermine public debt 
sustainability. 
Furthermore, the study emphasizes the issue of 
local as opposed to central government debt, as well as 
contingent liabilities, the full extent of which typically 
eludes standard debt-sustainability analysis. Finally, 
the medium-term focus of this analysis abstracts from 
structural factors that are likely to introduce a significant 
upward pressure on the regions’ fiscal budgets and debt 
ratios in the longer term. For example, health care, 
pension spending, and social safety nets are likely to 
expand. The related fiscal outlays will add significant 
pressure on general government budgets across the 
region, shifting debt ratios upward.
In sum, assessing public debt sustainability in Asia 
and the Pacific involves more rigorous analysis that goes 
beyond simple debt-sustainability analysis projections. 
Nevertheless, even a more attentive analysis of the debt 
and risk profiles for selected countries in the region 
suggests that, by and large, public debt in these countries 
is sustainable and governments do have a degree of policy 
space to count on for the case that fiscal intervention to 
support their economies should be required.
1 With the main exception of East Asia (including the PRC, the 
Republic of Korea, and Mongolia), where the historical scenario is 
affected by a debt crisis in Mongolia, which saw the country’s debt 
ratio spike to about 100% in the early 2000s before falling steeply in 
the rest of the decade.
2 VAR-based Monte Carlo simulations.
Reference
B. Ferrarini, and A. Ramayandi (forthcoming). “Public Debt 
Sustainability Assessments for Developing Asia.” In B. Ferrarini, 
R. Jha, and A. Ramayandi, eds. (forthcoming). Public debt 
sustainability in developing Asia. Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
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improvement in investor sentiment could soon be followed by 
another stream of volatile capital inflows to the region, which 
was one of the factors behind the rise in inflation during the 
recovery, as it flooded the region with additional liquidity.
While the slowdown in Europe is putting a brake on 
economic growth in Asian economies, the extent seems to be 
manageable. Except for Thailand, which is still recovering after 
the floods late last year, actual output levels in the region do 
not appear to be substantially below trend (Figure 1.3.4). This 
suggests that the region’s economies are still operating around 
their potential output levels and are expected to continue doing 
so in the medium run—unlike the major industrial economies 
(Figure 1.3.5).
Although there is no clear case for developing Asia to deploy 
aggressive countercyclical policy, there may still be a need for 
policy intervention. The region accounts for a large and growing 
share of the world’s economic activity, thus such intervention 
may help to ensure the continuation of strong domestic 
demand, which in turn will also contribute positively to the 
global economic recovery.
The role of monetary policy for maintaining the growth 
momentum seems to be more limited than that of fiscal policy. 
The overall stance of monetary policy in the region is still fairly 
accommodative. Real interest rates are still very low—slightly 
below zero in most cases or even highly negative (Viet Nam) 
(Figure 1.3.6). The slowdown in food price inflation has helped 
cool the headline rate, but core inflation has not slowed as 
much, suggesting that price pressures remain. Finally, credit 
in the region, although moderating slightly, continues to grow 
strongly, at a two-digit rate in most cases.
Looking to the longer term
The smaller GDP gaps, relatively low real interest rates and high 
credit expansion, as well as persistent core inflation in Asia 
suggest that pressures for inflation originating from aggregate 
demand are still persistent. Recent improvement in the investor 
sentiment also entails the potential for another stream of capital 
inflows to the region, which in turn adds pressure for aggregate 
demand to increase. In tandem with the risk of elevating price 
of oil in the international markets, and the absence of further 
shock to the global environment, there may be resumption for 
inflationary pressures to the region.
If inflationary pressures build again and capital inflows 
resume, there may be a need to readjust monetary policy to 
maintain price stability. But until that happens (if indeed it 
does), the region’s monetary authorities should fine tune their 
policy stance while keeping focused on stabilizing inflation 
expectations.
To shield against the highly volatile nature of capital flows, Asia 
needs to be ready with measures to fend off large and rapid fluctuations 
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in cross-border capital movements. Strengthening domestic financial 
systems by improving their supervision and regulatory rules should help 
enhance domestic financial stability. More flexible exchange rate regimes 
are also useful for filtering speculative short-term capital inflows. If 
large swings of capital flows to the region reoccur, various measures of 
capital flow management can also be deployed, but they require regional 
coordination to be effective.
Given the limited room for monetary policy maneuver, authorities can 
also use fiscal policy. They can compensate for the slowdown in external 
demand by boosting domestic demand to keep the growth momentum, 
but have to do this without undermining their fiscal position. So although 
debt-to-GDP ratios in the region have now generally resumed their 
downward path, governments have no room for complacency. Sustaining 
these improving debt ratios depends on continued favorable growth and 
interest rates, which—as seen repeatedly over the years—can suddenly 
reverse. Moreover, the region faces further sources of fiscal strain in the 
years ahead, such as adjusting to aging populations and building adequate 
social safety nets.
Fiscal policy should thus strike a balance between the pursuit of 
long-term fiscal stability and support to growth. Fiscal authorities can do 
this with budget-neutral measures through expenditure-switching policies 
that support domestic economic rebalancing, such as increasing the share 
of spending on education, health, and social safety nets, within given 
deficit levels. They may though at some stage need to raise tax revenue as 
a share of GDP to finance the needed social spending, by broadening tax 
bases and improving tax administration.
Such fiscal shifts will be increasingly important as the region 
confronts rising income inequality while fostering continued economic 
expansion—an issue further analyzed in the theme chapter.
Endnotes
1 A recent empirical study of the relative importance of finance and trade links between the 
eurozone and developing Asia as channels of contagion comes to the same conclusion—
financial sector repercussions will be felt, but trade impacts are potentially larger (M. Lee 
et al. Forthcoming. “Economic Impact of Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis on Developing 
Asia.” ADB Economics Working Paper Series. Manila: Asian Development Bank.).
2 This section is based on a background paper for this report, by A. Ma and A. Van Assche. 
“Is East Asia’s Economic Faith Chained to the West?” Forthcoming. ADB Economics 
Working Paper Series.
3 R. Bems, S. Johnson, and K.-M. Yi. 2010. Demand Spillovers and the Collapse of Trade in 
the Global Recession. IMF Economic Review 58(2). pp. 295-326.
30  Asian Development Outlook 2012
A1.1.1 Business activities and consumer confidence 
indicators, United States
20
50
80
110
Consumer condence index Retail sales 
Industrial production
Feb
12
Jul Jan
11
JulJan
10
JulJan
09
JulJan
08
JulJan
2007
Index, 2007 = 100
Source: CEIC Data Company (accessed 27 March 2012).
Click here for figure data
A1.1.2 Contributions to GDP growth, United States 
-10
-5
0
5
10
Q1
2009
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
10
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
11
Q2 Q3 Q4
Percentage points, seasonally adjusted  annualized rate 
Personal consumption GDP
Government consumption Gross xed capital formation
Net exports Change in stocks
Source: US Department of Commerce. Bureau of Economic Analysis. http://www.
bea.gov (accessed 28 March 2012).
Click here for figure data
Annex: The external environment
Continuing the pattern of 2011, developments in the major industrial 
economies of the United States (US), eurozone, and Japan will hold 
back global economic activity over the next 2 years. In particular, the 
eurozone is expected to see renewed recession in 2012. Under the baseline 
assumptions, growth of the industrial economies is expected to edge even 
lower from its already slow 2011 rate of 1.2% to 1.1% in 2012 before picking 
up a shade to 1.7% in 2013. Against this dim global economic backdrop, 
world merchandise export growth is expected to slow to 3.8% in 2012 
before recovering in 2013 (see Table 1.1.1 at the start of the main text).
Recent developments in major industrial 
countries
United States
Data for the first half of 2011 disappointed and spurred 
speculation about a double-dip recession and additional policy 
stimulus. Uncertainty about the course of the economy reached 
its climax in August when long-term US sovereign credit was 
downgraded by a major rating agency. In part owing to the 
situation in the eurozone, however, yields on US treasuries fell 
and the dollar appreciated.
GDP growth—at a quarter-on-quarter, seasonally adjusted 
annualized rate (qoq saar)—was barely positive in the first 
quarter of 2011, but picked up in the second half with a strong 
performance in the last quarter when growth reached 3.0% qoq 
saar, taking it to 1.7% for the year. Industrial production and 
retail sales rose only gradually (Figure A1.1.1) from the trough in 
May 2009. 
The unsteady climb in consumer confidence ended in March 
2011, but has recovered since December last year. The values of 
the PMI compiled by the Institute for Supply Management lie 
above 50 for the first 2 months of 2012, 54.1 for January and 52.4 
for February. Values above 50 indicate that the manufacturing 
economy is generally expanding.
Moderate gains in private consumption and fixed 
investment accompanied the GDP growth pickup in 2011 
(Figure A1.1.2). Cuts in government consumption have slowed 
the recovery and are expected to continue doing so, such that 
in 2012 and 2013 the economy will extend its recovery, but at 
a moderate pace only. Absent large negative spillovers from 
Europe and with an accommodative monetary policy, growth is 
likely to reach 2.0% in 2012 and 2.3% in 2013.
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As with consumption, recent data for private investment and 
inventories suggest that businesses are still hesitant to expand production 
facilities and that the economy is far from reaching capacity constraints. 
Fixed investment has been growing over the last 6 quarters (to Q4 2011), 
but without conviction. Inventories are still adjusting after a large decline 
toward end-2010. External demand for US goods continued expanding 
through 2011. Facilitated by a weaker dollar, net exports made a modest 
positive contribution to GDP growth in 2011.
Beyond the uncertainty originating from outside the country, the 
state of public finances and the high unemployment rate pose major 
challenges. But whether immediate progress can be made on 
these policy fronts is questionable as the country enters another 
presidential election season. When and how policymakers will 
move on improving future fiscal space by deciding on medium- 
and long-term fiscal reform also affects the forecast for 2012 
and 2013. Postponing fiscal consolidation until the economy has 
stabilized appears to be desirable, but may not turn out to be 
politically feasible.
Inflation remains well under control (Figure A1.1.3). As 
the global economy recovers slowly, slow-moving food and 
energy prices are expected to buttress the recovery. Given 
low and stable price inflation (not exceeding 2.0% over the 
forecast horizon), monetary policy is also expected to continue 
supporting the recovery, with the target for the Federal Funds 
rates unchanged within 0–0.25% at least until mid-2013, and 
slowly tightened after that.
Policy efforts are still very much geared to easing the impact 
of the previous downturn. In February 2012, the US Congress 
voted to extend the payroll tax cut of 2011 and unemployment 
insurance benefits through the whole year of 2012.
Eurozone
The core eurozone countries had a strong beginning to 2011—despite 
tensions in segments of the sovereign debt market—feeding hopes that 
the eurozone could escape a second recession after the first 
recession in 2009. Over the course of the year, however, a raft of 
new policy measures failed to prevent the sovereign debt crisis 
from engulfing Spanish and Italian government debt. Market 
players often viewed the timing of these measures as too late 
and kept testing the commitment of all member countries to the 
common currency. By year-end, growth for 2011 is estimated to 
have reached 1.4% year on year, with a negative outlook.
This negative trend is expected to carry over into 2012, and 
most forecasters see the eurozone falling back into recession for 
the year of 0.5%, heavily reflecting the impact of fiscal austerity 
measures. The year 2013 may bring better news with GDP 
growth reaching 1% year on year. 
However, developments across countries differ substantially. 
Germany and many other core members of the eurozone 
are expected to grow slowly in 2012, whereas those countries 
directly affected by the European debt crisis will experience 
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more pronounced downturns. For example, German GDP 
growth will fall to 0.5% in 2012 after 3.0% in 2011.
Throughout 2011, net exports stayed a main contributor to 
GDP growth (Figure A1.1.4). The EU’s trade with the rest of the 
world continued recovering from the 2009 contraction—the 
most rapid growth with developing Asia (Figure A1.1.5 and 
A1.1.6).
Fixed capital formation added 0.7 percentage points to 
GDP growth (saar) in the first quarter, marking an important 
turnaround after persistently negative investment growth 
during the postcrisis recovery (apart from the second quarter 
of 2010). After mid-2011, industrial production slowed and then 
declined (Figure A1.1.7). 
Private consumption made a positive—albeit small—
contribution to the first 3 quarters of GDP growth, turning 
negative in the last quarter of 2011. Retail trade growth averaged 
2.4% from January to April, but declined later in the year.
Unemployment stood at 10.7% in January 2012, thus slightly 
higher than at the start of the previous year, but this aggregate 
masks considerable disparity among member states. Spain’s 
unemployment rate, for example, stood at 23.3% in January 2012, 
about five times the rate in the Netherlands or Austria and 
more than three times Germany’s (Figure A1.1.8).
Consumer price inflation was 2.7% in February 2012, down 
from its peak of 3.0% in April 2011 (Figure A1.1.9). This reflects 
declining oil prices in the second quarter of 2011, as well as 
changes in measuring seasonal goods in computing the index. 
Food price inflation was higher than nonfood price inflation in 
the first half of the year, peaking at 4.0% in October–November 
2011. Energy and commodity prices are likely to exert upward 
pressure on inflation in the second half of 2012.
Stress in segments of the European sovereign debt markets 
intensified in July and August when the political debate about 
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a second rescue package for Greece confirmed again deep 
disagreement among eurozone members on how to resolve 
the crisis. Although a disorderly Greek default was prevented 
and additional measures to prevent further spreading of the 
crisis were agreed in March, July, and October 2011, sovereign 
interest rate spreads relative to German interest rates rose 
sharply in vulnerable economies, most importantly Spain and 
Italy. Tensions eased only as the European Central Bank (ECB) 
intervened in secondary sovereign debt markets.
During the October 2011 fall, the crisis intensified and 
new measures were taken to calm the situation. Although 
public attention is often directed to the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF) as the prime mechanism to resolve the 
Greek debt crisis, the ECB has played a key role in stabilizing 
financial markets. After carefully extending its mandate beyond 
guaranteeing price stability to allow for direct purchases of 
government debt, it has emerged as a true lender of last resort. 
In two longer-term refinancing operations in November 2011 and 
February 2012 offering three year loans at historically low interest rates, 
the ECB allocated about 1 trillion euros to the European banking sector. 
With the ECB turning to quantitative easing, sufficient liquidity is in the 
system to allow for smooth debt roll-over of most European economies.
Japan
GDP contracted in the first half of 2011 by 2.9% (qoq saar) 
(Figure A1.1.10), although the 1.2% second-quarter GDP decline was 
smaller than expected given the earthquake in March, and may be a 
sign of recovery from the disaster. The contraction mostly occurred in 
exports of automobiles and electronic parts and stemmed from supply 
chain disruptions and weak private demand. Equally important was 
continued deflationary pressure.
Although reconstruction efforts started to be felt in the 
second half of 2011 (annualized quarterly GDP rose by 7.1% in 
the third quarter), supply-chain disruptions after the flooding in 
Thailand during August–November 2011, a persistently strong 
yen, and faltering foreign demand caused the GDP to contract 
by 0.7% in the last quarter of 2011 (qoq saar). GDP fell by 0.7% 
over the whole of 2011.
The recovery is expected to regain momentum in 2012, 
touching 1.9% GDP growth before receding to 1.5% in 2013, 
reflecting the dynamics of expected government expenditure: 
a sharp increase in 2012 will wear off and slow in 2013. 
Reconstruction will be driven by higher government spending 
and private residential investment; private consumption growth, 
by contrast, will remain weak.
The March disaster boosted imports in 2011, and will 
continue to do so this year, such that net exports will not 
contribute to GDP growth either this year or next. Consumer 
sentiment and business confidence have suffered amid fears 
relating to the nuclear crisis and deteriorating external environment. 
Sluggish wage growth and public expectations of a rise in the 
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consumption tax will depress consumer sentiment in the 
coming years, with private consumption forecast to see almost 
no increase. Government consumption growth will be sustained 
throughout 2012–2013 by relief and reconstruction work, but it 
will fall back after that. Investment growth will also be boosted 
in 2012 by reconstruction.
Industrial production recovered from its lows after the 
earthquake at first, but has been slow since (Figure A1.1.11). 
The floods in Thailand severely affected activity in the 
semiconductor industry.
Average consumer price inflation is estimated to have been 
above zero—0.3%—in 2011 (Figure A1.1.12) owing to supply-
side factors, including a loss of agricultural land. Nonetheless, 
Japan’s fundamentally deflationary environment remains in 
place, and the monetary authority is expected to preserve its 
expansionary stance while this is the case.
The Bank of Japan increased its Asset Purchase Program 
to ¥65 trillion in February 2012. In addition, the Bank of Japan 
introduced an explicit inflation target of 1% in the same month, 
suggesting more activity on the monetary policy front in the 
months to come.
In the next 2 years, moderate economic growth and the 
consequent narrowing of the output gap will keep inflation in 
positive territory.
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Over the past 2 decades, developing Asia has reduced poverty faster 
than any other region of the world, at any time in history. But the bulk 
of developing Asia’s population lives in countries with rising inequality. 
This is in contrast both to the “growth with equity” story that marked 
the transformation of the newly industrialized economies in the 1960s 
and 1970s, and to recent trends in other parts of the developing world, in 
particular Latin America, where income inequality has been narrowing 
since the 1990s.
This theme chapter presents an analysis of inequality in Asia, and 
develops a range of policy options to confront the rising inequality. A 
key message emerging from the analysis is that technological change, 
globalization, and market-oriented reform—the main drivers of Asia’s 
rapid growth—are the basic forces behind rising inequality in the 
region. These forces tend to favor owners of capital over labor, high-
skilled over low-skilled workers, and urban and coastal areas over rural 
and inland regions.
The impacts of these forces have been compounded by various forms 
of unequal access to opportunity—to earn income from labor and to build 
human capital—caused by institutional weaknesses, market distortions, 
and social exclusion. Working together, these have led to a falling share of 
labor income in total national income, rising premiums on human capital, 
and growing spatial inequality.
Yet these three forces should not be obstructed, because they are 
the engines of productivity and income growth. Policy makers should 
confront rising inequality through interventions that equalize opportunity 
and reduce inequality, in three areas: efficient fiscal measures that reduce 
inequality in human capital, policies that work toward more and high-
quality jobs, and interventions that narrow spatial inequality.
The analysis and policy options in this theme chapter provide a 
broad road map for policy makers to chart their own, country-specific, 
path to addressing inequality—which, if unchecked, could undermine 
the momentum for economic growth and for a better quality of life for 
all Asians. 
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Rising inequality concerns in Asia
Remarkable growth—but widening inequality
Remarkable growth …
Many countries in Asia and the Pacific have seen remarkable 
achievements in growth and poverty reduction in the last 2 decades. From 
1990 to 2010, the average annual growth rate of gross domestic product 
(GDP) for developing Asia reached 7.0% in 2005 purchasing power parity 
(PPP) terms, more than double the 3.4% for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (Figure 2.1.1). Much of the growth was driven by the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and India—the world’s two 
most populous countries—with annual GDP growth of 9.9% 
and 6.4%, respectively.
The rapid growth has dramatically improved living 
standards and greatly reduced poverty. During 1990−2010, the 
region’s average per capita GDP in 2005 PPP terms increased 
from $1,633 to $5,133. The proportion of the population living
on or below the $1.25-a-day poverty line fell from 53.9% in 1990
to 21.5% around 2008, as 716 million people were lifted out of 
poverty. Seventeen countries reduced poverty by more than 
15 percentage points in the period.
… but widening inequality
This performance in growth and poverty reduction has, 
however, been accompanied by rising inequality in many 
countries. Of the 28 countries that have comparative data 
between the 1990s and 2000s, 11—accounting for about 82% 
of developing Asia’s population in 2010—experienced rising 
inequality of per capita expenditure or income, as measured by 
the Gini coefficient (Figure 2.1.2).1
Developing Asia has historically been a region with 
relatively low levels of inequality, especially compared with 
other regions such as Latin America. Unlike developing Asia, 
though, most Latin American countries have seen narrowing 
inequality in the last 2 decades—even if average inequality there 
is still much wider than in developing Asia.
Concepts of inequality
Inequality of outcome and of opportunity
In discussing inequality, it is useful to distinguish two concepts: 
inequality of outcome and inequality of opportunity. A principal building 
block of economics is the idea of human welfare—a broad sense of an 
individual’s “well-being.” Individuals will use the resources that they have 
2.1.1 GDP growth 1990–2010 and poverty reduction 
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Note: Cumulative reduction in poverty rate is estimated as the difference in 
the percentage of poor people between the latest year in the 2000s and the 
earliest year in the 1990s for which data are available, weighted by 2010 and 
1990 population, respectively. For Asia and the Pacific these include Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan 
(Central Asia); People’s Republic of China (East Asia); Fiji and Timor-Leste 
(Pacific); Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka 
(South Asia); and Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam (Southeast Asia). 
Source: ADB estimates using data from PovcalNet (accessed 9 March 2012) and 
World Development Indicators online database (accessed 7 February 2012).
Click here for figure data
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2.1.2 Annualized change in inequality of expenditure or 
income, developing Asia, 1990s and 2000s
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available, to maximize their well-being, subject to factors that 
may constrain their options. In the study of inequality, income 
or expenditure are commonly used to proxy the outcome of this 
process.
Focusing solely on income or expenditure can, though, 
be limiting. Non-income dimensions like education and 
health have come to the fore in recent years offering a 
multidimensional perspective on inequality and poverty. Good 
health, for example, confers on individuals benefits that are 
not fully captured by the increment it provides to incomes. 
Inequality in education and health may manifest themselves as 
differences in access and coverage among population groups 
defined by their income, gender, ethnic origin, or birth location.
While the concept of inequality of outcome suggests 
the endpoint of a process, one can usefully think of how to 
distinguish between the resources that one has available and 
the level of effort applied. Inequality of opportunity is the 
portion of the inequality of outcome that can be attributed 
to differences in “individual circumstances” (Roemer 1998). 
By circumstances we mean those features that are outside the 
control of an individual, such as gender, race, ethnicity, or place 
of birth. The same is true of a child’s parental characteristics, 
for example, father’s education or income.
On the other hand, given an individual’s circumstances, 
what individuals choose for effort in the labor market or 
in education—“individual effort”—will also influence their 
outcomes.
Applying the concepts
The distinction between inequality of opportunity and 
inequality of outcome can be particularly useful in guiding 
public policy. Equality of opportunity is not only intrinsically 
important, but also a critical condition for a prosperous society. 
Public policy must be put in place to reduce or eliminate inequality of 
opportunity. As we will argue later, equality of opportunity is at the 
heart of the inclusive growth concept. In this chapter our focus will 
be on equality of opportunity, on assuring that everybody has equal 
opportunity to participate in the growth process and benefit from its 
fruits, equitably. To the extent that inequality of parents’ income leads 
to inequality of opportunity for children, this inequality needs to be 
overcome by interventions to assure equal access to public services and to 
markets for all in society.
In the real world, a clear distinction between inequality of outcome 
and of opportunity is not straightforward. There could also be differences 
in opinion on what constitute circumstances and what constitute efforts 
in a society (Roemer 1998; Paes de Barros et al. 2009). Even with these 
difficulties, in many low-income countries, it is relatively easy to observe 
extreme circumstances that severely limit opportunities for a large 
segment of the population.
These circumstances include the lack of, or unequal access to, the 
high-quality jobs and public services to which every citizen is meant to 
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have equal access irrespective of circumstance—variations in this access 
reflect inequality of opportunity. For children, variations in access to 
education and health are indicators of inequality of opportunity, as these 
are outside children’s control.
This distinction is something of which Asian policy makers are aware 
(Box 2.1.1). Beyond the intrinsic value of equality—the idea of fairness, for 
which most humans are hard wired—does inequality make any difference 
for a country’s development?
How do Asians view the distinction between inequality of 
opportunity and inequality of income? Box figure 1 presents 
results for Asia and OECD countries from the World Values 
Survey of 2005. 
This survey asked representative samples of people in 69 
countries to locate their views on a scale of 1 to 10, with 
1 meaning “incomes should be made more equal,” and 10 
meaning “we need larger income differences as incentives.” 
The Asian responses are more skewed toward 10—about 
63% of the responses are in the 6–10 range—but there is still 
significant weight in the lower value responses. The OECD 
responses are spread more evenly over the 10 categories.
This interpretation seems to be consistent with the results 
coming from ADB’s web-based survey of Asian policy makers 
(Box figure 2; see Box 2.1.3 below for survey details). 
About 60% of the respondents agree or strongly agree with 
the statement that it is more important to reduce inequality 
of opportunity (such as access to education, health, and 
employment services) than to reduce inequality of income; 
and 84% of the respondents agree or strongly agree with the 
statement that income inequality is acceptable if it is due 
to differences in individual efforts and an outcome of fair 
competition.
2.1.1 Opportunity vs. outcome—Perceptions from Asia
1 World Values Survey 2005—More or less income 
inequality?
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2 Inequality of outcomes and inequality of 
opportunity—informal policy maker survey
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Why inequality matters
Inequality is an important dimension of development in its own right, but 
it also has consequences for governments’ fight against poverty and efforts 
to sustain growth. Both poverty reduction and the foundations for future 
growth can be strengthened by ensuring that the benefits of development 
are shared broadly.
Inequality and poverty reduction
Rising inequality hampers poverty reduction. For countries with 
comparable data, Figure 2.1.3 compares actual poverty headcount rates 
(using the $1.25-a-day poverty line in 2008) with the poverty headcount
rates simulated keeping inequality unchanged from the 1990s to the 
2000s. The simulations highlight the degree to which rising 
inequality holds back poverty reduction. Had inequality not 
increased, notably:
•	 In India, the poverty headcount rate would have been 
reduced to 29.5% in 2008, instead of the actual 32.7%;
•	 In the PRC, extreme poverty would have declined to 
4.9%, instead of the actual 13.1%;
•	 In Indonesia, the poverty rate would have fallen to 6.1%, 
instead of the actual 16.3%.
For the 11 economies with rising inequality, the cost of that 
widening comes to 240 million more people trapped under 
the $1.25-a-day poverty line—6.5% of the region’s population
today. In contrast, those countries with decreasing inequality 
had smaller poverty rates than they would have had with stable 
inequality.
Inequality, institutions, and growth
So, not only does inequality dampen the poverty reduction 
impact of growth, it can also affect growth itself, through a number of 
economic, social, and political mechanisms.
Inequality of wealth and income can lead to a misallocation of 
human capital. Those with little wealth or low income are unable to 
invest in human capital, or wealth- and income-enhancing activities, 
and will remain poor. In principle they may be able to borrow to finance 
investment. But imperfect financial markets, coupled with other market 
failures, often heavily constrain their ability to borrow and invest. 
Similarly, much evidence shows that small enterprises have high potential 
rates of return to investment but are constrained from accessing capital 
(for example, de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff 2008).
Widening inequality—leaving more people at the top and bottom of the 
ladder—can also mean a hollowing out of the middle class. The importance 
of the middle class for stability and growth has been emphasized and 
analyzed in recent years. Birdsall (2010, p.158), for example, has argued 
that “growth driven by and benefiting a middle class is more likely to 
be sustained—both economically, to the extent that the rent seeking 
and corruption associated with highly concentrated gains to growth 
are avoided, and politically, to the extent that conflict and horizontal 
inequalities between racial and ethnic groups are easier to manage….”
2.1.3 Actual and simulated poverty rates at $1.25
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In fact, there is a broad consensus among analysts on the link between 
inequality and the quality of institutions. Along several dimensions, 
ranging from political stability, through institutional stability, to property 
rights, the negative impact of inequality on institutional quality seems 
to be well established, although the two-way causality is also widely 
recognized (Zhuang et al. 2010; Nye forthcoming). At the same time, 
there is also a literature on the effect of inequality on crime and violence 
and, through that, on the investment climate (for example, Fajnzylber, 
Lederman, and Loayza 2002; Özler and Demombynes 2002).
Finally, greater inequality may lead to a political backlash, in which 
pressure grows for governments to enact populist policy measures. In 
response to the rising demands, the political process may favor policies 
which, in the short term, would benefit the lower end of the income 
distribution, but which in the long run could hold back efficiency and 
growth (Alesina and Rodrik 1994). Under such conditions, the interests of 
the political system diverge from the interests of the economy as a whole. 
This is a widespread concern in developing and developed countries alike.
Empirically establishing the linkage between inequality and growth is 
not easy, because numerous factors are at work, and economic analysis is 
often subject to data and methodological limitations. Unsurprisingly, the 
empirical evidence is itself mixed (for example, Kanbur and Lustig 2000; 
Barro 2008).
Recent studies by Berg and Ostry (2011a, 2011b), however, provide 
convincing evidence on the inequality–growth relationship. The studies 
make a key distinction between growth over the short run and growth 
over the long run (Box 2.1.2). This corresponds to the different issues 
involved in “igniting” growth versus sustaining it over the long run. 
Many countries can ignite growth in the short run, but far fewer can 
sustain it (Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik 2005). The econometric 
analysis of Berg and Ostry confirms that inequality is a key variable 
explaining long-run growth. Thus not only does rising inequality dent the 
poverty impact of a given growth rate, it can also affect the sustainability 
of a growth path.
Inequality on the policy agenda
Governments are not blind to the problem. Indeed, in recent years more 
of them have embraced the concept of inclusive growth to make income 
distribution more equitable:
•	 In the PRC, where the Gini coefficient of per capita expenditure 
worsened from about 32.4 in 1990 to 43.4 in 2008, the government 
set about building a harmonious society as the development goal 
in its Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006−2010). This goal has been 
reaffirmed in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011−2015), with greater 
emphasis on the quality—not just the rate—of growth, and 
making growth inclusive.
•	 In India, where the Gini coefficient deteriorated from 32.5 in 1993 
to 37 in 2010, the government made an explicit commitment to 
inclusive growth in its Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2007−2012). The 
central vision of the plan is “…not just faster growth but also 
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In analyzing the determinants of growth, one needs to 
make an important distinction between short-term and 
long-term growth. The course of economic growth does 
not run smooth. Growth over a long period is made up 
of “growth spells,” where growth accelerates to a higher 
rate then falls again. Some of this is purely cyclical, but a 
recent literature focuses on finding policy and structural 
determinants of the frequency and length of these spells.
This literature suggests that accelerating growth in the 
short run may be easier than sustaining it over the longer 
term—and at the very least the determinants of these two 
types of growth can be very different. The former can be 
achieved by a set of conventional reforms that lead to a 
burst of investment and output—liberalization of trade or 
finance, for example. But sustaining this growth requires 
longer-term institutional underpinnings (Rodrik 2005).
Further, economies are subject to shocks, even more so 
in an era of globalization. How policy makers respond to 
these shocks will determine the speed and sustainability of 
the rebound and the subsequent growth path. But because 
any policy response will invariably have distributional 
consequences, the ability of policy makers to push through 
efficient responses to shocks depends on their ability to 
manage the distributional consequences of these responses 
(Rodrik 1999).
Inability to manage these shocks, and more generally 
the distributional consequences of efficient reforms, will 
mean that growth accelerations will peter out sooner than 
if these shocks are managed well, and growth spells will be 
shorter. Long-run growth will therefore be lower.
Berg and Ostry (2011b) argue that inequality can 
influence the duration of growth spells through several 
channels:
•	 With credit market imperfections, inequality inhibits 
private investment in human capital.
•	 If the distribution of political power follows the 
distribution of income, this may lead, on the one 
hand, to pressure for populist policies from the bottom 
end, and, on the other, to efforts by elites to resist 
this pressure through corruption—both of which are 
inefficient and detrimental to growth.
•	 Inequality may increase the risk of political instability.
Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer (2008) test for the effect 
of inequality on growth, focusing on its impact on the 
duration of growth spells. The empirical results show that 
income distribution survives as one of the most robust 
and important factors associated with growth duration. A 
10-percentile decrease in inequality increases the expected 
length of a growth spell by 50%. They conclude that 
inequality is a more robust predictor of growth duration 
than many variables widely understood to be central to 
growth.
Sources: Berg and Ostry (2011a, 2011b); Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer 
(2008); Rodrik (1999, 2005).
2.1.2 Inequality and sustained growth
inclusive growth, that is, a growth process which yields broad-
based benefits and ensures equality of opportunity for all.”
•	 The 2010−2014 development plan for Indonesia, which saw its Gini 
coefficient worsen from 29 in 1990 to 39 in 2011, offers a vision of 
a society supported by five national development agendas, among 
them inclusive and just development.
•	 Malaysia’s 2011–2015 Development Plan is based on the “1Malaysia: 
People First, Performance Now” concept, and adopts an inclusive 
development approach to ensure equitable access to economic 
participation among all Malaysians, particularly aiming at 
improving livelihood of the poorer 40% of households.
•	 In the Philippines, the vision of the 2011–2016 medium-
term development plan is to achieve inclusive growth, create 
employment opportunities, and reduce poverty.
•	 Thailand’s 2012–2016 Development Strategy is based on 
the “sufficiency economy” philosophy and people-centered 
development, with a vision of equity, fairness, and resilience.
To gauge the extent of the rising concerns over inequality among 
Asian policy makers, in early 2012 ADB carried out a web-based survey 
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(Box 2.1.3). Over 65% of respondents agreed that income inequality in 
their countries was high or very high. Almost all felt that incomes in their 
countries were becoming more unequal. Importantly, for a region with 
considerable success in lifting its citizens out of poverty, a majority of the 
respondents felt that widening inequality was not acceptable even with 
these declines in the poverty rate.
To better understand the views of regional policy makers, 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) used an informal 
survey covering different aspects of the inequality problem. 
ADB targeted officials of ministries of finance, planning 
authorities, and other government agencies in the region.
The survey was administered online from 11 January to 
29 February 2012. In some 
cases, the questionnaire was 
translated into local languages. 
From key government 
agencies in 25 of ADB’s 
developing member countries, 
504 respondents registered 
their opinions. The results 
confirm that policy makers 
consider rising inequality an 
increasingly serious problem 
(Box figure). In particular:
•	 About two-thirds of the 
respondents indicated 
that the level of income 
inequality is high or 
very high and that it has 
increased from 10 years 
ago;
•	 44% of the respondents 
indicated that the level of 
concern over inequality 
among policy makers is 
high or very high and 70% 
indicated that the concern 
has increased;
•	 95% of the respondents 
think that it is important 
or very important to have 
policies in place to prevent 
rises in inequality in order 
to maintain stability and 
sustain growth; and
•	 More than 52% disagree 
or strongly disagree 
with the statement that 
higher income inequality 
is acceptable so long as 
poverty is declining.
A simple analysis of the survey results shows that 
respondents from countries with rising inequality have 
a higher level of concern over inequality and a sense of 
urgency for addressing it than those from countries with 
declining inequality.
2.1.3 How important is inequality to developing Asia’s policy makers?
Concerns about inclusiveness of growth and rising inequaity—Policy maker survey
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Income inequality in Asia
This chapter draws on data from several sources. The first is the World 
Bank’s PovcalNet, which provides Gini coefficients for most of the 
countries covered. The PovcalNet also provides grouped per capita 
income or expenditure data (by decile), from which the quintile ratios 
and growth incidence by quintile can be computed. The grouped 
expenditure data (together with rural and urban populations) were also 
used to estimate the national Gini coefficients for the PRC and Indonesia 
for more recent years as they are not available in PovcalNet. 
The second is unit-level household survey data, which are used for 
estimating growth incidence curves, the top 5% and 1% income (or 
expenditure) shares, and GE(0) indexes (in decomposition analysis) for 
a selection of countries. Unit-level survey data are also used to estimate 
Gini coefficients and quintile ratios when PovcalNet does not provide 
sufficient data, mostly for Pacific countries. Inequality measures for India 
are all calculated from unit-level household survey data. 
The third source is official statistical publications or databases for all 
OECD countries, the Republic of Korea, and Taipei,China.
Inequality can be estimated for per capita income or per capita 
expenditure. The two measures usually give different results, with income 
inequality normally higher than expenditure inequality. For example, the 
income measure of the Gini was 47 in the Philippines in 2009 while the 
expenditure measure was 43. Viet Nam provides a more stark example: 
the income measure was 46 in 2008 and the expenditure measure 37. For 
most developing Asian countries, this theme chapter estimates inequality 
measures from expenditure data, with the exception of those for 
Malaysia and Taipei,China that are based on income data. Estimates for 
Sub-Saharan African countries are also based on expenditure data, while 
those for Latin American and OECD countries are based on income data. 
These are largely determined by data availability.
Standard measures of inequality are discussed in Box 2.2.1.
Recent trends of income inequality estimates in 
developing Asia
Higher growth and rising inequality
Of the 36 economies with available data in 2000s (Table 2.2.1),2 13 had a 
Gini coefficient at or greater than 40, widely considered the threshold for 
“high inequality.”3 The average Gini for the 36 economies is 37.4 Eleven 
of the 28 economies with comparable data show an increase (worsening) 
in the coefficient in the last 2 decades. These 11 cover 82% of the region’s 
population. On an annual basis, the increase in inequality was most 
pronounced in the PRC: the Gini there worsened from 32.4 to 43.4 in 
1990–2008 (1.6% a year). Indonesia’s increased from 29.2 in 1990 to 38.9 in 
2011 (1.4% a year).
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The Gini coefficient is one measure of dispersion of a 
frequency distribution, for example, of how income 
or consumption expenditures are distributed across 
households. For an income distribution, the Gini is 
computed as follows:
∑
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where xi is the income (or expenditure) of individual i, 
µx is the average income of the population, and n is the 
total number of individuals in the population. The Gini 
will range from 0 if all individuals have the same income 
(perfect equality) to 1 if income is held by only one person 
in the population (perfect inequality). For convenience, 
this theme chapter cites the Gini multiplied by 100.
The quintile income (or expenditure) ratio is the ratio of 
the total income (or expenditure) of the top (richest) 20% 
of the population to that of the bottom (poorest) 20%.
Generalized entropy GE(0) is one member of a family 
of measures derived from the notion of entropy in 
information theory. It is also known as Theil’s second 
measure and can be computed as follows:
∑
=
=
n
i i
x
xlnnGE(0) 1
1 µ )(
A major attraction of this index is that it is decomposable: 
the total inequality can be decomposed into a component 
measuring inequality between groups and components 
measuring inequality within groups.
Income (or expenditure) shares of the top 1% and 5% of 
the households in the distribution focus on income (or 
expenditure) shares of the richest households.
The growth incidence curve plots per capita income (or 
expenditure) growth at each point of an income distribution 
between two periods, which can provide more detailed 
insight into what is driving changes in the distribution over 
time than any summary measure of inequality.
2.2.1 Methods for measuring inequality
2.2.1 GDP growth and change in the Gini coefficient
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There appears to be a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between the increase in the Gini (rising inequality) and GDP growth 
(Figure 2.2.1).
The trend of rising inequality is widespread in the region. 
Yet 14 economies with data in the 2 decades recorded an 
improvement in the Gini, five from Central Asia. Part of the 
former Soviet Union, these five underwent dramatic economic 
and social transformation from the late 1980s, when the Gini 
surged, but the coefficient declined in more recent years as 
their economies became more stable. In the Kyrgyz Republic, 
for example, the Gini worsened from 26 in 1988 to 53.7 in 1993, 
then declined to 36.2 in 2009.
Most of the other countries that saw an improving Gini 
coefficient (sometimes sharply) have a small economy: Bhutan, 
Fiji, Maldives, Nepal, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, and Samoa. Some 
of them are vulnerable to shocks. Maldives, for instance, 
experienced a devastating tsunami in 2004 and Timor-Leste 
went through civil conflicts. These are likely to have impacted 
on incomes of different classes and on income distribution.
To gain more insight into the pattern of inequality and 
its change over time, we look at the Gini coefficient of urban 
and rural subpopulations within a country, focusing on the 
PRC, India and Indonesia, the region’s three most populous 
countries.
In the PRC, rural and urban inequalities increased in 
1990–2008—urban from 25.6 to 35.2 and rural from 30.6 to 39.4 
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2.2.1 Trends in inequality in developing Asia
Gini coefficients Quintile ratios
Economy Initial 
year
Final 
year
1990s 2000s Annualized 
growth rate 
(%)
1990s 2000s Annualized 
growth rate 
(%)
Central Asia
Armenia 1998 2008 36.0 30.9 -1.5 5.8 4.5 -2.5
Azerbaijan 1995 2008 35.0 33.7 -0.3 6.1 5.3 -1.1
Georgia 1996 2008 37.1 41.3 0.9 7.1 8.9 1.9
Kazakhstan 1996 2009 35.3 29.0 -1.5 6.2 4.2 -3.0
Kyrgyz Republic 1993 2009 53.7 36.2 -2.5 22.7 6.4 -8.0
Tajikistan 1999 2009 29.0 30.8 0.6 4.5 4.8 0.6
Uzbekistan 1998 2003 45.3 36.7 -4.2 - - -
East Asia         
China, People's Rep. of 1990 2008 32.4 43.4 1.6 5.1 9.6 3.6
Korea, Rep. of 1992 2010 24.5 28.9 0.9 - - - 
Mongolia 1995 2007 33.2 36.5 0.8 - - - 
Taipei,China 1990 2010 31.2 34.2 0.5 5.2 6.2 0.9
South Asia         
Afghanistan  - 2007 - 27.8 - - - - 
Bangladesh 1991 2010 27.6 32.1 0.8 3.9 4.7 0.9
Bhutan 2003 2007 46.8 38.1 -5.2 9.9 6.8 -9.4
India 1993 2010 32.5 37.0 0.7 4.8 5.7 1.1
Maldives 1998 2004 62.7 37.4 -8.6 46.6 6.8 -32.1
Nepal 1995 2010 35.2 32.8 -0.5 5.5 5.0 -0.7
Pakistan 1990 2007 33.2 30.0 -0.6 5.2 4.2 -1.3
Sri Lanka 1990 2006 32.5 40.3 1.3 4.8 6.9 2.3
Southeast Asia         
Cambodia 1994 2008 38.3 37.9 -0.1 5.8 6.1 0.3
Indonesia 1990 2011 29.2 38.9 1.4 4.1 6.6 2.2
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 1992 2008 30.4 36.7 1.2 4.3 5.9 1.9
Malaysia 1992 2009 47.7 46.2 -0.2 11.4 11.3 0.0
Philippines 1991 2009 43.8 43.0 -0.1 8.6 8.3 -0.2
Thailand 1990 2009 45.3 40.0 -0.6 8.8 7.1 -1.2
Viet Nam 1992 2008 35.7 35.6 0.0 5.6 5.9 0.2
The Pacific         
Fiji 2002 2008 46.8 42.8 -1.5 12.6 8.0 -7.5
Kiribati  - 2006 - 40.0  -  - 7.8  -
Micronesia, Fed. States of 1998  - 45.0 -  - 10.3 -  -
Nauru  - 2006 - 48.0  -  - 16.2  -
Palau  - 2006 - 42.0  -  - 7.6  -
Papua New Guinea 1996  - 50.9 -  - 12.5 -  -
Samoa 2002 2008 45.0 43.0 -0.8 9.2 7.9 -2.5
Solomon Islands  - 2006 - 46.0  -  - 10.3  -
Timor-Leste 2001 2007 39.5 31.9 -3.6 7.0 4.6 -6.9
Tonga  - 2001 - 34.0  -  - 6.0  -
Tuvalu 1994 2004 45.0 37.0 -2.0 8.9 6.2 -3.6
Vanuatu  - 2006 - 46.0  -  - 10.4 - 
- = not available.
Note: Gini coefficients and quintile ratios are mainly from earliest available data in the 1990s (except for Bhutan, Fiji, Samoa, and Timor-Leste, which are in the 
early 2000s) and latest available data, based on per capita expenditures, except for those of Malaysia and Taipei,China which are income-based. Estimates for the 
People’s Republic of China and Indonesia combine the separate urban and rural distributions, weighted by share of urban/rural to total population.
Source: PovcalNet data (accessed 9 March 2012), supplemented by household survey data mostly from Pacific countries and from India, and publications of official 
statistics offices (Republic of Korea and Taipei,China).
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(Figure 2.2.2). The pace in both was similar, leaving rural areas 
more unequal than urban areas, a position unlike that in most 
developing countries. However, the rate of increase appears to 
have been slowing since the early 2000s, for both areas.5
In India, the urban Gini grew from 34.4 in 1993 to 39.3 in 
2010, much faster than the contemporaneous growth of the 
rural Gini, from 28.6 to 30.0. India’s rural inequality is lower 
and urban inequality is higher than in the PRC and, unlike 
the PRC but like most developing countries, India’s urban 
inequality is higher than its rural inequality.
Similarly in Indonesia, urban inequality has been 
consistently higher than rural inequality, respectively, in 
2011, 42.2 and 34. During 1990–2011, both urban and rural 
inequalities increased (but urban inequality faster).
Quintile ratios
The Gini coefficient presents an aggregate measure of 
inequality in a distribution, and it may hide detailed patterns 
of differences across different levels of income. Table 2.2.1 
above presents the quintile ratios—the ratio of the per capita 
expenditure of the top 20% to that of the bottom 20%. In the 
late 2000s, 126 out of the 32 economies with available data had 
a quintile ratio at or above 7, that is, the average per capita 
expenditure of the richest 20% households was at least seven 
times as high as that of the poorest 20%. The mean quintile 
ratio for the 32 economies was 7.1.7
Table 2.2.1 also shows that on an annual basis, the change 
in the quintile ratio is more pronounced than the change in 
the Gini for almost all the countries. For example, the PRC’s 
annualized rate of increase of the Gini was 1.6%, but 3.6% for 
the quintile ratio (the ratio grew from 5.1 in 1990 to 9.6 in 2008). The 
larger increase in inequality when measured by the quintile ratio than 
by the Gini suggests that rising inequality may have been driven by 
households at the top.
Growth incidence curves
Growth incidence curves provide more detail on distributional changes 
by allowing one to look at income growth between two periods at various 
points of an income distribution. Figure 2.2.3 shows the annual growth 
of mean per capita expenditure by quintile as well as for the entire 
population for the countries experiencing rising inequality in the last 
2 decades with available data.8
All income groups of households (apart from Georgia’s) experienced 
per capita expenditure growth during the periods reviewed. This suggests 
that economic growth has raised living standards for all people in these 
countries. However, per capita expenditure grew much faster for the top 
quintile households than for the lower quintiles, especially than for the 
bottom quintile.
In the PRC, for example, the mean expenditure growth for the bottom 
quintile in 1990–2008 was only 4%, but 7.6% for the top quintile. In India, 
the mean growth was only 0.8% for the bottom quintile but 1.9% for the 
2.2.2 Urban and rural inequality in the PRC, India, and 
Indonesia
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top quintile. (In Georgia, income fell for all quintile groups in 1996–2008, 
though as the decline was more significant for the bottom quintile than 
for the top quintile, inequality widened).
Figure 2.2.3 also compares mean growth of each quintile with that 
of the population. It shows that in all the countries (but the PRC and 
Tajikistan), rising inequality involves a shift of income from the bottom 
80% of the population to the top 20%, as indicated by lower mean 
expenditure growth for quintiles 1 to 4 than that for the whole 
population. In the PRC and Tajikistan, with mean expenditure 
growth for quintiles 1 to 3 lower than and for quintile 4 close 
to that of the top quintile, rising inequality involves a shift of 
income from the bottom 60% to the top 20% of population.
Figure 2.2.4 shows growth incidence curves for India and 
Indonesia using unit-level survey data. The results largely 
confirm the findings from mean expenditure growth by 
quintile. The growth incidence curve cuts across the line of 
growth of population mean per capita expenditure at close to 
the 80th percentile, suggesting that rising inequality in the 
two countries has been driven by income redistribution to the 
top 20%, at a cost to the bottom 80%. The growth incidence 
curve increases monotonically for Indonesia. But for India, 
expenditure growth at the lowest few percentiles was higher 
than growth of population mean per capita expenditure.
Expenditure shares of the top 5% and 1%
Figure 2.2.5 goes further up the income distribution, focusing 
on the very top. In terms of levels, there are large variations 
in the expenditure shares of the top 5% and 1%. Except for the 
Pacific countries, in the late 2000s the shares of the richest 
households are relatively close across countries, in the range of 
17−22% for the top 5% and 6−9% for the top 1%. For the Pacific 
countries, the shares of the top 5% and 1% are higher with a 
wider variation: 15−28% for the top 5% and 5−16% for the top 1%.
Consistent with the changes in the Gini and quintile ratios, 
most of the countries in Figure 2.2.5 show that the expenditure 
shares of the top 1% and 5% increased during the review 
2.2.3 Growth incidence by quintile, countries with rising inequality
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periods. In the PRC, for example, in 1995–2008 the share of the 
top 5% rose from 17% to 20.5%, and that of the top 1% from 4.6% 
to 6.4%. In India, the shares of the top 5% and 1% increased from 
17.7% and 6.5% in 1993 to 21.3% and 9%, respectively, in 2010. 
These results back up the earlier point that rising inequality in 
developing Asia is closely associated with very rapid increases in 
the very top income groups—that is, the rich are getting richer 
much faster.
Within- and between-country inequality
Although the focus of this chapter is on inequality within each 
country, it is useful both to look at Asia-wide inequality that 
considers developing Asian countries as one entity and to ask how 
important within-country inequality is, compared with between-
country inequality.
The Asia-wide Gini coefficient increased from 39 in the 
mid-1990s to 46 in the late 2000s, or 1.4% a year. Both within-
country and between-country inequality as measured by the 
GE(0) index (Box 2.2.1 above) widened (Figure 2.2.6). However, 
between-country inequality grew faster, as its contribution to 
Asia-wide inequality rose from about 22.6% in the mid-1990s to 
29.6% in the late 2000s, while the contribution of within-country 
inequality to Asia-wide inequality declined from 77.4% to 70.4% in 
the same period. The between-country income differences can be 
largely explained by much faster growth in the PRC than in the 
rest of the region.
Asia’s inequality in a global context
Before going into a detailed comparison of Asia’s inequality 
vis-à-vis other groupings, a word of caution. Inequality measures 
are by and large based on per capita incomes for OECD and 
Latin American countries, while they are based on per capita 
expenditure in most developing Asian countries (as well as 
Sub-Saharan Africa). As noted earlier, income-based inequality 
measures tend to run higher than expenditure-based ones.9
Despite recent increases, Gini coefficients in developing Asia 
are still on average lower than in other regions of the developing 
world (Figure 2.2.7). Developing Asia’s range of Gini coefficients 
of 28−51 is tighter than that of Sub-Saharan Africa’s 30−66, and 
lower than that of Latin America and the Caribbean’s 45−60. This 
conclusion is likely to hold even if we consider the differences 
between income-based and expenditure-based inequalities.
Yet developing Asia compares less favorably when one looks at 
changes in inequality. During the last decade, most Sub-Saharan 
African countries and more than half of Latin American and 
Caribbean countries experienced declines in Gini. In developing 
Asia, 11 out of the 28 economies with comparable data, covering 
82% of the region’s population, experienced increases in inequality 
(Figure 2.2.8 below).
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For Latin America, recent studies have identified several 
contributing factors to the declining inequality, including 
policies that enhanced employment prospects (including 
encouraging trade), targeted inequality of human capital 
through strengthened provision of education and health 
services, and promoted conditional cash transfers that help 
build human capital. Large, conditional cash transfer programs, 
such as Bolsa Familia in Brazil and Progresa/Oportunidades in 
Mexico, have played a central role in the turnaround (Esquivel, 
Lustig, and Scott 2010).
Compared with OECD countries, however, developing Asia’s 
inequality is much higher overall. Of the 34 OECD countries 
with comparative data, most countries had a Gini in the range 
of 25−35. High taxes and transfers are key reasons for their 
low income inequality. Twenty OECD countries had a Gini 
coefficient before taxes and transfers greater than 40 in the 
mid-2000s (Figure 2.2.9).
Yet even in OECD countries, as in developing Asia, 
inequality is on the rise: 17 OECD countries saw increases in the 
Gini coefficient from the mid-1990s to late 2000s (Figure 2.2.8).10
A study by OECD (2011a) reports that in many OECD countries 
household incomes increased much faster at the top income 
ranges from the mid-1990s to the late 2000s, similar to the 
experiences of many developing Asian countries. On average, 
income growth for households in the top decile was 1.5 times as 
high as that for the bottom decile from the mid-1980s to late-
2000s for 27 OECD countries. The difference in income growth 
between the top and bottom deciles was particularly significant 
in Germany, Sweden, the US, and the Netherlands, in the range 
of 3 to 15 times as high.
The OECD study identified various factors contributing to 
rising inequality, such as increased financial integration and 
technological change; increased imports from low-income 
countries, reducing employment prospects for less skilled 
workers; changes in labor market policies that tended to 
reduce income and benefits for less skilled workers; increasing 
prevalence of part-time work; greater numbers of single-headed 
households; increasing income shares for capital, benefiting 
rich households; increased incomes from self-employment, 
which reward the more highly skilled workers; and declining 
effectiveness of redistribution through taxes and transfers.
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2.2.9 Gini coefficients of OECD countries, 2000s
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2.2.8 Annualized change in Gini coefficient: Developing Asia and other regions, 1990s and 2000s
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Inequality of opportunity
What is opportunity?
An important development in the recent discourse on inequality is the 
focus on opportunity. Whether the opportunity is used well must be 
conceptually separated from whether it exists in the first place. The 
policy implications vary greatly depending upon whether the outcome 
was the result of differences in education and health available to an 
individual—opportunity—or differences in effort. A few examples will 
illustrate this point.
First, consider two low-income individuals. One, despite having been 
provided with a good education and health care, wastes this opportunity by 
not exerting enough effort and enterprise, and ends up with a low income. 
The other had poor education so that, despite being willing to work hard, 
ends up with low income. The first individual suffers due to lack of effort, 
while the second one is limited by his or her circumstances (Roemer 1998). 
The distinction here is that the first person could have applied more effort, 
while the second was constrained by a lack of opportunity.
But how do differences in opportunities arise in the first place? 
Consider two individuals with different levels of education and health 
because one did not have access to schools or health services. This could 
be because of discrimination in access for social reasons, or because of 
services not provided in certain geographic areas. Preventing individuals 
from enhancing their human capital to augment their earning potential—
through discrimination or incomplete service coverage—creates 
inequality of opportunity.
Unfortunately, that is not the only way that unequal opportunities 
arise. Consider now two individuals with the same level of education and 
health, and the same level of effort and enterprise, but one of whom is 
simply not allowed to exercise that effort and enterprise to earn income. 
This exclusion could stem from discrimination in the labor or credit 
market, or from gender or racial bias. Such social exclusion creates 
inequality of opportunity as well.
Differences in opportunity can therefore arise because of differences 
in access to public services that lead to differences in human capital 
formation (education and health), or because of differences in access to 
income earning opportunities. However, the final outcome, in this case 
income actually earned, depends also on the effort and enterprise applied 
by the individual. Inequality of opportunity is thus a determinant of 
inequality of outcome, but not the sole factor.
Inequalities due to circumstances are ethically unacceptable because 
it is attributable to factors over which the individual has no control. In 
contrast, inequalities due to effort may be ethically acceptable, and may 
even be desirable to reward enterprise and thereby spur productivity 
and growth. Thus inequality of opportunity is the more important for 
policy action.
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Of course, in practice it is not easy to separate effort from 
opportunity, especially in an intergenerational context (Kanbur 2010). 
Thus parental income, which may be the result of their effort, nevertheless 
determines the opportunity of their children. Inequality of income, even 
if it is not of direct concern in this framework, will still be important as a 
determinant of inequality of opportunity.
This connection between inequality of income and of opportunity 
makes it important to study both, and for policy makers to address both 
dimensions of inequality. If drivers of inequality are such that any given 
inequality of opportunity is transformed into ever greater divergences 
in income, and this income inequality translates into inequality of 
opportunity in the next generation, policy makers will need to redouble 
their efforts to break the link between parental income and educational 
opportunity for their children.
Inequalities of education and health in Asia
Asia has made significant strides in improving average achievements in 
education and health. However, considerable inequalities remain, as now 
discussed.
Education
Significant inequality in education persists in developing Asia, discussed 
here along three dimensions: wealth, location, and gender.11
Inequality by wealth quintile. Inequality in the proportion of out-of-
school children between rich and poor households was, in the late 
1990s to mid-2000s, very wide in developing Asia (UNESCO 2005). For 
example, in Bangladesh, India, Mongolia, Myanmar, and the Philippines, 
where the average proportion of out-of-school primary school-age 
children was about 20% in 1999–2003, children from the poorest quintile 
were three times as likely as those from the richest quintile to be out of 
school. In Cambodia and the Lao PDR, with an average proportion of 
about 35%, the children from the poorest quintile were four or five times 
as likely as those from the richest quintile to be out of school.
Results from more 
recent household survey 
data for Bhutan, Pakistan, 
and the Philippines 
show that inequality in 
education indicators persists 
(Figure 2.3.1). In Bhutan in 
2007, the net attendance rate 
for primary schooling for 
the top-quintile households 
(based on per capita 
household expenditure) was 
more than two times as 
high as that for the bottom 
quintile. The ratio was 
even greater for secondary 
schooling at close to five 
2.3.1 Gaps in net attendance rates between top and bottom quintiles, 2000s
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times, and postsecondary at 
25 times. Relative to 2003, the 
gap widened significantly for 
postsecondary education.
In Pakistan in 2008, 
the net attendance rate for 
primary education for the 
top quintile was about two 
times as high as for the 
bottom quintile. In the case 
of secondary education, the 
ratio was over five, and for 
postsecondary, it was 27, 
increasing slightly from 2002.
In the Philippines in 
2010, the difference in net 
attendance between the top and bottom quintiles was not 
large for primary education, but much larger for secondary 
education, even more so for postsecondary education. The 
net attendance rate for postsecondary education for the top 
quintile was about seven times as high as for the bottom 
quintile.
Inequality by location. Significant inequality in education 
also exists between urban and rural areas (Figure 2.3.2). 
For example, in Bhutan in 2007 and Pakistan in 2008, the 
net attendance rate in the rural area was only two-thirds in 
primary education, about one-half in secondary education, 
and one-third in postsecondary education of that of the urban 
area. In the Philippines in 2010, the inequality in education 
between rural and urban areas was much smaller in primary 
and secondary education, but significant in postsecondary 
education: the urban rate was 1.5 times as high as the rural 
rate.
Inequality by gender. Education indicators by gender are 
more available (partly because they are part of the MDG 
indicators). Recent data suggest that most developing Asian 
countries have achieved or almost achieved gender parity in 
primary education, apart from Afghanistan and Papua New 
Guinea, where gender differences remain wide—the latest 
available data (in the 2000s) indicate that the ratio of girls’ 
to boys’ gross enrollment in primary education stood at 0.69 
for Afghanistan and 0.82 for Papua New Guinea, according 
to the World Development Indicators. While the level of 
gender equality is less uniform for secondary than primary 
education, many countries made progress (Figure 2.3.3). 
Gender parity has been achieved in East Asia, Central Asia, 
and most countries in Southeast Asia, but gender gaps remain 
wide in South Asia (except Sri Lanka), and some countries 
in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. It is worrying to observe 
a reduction in the ratio of girls’ to boys’ secondary school 
enrollment rates in Afghanistan, however.
2.3.2 Urban–rural gaps in net attendance rates, 2000s
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Click here for figure data
2.3.3 Ratio of girls’ to boys’ gross enrollment in secondary 
education, 1991 and 2010
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2.3.4 Ratio of girls’ to boys’ gross enrollment in tertiary 
education, 2010
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In tertiary education, in some countries that have already 
achieved gender parity, girls’ enrollment rates exceed boys’, 
notably Maldives and Palau, where girls’ rates are more than 
twice as high (Figure 2.3.4). In contrast, the rest of South 
Asia, except Maldives, are behind most other countries in 
the region.
Health
Health inequality within countries remains considerable in 
Asia, despite overall improvements in the average health of 
countries’ populations throughout the region.
Inequality by wealth quintile. The mortality rates for the 
bottom quintile are much greater than for the top quintile in 
urban areas of all the countries in Figure 2.3.5. In the worst 
case, the chance of a poor infant dying at birth is more than 
10 times that of an infant born to a rich family. This stark 
pattern of inequality in infant mortality is partly related to 
differences in birth attendance by skilled health personnel 
between rich and poor households. In all countries for which 
data are available, the poorest do much worse than the 
richest. In the worst case, the percentage of attended births 
in the lowest quintile is less than a fifth of the number for 
the top quintile. In some cases the situation has worsened in 
recent years.
Inequality by location. Spatial disparity in health 
achievements in Asia is large, especially between urban and 
rural areas. WHO data12 show that in all the Asian countries 
with available data, the infant mortality rate in rural areas 
is much higher than that in urban areas. In Cambodia, 
Kazakhstan, the Philippines, and Viet Nam, the difference 
increased during the 2000s.
Inequality by gender. Gender is an important dimension of 
health disparity, which is clearly seen in under-five mortality 
rates (Figure 2.3.6). High mortality rates for both boys and 
girls in Afghanistan are alarming. A number of countries in 
Asia and the Pacific also record relatively high rates relative to 
the world average.
Boys’ under-five mortality rates are higher than girls’ in 
most countries in the region (and in other parts of the world), 
but girls’ rates exceed those of boys’ in the PRC, most of South 
Asia, and some Pacific islands. The preference for sons in these 
countries may be a causal factor, making the opportunity 
of life itself dependent on a predetermined characteristic—
gender. The observed greater number of male than female 
infants in these countries is not only due to the differential 
care after birth, but also partly due to sex-selective abortion, 
though this cannot be captured by mortality rates.
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2.3.5 Inequality in infant mortality rate, urban
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2.3.6 Under-five mortality rate for girls and boys, 2005−2010
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Measuring human opportunity in Asia
Strong disparities in education and health thus exist in Asia across 
income levels, location, and gender. But is there a systematic way of 
measuring overall inequality of human opportunity? Paes de Barros, et al. 
(2009) developed an approach that starts with the overall national rate of 
access to a public service—for example, enrollment in secondary school—
then calculates how different the access rate is across gender, location, 
parental education, household income, and other indicators capturing 
circumstance.13 The dissimilarity in access rates across these circumstance 
differences is the degree of inequality of opportunity (the D-index). The 
D-index can be interpreted as the proportion of a particular opportunity 
that needs to be redistributed to achieve equal distribution. The inequality 
of opportunity is then used to scale down the national access rate to 
estimate the human opportunity index (HOI).
The technical methodology outlined in Box 2.3.1 is applied to 
six developing countries in Asia (Bhutan, Indonesia, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Viet Nam) with a particular focus on 
inequality of opportunity that is related to basic education and 
infrastructure. The analysis includes five outcome variables: primary 
school attendance among children aged 6–11 years; secondary school 
attendance among children aged 12–17 years; access to safe water; access 
to electricity; and access to sanitation.
The analysis used a set of circumstance variables required to estimate 
the D-index and the HOI. These circumstance variables are gender, 
location of household (urban or rural), education of household head, per 
capita household expenditure, age of household head, gender of household 
head, and household size.
Estimating the D-index1 from household survey data 
involves the following steps:
•	 Estimating a separable logistic model on whether child j 
has access to a given opportunity (such as education) as 
a function of his or her circumstances such as parents’ 
education, family per capita income, gender, and 
location of residence, which are outside the control of 
the child (Roemer 1998).
•	 Given the coefficient estimates, obtaining for each child 
in the sample the predicted probability of access to the 
opportunity in consideration, ˆ .
•	 Computing
|ˆ|
2
1
1 πππ
−Σ= = ii
n
i wD  
where n is the number of sample households, wi is the 
population weight attached to the ith sample household, 
and π  is the proportion of the population with access 
to a given opportunity.2 Note also that π  may be called 
the coverage rate. D measures the degree of inequality 
of opportunity that is explained by the individual’s 
circumstances. As such, (1-D) may be interpreted as equity 
of opportunity.
The human opportunity index (HOI) is then defined as
)1( DHOI −= π
which is a composite index of the coverage rate, and equity 
of opportunity. The policy makers’ objective will be to 
maximize HOI, which can be achieved either by enhancing 
total opportunity (coverage) or by increasing equity of 
opportunity (more equitably distributing opportunity) or 
by increasing both coverage and equity.
1 D is also referred to in the literature as the dissimilarity index, 
which is widely used in sociology.
2 Note that π  is the mean of ˆ  across all individuals.
Source: Paes de Barros et al. (2009).
2.3.1 Inequality of opportunity (D-index) and the human opportunity index
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2.3.1 Inequality of opportunity in education (%)
Primary education, 6–11 years old Secondary education, 12–17 years old
Country Survey year Average 
opportunity
D-index Human 
opportunity 
index
Average 
opportunity
D-index Human 
opportunity 
index
Bhutan 2007 83.1 5.0 78.9 72.0 5.8 67.9
Indonesia 2009 94.3 0.9 93.4 80.6 3.7 77.6
Pakistan 2007–08 74.6 8.7 68.1 56.2 15.2 47.6
Philippines 2002 93.9 1.8 92.2 83.1 4.0 79.7
Sri Lanka 2009–10 99.4 0.1 99.3 86.4 2.2 84.5
Viet Nam 2008 96.3 1.3 95.1 82.0 4.4 78.3
Source: ADB estimates using household survey data.
Inequality of opportunity in basic education
The average coverage rate—or average opportunity—for primary 
education in various years in the 2000s was the highest for Sri Lanka 
(Table 2.3.1). It also had the lowest D-index—inequality of opportunity at 
close to zero, leading to an HOI of 99.3%. The three countries of Southeast 
Asia were moving toward universal access of basic primary education. 
For these countries, the estimated HOIs, higher than 90%, suggest that 
more than 90% of primary education services required for universal 
coverage are available and distributed equitably. Pakistan not only had 
the lowest average opportunity, its D-index was also the highest, leading 
to the lowest HOI among the six countries. For Bhutan and Pakistan, the 
relatively low HOI was due to both lower average opportunity and higher 
inequality of opportunity.
The HOIs for secondary schools (12–17 years old) are much lower 
among the six countries, suggesting that these countries face greater 
challenges in ensuring equal access to schools for children aged 12–17. 
The low HOIs are due to both lower average opportunity and higher 
inequality of opportunity than for primary education. This is expected 
because the opportunity costs of sending children to schools are higher 
at the secondary than the primary level. This also implies that financial 
incentives such as conditional cash transfer programs could be more 
effective in targeting older children if the main objective is to improve 
school enrollment.
Inequality of opportunity in basic infrastructure services for health
Basic services, such as safe water and sanitation (e.g., flushing toilets) 
have a direct impact on health status and overall well-being. Access to 
services such as electricity helps households increase their productivity 
for income generation. Studies show that a household’s access to basic 
infrastructure services is highly and significantly correlated with a lower 
probability of being poor (for example, Balisacan 2003; Fan, Zhang, and 
Zhang 2002).
Developing Asia faces a more serious challenge in providing basic 
infrastructure services than basic education services. The HOIs for 
access to basic infrastructure services such as safe water, electricity, and 
sanitation show lower values for all countries and higher dispersion 
across countries than those for access to basic education services, 
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2.3.2 Inequality of opportunity in access to basic infrastructure services (%)
Access to safe water Access to electricity Access to sanitation
Country Survey year Average 
opportunity
D-index Human 
opportunity 
index
Average 
opportunity
D-index Human 
opportunity 
index
Average 
opportunity
D-index Human 
opportunity 
index
Bhutan 2007 89.9 3.4 86.9 70.1 13.3 60.8 26.5 43.5 15.0
Indonesia 2009 26.8 21.3 21.1 89.5 3.2 86.6 55.2 10.6 49.3
Pakistan 2007–08 34.2 24.1 25.9 90.2 4.7 86.0 66.0 17.7 54.3
Philippines 2002 61.5 12.1 54.1 78.5 12.5 68.6 85.6 6.4 80.2
Sri Lanka 2009–10 40.5 16.3 33.9 93.8 2.1 91.9 94.2 2.2 92.1
Viet Nam 2008 26.4 42.7 15.1 97.2 1.5 95.8 40.2 31.0 27.8
Source: ADB estimates using household survey data.
2.3.3 Contribution of circumstance variables to inequality of opportunity for secondary education, 
12–17 years old (%)
Country Survey year Gender of 
children
Area of 
residence 
(urban/rural)
Per capita 
household 
expenditure
Age of 
household 
head
Gender of 
household 
head
Education 
level of 
household 
head
Household 
size
Bhutan 2007 3.4* 42.4* 54.7* 4.1* 1.4* -4.5* -1.6
Indonesia 2009 0.2* 11.6* 69.1* 0.4* 1.5* 17.2* 0.1
Pakistan 2007–08 9.5* 5.2* 61.0* 0.2 1.2* 24.0* -1.1*
Philippines 2002 6.4* 2.4* 90.7* 0.3* -0.5* 0.0 0.6
Sri Lanka 2009–10 1.3* 0.8* 96.0* 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.6
Viet Nam 2008 4.0* 6.6* 65.7* 1.2 -0.4 11.0* 12.0*
Note: * indicates that the estimated coefficient was found to be statistically significant at the 5% level in the logit regression model 
of the probability of school attendance among secondary-school-age children, 12–17 years.
Source: ADB estimates using household survey data.
2.3.4 Contribution of circumstance variables to inequality of opportunity for access to sanitation (%)
Country Survey year Area of 
residence 
(urban/rural)
Per capita 
household 
expenditure
Age of 
household 
head
Gender of 
household 
head
Education level 
of household 
head
Household 
size
Bhutan 2007 43.7* 33.7* 1.7* 1.4* 21.0* -1.6*
Indonesia 2009 79.6* 17.0* 0.6* 0.1* 2.7* 0.1*
Pakistan 2007–08 38.7* 50.6* 0.6* 0.8* 10.1* -0.8*
Philippines 2002 2.5* 97.2* 1.1* 0.1* 0.7* -1.5*
Sri Lanka 2009–10 -0.3* 98.9* 2.4* 0.0 0.0* -0.9*
Viet Nam 2008 29.0* 67.0* 0.8* 1.5* 2.3* -0.6*
Note: * indicates that the estimated coefficient was found to be statistically significant at the 5% level in the logit regression model 
of the probability of having access to sanitation.
Source: ADB estimates using household survey data.
highlighting the uneven rates of progress in expanding opportunities for 
basic infrastructure services in the region (Tables 2.3.2–2.3.4).
The lower HOIs in access to basic infrastructure services compared 
with those in access to education are due to lower levels of average 
opportunity and higher levels of inequality of opportunity in some 
countries, especially for access to safe water and to sanitation. In 
Viet Nam, for instance, a low HOI in access to safe water, at 15.1%, is due 
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to a low average opportunity at 26.4% and high inequality of opportunity 
at 42.7%. In Bhutan, a low HOI in access to sanitation, at 15%, is due 
to both a low average opportunity at 26.5% and high inequality of 
opportunity at 43.5%.
Determinants of inequality of opportunity
The estimation of the D-index is based on seven circumstance variables, 
including gender of children, area of residence, per capita household 
expenditure, gender, age and educational attainment of household head, 
and household size. The Paes de Barros et al. (2009) decomposition is 
used to show the importance of each of these variables in contributing to 
the inequality of opportunity. The following discussion focuses only on 
secondary education and access to sanitation.
Per capita household expenditure is the most important contributing 
factor to inequality of opportunity in access to secondary education 
(Table 2.3.3). For example, it explains 54.5% of the variation in Bhutan and 
96% in Sri Lanka. Location of residence (urban and rural) of children is 
also important (for Bhutan and Indonesia). Educational attainment of the 
household head also has a significant influence for Indonesia, Pakistan, 
and Viet Nam. Another important factor is gender of children. Variables 
including household size, and age and gender of household head, are not 
important contributing factors.
In the case of access to sanitation, per capita household expenditure 
is a major driver of inequality of opportunity, and so is residence 
location (Table 2.3.4), especially in Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
and Viet Nam. In Indonesia and Bhutan, the largest contributing factor 
is location of residence. Educational attainment of household head is 
also an important contributing factor in Bhutan and Pakistan. Other 
circumstance variables play insignificant roles.
It is well known that access to safe water and sanitation is generally 
lower in rural than urban areas. This is due to the relatively higher cost of 
building water and sanitation infrastructure as well as lower income levels 
in rural than urban areas. Rural areas often lack an enabling environment 
that encourages public or private investment in water services, leading 
to low provision of those services. This is a particular problem in 
South Asia where there is low overall public or private investment in 
infrastructure particularly in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan (WaterAid 
2011). Moreover, even if investments are made, poor maintenance is an 
additional constraint.
Summary
Much needs to be done to improve the distribution of opportunities—
as measured by disparities in access to basic services—in developing 
countries in Asia. Sri Lanka’s achievements in equitably providing 
basic education opportunities demonstrate the importance and possible 
effectiveness of public policy in achieving equity of opportunity, 
particularly in education. The need for action is urgent because, without 
it, inequality of opportunity will be magnified into greater and greater 
inequality of outcome, which will then continue the cycle of inequality of 
opportunity and outcome for the next generation.
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What drives inequality in 
developing Asia?
Drivers and channels of inequality
Technological progress, globalization, and market-oriented reform have 
been the key drivers of developing Asia’s rapid growth in the last 2 
decades—but they also had huge distributional consequences. Together, 
they have favored skilled rather than unskilled labor, capital rather than 
labor, and urban and coastal areas rather than rural and inland regions. 
These changes can explain many of the movements in inequality in many 
regional countries.
Technological change can impact on the distribution of income among 
different factors of production. If it favors skilled labor (more educated 
or more experienced) over unskilled labor by increasing its relative 
productivity, we could expect the skill premium—the ratio of skilled to 
unskilled wages—to go up, which would most likely increase income 
inequality. Technological change could also affect the distribution of 
income between labor and capital. If it is biased in favor of capital, it 
could increase inequality since capital incomes, in general, are less equally 
distributed and accrue to the rich more than to the poor.
In a similar fashion, globalization can affect income distribution. 
Trade integration, for example, could change relative demand for and 
hence relative wages of skilled and unskilled workers. It could also 
affect income distribution between capital and labor because capital 
and skills often work together due to their complementarity. Financial 
integration could broaden access to finance by the poor—but could also 
increase the risk of financial crises and hurt the poor more than the rich. 
Globalization can magnify the distributional impact of technological 
progress.
A large literature has emerged in recent years attempting to 
understand the impacts of trade integration, financial integration, and 
technological change on income distribution (Box 2.4.1), though it has yet 
to provide a clear-cut answer. One complication is that there are several, 
closely linked, confounding factors.14
Market-oriented reform is an important driver of growth, but can 
also have significant distributional consequences. Trade policy reform is 
often part of the driving forces of globalization. Labor market reforms 
can change the bargaining position of labor vis-à-vis capital owners, 
impacting on wage rates and income distribution between labor and 
capital. Economic transition from a command to a market economy can 
improve efficiency and make returns to assets more closely reflective of 
resource scarcity, which can affect income distribution among different 
productive assets in a significant way.
Moreover, the impacts of the three drivers of growth—technological 
progress, globalization, and market-oriented reform—can be 
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There is general consensus among researchers and policy 
makers that Asia’s stellar growth performance could not 
have been achieved without its embrace of globalization. 
All countries in Asia are committed to greater integration 
with the global economy in coming decades. How 
does greater openness of an economy influence income 
inequality? Economic analysis does not provide a clear 
answer.
The simplest trade theory predicts that for countries 
with abundant unskilled labor, opening the economy 
should raise the wages of unskilled labor and depress the 
wages for skilled workers and returns to capital, as the 
country specializes in low-skill production, increasing 
equality (Stolper and Samuelson 1941). The historical 
evidence on “growth with equity” from the Republic of 
Korea; Singapore; and Taipei,China seems to support this 
thesis (Wood 1999).
The recent evidence on trade, openness, and inequality, 
however, is mixed, especially for economies that are not 
readily characterized as being abundant in unskilled labor, 
are resource rich, or have production structures not easily 
captured by the simple model. The channels between 
market opening and inequality are complex, and the quest 
for clarity in results remains elusive (Box table).
Empirically, a number of variables that affect inequality 
can confound the effect of trade openness on inequality, 
most notably financial integration, and skill-biased 
technological change and rising skill premiums. 
2.4.1 Globalization and inequality
Empirical studies on globalization and inequality
Mechanism and net effect on inequality Sample or data Literature 
Decrease
Financial integration can spur growth and benefit the poor Meta-survey Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine (2007)
No effect
Trade liberalization Survey of results for Mexico, Colombia, 
Brazil, Chile (1990s)
Goldberg and Pavcnik 
(2007)
Inconclusive or varying
Trade liberalization may decrease or increase wage differentials Survey for Latin America and East Asia 
(1960−1970s, 1980s−1990s)
Wood (1999)
Financial integration may increase the poor’s access to finance, but gains 
may be captured by elite: Inequality increases at low income levels; 
decreases as income rises
Meta-survey Claessens and Perotti 
(2007)
Trade openness benefits the rich more than the poor in very poor 
countries; it benefits the poor and middle class more as income rises.
Household surveys, World Income 
Distribution (WYD) database (1988, 
1993, 1998)
Milanovic (2005)
Financial globalization increases Gini coefficient by about 0.04; trade 
globalization decreases Gini coefficient by about 0.05
Global dataset (1980s−2000s) IMF (2007)
Increase
FDI increases demand for high-skilled workers 119 countries (1993−2004) from World 
Development Indicators 2004
Choi (2006)
FDI increases demand for skilled workers, explains 11% of wage 
inequality
101 manufacturing industries in UK 
(1983−1992)
Taylor and Driffield 
(2005)
FDI increases demand for high-skilled workers, and thus explains 50% of 
the increase in share of skilled labor
Data on foreign assembly plants in 
Mexico (1975−1988)
Feenstra and Hanson 
(1997)
Trade induces skill-intensification in the traded manufacturing sector, 
resulting in a 0.1% change in wage premium
Micro-level data from approximately 
1 million workers in Mexico (1987−1993)
Cragg and Epelbaum 
(1996)
Trade index explains 10–12% of wage gap between workers with 
different schooling; financial index explains 12–33% of the gap; capital 
account index explains 25–30%
Household surveys from 18 Latin 
American countries (1977−1998)
Behrman, Birdsall, and 
Székely (2003)
Financial integration may lead to crises which hurt the poor: poverty 
incidence increased from 1997 to 1998 in Indonesia by 11–19.9%; 
Republic of Korea, 2.6–7.3%; Malaysia, 8.2–10.4%; Thailand, 9.8–12.9%
Country data for Indonesia, Republic 
of Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, and 
some Latin American countries (Asian 
financial crisis period)
Fallon and Lucas (2002)
Financial integration may lead to crises that hurt the poor; 
macroeconomic volatility increases poverty index by about 0.35 to 
0.40
Macroeconomic data on various 
countries (World Bank Live Database) 
(1980s−1990s)
Agenor (2002)
Source: ADB staff compilation.
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geographically uneven, leading to a further channel of changing 
income distribution: spatial inequality. This is because new economic 
opportunities, released by these drivers, are often most easily seized by 
locations closer to the existing trade routes—coastal areas, for example, 
not inland ones—and areas with better public infrastructure—such 
as urban locations, not rural areas. This leads to shifts in income 
distribution among different geographic locations.
Complicating the analysis is that the impacts of the three drivers 
are intertwined. Although they can be disentangled conceptually, it 
is difficult to do so empirically. In the next three sections, therefore, 
instead of trying to isolate their impacts, we will look at three channels 
through which the three drivers affect income inequality: shifts in income 
distribution between skilled and unskilled labor, by examining returns 
to human capital and the skill premium; between labor and capital, 
by analyzing labor and capital income shares; and between different 
locations, by estimating spatial inequality. This approach also facilitates 
discussions of policy responses.
Yet those individuals and groups excluded from the market because 
of individual circumstances beyond their control or discrimination would 
certainly not benefit from these opportunities—inequality of opportunity 
magnifies the distributional consequences of the three drivers. One such 
group is women—discussed in the final section.
Increasing skill premiums
Inequality of education is a major contributor to inequality of 
income. There is significant global evidence that the rates of return to 
progressively higher levels of education have been trending upward in 
recent years. In OECD countries, for instance, those who do not complete 
an upper secondary education could earn an average of 23% less than 
their counterparts who do. A person with a tertiary education can 
expect to earn over 50% more than a person with an upper secondary or 
postsecondary non-tertiary education (OECD 2011b).
In Asia, empirical studies find that the returns to education increase 
with educational attainment and that the relationship has been getting 
steeper over time. An ADB study (2007b) finds that from the mid-1990s 
to mid-2000s, real wages grew much faster for wage earners with tertiary 
or higher education than for those with lower educational attainment in 
India and the Philippines, leading to wider wage differentials. 
The same study also finds that education is the single most important 
factor among those variables that were included in analyzing wage 
inequality. In the case of India, the Gini coefficient of wages increased 
from 40.5 in 1993 to 47.2 in 2004. Half the increase can be explained 
by individual characteristics. Of this explained increase, about 50% is 
accounted for by education.
Many other studies have provided direct or indirect evidence of rising 
skill/education premiums in developing Asia. Son (2010) finds that in 
the Philippines education increases individuals’ employability. In 2003, 
the probability of being employed was 57% for individuals with tertiary 
education, and 34% for those with primary education only. This difference 
in employability increased from 1997 to 2003. Further, the difference in 
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employability due to differences in educational attainment was more 
pronounced among poorer households.
A study on India, the Philippines, and Thailand finds that the rate of 
return to college education rose relative to that of secondary education 
between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s (Mehta et al. 2011). This rise was 
related to the expansion of high-skill services jobs: employing only 7–11% 
of the labor force, they contributed 40–70% of the rate of return to college 
education.
A more recent study (World Bank 2012a) reports that the 
tertiary education premium15 stood at 90% for Cambodia 
(2007), 60% for the PRC (2005), 84% for Indonesia (2007), 70% 
for Mongolia (2007), 70% for the Philippines (2006), 120% for 
Thailand (2004), and 55% for Viet Nam (2006). In Cambodia, 
the PRC, Mongolia, and Viet Nam the premium increased in 
recent years across sectors. In Indonesia, the tertiary education 
premium increased in the manufacturing sector, and in the 
Philippines, it increased in the services sector.
Household survey data help reveal patterns of income 
inequality due to educational attainment (in this case, of the 
household head) (Figure 2.4.1). First, education inequality 
almost always accounts for more than 20% of total income 
inequality. Second, the share of total income inequality 
explained by educational inequality has by and large been 
on the increase. The share of inequality accounted for by 
differences in educational attainment increased in all the 
countries during the periods looked at, with the increase most 
significant in the PRC, from 8.1% in 1995 to 26.5% in 2007.
As in the rest of the world, developing Asia is facing strong 
upward pressure on the wage gap between skilled and unskilled 
labor. Is this because of skill-biased technological progress? 
There are empirical difficulties in isolating this factor 
because the wage premium depends on both demand- and 
supply-side factors. Unsurprisingly, analysts have come down on 
both sides of the explanation.16 To the extent that skill-biased 
technological change happens, its impact can be transmitted 
through globalization. It is unlikely that policy makers can 
reverse this trend, nor should they want to, since technological 
progress is delivering higher levels of productivity and growth 
in the economy. The answer, rather, is to address inequality in 
human capital itself.
Declining share of labor income
In the last 2 decades, the income share of labor has been on the 
decline and that of capital on the rise in many OECD countries. 
In the US, for example, the labor income share in industry 
declined from 65% in 1992 to 52.4% in 2009 (Figure 2.4.2). For 
the entire US economy, the labor income share fell from 68.7% 
to 64.2% in the same period. Similarly in Germany, the labor income 
share of industry peaked at 79.5% in 1993 from the rise that started in the 
mid-1980s, declining since then.
2.4.1 Income inequality decomposition by educational 
attainment of household head
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A declining labor income share means that the growth of 
wage rates lags behind growth of labor productivity. A number 
of contributing factors have been identified. 
The first is that technological change, especially connected 
with improvements in information and communications 
technologies, has raised the productivity of and return to 
capital relative to labor. The second is the decrease in the 
bargaining power of labor, due to changing labor market 
policies and declining union membership in these countries. 
The third is increased globalization and trade openness, that 
led to migration of relatively more labor-intensive sectors from 
advanced economies to emerging economies—with the sectors 
remaining in the advanced economies relatively less labor 
intensive and having a lower average share of labor income 
(Jacobson and Occhino 2012; Arpaia, Perez, and Pichelmann 
2009). It has also been noted that globalization and trade 
openness increase the elasticity of labor demand, which also 
weakens labor’s bargaining position (Rodrik 1997; Harrison 
2002).
Empirical evidence suggests that Asia is following this 
trend—all the economies in Figure 2.4.3 saw declines in labor 
income shares during the mid-1990s to mid-2000s.
What are the causes of these declines? Technological 
progress in the region appears to have been labor-saving and 
capital-using. Partly, this can be explained by a high level of 
capital accumulation in many Asian countries (Felipe 2009; 
ADB forthcoming). As a result, the wage employment elasticity 
of growth17 has been on the decline in many countries in recent 
years (Figure 2.4.4)—in the PRC from 0.44 in 1991–2001 to 0.28 
in 2001–2011 and in India from 0.53 to 0.41, for example. This 
decline means that each percentage of employment growth 
now requires a higher percentage of output growth than in the 
past—a phenomenon sometimes referred to as “jobless growth.”
A declining employment elasticity of growth implies 
increases in labor productivity. Annual growth of manufacturing 
labor productivity in 2000–2008 reached 6.7% in the PRC, 
5.5% in Malaysia, and was in the range of 3–4% in Indonesia, 
Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam (APO 2011).
That labor productivity is increasing but the labor income 
share is declining implies that real wage growth has lagged 
behind labor productivity growth, partly because of the 
presence of a large pool of rural surplus labor in many countries 
associated with their dual-economy structure.18 The pool of 
surplus labor weakens the bargaining power of labor and 
depresses wages in the nonagricultural sectors, contributing 
to declines in the labor income share when globalization and market-
oriented reform led to rapid growth. 
In India, for instance, the average annual growth of labor productivity 
was 7.4% in 1990–2007, while average annual real wage growth was only 
2% (Box 2.4.2). In the case of the PRC, Zhuang (1996) showed that if the 
labor market had been fully liberalized and controls over labor transfer 
2.4.3 Share of labor income in industrial/manufacturing 
value added, selected Asian economies
0
20
40
60
Mid-2000sEarly 2000sMid-1990sEarly 1990s
BANHKGINDMALSININOTAPPRCKORJPN
%
BAN = Bangladesh; PRC = People’s Republic of China; HKG = Hong Kong, China; 
IND = India; INO = Indonesia; JPN = Japan; KOR = Rep. of Korea; MAL = Malaysia; 
SIN = Singapore; TAP = Taipei,China.
Note: Early 1990s (1990–1992), mid-1990s (1994–1996), early 2000s (2000–2002), 
mid-2000s (2004–2006) for the PRC; India; Singapore; Malaysia; India; 
Hong Kong, China; and Bangladesh.
Source: OECD Stat database for Japan; Republic of Korea; Taipei,China; and 
Indonesia (accessed 1 March 2012); Felipe and Sipin (2004) for Singapore; 
Malaysia; Hong Kong, China; Bangladesh; Bai and Qian (2009) for the PRC; and 
Felipe and Kumar (2010) for India’s organized manufacturing sector.
Click here for figure data
2.4.4 Wage employment elasticity of growth, selected 
Asian economies, 1991–2001 and 2001–2011 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
2001−20111991−2001
Developing Asia
World
Viet Nam
Pakistan
Cambodia
Philippines
Bangladesh
Indonesia
India
Thailand
Malaysia
PRC
Sri Lanka
Elasticity
PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Note: Simple average for world and developing Asia.
Source: International Labour Organization. 2011. Trends Econometric Models. 
October.
Click here for figure data
Confronting rising inequality in Asia   67
from rural to urban areas fully relaxed in the early 1980s, urban wage 
rates would have fallen and the labor income share of the urban sector 
decreased by half.
A lower share of income going to labor and a higher share of income 
going to capital tend to increase inequality, because capital income is 
more unequally distributed (due to asset inequality) than income from 
basic wage labor.
Figure 2.4.5 shows the Gini coefficients for wealth of selected Asian 
economies and some comparator countries—they are much higher than 
those for income inequality.
The declining employment elasticity in Asia is of concern because the 
poor and middle class rely heavily on labor for their income. Figure 2.4.6 
shows that a higher wage employment elasticity is associated with a 
smaller increase in inequality. The policy implications of the close 
relationship between employment and inequality are significant. They 
suggest a search for policies that promote employment.
Spatial inequality—up to half the total
As the distribution of economic activity is structured geographically—
high concentrations and incomes in some locations, and low on both 
counts in others—so are the distribution of income and its evolution. 
Some locations have natural advantages—like fertile soil for agriculture 
or proximity to a coastline for trade.19 Economic analysis has also 
highlighted the role of agglomeration benefits, where once concentration 
The figure shows that over the period 1990–2007, labor productivity in 
India’s organized manufacturing sector grew much faster than the real 
wage rate. While the latter did not even double during the period, labor 
productivity increased threefold, from about R80,000 to about R250,000. 
This implies that gains in productivity were not passed on to wages and, 
consequently, the labor share of India’s organized manufacturing sector 
declined significantly.
2.4.2 India’s formal sector: Real wage rate and labor productivity growth
Growth of real wage rate and labor productivity 
in India’s formal sector, 1990–2007
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starts because of natural advantages or because of advantages 
conferred by infrastructure, there is a self-perpetuating process of 
increasing concentration (Krugman 2008).
Rural–urban inequality
The increasing rural–urban income gap is a significant 
contributor to inequality in several Asian countries 
(Figure 2.4.7), especially the PRC (around 45%). Its importance 
has even increased in some.
The possibility of rising inequality due to urbanization 
as part of the development process was first pointed out by 
Kuznets (1955). The particular mechanisms that he highlighted 
in his contribution (Box 2.4.3) starts with a two-sector model 
with the population divided between a low mean income, low 
inequality sector (rural/agriculture) and a high mean income, 
high inequality sector (urban/industrial). In this model, the 
drivers of inequality are changes in inequality within the two 
sectors, a widening of the gap between average incomes in the 
two sectors, and a shift of population from agriculture in the 
rural sector to industry in the urban sector.
Inequality changes within the two sectors will most likely be 
affected by the same factors discussed in the previous sections, 
in particular the widening wage premium for skills, and the 
regional disparity (to be discussed below). To the extent that the 
urban labor force has a higher level of human capital than the 
rural labor force, this factor would also tend to widen the rural–
urban gap in average incomes. But perhaps the strongest driver 
of that gap is the cumulative force of agglomeration economies 
and its impact on productivity (de Groot, Poot, and Smit 2008). 
For whatever combination of reasons, the rural–urban income 
gap in Asia has been widening in the last 2 decades, especially 
in the PRC (Figure 2.4.8).
Thus the first two—change in inequality within the two 
sectors and a widening of the gap in the average income 
between the two sectors—are likely to put upward pressure on 
inequality in Asian countries. 
What about the third factor? As is well known, urbanization 
in Asia is rapid. Kuznets explored this with the aid of a 
numerical example (Box 2.4.3), which showed increasing 
inequality to start with as urbanization begins, followed by 
a decrease at the later stages. Anand and Kanbur (1993) show 
that if there is no inequality within the two sectors, so that the 
only difference between them is because of the higher income 
in the urban area, then inequality will indeed follow an inverse 
U shape, so that this driver will tend to raise inequality in the 
early stages of urbanization. If, further, urban inequality is 
higher than rural inequality, this effect will be reenforced. These 
suggest that the rural–urban structural divide, present in all 
developing Asia, and the process of urbanization, which all Asia 
is going through, are powerful drivers of overall inequality.
2.4.6 Wage employment elasticity and change in Gini 
coefficient, Asia and the Pacific, 1991–2011 
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2.4.7 Income inequality decomposition by location,  
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The basic Kuznets model is a well-defined process of 
distributional shift as population moves from agricultural 
(rural, traditional) to nonagricultural (urban, modern) 
sectors during the course of development. The process was 
set out by Kuznets (1955, pp. 12−15) in his classic paper as 
follows:
The basic assumptions used throughout are that the per 
capita income of sector B (nonagricultural) is always 
higher than that of sector A; that the proportion of sector 
A in the total population declines; and that the inequality 
of the income distribution within sector A may be as 
wide as that within sector B but not wider. With the 
assumptions concerning three sets of factors—intersector 
differences in per capita income, intrasector distributions, 
and sector weights—varying within the limitations just 
indicated, the following conclusions are suggested: .... [E]
ven if the differential in per capita income between the two 
sectors remains constant and the intrasector distributions 
are identical for the two sectors, the mere shift in the 
proportions of populations produces slight but significant 
changes in the distribution for the country as a whole. In 
general, as the proportion of A drifts from 0.8 downwards, 
the range tends first to widen and then to diminish.
This is the famous Kuznets inverted-U in the original: 
“the range tends to first widen and then to diminish.”
Evidence on the Kuznets inverted-U is mixed. Kuznets 
himself presented evidence for his hypothesis from the 
United Kingdom, the US, and some other developed 
economies in the late 19th and the first half of the 20th 
century. During this period, in fact, these economies 
were already on the downward part of the inverse-U. 
The possibility of a Kuznets inverse-U for developing 
economies was tested 2 decades later, by Ahluwalia 
(1976), who found support for it using cross-sectional 
data. However, subsequent rigorous econometric testing, 
with better techniques and better data, did not support 
the inverse-U in cross-country data (Anand and Kanbur 
1993).
Focusing on the middle- and low middle-income 
countries, Cornia, Addison and Kiiski (2004) find that, 
out of 34 developing countries for which they have several 
observations between the 1950s and the mid-1990s, 
inequality is higher in the terminal period for 15 of them, 
equal for 14 and lower for 5. When data are available, a 
U-shape is observed in a number of cases where inequality 
is found to be increasing when comparing the terminal 
and the initial years. 
Barro (2008), on the other hand, seems to find support 
for the Kuznets inverted-U in the cross-sectional data, 
although he recognizes that many factors are important in 
providing a full explanation. 
Thus the scant empirical evidence validating Kuznets 
hypothesis calls for a multifactor analysis, recognizing 
that the contributions of the various factors explaining 
growth and inequality may change over time. There is no 
single overarching driver of inequality. Rather, we need to 
explore a number of mechanisms in detail.
Sources: Kanbur (2011); Aizenmann et al. (forthcoming); Anand and 
Kanbur (1993).
2.4.3 The Kuznets theory and evidence
Regional inequality
Regional inequality has also been a key contributor to total 
inequality in many Asian countries, particularly in the PRC and 
India (Figure 2.4.9). Notably for the PRC, in 1990–2003 regional 
inequality increased more or less concurrently with overall 
inequality.
In the PRC, there appears to be a general consensus 
that increased openness contributed to sharpening income 
disparities between coastal and interior regions. As Lin (2005)
notes, an important feature of that country’s global integration 
is the depth of concentration of international trade along the 
east coast—which has far lower transport costs to the country’s 
major markets such as Hong Kong, China; Europe; Japan; and 
the United States.20 The recent decline has been partly attributed 
to the government’s Great Western Development Strategy (Fan, 
Kanbur, and Zhang 2011).
In India, coastal states have also fared better than inland states, 
although here a set of compounding factors such as initial level of 
2.4.9 Inequalities in provincial per capita incomes, 1990–
2010, selected Asian economies
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human capital and public infrastructure is also important (Kanbur, 
Gajwani, and Zhang 2007). New private-sector industrial 
investments typically take place in existing industrial and 
coastal districts to reduce costs, and overall investments have 
become more concentrated.
More generally, the interplay between market-oriented 
reforms and economies of agglomeration appear to have given 
certain regions within countries an edge when it comes to 
economic growth. Indeed, this interplay has been linked to 
increasing inequality in Southeast Asia and East Asia’s middle-
income economies (Gill and Kharas 2007). Figure 2.4.10 
provides decomposition results for regional inequality in 
selected Asian countries. In the late 2000s, between-region 
inequality can explain 20–30% of the national inequality in 
Bhutan, the Philippines, and Viet Nam, and 10–15% in the PRC, 
Indonesia, India, and Sri Lanka.
Spatial inequality: The combined contribution
Combining the two components of the spatial inequality and 
calculating the fraction of total inequality explained by rural–
urban and interregional (provinces or states) divides, we see a 
share of more than half for the PRC (Figure 2.4.11).
In sum, the widening gaps between provinces and states, on the 
one hand, and between urban and rural areas on the other, provide and 
will provide the geographic driver of inequality in Asia. These divides 
are important in themselves, and because they account for a significant 
proportion of observed inequality in Asian countries. The driver of 
inequality in the spatial dimension is the interaction between new 
opportunities through trade, technology, and market-oriented reform, 
interacting with the structure of geography and infrastructure.
The rise in spatial inequality is not a reason to reverse openness and 
technological progress, or stop the reform process, but rather to reorient 
infrastructure investment to lagging regions, and to remove barriers to 
migration to the fast-growing regions.
Similarly, the process 
of urbanization cannot be 
reversed—nor should it 
be—because it brings with it 
higher national productivity 
and growth. But it raises the 
question of policy responses 
to the rise in inequality that 
it can also engender.
Gender inequality
If some individuals are 
partially or wholly excluded 
from access to education and 
health, or from participating 
in markets, this blocks a 
2.4.1o Income inequality decomposition, province/region 
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source of income and becomes a driver of inequality in society. Social 
exclusion therefore magnifies the distributional impact of globalization, 
technological progress, and market-oriented reform. In this section, we 
consider the issue of gender inequality.
Economic growth and gender inequality
The effect of economic growth on gender inequality in labor markets 
is ambiguous. Growth can narrow gender inequality through a 
number of channels, including the demise of traditional structures 
that reinforce human capital differences between men and women, the 
rising opportunity cost of women’s time outside of the labor force, the 
strengthening of women’s economic and property rights, technological 
progress, and the introduction of labor-saving consumer durables.
Yet economic growth does not necessarily mean inequality will 
decline, especially if unpaid work burdens, biased laws, differential 
access to resources, and social norms continue to constrain women in 
their ability to take advantage of new, well-paid jobs. A growing number 
of empirical studies have indicated that economic growth 
may improve or worsen gender inequality depending on the 
gendered indicator under consideration.
Increased openness to trade and FDI often brings 
increased access to employment for women in export-oriented 
labor-intensive manufacturing. At issue is the extent to 
which women have actually benefited from international 
trade and foreign investment through new paid employment 
opportunities. Some argue that gains in women’s employment 
have been accompanied by precarious working conditions 
and an expansion of informal-sector jobs that lack basic 
legal and social protections and are not subject to formal 
economic regulations. As firms face pressure in international 
markets to keep production costs low, the jobs they offer 
become increasingly insecure; employment is often temporary, 
casual, and flexible, characterized by poor working conditions 
(Benería 2007).
Another concern is low wages for women. Economic growth 
generated through export promotion may put downward 
pressure on the wages of workers in the export sector and, to 
the extent that women workers account for a high proportion of 
employment, contribute to wider gender wage gaps. Supporting 
this argument, Berik, Rodgers, and Zveglich (2004) used data 
for Taipei,China and the Republic of Korea and found that 
increasing competition from international trade is associated 
with larger wage gaps between men and women. Because 
the analysis controlled for gender differences in productivity 
characteristics, the widening wage gap was interpreted as a sign 
of increased wage discrimination.
Yet others have argued that jobs in the export sector offer 
better pay than the alternatives for women workers, and the 
evaluation of wages in the export sector ought to consider 
wages in alternative jobs, wages expressed in hourly terms, and 
nonwage working conditions (Kabeer 2004).
2.4.12 Women’s labor force participation rate, 2010 
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2.4.13 Women’s labor force participation rates and per 
capita GDP in Asia, 2010
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Technological change can also affect gender inequality. Several studies 
have shown that in middle- and higher-income economies, technological 
improvements have led to displacement of women from low-paying 
jobs in import-competing sectors. In particular, Anker (1998) provided 
evidence that women in middle- and higher-income economies tend to 
cluster in manufacturing industries that have begun to upgrade their 
technologies, reduce the size of their workforce, and move production to 
lower-wage countries.
In the case of Taipei,China, technological upgrading and rising 
capital intensity of export-oriented manufacturing after 1980 was 
linked to a relative decline in employment opportunities for women 
(Berik 2000). Women in lower-income countries can also experience 
job displacement when technological change makes traditional female 
jobs redundant and when women face barriers to training for new jobs 
(Jhabvala and Sinha 2002).
Women’s labor force participation
A specific dimension of opportunity is participation in the labor market. 
This generates income through the use of what is often poor women’s 
only asset, their labor. Labor force participation is much lower for women 
than for men in most Asia–Pacific countries, averaging around 0.7 
(Figure 2.4.12 above), with wide variations (Afghanistan the lowest, the 
Lao PDR the highest).
What are the determinants of women’s labor force participation? At 
a macro level, a stylized fact is that economic development and women’s 
participation in the formal labor market exhibit a fairly 
predictable and well-documented relationship. When countries 
begin to industrialize, female labor force participation falls as 
the household farm model becomes less common and more 
women engage exclusively in nonmarket activities such as child 
care and housework. In more advanced economies, female 
participation rates begin to rise again as growing numbers 
of women engage in market-based economic activity, often 
in combination with raising children. This trend generates a 
U-shaped function that fits time-series and cross-sectional data 
for a number of countries at different stages of development 
(Goldin 1994; Mammen and Paxson 2000; Tam 2011). The 
pattern across Asia–Pacific countries is consistent with this 
U-shaped relationship (Figure 2.4.13).
The micro evidence can uncover various forces behind 
women’s engagement in the labor market. An empirical study, 
based on Demographic and Health Survey data from nine 
Asian countries spanning 2005–2009 estimated the likelihood 
of a woman engaging in employment, conditional on the full 
set of personal and household characteristics (Rodgers and 
Zveglich forthcoming).
The results show that household wealth, in particular, 
can have different effects in different countries, and the 
results also point to important interactions between women’s 
role as caregivers to young children and their employment 
decisions. In every country, married women are less likely 
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to be employed than their single counterparts, and this relationship is 
statistically significant and fairly large in seven of the nine economies. 
These results point to the importance of policy actions that support 
women’s roles as caregivers of young children at the same time that they 
are employed in market-based activities.
Summary
This section argues that technological progress, globalization, and 
market-oriented reform—the key drivers of Asia’s rapid growth—are the 
basic forces behind the rising inequality in many Asian countries in the 
last 2 decades, and these forces have changed income distribution through 
three channels: capital, skill, and spatial bias.
The bias toward physical capital reduces labor’s share of national 
income while increasing the income share of the owners of capital. 
Similarly, the heightened demand for better skilled workers raises 
the premium on their earnings. And spatial disparities are becoming 
more acute: locations with superior infrastructure, market access, and 
scale economies—such as urban centers and coastal areas—are better 
able to benefit from changing circumstances. Empirical evidence is 
consistent with these arguments. Inequality of opportunity magnifies the 
distributional consequences of these driving factors.
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Confronting rising inequality: 
Policy options
Summary of key findings
Developing Asia’s rapid growth in recent decades has led to a significant 
reduction in extreme poverty, but it has also been accompanied by rising 
inequality in many countries. Income inequality has increased in 11 out 
of the 28 countries with comparable data, the 11 accounting for 82% of 
the total population. In many countries, income inequality coexists with 
non-income inequality in the form of unequal access to education, health, 
and basic services among different population groups classified by gender, 
location, and income. Asia’s rising inequality contrasts with the “growth 
with equity” story that characterized the transformation of the newly 
industrialized economies in the 1960s and 1970s, and with recent trends 
in other parts of the developing world, in particular Latin America, where 
income inequality has been on the decline since the 1990s.
Technological change, globalization, and market-oriented reform—
the main drivers of Asia’s rapid economic growth—are the basic driving 
forces behind the rising inequality in Asia. Working together, these have 
significantly impacted on inequality through a number of channels, in 
particular:
•	 Increasing skill premiums and returns to human capital. The 
emergence of vast new economic opportunities, unleashed by 
trade and financial integration, technological progress, and 
market-oriented reform, has increased returns to human capital 
and the skill premium, with individuals having higher educational 
attainment and skill endowment able to benefit more from the 
new opportunities. Our analysis shows that, in many countries, as 
high as 25–35% of the total income inequality can be explained by 
interperson differences in human capital and skill endowments.
•	 Falling labor income shares. As in many countries in other parts of 
the world, technological progress appears to have favored capital 
over labor. The abundance of labor relative to capital, which 
depresses wage rates, is also a contributing factor to the declining 
labor income share in developing Asia. Since capital is less equally 
distributed, this has contributed to rising inequality.
•	 Increasing spatial inequality. Some regions, especially urban and 
coastal areas, are better able to respond to the new opportunities 
because of their advantages in infrastructure and market access, as 
well as agglomeration economies from a self-perpetuating process 
of increasing concentration. The process of urbanization reinforces 
the inequality effects of agglomeration. Our analysis shows that 
in many Asian countries about 30–50% of income inequality is 
accounted for by spatial inequality due to uneven growth.
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The impact of the basic driving forces of inequality has been 
compounded by various forms of unequal access to opportunity—to earn 
income from labor and to build human capital—caused by institutional 
weaknesses, market distortions and failures, and social exclusion.
The basic driving forces of inequality cannot—and should not—be 
reversed. They generate productivity growth, which underpins Asia’s 
poverty reduction, betterment of quality of life, and prosperity. However, 
high inequality could undermine social cohesion, political stability, 
and sustainability of growth, and a divided and highly unequal nation 
cannot be prosperous, as shown by international experience. Rising 
inequality could also lead to demands for populist measures that would 
be detrimental to efficiency and growth.
How should Asian governments respond to the rising inequality? Via 
three sets of policy measures. These measures cannot eliminate inequality, 
but will go a long way toward reducing it and, at the same time, not 
endanger development or hurt growth.
•	 Efficient fiscal policy. Measures include increasing spending 
on education and health, especially for the poorer; developing 
better targeted social protection schemes, including conditional 
cash transfers that target income to the poorest but also 
incentivize the building of human capital; and greater revenue 
mobilization through broadening the tax base and improving tax 
administration, and switching spending from inefficient general 
subsidies to targeted transfers.
•	 Interventions to address lagging regions. Measures include 
improving regional connectivity; developing new growth poles 
in lagging regions; strengthening fiscal transfers for greater 
investment in human capital and better access to public services 
in lagging regions; and removing barriers to migration from poor 
to more prosperous areas.
•	 More employment-friendly growth. Policies include facilitating 
structural transformation and maintaining a balanced sectoral 
composition of growth between manufacturing, services, and 
agriculture; supporting the development of small and medium-
sized enterprises; removing factor market distortions that favor 
capital over labor; strengthening labor market institutions; and 
introducing public employment schemes as a temporary bridge to 
address pockets of unemployment and underemployment.
Efficient fiscal policy
Fiscal policy is a key part of the policy responses to rising inequality 
in Asia. Both government spending and taxation can affect inequality. 
Asian governments have ample room to maneuver in using fiscal policy 
to address the challenge of rising inequality, depending on individual 
country circumstances. This could involve increasing human capital 
investment and social protection provision—financing the increased 
spending on these through greater and more equitable revenue 
mobilization—and switching spending on inefficient general price 
subsidies (as for fuel) to targeted transfers.
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Fiscal spending
A large part of inequality in developing Asia is explained by differences 
in individual attainments in education and human capital. Returns 
to human capital are largely driven by the market, and it may not be 
efficient and or even desirable for governments to try to alter them. 
However, it is efficient and desirable for governments to reduce inequality 
in the distribution of human capital in the population, by making 
public investments in education and health and by ensuring that all 
members of society have equal access to these basic services, regardless 
of their individual circumstances. A recent study shows that government 
spending on education and health helps reduce income inequality 
(Box 2.5.1). It has also been well documented that a key contributing 
factor to the recent decline in income inequality in many Latin American 
countries is improved access to education by the poor (Esquivel, Lustig, 
and Scott 2010, for example).
Increasing spending on education and health. Figures 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 
show wide variations in spending on education and health as a share 
of GDP among developing Asian countries. In 2010, in 15 out of the 
33 Asian countries where comparative data are available, government 
spending on education as a share of GDP was less than 4%, including the 
PRC, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines, compared with an 
OECD average of 5.2%. In 2009, in 20 out of the 41 Asian countries with 
comparable data, government spending on health as a share of GDP was 
less than 5%, including most economies in East Asia, South Asia, and 
Both taxation (particularly personal income taxes) and 
public spending reduce inequality, but public spending has 
a larger impact on the distribution of income, according to 
a study of 150 countries with data for 1970–2009.
The results in the box table suggest that government 
expenditures on health and education reduce income 
inequality in Asia and the rest of the world. But 
expenditure on social protection and housing appears to 
increase income inequality in Asia, whereas it lowers it in 
the rest of the world.
Asia has made substantial progress toward achieving 
the Millennium Development Goals and targets on 
education and health. These achievements are consistent 
with the finding that education and health expenditures 
reduce inequality. However, social protection policies 
generally remain limited in Asia, and in countries where 
they exist, they tend to have a narrow coverage, extended 
mainly to urban population and the formal sector. This 
could explain the paradoxical finding of social protection 
spending increasing inequality in Asia. The finding 
suggests that universal social protection that covers the 
entire population would help reduce inequality.
For taxation, the results provide evidence that 
personal income taxes reduce inequality, with a greater 
effect in Asia than in the rest of the world, possibly 
because of a larger number of people not paying income 
tax. Although taxes by themselves are less effective in 
redistributing income, taxation is crucial to raise financing 
for government expenditure to achieve distributional 
objectives.
2.5.1 Estimating the impact of fiscal policies on income inequality
Estimated marginal impact of government spending 
on the Gini coefficient (percentage points)
Asia Rest of the world
Social protection 0.490 -0.276
Education -0.486 -0.034
Health -0.241 -0.330
Housing 2.162 -0.614
Note: A negative sign means that an increase in government 
spending reduces the Gini coefficient. The numbers show the 
percentage point change in income inequality (measured by the 
Gini coefficient) associated with a 1 percentage point increase in 
the government expenditure variable.
Source: Claus, Martinez-Vazquez, and Vulovic (forthcoming).
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Southeast Asia, compared with the OECD average of 9.4%. These figures 
suggest that there is scope for developing Asian economies to increase 
spending on education and health.
In practice, even if education and health services are available, poor 
households may not able to use them because of economic pressures (such 
as losing income, by sending children to school). To address the demand-
side constraints, the policy community has developed the instrument 
of conditional cash transfers (CCTs). They have been designed to have 
long-term benefits by providing poor households with an incentive to 
invest in human capital (education and health). For example, poor families 
receive cash transfers conditional on their children attending school.
CCTs have expanded rapidly in Latin America since the 1990s, and 
have been found to be effective in improving education and health 
2.5.1 Government expenditure on education (% of GDP), 
2000s
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2.5.2 Government expenditure on health (% of GDP), 2009
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The Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) has 
run since January 2008. It aims to provide cash grants 
to extremely poor households and allow them to meet 
certain human development goals—health, nutrition, 
and education of children below 15 years—set by the 
government. Around 3 million households nationwide are 
targeted under 4Ps in 2012, out of 18.5 million households 
in 2009.
The targeting involves a number of steps, including 
selecting the poorest municipalities and cities within 
each selected province based on poverty incidence, and 
identifying poor households in the selected municipalities 
and cities using a proxy means testing that assesses 
household socioeconomic characteristics such as 
ownership of assets, type of housing units, educational 
attainment of household head, family livelihood, and 
access to water and sanitation facilities.
To be eligible for 4Ps, a household must have an 
income equal to or below the provincial poverty threshold; 
have children 0–14 years old and/or a pregnant woman 
at the time of assessment; and agree to meet the program 
conditions. 
The conditions have both health and education 
components. In particular, pregnant women must avail of 
pre- and postnatal care and childbirth must be attended by 
a health professional. Parents are required to attend “family 
development sessions” conducted by local governments. 
Children aged 0–5 must get regular preventive health 
checkups and vaccines, and those aged 6–14 must receive 
deworming pills twice a year. Children 3–14 years old 
must attend classes at least 85% of the time. Schools 
are required to report the attendance rate of program 
beneficiaries to their municipal governments.
The program benefits include P500 (around $12) a 
month per household for health and nutrition expenses, 
and P300 a month per child attending school for 
10 months, up to a maximum of three children per 
household. Transfers are generally handed to the most 
responsible adult in the household, and are credited to the 
“cash card facility” of the government-owned Land Bank 
of the Philippines.
Source: DSWD (2012).
2.5.2 Conditional cash transfers in the Philippines: The Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program
indicators for poor households in many countries (Schultz 2004; Schady 
and Araujo 2006). In Asia, CCTs have been implemented in Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, Pakistan and, more recently, Indonesia and the Philippines 
(Box 2.5.2). CCT programs, which are financially sustainable and 
combined with complementary programs to improve the delivery of 
health care and education services, could play an important role to reduce 
poverty and inequality in Asia.
Increasing social protection spending. Social protection also has an 
important role in reducing inequality. Social safety nets mitigate the 
risks of external and transitory livelihood shocks, as well as meeting the 
minimum needs of the chronically poor. Exposure to such shocks can 
have a profound and long-lasting impact not only on economic well-
being, but also on accumulation of human capital, such as education 
and health. Social safety nets act as a coping mechanism for poor and 
vulnerable people and help improve well-being by investing in human 
capital in the long run, which, in turn, can enhance accessibility of 
those with limited assets and capabilities to opportunities (Ali and 
Zhuang 2007).
Despite the increasing recognition of the importance of social safety 
nets in the region, their provision remains limited. ADB (2008) shows 
that very few developing Asian countries have adequate social safety nets, 
compared with Japan or the Republic of Korea. One reason is the limited 
resources allocated to social protection (Figure 2.5.3).
Countries often face many challenges in increasing social protection 
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2.5.3 Social protection expenditure (% of GDP), 2008
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2.5.4 Share of the poor receiving social protection (%), 2008
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provision, including affordability, targeting, and institutional and 
administrative capacity.
As for affordability, while this is often raised as an issue, studies have 
shown that the costs of basic universal social protection are not beyond 
the reach of most developing countries (for example, Ortiz and Yablonski 
2010). ILO (2008) shows that virtually all countries can afford basic social 
security.21
On targeting, poor beneficiaries of social protection programs account 
for, on average, only about 54.8% of the poor population in developing 
Asia, pointing to a clear case for improving targeting (Figure 2.5.4).
In terms of institutional and administrative capacity, examples 
include better accounting, rigorous financial controls, human resource 
development, computerization, and greater disclosure to stakeholders.
Switching general price subsidies to targeted transfers. Increased 
spending on education, health, and social protection can be partly 
financed by reducing some other spending items. In most Asian 
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countries, infrastructure investment is inadequate and should 
not be the target for spending reduction through switching. 
But switching government spending from general subsidies to 
human capital investment and social protection provision could 
be an effective means to reduce inequality in human capital and 
in income.
Many countries allocate large sums to general price 
subsidies, which entail significant fiscal costs, but benefit 
the non-poor more than the poor. A typical example is fuel 
subsidies (Figure 2.5.5). In Indonesia, for example, in 2011 fuel 
and electricity subsidies amounted to 3.4% of GDP, which was 
larger than government spending on infrastructure that year. It 
is estimated that the richest 10% of households consumed 40% 
of the total subsidized gasoline, and the top half of households 
used almost 84% of it (Ginting and Aji 2012).
Encouragingly, the Indonesian government is taking some 
action to tackle this issue. In March 2012, the government 
proposed a revised 2012 budget bill to reduce untargeted 
fuel subsidies and to use the saved budget resources for 
infrastructure investment, promotion of green growth, and 
transfers to poor regions and households.22 Although what was 
passed by the Parliament was far short of what the government 
originally proposed, it is still welcome.
Greater and more equitable revenue mobilization
Given the large need for more human capital investment and 
social protection provision in many developing Asian countries, 
governments will inevitably have to mobilize more revenue. 
The share of government revenue in GDP is low in many Asian 
countries. For example, in 2011, the share of central government 
revenue in GDP was about 12–14% in Bangladesh, Cambodia, 
Myanmar, Pakistan, and the Philippines compared with the 
world average of close to 25% (Figure 2.5.6). The majority 
of government revenues are from taxation. In many Asian 
countries, more tax revenues can be mobilized by broadening 
tax bases and improving tax administration.
Broadening the tax base. The tax base can be broadened 
by reducing various exemptions, deductions, and incentives. 
Despite tax rates comparable to the world average (though lower 
than the OECD average), personal income tax collection is low 
in Asia (Figure 2.5.7). This is partly because of relatively high 
tax free (minimum exempt) thresholds and a relatively high 
threshold of income above which the top marginal personal 
income tax rate applies (Figure 2.5.8).
Also contributing to the lower tax collection are tax 
concessions. In the PRC, for example, only 11 types of personal 
income are liable to tax, and others not. Some of these 
categories are taxed at progressive rates (wages and salaries), 
while others are taxed at a flat rate (such as incomes of personal 
services, royalties, and rental and lease incomes). Tax reform is 
2.5.5 Fossil-fuel consumption subsidy (% of GDP), 2010
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2.5.6 Central government revenue in selected Asian 
economies (% of GDP), 2011
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2.5.7 Personal income tax (% of GDP) and top personal 
marginal income tax rate, 2009 or latest available year
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2.5.8 Ratio of top personal income tax threshold to gross 
national income per capita, late 2000s
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a key policy measure to improve income distribution in the PRC’s 12th 
Five Year Plan (State Council of China 2011).
Corporate income taxes are also low in some Asian countries partly 
because of tax incentives to attract investment and for activities seen 
as having social or economic merit. However, tax incentives can reduce 
the progressivity of income taxation if resources are captured by high-
income interest groups lobbying for concessions. Moreover, they are 
often inefficient because they simply subsidize activities that firms would 
have undertaken anyway. Tax collection could thus also be increased by 
broadening the corporate tax base.
Value added tax (VAT) receipts are also low as a share of GDP in 
many Asian countries and is a potential source of additional government 
revenue. It is true that VAT is regressive and it is not an effective tool for 
reducing income inequality, but it is less distortionary than income and 
sales taxes, and is easier to collect.
VAT does not exist in, for example, Bhutan, Malaysia, Maldives, and 
Myanmar. For those countries where VAT exists, its collection can be 
increased by broadening its base. VAT exemptions or reduced tax rates for 
necessities are often used to address its potential regressivity. However, 
these two mechanisms are costly and not well targeted at the poor. A 
more effective policy would be direct transfer payments to those in need. 
In countries where the VAT tax rate is low, it could be raised.
Improving tax administration. Government revenue can be increased 
by improving tax administration. In the Philippines, for example, 
poor tax administration has been identified as a critical constraint to 
increasing government revenue (ADB 2009b). Complicated tax systems 
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with many tax rates, exemptions, deductions, and concessions 
increase tax administration and compliance costs as well as the 
opportunity for tax planning and tax avoidance. They are also 
often seen as unfair because higher income taxpayers generally 
have greater scope and resources to shift income to avoid higher 
tax rates. Unfair tax systems can reduce people’s and businesses’ 
willingness to pay taxes. Strengthening governance and 
institutions is also a key to improving tax collection.
Reducing regional inequality
Spatial inequalities account for a large part of Asia’s inequality. 
Reducing spatial inequality should therefore be a key element of 
the policy responses. A key component of such inequality is that 
between provinces or states. Four policy options for reducing 
regional inequality are discussed below.
Improving regional connectivity. Poor connectivity due to 
lack of adequate transport and communication infrastructure 
is often a major constraint for interior states or provinces 
in engaging in global trade and attracting investment. The 
proportion of paved roads in total roads was close to 100% in 
Thailand (as of 2000), while it was only 6.3% in Cambodia (as 
of 2004), 9.9% in the Philippines (as of 2003), 11.9% in Myanmar 
(as of 2005), 13.5% in Lao PDR (as of 2008), 47.6% in Viet Nam 
(as of 2007), and 49.3% in India (as of 2008) (Figure 2.5.9). 
Several ADB studies have found that the lack of adequate 
infrastructure including transport is a critical constraint to 
private investment in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Nepal 
(ADB 2009b, 2010, 2011b). Improving infrastructure therefore 
should be one of the key policy measures to reduce regional 
inequality.
Developing growth poles in lagging region. To a large extent, 
interregional inequality is due to coastal areas’ proximity to 
overseas markets. This is an exogenous factor and no one can 
change it. However, developments in economic theory have 
also emphasized the importance of agglomeration economies, increasing 
returns, and clustering in shaping regional development (Krugman 2008). 
This means that countries can identify areas of potential growth poles 
and use policy tools and public investment to trigger growth. Countries 
could develop strategies for generating growth in lagging regions for 
equity as well as efficiency considerations. The PRC’s Great Western 
Development Strategy presents a good example (Box 2.5.3).
Fiscal transfers for greater investment in human capital and better 
access to public services in poor regions. Fiscal transfers from richer 
regions to poorer regions also have an important part to play in reducing 
regional inequality. However, such transfers are likely to encounter 
political resistance from the richer regions, all the more so as even 
better-off regions in developing countries face a raft of pressing fiscal 
demands. Further, high levels of fiscal transfers may be seen as penalizing 
successful regions and rewarding unsuccessful ones, hence undermining 
incentives. Fiscal transfers should, therefore, be carefully designed and 
2.5.9 Paved roads in Asian economies
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This strategy was adopted in 2000 to boost the PRC’s less 
developed western region. It covers 11 provinces (Gansu, 
Guizhou, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guangxi, 
Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet, and Xinjiang) and one 
municipality (Chongqing). This region covers nearly three-
fourths of the area of the country, but only one-fourth of 
its population and one-fifth of its total economic output 
(as of 2010).
The main components of the strategy include the 
development of infrastructure (transport, hydropower 
plants, energy, telecommunications, and urban 
development), attraction of foreign investment, increased 
efforts on ecological protection (such as reforestation), 
promotion of education, and retention of talent flowing to 
richer provinces. 
During 2000–2009, total state investment in major 
projects in the western region reached CNY2.2 trillion 
(about US$349 billion); fiscal transfers from the central 
government reached more than CNY3 trillion; the region’s 
volume of imports and exports grew by nearly one-fourth 
each year on average, with its share in the national total 
increasing from 3.8% to 4.2%; and annual average regional 
GDP growth reached 11.9%, higher than the national 
average, with the region’s share in national GDP increasing 
from 17.1% to 18.5%.
What has been the overall impact of the strategy on 
regional inequality? This is of course difficult to estimate 
because the counterfactual is difficult to specify. However, 
Fan, Kanbur, and Zhang (2011) argue that regional 
inequality in the PRC has begun to stabilize and perhaps 
even turn down since the mid-2000s, partly as the result of 
this strategy. 
Based on primary survey data in two poor provinces—
Guizhou and Gansu—Zhang, Yang, and Wang (2011) 
show that real wages have risen rapidly since 2003. 
Finally, Khan and Riskin (2005) have argued that overall 
inequality has begun to level off, and have identified the 
strategy as a key factor.
Sources: Fan, Kanbur, and Zhang (2011); Zhang, Yang, and Wang 
(2011); Khan and Riskin (2005); http://www.chinawest.gov.cn/web/
NewsInfo.asp?NewsId=55943.
2.5.3 The PRC’s Great Western Development Strategy
linked to targets and performance in improving development outcomes in 
recipient regions, and should aim to build poor regions’ own capacity for 
self-sustaining regional development, such as staving off extreme poverty, 
investing in human capital, and improving public services.
Reducing barriers to within-country migration. Migration from 
poor to prosperous areas is one of the major means for reducing 
regional inequality. Migration and labour mobility often come up 
against significant barriers. One comes from the bureaucratic and 
administrative obstacles to moving from one part of the country to 
another. For example, in the PRC, the hukou (registration) system 
constrains rural–urban migration by limiting rural migrants’ access to 
basic public services such as education, health care, and social protection 
in urban areas. Lack of necessary skills and suitable job opportunities 
in prosperous areas is another barrier. Absence of portability of pension 
benefits also discourages individuals from seeking better opportunities 
elsewhere. Improving connectivity, as mentioned, will facilitate not only 
the movement of goods but also of people.
Making growth more employment friendly
Since the declining share of labor income is associated with rising 
inequality, a key issue is how to maintain and even raise this share during 
the growth process. This requires shifting the labor demand curve in 
the productive sectors of the economy as output increases. If demand 
outstrips supply, wages will rise, increasing the labor income share 
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and containing inequality. Therefore, making growth more 
employment friendly so as to create productive and well-paid 
jobs for a much wider section of the population is one of 
the keys to confronting rising inequality in developing Asia. 
Various policies stand out.
Facilitating structural transformation
Agriculture is still the largest (or at least substantial) employer 
in most Asian developing countries, and its dominance in 
providing jobs is closely associated with the high proportion 
of vulnerable employment, which contributes to inequality 
(Figure 2.5.10). A key challenge for most developing Asian 
countries is therefore to facilitate the process of structural 
transformation to transfer large amounts of rural, agriculture 
surplus labor to urban, manufacturing and services sectors, 
where most of the future’s productive jobs will be generated.23
These include making the business environment more 
conducive to investment, improving infrastructure, reducing 
regulatory burdens on enterprises, promoting innovation, and 
upgrading industry.
Sectoral composition of growth has received some attention on 
development experiences in Asia (ADB 2007a). In 2010, India’s share of 
manufacturing in GDP was close to the average of low-income countries, 
but much lower than the average of both lower and upper middle-income 
countries (Figure 2.5.11).24 In the PRC, on the other hand, the share of 
services in GDP was much lower than the averages of low-, lower middle 
and upper middle-income countries.25
A country’s sectoral composition is determined by its comparative 
advantages and other factors, but development policy often 
plays a role. For instance, India is making greater efforts to 
develop manufacturing, while the PRC is aiming to increase 
the share of services as a source of growth and job creation. 
International experiences suggest that both manufacturing and 
services are important for growth and job creation, and the two 
often support each other during economic development.
Structural transformation also involves maintaining a 
high pace of agricultural productivity growth. This requires 
governments to implement agricultural policies to produce 
more output per hectare. Improving the access of the rural poor 
to irrigation, electricity, transport services, new technology and 
improved seeds, agricultural extension services, and financial 
services are all vital for raising farm productivity. If ownership 
or access to land is highly skewed, implementing mechanisms 
that improve the access of the poor to land is also essential. In 
the PRC, rural nonagricultural village and township enterprises 
have played an important role in lifting income levels of the 
rural population and reducing rural poverty. Such enterprises 
could be promoted by other Asian countries.
2.5.10 Vulnerable employment in Asia, latest year
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2.5.11 Share of manufacturing and services in GDP, 2010
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Supporting the development of small and medium-sized enterprises
SMEs provide most jobs, in developing and developed countries alike. 
But SMEs often face constraints, especially in accessing finance, human 
capital, and markets. Three ADB studies found that access to finance 
was ranked among the top constraints to business growth by SMEs in 
the Philippines, Indonesia and Nepal (ADB 2009b, 2010, 2011b). In the 
PRC, access to finance and human capital is also considered among major 
constraints by SMEs, many of which are in rural areas.
Governments should support SME development by facilitating their 
creation, removing unnecessary and cumbersome restrictions on their 
development, and addressing market failures in their access to finance. 
Governments can also help SMEs adopt new technologies and access new 
markets (ADB 2009a).
On access to finance, recent international experience suggests that one 
of the most important ways governments can increase access to finance 
is to improve the institutional underpinnings of financial transactions 
by strengthening creditor rights, defining property rights so property 
can be used as collateral for credit, and enhancing credit registries and 
systems to screen borrowers. They can also improve the informational 
infrastructure that underlies the workings of financial markets.
To help SMEs adopt technologies and enter new markets, 
governments can provide information on improved production methods, 
products, and markets, technical support services, and vocational 
training. They can also foster links between SMEs and large enterprises 
and encourage cluster-based development by exploiting the fact that many 
enterprises that make and sell related or complementary products are 
grouped close together, often with their suppliers and buyers.
Removing factor market distortions
One of the reasons why developing countries with relatively abundant labor 
prefer labor-saving and capital-intensive techniques could be distortions in 
factor markets: market prices of factors of production fail to reflect relative 
abundance, due to causes such as underdevelopment of the financial sector 
or financial repression. In the PRC, for instance, factor market reform has 
lagged behind product market reform, and interest rate control has kept 
borrowing costs low, especially for state-owned enterprises. During 1990–
2010, the PRC’s real lending rate was one of the lowest among 50 middle- 
and high-income countries (ADB forthcoming). The low cost of capital has 
been put forward as one of the causes of the imbalances of growth sources 
in the PRC (Huang 2010; World Bank 2012b).
In India, the financial repression, as evidenced by persistently negative 
real savings deposit rates, could also be a contributing factor to the low 
cost of capital relative to labor in the formal sector (RBI 2011). It has also 
been suggested that some of the earlier policies of industrialization, which 
was intended to promote labor-intensive industries and adoption of labor-
intensive techniques, had some unintended consequences of encouraging 
the use of capital intensive technology (Kochhar et al. 2006; Felipe, 
Kumar, and Abdon forthcoming).
Reducing factor market distortions could, therefore, promote job 
creation. A key policy measure is to reduce or eliminate financial 
repression by further developing the financial sector. This include 
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reducing and eliminating distortions in the cost of capital by gradually 
adopting market-determined interest rates; allowing greater competition 
and private sector participation in the financial sector; further 
strengthening the regulatory framework and governance of financial 
institutions; carefully managing the liberalization of the capital account; 
and making the exchange rate more flexible. India liberalized deposit 
interest rate in November 2011 (RBI 2011).
Labor market institutions
Employment generation also needs to be supported by effective labor 
market institutions. On the one hand, labor market institutions should 
help improve the employability of labor through providing skill training 
and assistance with job search (such as employment services), and provide 
necessary protection of worker rights. On the other hand, they should not 
impose excessive costs on enterprises and hurt job creation.
There are significant disagreements on effects of labor market 
interventions on job creation. Some believe that interventions such as 
employment protection legislation, minimum wages, and collective 
bargaining are important to protect the rights of workers, while others 
think that these interventions will raise labor costs, only protect those 
who have already been employed (or “insiders”), but make employers 
reluctant to hire new workers, or find ways to bypass these (for example, 
by replacing regular, formal jobs with contract labor that offers less 
protection, lower wages and little social security), hence hurting job 
creation. Empirical evidence on these is mixed (Felipe and Hasan 2006).
In some countries, there has been an implicit or explicit move to a 
“flexicurity system,” which involves giving employers greater flexibility 
in adjusting the workforce based on their needs as determined by market 
fluctuations, while the security of workers is “socialized” through policies 
and programs administered by or through the state, such as re-training 
or unemployment insurance (Auer 2007). This approach reduces the 
retrenchment burden on firms (making it more likely that they will hire 
and provide better security for workers. In Asia, some countries have 
moved in this direction, including the Republic of Korea and the PRC, 
while others have found it hard to restructure labor market institutions 
(Vandenberg 2010).
In sum, while there is large room for many Asian countries to 
build effective labor market institutions, the exact form and approach 
to follow will have to be decided by each country on the basis of their 
specific circumstances. For countries that have transited from a planned 
economy to a market economy and basic labor market institutions are 
yet to be established, there is a case for moving toward establishing or 
strengthening formal arrangements. For countries where labor market 
regulations have been seen as too restrictive and a major constraint to 
growth and job creation in the formal sector, there is a need to examine 
the specific elements that are likely to be constraints and ensure that they 
are appropriately addressed.
Public employment schemes
Governments can also introduce public employment schemes to act as 
a buffer stock or mechanism for employment: when the private sector 
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downsizes in recessions, workers who lose their job can find work in 
such a scheme. The government pledges to hire anyone satisfying certain 
criteria and willing to work on projects such as small infrastructure (e.g., 
clean water and sewage projects, roads) at a basic public sector living 
salary. Many developing countries, including Bangladesh, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, and Sri Lanka in Asia, and Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Mexico in Latin America, and developed 
countries including Australia and France, have public employment 
programs, many of which are temporary (Felipe 2009).
Some countries have implemented such programs to counter the 
major problems associated with persistent unemployment. In Asia, a well-
known case is India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(Box 2.5.4).
Toward inclusive growth in Asia
Driven by globalization, technological progress, and market-oriented 
reform, developing Asia has had a remarkable period of growth and 
poverty reduction. However, the drivers of growth are also magnifying 
the effects of inequalities in physical and human capital, leading to rising 
income inequality. These forces require Asian policy makers to redouble 
their efforts to generate more productive jobs, equalize opportunities 
in employment, education and health, and address spatial inequality. 
Without such policies, which will enhance growth further, Asia may be 
pulled into inefficient populist policies, which will benefit neither growth 
nor equity.
The policy options outlined constitute key elements of a strategy 
for inclusive growth. Broadly, inclusive growth can be defined as 
“growth coupled with equality of opportunity,” and it needs three policy 
pillars: sustained growth to create productive jobs for a wide section 
of the population; social inclusion to equalize access to opportunity; 
and social safety nets to mitigate vulnerability and risks and prevent 
The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Scheme was launched in 2006 in the 200 most 
backward districts of India (of 640 districts in all). It is a 
program that explicitly recognizes the “right to a job.” 
Under the program, every rural adult willing to 
be engaged in unskilled manual labor has the right 
to demand work from the state government for up to 
100 days per household annually. The core funding for the 
program is provided by the central government, and state 
governments make additional contributions.
The program has been extended and now covers the 
entire country (apart from 100% urban districts). The 
number of households who were provided employment 
increased from 21 million in 2006/07 to 38 million in 
2010/11, which amounted to more than 1,200 million 
person-days of work. A notable aspect of the scheme is the 
large number of women who have sought work—female 
participation increased from 41% to 49% in this period.
The program has several achievements, including 
lifting rural wages; reducing distress migration; creating 
community assets; promoting empowerment and making 
politicians more responsive to the demands of the 
poor; reducing unemployment and underemployment; 
encouraging growth of agricultural production; reducing 
discrimination; and reducing malnutrition.
It has also drawn criticism, however, including 
allegations of corruption, weakening work incentives, 
undermining fiscal sustainability, distorting the labor 
market, and causing wage inflation.
Sources: Bonner et al. (2012); Jagannathan (2011); Sjoblom and 
Farrington (2008).
2.5.4 India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
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extreme poverty (Zhuang and Ali 2010). Such a strategy would ensure 
that all members of society can participate in the development process 
productively and benefit equitably from the opportunities generated by 
economic growth.
It is encouraging that more and more developing Asian countries are 
embracing the concept of inclusive growth, with an increasing number 
of countries—including the PRC, India, and many Southeast Asian 
countries—placing inclusive growth at the heart of their development 
policy, as reflected in their recent medium-term development plans. 
Indeed, the entire development community is embracing the concept of 
inclusive growth. These developments will go a long way toward reducing 
poverty and inequality and making the world a more equitable place.
Endnotes
1  A common measure of inequality, ranging from zero indicating perfect equality and 1 (or 
100) indicating perfect inequality. See Box 2.2.1 for technical details.
2  Of these countries, 25 have data for the 1990s and 2000s.
3  The 13 comprise one in East Asia (PRC), three in Southeast Asia (Malaysia, the Philippines, 
and Thailand), one in South Asia (Sri Lanka), one in Central Asia (Georgia), and seven in 
the Pacific (Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu). The Gini of 
the rest of the economies ranged from 27.8 for Afghanistan to 38.9 for Indonesia. 
4  If two countries with data only in the 1990s are included, the average is 37.9.
5  We say “appears” because the rural Gini had a sharp fall in 2002–2005 but a steep rise in 
2005–2008. It is unclear whether this switch reflects data problems or changes in income 
distribution.
6  The PRC, Fiji, Georgia, Kiribati, Malaysia, Nauru, Palau, the Philippines, Samoa, Solomon 
Islands, Thailand, and Vanuatu.
7  This is a simple arithmetic average.
8  Data are not available for the Republic of Korea; Mongolia; or Taipei,China.
9  The difference between the two measures was 4.4 percentage points for the Philippines in 
2009 and 8.9 percentage points for Viet Nam in 2008.
10  The increases were more pronounced in Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Luxembourg, Spain, and Sweden.
11  A caveat: inequality in education is difficult to measure, as the quality dimension of 
education in particular is hard to capture through survey and census instruments.
12  Global Health Observatory Repository Data (accessed 18 February 2012).
13  Circumstances, as used here, are personal or family socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics over which an individual has no direct control.
14 A cross-country study by IMF (2007) finds that global trade integration helps to reduce 
inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient, global financial integration increases it, and 
technological progress is the most important contributor to rising inequality globally in 
the last 2 decades. The study also finds that these impacts are particularly pronounced in 
developing Asia.
15  Tertiary education premium refers to the wage premium for workers with at least tertiary 
education compared with workers with a lower level of education.
16  Acemoglu (2002) notes that for the late 20th century, there has been a rise in returns to 
education and a decrease in low-skill wages, despite an increase in the supply of college 
graduates, which suggests that supply has not kept up with demand for high-skilled labor. 
Studies have also argued for evidence of skill-biased technological change in developing 
countries (Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007; Robbins 1996; Sanchez-Paramo and Schady 2003; 
and Attanasio, Goldberg, and Pavcnik 2004 for Latin America; Hsieh and Woo 2005 for 
Hong Kong, China; and Kijima 2006 for India). However, Card and DiNardo (2002) 
point out that wage inequality stabilized in the US despite continuing developments in 
computer technology. They also argue that skill-biased technological change does not 
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fully explain wage gaps across genders, and racial and demographic structures. The debate 
between competing explanations for the US is ongoing (see Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2008; 
Marquis, Trehan, and Tantivong 2011).
17  Wage employment refers to wage-earning employment, mostly in the formal sector. Wage 
employment elasticity is the ratio of employment growth to GDP growth between two 
periods. It thus measures the amount of employment growth required to generate each 
percentage point of GDP growth.
18  A dual economy consists of two sectors, one a low-income, rural subsistence sector with 
surplus population, and the other an expanding urban modern (manufacturing and 
services) sector. The urban economy absorbs labor from rural areas, which holds down 
urban wages until rural surplus labor is exhausted. See Lewis (1954).
19  Several decades ago, Arthur Lewis—a Nobel Prize winner—pointed out the tendency of 
the development process to be inegalitarian: “Development must be inegalitarian because 
it does not start in every part of the economy at the same time…There may be one such 
enclave in an economy, or several; but at the start, development enclaves include only a 
small minority of the population” (Lewis 1976).
20  See also the long-run analysis of regional inequality in the PRC by Fan, Kanbur, and Zhang 
(2011).
21  According to the UN (2007), the cost of a universal social pension scheme designed to 
keep the elderly out of poverty (at the $1-a-day poverty line) was estimated at 0.25% of 
GDP for Malaysia and about 0.5% of GDP for the Philippines and Thailand in 2005.
22  The revised 2012 Budget Law gives a mandate to the government to increase fuel prices if 
the average Indonesian crude oil price in the last 6-month period increases to $120.80 per 
barrel (15% above the budget assumption of $105).
23  ADB (2007a) provides a comprehensive discussion of the issues involved.
24  Although India’s share of services in GDP is high, it has been argued that jobs in the sector 
are mostly of low productivity and poorly paid. While the booming business process 
outsourcing sector has generated many productive and well-paid jobs, this has only 
benefited a small group of the educated (ADB 2007a).
25  Some argue that the PRC’s low share of services is also related to the way the data for 
services are collected and included in national income accounting (Pant 2007).
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Armenia’s recovery continued in 2011, bolstered by buoyant growth in industry and agriculture. Prudent 
fiscal and monetary policies helped control inflation and lower the budget deficit, although public debt 
remained high in 2011, leaving little room for fiscal maneuver. The external accounts generally improved. 
Economic growth will continue in 2012 and 2013—but with downside risks—and over the medium term, 
continued and faster structural reforms are needed to support growth. 
Economic performance
After modest growth of 2.1% in 2010, economic recovery continued 
in 2011, with growth estimated at 4.5%. On the supply side, industry, 
agriculture, and services were responsible for the stronger performance, 
as construction declined (Figure 3.1.1).
Industry (excluding construction) was the driving force, growing by 
an estimated 12.3%, including 12.2% in mining and quarrying and more 
than 16% in food processing. Agriculture expanded by an estimated 
12.6%, rebounding from a 15.7% decline in 2010 that greatly impeded the 
country’s recovery from the 2009 recession. Agriculture was a major 
focus of government policy and benefited from interest rate subsidies and 
free seed distribution programs. Construction, largely household-financed 
and that had been the main driver before the crisis, remained weak, 
contracting by about 10% despite a recovery in remittances. As overall 
activity accelerated, services expanded by 5.8%, with the fastest growth in 
health and social work activities, entertainment and recreation.
On the demand side, net exports and consumption underpinned 
the recovery, while total investment detracted from growth. Net exports 
improved by 17%, reflecting the favorable external environment, and private 
consumption rose by an estimated 2.3%, on higher domestic bank lending 
and sustained remittance inflows. Total investment fell by 4.1%, marking 
sluggish private investment and restraints on public capital spending.
Average annual inflation decreased to 7.7% from 8.2% in 2010 
(Figure 3.1.2). Monetary tightening and a slowdown in nonfood prices 
offset rapid increases in food prices, helping bring inflation closer to the 
central bank’s target band of 4% +/-1.5%. In December 2011, year-on-year 
inflation was 4.7%, half the previous year’s rate. The central bank raised 
the refinancing rate by 125 basis points in three steps in February–April to 
8.5% and kept it steady until September, when it was cut by 50 basis points 
to 8.0%, owing to diminishing inflation pressures.
Propelled by increased credit activity and a continued buildup in net 
domestic assets, broad money (M2X) growth doubled to 23.7% in 2011. 
However, net foreign assets declined, reflecting the central bank’s sales 
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of foreign exchange in an attempt to limit depreciation and to smooth 
large fluctuations.
In 2011, the government continued to pursue a prudent fiscal policy, 
with the aim of gradually reducing the budget deficit and achieving 
macroeconomic stability. The overall budget deficit is estimated to have 
narrowed to 3.3% of GDP from 5.0% in 2010, surpassing the official target 
of 3.9% (Figure 3.1.3). Fiscal consolidation efforts, combined with the 
impact on revenues of economic expansion and some improvements in 
tax and customs administration, raised general government revenue to 
23.6% of GDP from 22.3% in 2010. Restrained capital spending enabled 
total outlays to fall to 26.9% of GDP from 27.3% in 2010.
The ratio of central government debt to GDP rose slightly to an 
estimated 43% at end-2011 from 39.2% the previous year, still within the 
50% ceiling stipulated by the Public Debt Law. About 86% of all public 
debt is external, with domestic debt held mainly by banks.
The balance of payments generally improved, and the current 
account deficit narrowed to an estimated 12.4% of GDP from 14.7% in 
2010 (Figure 3.1.4). Exports surged by an estimated 20.0% to $1.4 billion,
benefitting from generally favorable global commodity prices that boosted 
export values of copper, molybdenum, and other metal concentrates from 
mining. Imports climbed by an estimated 8.8% to $3.5 billion, boosted
by domestic demand that reflected a gradual recovery in foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and a rebound in remittances.
The large current account gap was financed primarily by donor inflows 
and FDI. Remittances from workers abroad rose by 20% to $1.3 billion,
slightly below their 2008 peak of $1.4 billion; most remittances came from
the Russian Federation. Net FDI rose by 15.7% to an estimated $650 million,
and most investments were directed to mining, telecommunications, and 
energy. The Russian Federation accounted for nearly half of all investment. 
Strong export growth, successive releases of funds from Armenia’s 
arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) initiated in 
2010, and a rise in remittances lifted foreign reserves to $1.96 billion by
December, equivalent to about 5.2 months of imports.
In 2011 the nominal effective exchange rate depreciated by 1.2% 
and the real effective exchange rate by 2.2%, though the full potential 
of exports remained constrained by low competitiveness and high 
concentration in mining (Figure 3.1.5).
The government continued implementing economic reforms to 
improve the business environment, streamlining the permit process and 
making more use of electronic services and one-stop shops for investors. 
Armenia improved in five of the 10 areas in the World Bank’s Doing 
Business 2012 survey and was among the top 10 reformers worldwide, 
rising six places to 55.
Economic outlook
Armenia’s economic recovery is expected to continue in 2012 and 2013, 
though a shade less quickly than in 2011 (Figure 3.1.6).
Weak economic prospects in Europe (which accounts for about 60% of 
Armenia’s exports) and their possible spillover to the Russian Federation 
(80% of remittances, Figure 3.1.7) pose major risks to economic growth. 
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However, structural policy reforms under way, such as an electronic 
listing of properties and property values as well as electronic facilities to 
issue construction permits, will help improve the investment climate.
On the supply side, agriculture is expected to continue to grow, 
but moderately, mainly reflecting government support and assuming 
continued normal weather conditions. The forecast increases in mining 
and food processing will contribute to overall industry growth. A 
moderate rise in construction is foreseen, mostly owing to large 
infrastructure projects, but no major changes are expected in household-
financed construction. On the demand side, remittance-backed 
consumption is expected to be the growth driver, aided by a modest 
recovery in public investment spending.
Planned reforms will provide additional impetus to growth and 
should make it less volatile. Laws on free economic zones, an export-led 
strategy, and a “regulatory guillotine” initiative aimed at eliminating 
excessive regulation—all adopted in 2011—may lay the favorable 
groundwork for attracting investment and diversifying the country’s 
industrial base. Early in 2012, approving the first applications from the 
Russian Federation, the government authorized the creation of two 
economic zones, one for agricultural exports and one for high-tech goods.
Fiscal consolidation is set to continue in 2012 and 2013, given concerns 
about the buildup of public and external debt. The government’s medium-
term fiscal objective is to reduce the budget deficit to 3.1% of GDP in 2012 
and 2.0% in 2013. Although a pronounced global slowdown could reduce 
revenue, sustained reforms in tax, customs, and economic competition are 
expected to raise the tax-to-GDP ratio. They include a strong tax package 
adopted in 2011 that raised excises on liquor, luxury vehicles, and engine 
oil, the marginal rate on high-income taxpayers, and higher tax rates on 
gambling facilities and restaurants. Good revenue performance would 
enable the government to increase social security benefits and pensions, 
while reducing the overall budget deficit. 
Average annual inflation is forecast to diminish to 4.1% in 2012 
and rise slightly to 4.5% in 2013, as continued domestic support returns 
agricultural production to normal patterns and global food prices 
moderate and then pick up a little. Tight monetary policy will also help 
contain inflation. The 12-month (December–December) rate is expected to 
remain in the target band in the forecast period.
The external public debt-to-GDP ratio is set to rise in the forecast period 
(Figure 3.1.8), limiting the space for new borrowing. Still, the IMF, in its 
latest (December 2011) debt sustainability analysis, viewed external public 
debt as sustainable and the risk of debt distress as low, even after applying 
stress tests. The IMF judged that the 3% structural deficit target would 
maintain the debt ratio at current levels past 2016 without large shocks 
(although history suggests considerable likelihood of shocks occurring).
Lower world demand and a fall in prices for key commodity 
exports, such as copper and other metals, could harm export earnings. 
However, given the expected outcomes of the government’s export 
diversification strategy—approved in 2011 and targeted at developing 
11 industrial branches with export potential, including pharmaceuticals, 
engineering, and brandy production—exports are projected to expand 
by 8.0% in 2012 and by about 11.0% in 2013 on top of the large growth 
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in 2011. Given recent trends in remittances and investments, imports 
are likely to continue to grow by about 4.5% in 2012 and 6.0% in 2013. 
The large infrastructure projects will likely boost domestic demand for 
imports. The recently adopted mining code, which reset mining royalties 
consistent with international best practices, is expected to attract further 
investment in the sector. 
The current account deficit is forecast to widen to 11.2% of GDP in 
2012 and then shrink to 10.0% of GDP in 2013, reflecting projections for 
gradual export diversification and continued strong remittances. Loan 
inflows and a modest rise in FDI are expected to help finance the current 
account deficit (Figure 3.1.9).
Policy challenge highlights
Continued reforms in tax and customs and in the business environment 
are needed to sustain economic growth and diversify the economic base 
from traditional overreliance on mining and construction, although the 
impact of reforms may take a considerable time.
The government has committed to accelerate these reforms. Despite 
the toughening of antitrust legislation, conditions for competitiveness 
remain unequal across firms of different sizes. Monopolistic practices of 
producers and importers of certain products distort prices and contribute 
to inflation. Corruption and inefficient state governance are still serious 
obstacles to reform.
Further improvements to the business environment, especially in 
paying taxes, enforcing contracts, and trading across borders, are a 
priority for the government. Moreover, slow progress in legal reform 
has hindered the effectiveness of new laws. Thus the government is 
implementing an action plan on doing business that encompasses some 
50 activities, including reducing the cost of company registration and the 
steps to resolve contractual disputes, and, for small and medium-sized 
enterprises, simplifying tax payments and allowing electronic payment of 
customs duties. 
More effort to strengthen governance will likewise be important to 
improve social policy, improve the distribution of resources, and reduce 
the recent crisis-related increase in poverty. Private sector development, 
especially through promoting small and medium-sized enterprises outside 
the capital, is critical in reducing the gap in living standards between the 
capital and the regions.
Despite the monetary tightening and the central bank’s policies to 
contain dollarization of the economy, foreign currency loans and deposits 
continue to be dominant (60% and 70%, respectively), increasing the 
country’s vulnerability to exchange rate shocks and making monetary 
policy less effective.
Additional spending on roads, urban infrastructure, and water 
services is crucial for inclusive growth over the longer term. Financing 
such spending without increasing the already high public debt-to-GDP 
ratio will require further increases in the tax-to-GDP ratio and reductions 
in public debt. Closer public–private partnership in infrastructure 
could also help reduce the burden on government finances and meet 
burgeoning infrastructure needs.
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Growth was virtually nil in 2011, as safety concerns caused a stoppage in oil production at one of the main 
platforms for much of the year, offsetting gains from government-financed investment in other sectors. 
With expected more normal oil production, growth should strengthen in 2012 and 2013. Diversifying the 
economy will be important to maintain growth over the longer term.
Economic performance
Overall GDP grew by a mere 0.1% in 2011, as a 9.3% contraction in the 
oil sector largely offset a 9.4% expansion in non-oil activity, which 
was largely driven by public investment in infrastructure. Crude 
oil production fell by 10.5%, as a review and strengthening of safety 
procedures halted output at the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli oil platform for 
much of the year. Natural gas production declined by 2.2%, as Turkey, 
the country’s major importer, reduced imports of Azeri gas and no other 
countries made offsetting purchases.
The non-oil sector recorded growth in agriculture, construction, and 
services (Figure 3.2.1). Agriculture grew by 5.8%, mainly from higher 
crops and livestock production, reflecting expanded cultivation and the 
impact of government tax credits and lending programs for improving 
access to modern farm equipment. Construction climbed by 20%, lifted 
by non-oil government projects and foreign investment in tourism. 
Industry contracted by 4.3% because of the lower oil output. Services rose 
by 6.5%, led by 10.3% growth in the wholesale and retail sector and some 
expansion of communications and tourism.
On the demand side, investment—mainly non-oil and largely 
financed from domestic resources—surged by 27.3%, with machinery 
and equipment manufacturing, communications, and chemical 
production receiving most of it. Private consumption grew by 9.9%, 
fueled in part by a 14.2% salary increase for civil servants introduced in 
September–November.
Average annual inflation moved up to 7.9%, largely reflecting higher 
food prices early in the year as a result of crop damage late in 2010 and 
price increases for imported foodstuffs, as well as inflation in trading 
partner countries. Monthly inflation spiked in the first half as food stocks 
declined, and then moderated in the second half with the new harvest 
(Figure 3.2.2).
Fiscal policy is driven largely by oil income, which accumulates in the 
State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ), from where transfers are made to 
the budget to finance state spending. In 2011 such transfers constituted 
57% of total government revenue (versus 52% in 2010); they helped finance 
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an expansion of government activities, in particular public investment 
projects in areas such as transport, energy, and water supply. The transfers 
allowed a surplus in the state (unconsolidated) budget of 0.6% of GDP; 
without them, the budget would have run a deficit of 17.3% of GDP 
(Figure 3.2.3).
Total government revenue, including SOFAZ transfers, was equivalent 
to 31.4% of GDP. Non-oil receipts grew by 22%, reflecting the strong non-oil 
performance, although they contributed less than half all budget receipts.
Higher oil prices enabled the government to raise its spending by 
30.8%, including the steep rise of wages for civil servants, higher pensions 
and other social program spending, as well as building projects. Capital 
expenditure accounted for more than half the government’s outlays.
Responding to rising inflation and concerns over capital inflows, the 
central bank tightened monetary policy, raising the refinancing rate in 
June to 5.25% and increasing reserve requirements in May from 0.5% to 
2.0% on all deposits and, in July, to 3.0% on foreign currency deposits. To 
prevent significant real appreciation of the local currency and to create a 
more competitive non-oil sector, the central bank also used sterilization 
operations, selling $497 million to the banks (Figure 3.2.4).
The current account recorded a surplus of 28.7% of GDP, smaller than 
the previous year. Because of higher imports, the trade surplus declined 
to $16.8 billion from $19.7 billion in 2010, as higher oil prices (despite
lower oil production) helped total exports to stay at around the 2010 level 
of $26.5 billion. Non-oil exports remained small at $1.6 billion. Growing
domestic demand helped raise imports, mainly of machinery, electronics, 
and foodstuffs, by more than 50%.
Remittances jumped by 42.7%, reflecting the revival of the Russian 
and Turkish economies, the main employment destinations for expatriate 
Azeris. Foreign direct investment remained less than 0.5% of GDP, 
reflecting little net private investment in either the oil or non-oil sectors. 
Overall reserves grew to an estimated $10.3 billion. Total external debt
at end-2011 was estimated at 17.8% of GDP, including public and publicly 
guaranteed external debt of 8.4% of GDP.
Economic prospects
GDP growth is projected to accelerate to 4.1% in 2012 but to moderate to 
3.5% in 2013, mirroring higher oil output and continued expansion in the 
non-oil sector (Figure 3.2.5). Oil output is forecast to pick up moderately 
in 2012 after completion of upgrades on the three main oil platforms, 
while the expected opening of new gas platforms may increase gas 
production if demand also increases (Figure 3.2.6). Continued recession 
in the eurozone will, however, likely limit demand for petroleum and thus 
the rise in oil production. Similarly, a steep fall in prices might lead the 
government to curb output.
Growth in the oil sector will affect transport, communications, and 
wholesale and retail trade, particularly the development of new rail and 
sea transport links for petroleum. Current road projects will stimulate 
transport, while agricultural projects and subsidies for imported seeds 
should help boost agricultural output. These measures will also encourage 
farmers to shift more into cash crops.
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Services are expected to stay largely driven by trade and tourism 
in 2012. The government’s investment program should, by expanding 
infrastructure, support industry and construction through boosting 
demand for local production of cement, steel pipes, and other building 
materials. Although the non-oil sector will remain small, its development 
and an improved business environment would improve domestic 
employment opportunities, possibly reducing remittances over the 
medium term.
Despite the central bank’s goal of reducing inflation to 7–7.5% in 
2012 and 2013, various factors could take inflation to 9.0% in 2012 before 
it subsequently recedes to 8.5% in 2013 (Figure 3.2.7). Strong domestic 
demand fueled by oil income, rising public sector consumption (including 
planned government salary increases), and expanded domestic credit to 
the economy may heighten inflationary pressures in 2012. The completion 
of grain-storage and improved food-processing facilities should, however, 
reduce food imports, helping moderate inflation in 2013.
The budget envisages a deficit of 1.3% of GDP in 2012 (Figure 3.2.8), 
as total government spending is planned to rise by 10%, while revenue is 
forecast to grow by only 4%, based on a very conservative assumption for 
oil prices ($80 per barrel). Revenue, including SOFAZ transfers, is forecast
at 37% of GDP in 2012, but would come in lower if petroleum prices 
plunged. Higher petroleum prices on the other hand could allow for even 
steeper increases in salaries and pensions in 2012, although a sharp fiscal 
expansion risks overheating the economy and stoking inflation.
The budget outlines a 22.2% expansion in social outlays in 2012. The 
government’s investment plan aims to keep capital spending, mainly for 
infrastructure projects on irrigation, roads and energy, at 2011 levels.
A budget deficit of 1% of GDP in 2013 is forecast, with total revenue, 
including SOFAZ transfers, of 32% of GDP. Because of limited non-oil 
sector income, the budget presumes that transfers from SOFAZ will 
account for 61% of total government revenue in 2012, and comparable 
transfers will likely be needed in 2013. Although SOFAZ balances, at close 
to 60% of 2010 GDP, should be sufficient to support such budget transfers 
over the next few years, global shocks and unexpected problems with oil 
production could affect the future sustainability of relying on SOFAZ 
transfers to fund expenditure.
Monetary policy will continue to focus on restraining inflation, so 
as to limit nominal interest rates and avoid a real appreciation of the 
local currency. The central bank plans to improve prudential and capital-
adequacy control, as well as risk management, while strengthening 
the interbank market. Consolidating existing, small private banks 
and privatizing the state-owned International Bank of Azerbaijan (the 
country’s largest bank) should foster a more competitive environment and 
cut banking costs.
The current account surplus is expected to remain high, at 22.0% of 
GDP in 2012 and 19.0% in 2013 (Figure 3.2.9), in light of elevated oil prices 
and increased output. Oil-related exports are expected to remain the 
dominant export category, at about 90% of the total.
Services imports, including transport, communications, and 
construction, are expected to grow once oil operations are back to 
strength. Continued hydrocarbon development—exploration for new oil 
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wells and preparations for the second phase of the Shahdeniz (gas field) 
project—should sustain foreign investment.
Factors that may affect the actual outturn include rising imports of 
construction machinery and equipment, which may take the current 
account surplus below current forecasts. In addition, foreign investment 
could rise sharply if petroleum reserves are found in the area covered by 
an oil exploration agreement signed between BP and SOCAR in late 2010.
Financing for new projects is forecast to increase public and publicly 
guaranteed debt slightly, to about 8.7% of GDP in 2012. With international 
reserves of more than $40 billion (including SOFAZ assets), Azerbaijan’s
external position should remain comfortable over the next several years.
Policy challenge—diversifying from petroleum
Supporting growth in the non-oil sector and reducing dependence on 
oil revenue are the most pressing long-term issues for the economy. The 
key to maintaining long-term growth—diversifying the economy—will 
depend on developing a strong private sector. In turn this will require 
access to financing and an improved business and investment climate. 
Thus financial and regulatory reform making it easier to do business 
will be essential. Non-oil activity needs to be promoted subnationally 
especially, in order to reduce urban–rural income disparities.
With the country’s rich natural resources, agriculture appears the 
most promising area for diversification, and some studies suggest that 
its productivity can be increased two- or threefold over the medium 
term. Such gains would require a stronger legal framework, output 
reoriented toward cash crops, and improved market access, as the 
relatively few produce-collection points and processing plants hold back 
earnings opportunities. Heavy investment is thus needed to develop 
agroprocessing, which requires cold-storage tanks and transport systems, 
sophisticated processing plants, and strong marketing.
Public investment in the non-oil sector should increasingly be financed 
by taxes rather than transfers from SOFAZ, to improve the sustainability 
of public finances. SOFAZ revenue should be used mainly to smooth out 
public spending and finance large, one-time infrastructure projects.
In financial sector reform, the central bank’s decision to privatize the 
International Bank of Azerbaijan, is expected to strengthen competition 
among banks, while the additional capital obtained for that bank should 
strengthen banking generally (the bank’s liquidity and capital shortages 
have complicated privatization, however). Proposed consolidation of small 
banks could also improve competition and increase efficiency, which 
would benefit the private sector through lower banking costs and easier 
access to finance.
Azerbaijan improved its ranking in the World Bank’s 2012 Doing 
Business survey to 66, aided by reforms simplifying tax payments. 
Nevertheless, the country still rates poorly in many areas and was 
downgraded in several, including access to electricity and trading across 
borders (although current energy projects should improve the electricity 
ranking). Likewise, transport projects and regional cooperation programs 
may well encourage Azerbaijan and other member countries to streamline 
trading procedures and so boost cross-border trade.
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Georgia
The economy maintained robust growth in 2011, following its recovery in 2010 from the global recession, 
while annual inflation rose slightly. The current account deficit remained large, as nominal imports grew 
more than exports. In 2012 a weaker global environment will likely reduce growth by constraining exports, 
foreign direct investment, and remittances. A key policy challenge is to achieve more inclusive growth, 
particularly for rural areas.
Economic performance
The economy continued to show robust growth, estimated by the 
government at 7.0% (Figure 3.3.1). Among the productive sectors, about 
half the growth came from services, which rose by 5.6% relative to the 
previous year, because of strong increases in the financial sector, tourism, 
and communications. Another two-fifths came from industry, which 
rose by 9.7% during 2011, as strong external demand and continued 
structural reforms boosted manufacturing, although mining declined due 
to reduced production of coal, lignite, and peat. The small balance came 
from agriculture, which, after 3 years of decline, rose by 5.5% during the 
year, reflecting higher crop production as a result of good weather and 
favorable prices.
On the demand side, private investment and private consumption 
are both estimated to have contributed to growth, with consumption 
benefiting from higher remittance inflows, aided by the Russian 
Federation’s healthy economy. Government consumption and investment 
had little impact, as fiscal consolidation held back government spending, 
while net exports had a negative impact (real imports grew far more than 
real exports).
Although average inflation rose to 8.5% from 7.1% in 2010, the 
12-month rate slowed to 2.0% in December, after peaking at 14.3% in 
May 2011 (Figure 3.3.2), as the moderation in prices of food (domestic 
and imported) and other imports during the second half of the year 
outweighed price hikes for transport and utilities stemming from price 
liberalization.
The fiscal deficit narrowed to 2.9% of GDP from 6.6% of GDP 
in 2010, consistent with the adjustment program supported by the 
International Monetary Fund. Tax revenue rose by 26.0%, reflecting a 
new tax code, enforcement of new revenue measures, and simplification 
of tax compliance and reporting requirements, all of which took effect 
at the start of the year. Relative to GDP, however, total revenue rose only 
slightly, to 28.4% from 28.3% in 2010, because of declines in grants and 
nontax revenue as a share of GDP.
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 Spending growth was kept to 4.7%, reflecting compression in capital 
expenditure as well as tighter spending limits on public salaries and 
defense. Total expenditure fell to 31.3% of GDP from 34.9% in 2010.
Treasury securities, foreign financing, and privatization receipts all 
contributed to budget financing. Treasury securities—funding 28.4% of 
the budget deficit in 2011—have emerged in recent years as an important 
source of deficit coverage, and successful issues of treasury notes of up 
to 10 years’ maturity have become an important step for developing the 
secondary market for tradable domestic debt. In addition, the successful 
issue of a second sovereign Eurobond (the first was in 2008) reduced the 
rollover risk from external liabilities falling due in 2012 and 2013. Total 
government debt was estimated at 36.8% of GDP at end-2011.
M3 broad money grew by 17.2% (Figure 3.3.3), reflecting a 19.5% rise 
in bank credit to the private sector. The central bank’s switch to a more 
accommodative monetary policy in July lowered the policy rate in steps 
from 7.5% to 6.5% by January 2012, although heavy dollarization of 
the banking system limits monetary policy effectiveness. Interest rates 
declined on long-term loans, despite strong growth in lari-denominated 
loans and higher credit risk premiums, although the lending rate 
remained high at 19.2%. Deposit interest rates rose slightly to 9.4%, as 
banks moved to increase deposits by offering competitive interest rates 
(Figure 3.3.4).
Banking stability improved, reflecting a near doubling of banks’ 
returns on assets and on equity in light of wider profit margins and 
a continued high capital-adequacy ratio of about 17%. The ratio of 
nonperforming loans to total loans decreased to 8.6%, partly due to rising 
credit volumes.
The current account deficit worsened to an estimated 13.3% of GDP 
from 11.5% in 2010. The trade deficit widened by an estimated 25% to 
$3.6 billion (Figure 3.3.5). Exports shot up by 42.3%, reflecting rapid
growth in vehicle reexports to Kazakhstan (in advance of higher customs 
duties, as Kazakhstan—a traditional major market—entered a customs 
union with Belarus and the Russian Federation in January 2012) and a 
near doubling of sales of nitric fertilizers due to heavier global demand 
associated with high food prices. Imports surged by 39.8% (from a larger 
base than exports), mainly reflecting increased imports of intermediate 
goods and petroleum products.
Strong remittances and continued surpluses in services—mainly from 
tourism (which rose by nearly 39% to $2.5 billion) and transport—offset
some of the deterioration in the trade balance. A 21% rise in foreign direct 
investment (FDI) inflows to an estimated $981 million helped finance
the larger current account deficit. Gross international reserves climbed 
by 23.5% to $2.8 billion, equivalent to around 4 months of imports. Total
external debt, including private debt, fell to an estimated 57.5% of GDP at 
end-2011 from 61.6% the previous year.
The flexible exchange rate regime continued to provide relative 
stability for the external sector. The lari appreciated by 12.2% in 
nominal effective terms and by 8.4% in real effective terms during 2011 
(Figure 3.3.6).
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Economic prospects
For a small economy that relies heavily on trade and remittances, 
economic prospects will depend heavily on the external economic 
environment, in particular developments in the European Union (EU) 
and neighboring countries such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, the Russian 
Federation, and Turkey. The expected slowdown in the eurozone and the 
Russian Federation will likely limit exports, FDI, and remittances, while 
continued fiscal restraint will curtail the government’s ability to augment 
growth. Thus growth is projected to slow to 6.0% in 2012, recovering 
somewhat to 6.3% in 2013 with the assumed improvement in the world 
economy.
Year-average inflation is projected to slow to 4.8% in 2012, reflecting 
the expected moderation in global food prices. A return to modest 
increases in global commodity prices should cause only a slight rise in 
inflation to 6.2% in 2013, predicated on limited supply-side pressures and 
the absence of wage-price spirals.
The high level of dollarization will continue limiting the scope 
for monetary policy such that the authorities will need time to push 
through with their desired move to inflation targeting. Consistent with 
its adjustment program, the government aims to reduce the budget 
deficit further to 3.3% in 2012 and to 2.9% in 2013 (Figure 3.3.7). Fiscal 
consolidation will include both current and capital expenditure, with a 
careful review of subsidies. Total government debt is forecast to nudge up 
to 38.0% of GDP at end-2012 and to 38.2% the following year (Figure 3.3.8).
The current account deficit is projected to narrow to 12.5% of GDP 
in 2012, with slowing growth expected to reduce imports more than 
exports. Both sides of the trade account are, however, expected to rise in 
2013 with a recovery in the world and domestic economies. As nominal 
GDP is forecast to grow more than the current account deficit, the 
current account deficit as a share of GDP will narrow further in 2013, to 
about 12.0%.
Negotiations for a long-awaited free trade agreement with the EU 
were launched in early 2012. An agreement would give Georgia extended 
access to the EU’s single market, which should improve trade and 
investment.
While sound macro-prudential policies and fiscal restraint have 
reduced the chances of overheating and speculative bubbles, downside 
risks remain. These include a continuing large current account deficit; a 
limited export base with high import content and FDI focused more on 
the nontradable sector than on exports; heavy dependence on foreign aid 
and borrowing (despite high levels of official borrowing at concessional 
rates); and low private savings. 
Policy therefore needs to promote capital inflows toward productive 
investment, particularly in the export sector. Similarly, the government 
needs to better leverage the country’s investment resources and to 
maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of public spending. These 
measures are even more essential given current risks in the international 
financial markets, which may hinder availability of private investment 
and concessional financing from development partners.
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Policy challenge—securing inclusive growth
A major challenge over the medium to long run is to ensure economic 
growth that is more inclusive, with more equal access to economic 
opportunities and social welfare. One indication of income disparities 
is Georgia’s relatively high Gini coefficient of 0.41, well above 0.31 for 
Armenia and 0.34 for Azerbaijan.
The government needs to step up its efforts to address structural 
unemployment, which stems from a mismatch between existing human 
capital and available jobs and which represents an important supply-
side constraint. While skill inadequacies are an important part of the 
problem, so too is the limited range of well-paying jobs, in turn reflecting 
the small size of the tradable goods sector. Structural reforms to promote 
investment, particularly in export-oriented industries, could help create 
greater demand for employment while providing a way to reduce the 
chronic current account deficit in the medium term. At the same time, 
addressing high youth unemployment (35%) by improving skills through 
more vocational education, progress in secondary education, and 
on-the-job training (including the use of new technology) will help create 
a supply of employable workers to fill new jobs.
As job creation in the past was primarily skills-based and concentrated 
in finance and services, investing more in labor-intensive sectors such as 
industry and agriculture would enhance the inclusiveness of economic 
growth. About half the workforce is employed in agriculture, which 
contributes less than 10% of GDP (Figure 3.3.9). Surplus labor in urban 
areas, however, with low levels of labor absorption in agriculture, has made 
it extremely hard for the rural unemployed to move into other sectors. 
The narrow base of the formal economy in rural areas, where self-
employment is associated with subsistence income and low productivity 
in agriculture, contributes to rural poverty. Moreover, the prevalence 
of subsistence income limits the demand of the rural population for 
outputs from other sectors, constraining sectoral diversification of the 
economy and hindering development spillovers between agricultural and 
nonagricultural activity.
To help narrow differences between urban and rural development, the 
government has proposed a strategy to promote rural growth. This includes 
increasing investment in, among others, manufacturing, agriculture 
and renewable energy, in part through public–private partnerships. 
Well-designed public investment in infrastructure—whether in roads, 
power, water supply, or irrigation—would support private investment in 
agroprocessing and other industries, bolstering rural employment and 
reducing a persistent urban bias against agriculture. It would also promote 
the development of a more export-oriented agricultural sector, to draw on 
Georgia’s favorable climate and natural resources.
Structural reforms, too, should focus on areas that could improve 
Georgia’s attractiveness as a place to do business. Although the country 
has improved its standing in the 2012 Doing Business report from the 
World Bank—to 16 out of 183 countries (better than Malaysia, Thailand, 
Germany, and Japan)—it could still benefit by addressing issues in 
resolving insolvency, enforcing contracts, and trading across borders. 
In addition, improving governance and transparency in business would 
promote productivity and create greater job opportunities.
3.3.9 Agricultural indicators
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Kazakhstan
Good oil sector performance and sizable public investment contributed to robust expansion and a strong 
balance of payments in 2011. Growth is forecast to moderate in 2012, reflecting the slowdown expected 
in Europe and the Russian Federation, before recovering somewhat in 2013 as the world economy 
strengthens. Structurally, the economy remains dependent on oil production and constrained by financial 
sector weakness. Over time growth will depend on the success of the government’s diversification efforts, 
largely funded by oil earnings. 
Economic performance 
Growth since independence has turned largely on strong oil and gas 
exports. Much of the proceeds have been saved in the National Fund for 
the Republic of Kazakhstan (NFRK), with portions transferred to the 
budget to fund public investment. 
Global recovery helped growth rebound to 7.0% in 2010, and then to 
an estimated 7.5% in 2011, reflecting a surge in agricultural production, a 
strong upturn in services, and continued government investment in some 
industries (Figure 3.4.1). Agriculture, hit by a severe drought in 2010, was 
aided in 2011 by particularly favorable weather, which helped it grow by 
26.7%. Grain production more than doubled, achieving record yields. 
Industrial output (excluding construction) rose by 3.5%, driven mainly 
by a 6.2% increase in manufacturing, due to rapid growth in chemicals, 
metallurgy, and machinery and vehicles. Mining picked up by about 1.3%. 
Oil output fell by 0.5%, affected by social unrest in a key production area, 
although gas condensate and natural gas output climbed by 6.1% and 
5.2%, respectively. Construction expanded by 2.7%, reflecting government 
stimulus and investment in infrastructure.
Services rose by 7.7%, driven by strong growth in wholesale and retail 
trade (14.5%), transport and warehousing (6.8%), and communications 
(18.7%). Financial services and insurance contracted by 4.5%, although the 
credit market expanded for the first time since the global financial crisis. 
Real estate activity slowed to 1.4% from 3.5% in 2010, despite continued 
support from the government for residential construction. 
On the demand side, based on 9 months’ data, total consumption is 
estimated to have risen by almost 11%, driven by nearly 18% growth in 
government consumption and a 9% rise in private consumption, as higher 
household income strongly boosted retail trade (Figure 3.4.2).
Gross fixed capital formation moved up by an estimated 4.5%, 
underpinned by higher investment in manufacturing, transport and 
warehousing, information and communication, and real estate. Much 
of this investment involved government support under the Accelerated 
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Program of Industrial and Innovative Development, which aims to 
promote economic diversification and greater competitiveness through 
its more than 600 government-led projects, many implemented by the 
government’s National Welfare Fund, Samruk-Kazyna (SK). Net exports 
rose by about 5%, reflecting higher oil prices. 
Average annual inflation rose to 8.3%, slightly above the target of 
6–8% set by the National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK) (Figure 3.4.3). The 
acceleration reflected double-digit increases in food and fuel prices, 
despite stringent price regulation and efforts to contain fuel prices by 
having the national oil and gas company sell imported fuel products at 
a loss. Inflation accelerated during the first 8 months of the year, as food 
prices surged, and then slowed toward year-end. In the year through 
December, inflation was 7.4%. 
The fiscal deficit narrowed slightly to 2.1% of GDP, from 2.4% of GDP 
in 2010, as revenue growth outpaced the rise in expenditure. Thanks 
to notable increases in both tax and nontax receipts—reflecting strong 
economic growth, higher export duties for oil products and larger receipts 
from the Russian Federation under the Customs Union agreement, and 
increased nontax income (penalties, fines, and dividends)—revenue rose 
by 35.6%. Total revenue, including transfers from the NFRK, remained at 
19.7% of GDP. 
Reductions in the number of government employees and more 
careful monitoring of government spending helped limit expenditure to 
21.7% of GDP. Spending for education, health care, and social assistance 
remained at about the same share of GDP as in 2010. Public sector wages 
were increased by 18–24% through November, while pensions and social 
allowances were raised by 30% and 9%, respectively.
Broad money expanded by 15.0% and reserve money by 10.3% owing 
to higher net foreign assets at the NBK and commercial banks. The NBK, 
reversing the easing carried out during the crisis, raised the refinancing 
rate from 7.0% to 7.5% in March 2011 in response to higher inflation and 
maintained it through year-end. 
With the foreign exchange market supporting the tenge (the national 
currency), the NBK returned to a managed float regime in March 2011 
with limited intervention, buying in the first half of the year and selling 
in the second half, to minimize exchange rate fluctuations (Figure 3.4.4). 
In nominal terms, the tenge remained largely stable against major 
currencies and depreciated slightly against its currency basket. The real 
exchange rate, however, appreciated by 5.7% against the dollar and by 1.0% 
against the euro because of relative inflation rates, but depreciated by 2.8% 
against the Russian ruble toward end-2011, after appreciating between 
August and mid-December. 
Positive trends in the economy led Standard & Poor’s and Fitch 
to raise their sovereign ratings by one notch each, to ВВВ+ and BВВ, 
respectively, in November. But the banking sector remains weak, and 
about one-third of loans are nonperforming.
In April the NBK’s role expanded to include financial supervision. 
Reserve requirements for banks were increased in May, from 1.5% to 2.5% 
on internal liabilities and from 2.5% to 4.5% on other liabilities, to address 
the high level of nonperforming loans (NPLs). Legal amendments were 
approved to prolong the guarantee of individual deposits up to T5 million 
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3.4.5 Current account indicators
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(a little less than $34,000) and to make the write-off of bad loans tax
deductible. The NBK will also establish a distressed assets fund to deal 
with the banks’ bad loans. 
The current account surplus more than tripled to an estimated 7.3% of 
GDP, as the trade surplus surged by 62% to $46.8 billion. Exports rose by
46.1%, reflecting high oil prices, while imports grew by 31.8%. The services 
account improved but still recorded a deficit of $6.1 billion. In addition,
there was a $24.1 billion payment to direct investors (mostly in the oil and
mineral sector) and a large outflow from net remittances, estimated at 
$1.3 billion, as Kazakhstan is a destination for foreign labor (Figure 3.4.5).
Net foreign direct investment tripled to about $8.8 billion. Gross
official reserves of the NBK rose by $1.05 billion to $28.8 billion
during the year, while the NFRK’s external assets rose by 43% to 
$43.7 billion. External debt fell from 79.8% of GDP at end-2010 to 66%
at end-September, with external private sector debt estimated at 63% of 
GDP, half of which was intracompany debt of multinational subsidiaries 
operating in extractive industries. Government external debt remained 
very low at about 2.3% of GDP. State enterprises’ debt, which is not 
reported as public debt, exceeds 10% of GDP, and a June 2011 report by 
the International Monetary Fund noted indications of growing foreign 
borrowing by some enterprises in which SK has holdings. 
Economic prospects 
Economic growth is projected to slow to 6.0% in 2012, reflecting the 
expected slowdown in the eurozone and the Russian Federation. It 
should accelerate to 6.5% in 2013, as the world economy strengthens 
(Figure 3.4.6). Growth could turn out slower if prospects for oil and other 
commodities worsen, the world outlook deteriorates, or domestic demand 
is weaker than expected. 
Sizable investments under the Accelerated Program should boost 
manufacturing and construction, while an expected resurgence of mineral 
prices and minimal decline in oil prices is seen encouraging growth in 
petroleum and mining. Implementation of the Accelerated Program, 
supplemented by other programs aimed at improving infrastructure and 
productivity, and at promoting industrial and social modernization, are 
likely to support growth by easing bottlenecks and boosting domestic 
producers’ competitiveness. 
Integration into the Common Economic Space (CES) with Belarus 
and the Russian Federation stands to expand trade, particularly if other 
countries also join. Inflation is projected to decline to 6.5% in 2012 due 
to lower food prices, and then rise slightly to 6.8% in 2013 as food price 
inflation resumes (Figure 3.4.7). The 20% rise in the producer price index 
during 2011 and the need to harmonize tariffs and prices under the CES 
to higher Russian prices will contribute to inflationary pressures in 2012. 
However, the authorities are expected to continue using price regulation, 
subsidies, and bans on individual products to keep observed inflation 
within the 6–8% target range.
Fiscal policy envisages an increase in the overall budget deficit to 
about 2.5% of GDP in 2012, as revenue is forecast to decline to about 
19% of GDP, while expenditure as a share of GDP is forecast to fall by 
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less than revenue (Figure 3.4.8). The authorities aim to reduce the deficit 
to 1.5% of GDP in 2013 through further tax administration reform (by 
more extensive auditing, registering the remaining small sellers for 
tax payments, and moving toward universal tax declarations), better 
procurement methods, and a moratorium on government hiring. 
Nevertheless, pensions, social assistance, and wages for the social sector 
will grow in real terms. 
In January 2012, the President announced a policy change to 
broaden the NFRK’s objectives with a new investment function. Part 
of the NFRK’s assets will be invested internally to fund government 
development programs. The NFRK will, for example, lend $4 billion
(nearly 2% of GDP) to the national oil and gas company Kazmunaigas in 
two tranches, in 2013 and 2015, to accelerate production at the Kashagan 
oil field, the world’s largest field discovered in recent decades.
In 2012 and 2013, annual transfers from the NFRK, which are 
budgeted at a fixed amount of around $8 billion, will be topped up with
T180 billion (about $1.2 billion or 0.6% of GDP) to allow more flexibility
in meeting or expanding social expenditure without exceeding budget 
deficit targets. In addition, $300 million–500 million (roughly 0.2–0.3%
of GDP) in revenue is expected from sales of shares in state enterprises 
to the population and pension funds through the proposed launch of the 
People’s Initial Public Offering Program in 2012. Total government debt 
(excluding state enterprises’ debt) is not expected to exceed 15% of GDP in 
2012 and 2013, a very low rate by international standards.
In January 2012, 12-month inflation fell to 5.9%, the lowest in 
many years. In mid-February, the NBK reduced the refinancing rate by 
0.5% and is considering another decrease in April if inflation remains 
low. Thus interest rates generally may also decline moderately. As for the 
exchange rate, in the first 2 months of 2012 the tenge remained stable, 
slightly above 148/$1, and strengthened somewhat after February.
Despite government support to the financial sector, a persistent high 
level of NPLs is a major concern and a key constraint to economic growth. 
At end-2011, banking sector performance was worse (in terms of credit-
to-GDP and asset-to-GDP ratios, share of NPLs, return on assets, and 
return on equity) than at end-2010. In addition, the large BTA Bank, which 
was recapitalized and restructured in 2009–2010, remains in difficulty 
and in January 2012 requested approval for a second restructuring. In this 
situation, SK—a major shareholder—may be forced to bail out the bank 
using public money. Over the medium term, NPLs may also rise as a result 
of financial assistance provided through interest-rate subsidies and partial 
credit guarantees under the government’s Roadmap of Business 2020 
program, which helped increase bank lending in 2011. 
The poor performance of the state pension funds also presents a 
macroeconomic risk, given the aging population. Between losses on 
external assets and poor returns on the more than 40% of their funds 
invested in low-interest-rate government securities, the funds have lost 
over 20% of their real value during the past 6–8 years and could be hard 
hit if another crisis occurs. 
The current account is forecast to record surpluses of about 1.0–1.5% 
of GDP in 2012 and 2013 (Figure 3.4.9). Surpluses of at least 20% of GDP 
are projected for the trade balance, supported by high prices for oil 
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and other commodities and easier access to the Russian transport and 
communications network, including oil pipelines, under the CES. The 
services account is set to improve, with completion of the infrastructure 
development around the Kashagan project and transition to the 
production phase. Income-related outflows may also increase, however, as 
continued mineral earnings generate higher payments to foreign investors. 
Capital inflows should average about $4 billion in 2012 and 2013, while
gross reserves are forecast to reach $32 billion and $35 billion at the close of
2012 and 2013. The NFRK’s assets will grow more slowly than during 2011, 
given the government’s intention to invest NFRK resources extensively in 
the economy, but they will likely exceed $50 billion at end-2012, offering
substantial resources for future development (Figure 3.4.10).
Total external debt is forecast to remain at 65–70% of GDP at the end 
of this year and next (Figure 3.4.11). The share of intracompany debt will 
remain unchanged and public external debt (excluding state enterprises’ 
debt) will maintain its traditionally low level.
Policy challenge—diversifying the economy
Kazakhstan’s dependence on petroleum and mining makes it vulnerable 
to swings in international prices. And it is hard to establish a more 
inclusive growth model, as jobs in petroleum are limited, involving either 
low-skill employment or a few highly paid, specialized positions. Thus 
some energy earnings should be spent on developing new, competitive 
industries that can support a shift away from oil dependence, especially as 
entry into the CES provides access to much broader markets. 
To help diversify its economy, Kazakhstan needs to expand its current 
efforts to develop competitive projects under the Accelerated Program 
based on its comparative advantages (mainly in agriculture, construction 
materials, oil and gas refining and infrastructure, metallurgy, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, defense, and energy development). Such expansion 
will likely require it to modernize and renovate infrastructure, which 
may create investment opportunities for specialized private investors in 
public–private partnerships, including non-oil multinational companies. 
Investment in infrastructure is needed to attract new technology, both to 
address a growing electricity deficit and to modernize transport, water 
supply, and sanitation in order to cut costs and expand services. 
The careful use of government policy instruments—tax incentives, 
subsidies, regulations, and expenditure for activities that support 
industry—can assist private ventures with good potential, particularly 
in exporting. The experience of Asia’s newly industrialized economies 
suggests that successful industrial programs are those that have the 
government serving as a facilitator and regulator rather than lead 
implementer, leaving that function to the market. 
At the same time, scarce resources must not be used to aid 
poorly performing firms or to help vested interests seeking support 
for unprofitable activities. State support should be limited in time, 
supportive of competition, and terminated when projects fail. In addition, 
government funding should accompany—and not replace—broader 
reforms in governance and regulation, as well as efforts to build human 
capital by strengthening education and training. 
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Kyrgyz Republic
The economy is still recovering from the political crisis of April 2010. A new government has been set 
up, public confidence is slowly returning, and all sectors have seen growth. Improved tax administration 
and high gold prices increased government revenue, but higher civil service wages and social spending, 
alongside continuing reconstruction in the south, strained overall finances. Integration into the customs 
union with the Russian Federation, Belarus, and Kazakhstan may be a challenge, with risks of inflation 
pressures, unemployment, and trade disruptions.
Economic performance
Following a sluggish first quarter, real growth picked up as the year 
progressed, reaching 5.7% for 2011 (Figure 3.5.1). All sectors showed robust 
gains, reflecting improved security and sustained public confidence after 
the events of April 2010, which saw the ouster of the president and ethnic 
violence in the south.
Agriculture showed a modest bounceback to 2.3% growth, following 
its 2.6% contraction in 2010. Land under cultivation increased by 9%, 
because shortages of fuel and financing were less severe than in 2010, 
although a drought in the south kept grain production stagnant.
Industry expanded by 8.8%, with growth in nearly all major 
subsectors (Figure 3.5.2). Manufacturing grew by 9.8%, or 18.8% excluding 
gold production, which declined slightly year on year due to low gold 
concentration in ore extracted during the year. Textile and chemical 
industries grew especially fast, reflecting the resumption of trade with the 
Russian Federation and Kazakhstan (disrupted by the crisis). However, 
food processing declined, reflecting the previous year’s fall in agricultural 
production and the weak recovery in 2011. Also within industry, 
construction declined by 3.9%—adding to the 18.5% fall in 2010—
reflecting a slow recovery of private sector confidence and the continuing 
postponement of several large projects that were put on hold in 2010.
The services sector, which fell sharply in 2010 following the political 
events, rebounded by 5.2%, reflecting improved consumer sentiment and 
the reopening of borders with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. (The borders 
were closed periodically after April 2010. By October that year the border 
with Kazakhstan was largely reopened, and in October 2011 Uzbekistan 
reopened an important border crossing.) Most of its subsectors saw 
growth, including trade, hotels and restaurants, and transport and 
communications, although real estate contracted by 1.7% on continuing 
fears of socioeconomic turbulence.
On the demand side, private consumption is estimated to have grown 
by 4.5%, reflecting a notable rise in retail sales, despite a small increase 
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in unemployment. The growth in consumption was driven largely 
by returning consumer confidence and an increase in remittances to 
$1.4 billion, equivalent to 25% of GDP, reflecting more Kyrgyz migrants
working in the Russian Federation in 2011.
Private investment is estimated to have fallen by a further 16%, 
after a 23% decline in 2010. By contrast, the growth rate of government 
investment roughly doubled to an estimated 16%, reflecting continued 
spending to rehabilitate damaged infrastructure in the south.
Consumer prices rose by 16.6% on a year-average basis, mainly 
because of rapid price increases during the first half of the year. Inflation 
slowed during the second half, and the 12-month (December over 
December) rise in the consumer price index was only 5.6% (Figure 3.5.3).
Food prices, which rose by 25.9%, were the main driver of inflation; 
nonfood prices rose by 10.3%. The slowdown in inflation during the 
second half of the year largely reflected good harvests in the Russian 
Federation and Kazakhstan, which lowered the cost of imported food, 
along with the impact of tighter monetary policy.
The overall budget deficit rose slightly, to 7.6% of GDP, as increases in 
tax revenue offset higher social—but not capital—spending (Figure 3.5.4).
Government revenue rose by around 30%, reflecting strong economic 
growth, high gold prices, and reforms in tax policy and administration, 
including improved customs valuation, higher excise tax yields, a stronger 
large taxpayer unit, and more effective audit procedures. Total revenue 
and grants reached 32.2% of GDP.
Government spending rose by 34%, reflecting higher government 
grants, wages, and social outlays to raise pensions toward the national 
subsistence level. Total expenditure reached 39.7% of GDP, and total 
public and publicly guaranteed debt—external and domestic—declined to 
52% of GDP at end-2011.
Extensive dollarization of the economy and a shallow financial sector 
limit the impact of monetary policy in the country. Still, in 2011 the 
National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic raised its policy rate steadily over 
the year, from 5.5% to 13.5%. Credit growth in the broad financial system 
accelerated to 19.2% from 18.2% in 2010, reflecting in part the lagged 
impact of earlier expansionary policy and the low reserve requirement 
set by the central bank in 2010. Commercial banks were responsible for 
most of the increased lending. The ratio of nonperforming loans to total 
credit portfolio declined, from 13.8% to 9.8%. Higher nominal interest rates 
contributed to the local currency’s appreciation from March to August.
The current account deficit narrowed slightly to 6.8% of GDP from 
8.0% in 2010, despite higher imports, reflecting a less negative income 
balance and stronger remittances, which reached 25% of GDP (Figure 3.5.5).
Trade rebounded strongly, after the fall in 2010 due to the border 
closures. Exports are estimated to have grown by 31.1%, with gold 
remaining the largest item. Imports grew by an estimated 34.4%, mainly 
reflecting higher imports of gasoline and diesel fuel. The Commonwealth 
of Independent States countries remained the largest trading partners, 
with 64% of trade volume.
Foreign direct investment fell by 14% reflecting continued weak 
investor confidence. Nevertheless, net international reserves rose by 7% to 
$1.8 billion.
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Economic prospects
GDP growth is expected to slow to 5.0% in 2012 and then rise to 5.5% in 
2013 (Figure 3.5.6). With the restoration of public confidence and political 
stability, higher domestic demand and stronger investor confidence are 
expected to spur private sector activity in the non-gold sectors. Against 
this, the adverse impact of the eurozone recession on Kazakhstan and 
the Russian Federation—key trading partners and sources of worker 
remittances—will inhibit growth. Private transfers are expected to stay 
around 20–25% of GDP, however.
Growth is expected to be driven by the industry and services sectors. 
Government plans to provide subsidized loans to farmers in 2012 are 
expected to promote growth in agriculture.
Large investment projects in infrastructure will drive construction, 
such as rehabilitating major road networks and building new power 
grids. Many other projects, including additional power grids and 
hydropower plants, remain under negotiation.
Private consumption growth is forecast at 5.9% and 5.1%, respectively, 
in 2012 and 2013, although continuing tensions in the south could 
jeopardize these increases. Net exports are likely to show little growth, 
as slower growth in the country’s main trading partners—the People’s 
Republic of China, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and the 
eurozone, point to only modest prospects for exports.
Year-average inflation is expected to continue decelerating, to 
5.0% in 2012, reflecting tighter fiscal and monetary policies and likely 
moderation in the prices for imported food (Figure 3.5.7). Inflation is 
forecast to rise to 5.5% in 2013, on expected price increases for imported 
food.
The government aims to reduce the fiscal deficit to 7.3% of GDP 
or less in the next 2 years, in order to improve debt sustainability and 
contain inflation pressures. These lower deficits would likely maintain 
the ratio of total public debt to GDP at 52–53% in the forecast period.
Recent government announcements signal plans to continue 
improving tax administration and customs collection. Revenue is 
targeted to reach 32–33% of GDP over the forecast period.
On the spending side, cuts for operations, along with a planned 20% 
reduction in the civil service headcount this year, are forecast to offset 
the impact of higher pensions and other socially oriented expenditures. 
Total expenditure is forecast at 39.6% of GDP in 2012 and 38.7% in 2013.
Monetary policy should remain conservative, reflecting central bank 
support of fiscal policy to mitigate inflation pressures. Nominal interest 
rates are likely to stay within the 13–15% band, contributing to further 
appreciation of the local currency this year.
The current account balance is projected to improve somewhat to 
a deficit of 6.6% of GDP in 2012 before returning to and 6.8% in 2013 
(Figure 3.5.8). Following the sharp recovery in 2011, export growth is 
forecast to moderate to 11.8% and then to 7.7% in 2013, as predicted 
slower growth in Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation weaken 
demand for the country’s exports. Import growth is forecast to ease to 
10.4% and 9.2%, respectively, reflecting increasing domestic production 
of foodstuffs, continuing but slower remittance growth, and moderating 
imported food prices in 2012.
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Foreign direct investment inflows will largely depend on the 
government pushing through with its proposed structural reforms, 
which include a reduction in business licenses as part of a broader effort 
to reduce regulatory burdens on activity. The ratio of total external debt 
to GDP is expected to remain relatively stable at around 48–49% in the 
forecast period (Figure 3.5.9).
Policy challenge—joining the customs union
Although economic activity is recovering after the crisis of 2010, political 
stability and investor confidence still need strengthening. As investments 
have been falling, the government is considering providing new tax 
incentives to investors. Unless substantial new investment is generated, 
this move could raise the fiscal deficit and increase the debt-to-GDP 
ratio.
Over the longer term, the planned accession of the Kyrgyz Republic 
into the customs union that Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Russian 
Federation inaugurated in January 2012 poses major challenges to the 
economy. Entry into the customs union would make the country subject 
to new common external tariffs, which are generally higher than those 
now in force in the Kyrgyz Republic. These new tariffs would raise the 
price, and reduce the volume, of “shuttle trade” products, which consist 
largely of textiles reexported from the People’s Republic of China to the 
Russian Federation and Kazakhstan. The shuttle trade was estimated to 
contribute 3–4% of GDP in 2005–2009.
The terms of accession, including the common external tariffs, 
are being discussed. The government is concerned that premature 
accession may entail job losses and is seeking measures to mitigate 
the possible negative economic effects. Conflicts between customs 
union arrangements and the country’s obligations as a World Trade 
Organization member also need to be resolved.
3.5.9 External debt
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Tajikistan
Underpinned by record-high remittance inflows and supported by expansion in agriculture, services, and 
industry, growth accelerated in 2011, continuing the recovery to precrisis levels. Inflation remained high for 
most of 2011 but gradually eased toward year-end. In the short and medium term, continued moderate 
growth is forecast, but heavy reliance on remittances and public investment as drivers of demand-driven 
growth alongside extremely low private investment may not be sustainable.
Economic performance
GDP growth accelerated to 7.4% (from 6.5% in 2010), reflecting strong 
domestic demand and expanding agriculture, services, and industry, 
despite limited electricity supply and disruptions to rail transit through 
neighboring countries that held back output in the first half (Figure 3.6.1).
Driven by record remittances, services were the main driver of 
growth, expanding by 13.5%. Agriculture grew by 7.9%, despite difficult 
climatic conditions. Cotton production shot up by 34%, reflecting a 30% 
rise in the area devoted to cotton, as high international prices encouraged 
additional planting. Other crops, particularly fruits and vegetables, also 
showed double-digit growth.
Industry grew by 5.9%, encompassing a wide variation between a 
more than 38% increase in mining and extraction industries and a 16% 
contraction in aluminum output caused by disruptions to alumina 
imports and reduced electricity generation in the early part of the year.
Consumption, reflecting higher imports, was the main source of growth 
on the demand side. Private investment showed little expansion, and its 
share in GDP remained extremely low at about 3%. Domestic investment 
was dominated by the government through state-owned enterprises.
Rising global food and fuel prices and higher remittances (which 
boosted domestic demand for imports) nearly doubled year-average 
inflation to 12.5% from 6.5% in 2010, although core inflation (excluding 
food and fuel) remained moderate at 5.7%.
Increases in export duties for oil products imposed by Tajikistan’s 
main supplier, the Russian Federation, in the first half of 2011 raised fuel 
prices by 59%. Food price inflation peaked in that half in response to 
rising world prices (Figure 3.6.2), with staple foods rising by an average 
of 32%, before slowing in the second. Massive public expenditure on 
infrastructure and special projects to commemorate the 20th anniversary 
of Tajikistan’s independence added to inflationary pressures.
The overall budget deficit widened to 3.1% of GDP, although the 
more narrowly defined fiscal deficit (excluding foreign-financed public 
investment projects) was less than 1% of GDP (Figure 3.6.3).
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Revenue receipts exceeded the budget target, with tax collection 
surging by 30% from 2010, reflecting high prices for key exports and 
increased imports. Nevertheless, a narrow tax base and heavy dependence 
on import-based taxes contributed to a fragile fiscal position. Total 
revenue equaled 24.4% of GDP.
Government expenditure, in particular capital spending on 
infrastructure, rose by close to 30%, reflecting strong revenue and heavy 
foreign financing. Government investment surged by 41%, with increased 
spending focused on energy and transport infrastructure projects, 
including rehabilitation of the massive Roghun hydropower plant. 
Spending for social insurance and social protection grew by about 7%, as 
the state budget focused on capital outlays. Total expenditure amounted 
to 27.6% of GDP.
Although the stock of public and publicly-guaranteed debt 
climbed, rapid GDP growth reduced the ratio of public and publicly-
guaranteed debt to GDP to 33.3% from 36.5% in 2010 (Figure 3.6.4). 
Potential contingent liabilities for state enterprises and the financial 
sector continued to raise questions about fiscal sustainability over the 
medium term.
Although high dollarization and an underdeveloped financial market 
undermined such moves’ effectiveness, the National Bank of Tajikistan 
(NBT) pursued contractionary monetary policy during much of the 
year to curb inflation, raising its refinancing rate from 8.25% to 9.0% in 
February and again to 10.0% in October 2011. Yet reserve money still 
grew by more than 27% during the year, reflecting the recovery of private 
sector credit and considerable liquidity support from the central bank to 
commercial banks. 
Since late December, with inflation slowing, the NBT has relaxed 
policy somewhat, lowering the refinancing rate in two steps to 9.0% by 
February 2012, to stimulate the economy.
Although financial sector indicators improved somewhat, more 
than 15% of loans remained nonperforming. The sector is constrained 
by limited private investment, few deposits, and exposure to risky 
agricultural loans. The exchange rate of the somoni, the local currency, 
depreciated by more than 8% against the US dollar and Russian ruble and 
10% against the euro in 2011 (Figure 3.6.5).
The current account switched to a 4.1% of GDP deficit, after a 2.1% 
surplus in 2010. High remittances helped boost imports by about 20%, 
but exports picked up by only 5.2%, widening the trade deficit to over 
$2 billion. The limited production base, noncompetitive products, and
a focus on a few export commodities—mainly aluminum and cotton—
limited export growth. Import growth largely reflected surges in food 
products (38%) and textiles (27%), as well as industrial products (13%).
After hitting a trough in 2009–2010 of less than $20 million, foreign
direct investment edged up to an estimated $30 million in 2011, but even
this was very low. The government continued borrowing for energy and 
transport infrastructure projects. Gross reserves climbed to $582 million
at end-2011, equivalent to 2 months of imports, from $476 million at
end-2010. Public and publicly guaranteed external debt declined to 31.3% 
of GDP at end-2011, compared with 34.4% of GDP a year earlier.
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Economic prospects
Remittances will continue supporting aggregate demand, but GDP 
growth is forecast to decline to 5.5% in 2012, reflecting slower growth in 
the Russian Federation and other key trading partners, before recovering 
to 6.0% in 2013 as the world economy improves (Figure 3.6.6). Large 
remittances should boost consumption, maintaining sizable consumer 
imports and helping finance higher public investment through increased 
tax revenue. Although the overall outlook for exports is uncertain, 
construction of an international power line and the signing of an 
export agreement in 2011 should boost summer exports of electricity to 
Afghanistan in 2012 and 2013.
Output projections are less certain on the supply side. Moreover, 
the economy will remain prone to risks from recurrent shocks such as 
drought, natural disasters, and regional trade and political disputes.
Agriculture’s performance will depend heavily on cotton output, 
which could expand further if global cotton prices stay high. Industry 
(including construction) and services will continue to fuel growth 
but at slower rates than in 2011 because of continued problems in the 
power sector, limited supplies of inputs, and aging production facilities, 
particularly in aluminum.
Inflation is forecast to stay around 8.5–9.0% in the next 2 years 
(Figure 3.6.7), as upward pressures on nonfood prices from higher imports 
and other factors offset the impact of moderating food prices. The 
Russian Federation is considering exempting from export duties only a 
fraction of oil products exported to Tajikistan, so inflation pressures from 
high fuel prices will persist in 2012. Additional pressure is likely to come 
if the government proceeds with plans to raise electricity tariffs.
Although the narrowly defined fiscal deficit is projected to remain 
around 0.5% of GDP, the overall deficit may widen beyond the forecast 
5.5% of GDP. Slowing export growth may limit revenue. On the other 
hand, any increase in revenue will likely encourage a corresponding rise 
in expenditure, mainly for infrastructure, which would add to external 
borrowing under the public debt management framework.
The government plans to expand reforms in social assistance 
programs, which remain highly inefficient and poorly designed to the 
needs of the most vulnerable social groups. Tajikistan is unlikely to 
meet its Millennium Development Goal targets by 2015, although the 
government aims to focus more on investment strategies for more 
inclusive growth through initiatives to improve access to health care and 
education, including universal access to education for girls.
Continuing large consolidated deficits are expected to raise the public 
debt-to-GDP ratio to 37.3% by end-2012 and 37.8% a year later, which could 
prove risky in view of the possible recurrence of shocks to the economy.
Despite persisting inflation, monetary policy may need to reflect more 
of a balance between supporting economic recovery and ensuring price 
stability, given the expected slowdown in growth and the limited volume 
of loanable funds for the economy. Slowing inflation has already led the 
central bank to reduce the refinancing rate from 9.8% in December 2011 
to 9.0% in February 2012, and it may follow with further steps to more 
expansionary monetary policy. Weak external performance is expected to 
put further downward pressure on the national currency.
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The current account deficit is expected to widen from 4.1% in 2011 
to 7.0% in 2012 before narrowing to 6.5% in 2013 (Figure 3.6.8). Export 
receipts are projected to fall as a result of declining international prices 
for cotton and other exports. Imports, though, should remain at least at 
the current level because of higher remittances (Figure 3.6.9).
The government is likely to continue external borrowing to finance 
infrastructure projects, mainly in energy and transport. However, 
the above-mentioned debt management framework requires all new 
government borrowings to have at least a 35% grant element and to limit 
borrowings to priority projects. Total public debt is projected to stay 
below 40% of GDP over the foreseeable future.
Foreign direct investment inflows are projected to continue rising 
gradually over the medium term, in line with current reform initiatives in 
tax administration and regulatory simplification. The bulk of investments 
will likely go to several large infrastructure projects, such as hydropower 
stations, toll roads, and supporting facilities for mining. Public and 
publicly guaranteed external debt is forecast to reach 37.2% of GDP at 
end-2012 and 37.5% of GDP 12 months later.
Policy challenge—boosting investment
A big concern remains the very limited share of private investment and 
foreign direct investment inflows, and more generally, a weak business 
environment and problems in the financial sector. The government relies 
extensively on public investment, an approach that may be unsustainable 
given the limited room for additional budget outlays. The private sector 
still represents less than half of GDP—and private investment less than 
5%—reflecting an unfavorable business environment and lack of investor 
confidence. Most private enterprises are still small or of medium size and 
require little capital, operating in areas such as trade and services.
Serious efforts are necessary to reverse the lack of investor confidence 
and declining levels of private investment. Reducing risks to private 
investors—by providing and then enforcing property rights, for example, 
by reducing corruption, and by enhancing supportive infrastructure—is 
critical. Improving the security situation at the border with Uzbekistan, 
where clashes between border guards have closed an important rail line, 
and maintaining macroeconomic stability would also encourage private 
investment inflows.
Difficult business regulations also discourage private investment. 
Despite being among the top 10 reformers in the World Bank’s 2010 and 
2011 Doing Business reports, in the 2012 report Tajikistan still ranks 147 
among 183 economies in the ease of doing business. Tax administration 
is complicated and time consuming, while the tax burden is high and 
encourages tax evasion. Limited financial intermediation and costly 
business financing are also major barriers. Addressing inefficiency, 
eliminating directed lending, and promoting competition by allowing 
international banks to enter the market could facilitate more lending and 
help cut financing costs. 
Overall, understanding and eliminating key constraints to private 
investment, including deterrents to foreign investment, is critical to 
achieve sustainable economic growth in the medium term.
3.6.8 Current account balance
-600
-300
0
300
-10
-5
0
5
Level Ratio
1312111009082007
Forecast
$ million % of GDP
Sources: International Monetary Fund. 2010. Country Report 
No. 10/374. December; 2011. Country Report No. 11/130. June; 
2012. Country Report No. 12/32. February. http://www.imf.org
Click here for figure data
3.6.9 Net remittances
0
1
2
3
4
1312111009082007
$ billion
Forecast
Sources: International Monetary Fund. 2010. Country Report 
No. 10/374. December; 2011. Country Report No. 11/130. June; 
2012. Country Report No. 12/32. February. http://www.imf.org
Click here for figure data
Turkmenistan
Growth continued at nearly double-digit levels in 2011, reflecting a sharp rise in gas exports and sizable 
public investment. A similar rate is expected in 2012, through planned expansion of gas pipelines, but 
growth may moderate in 2013. Diversifying the economy in order to reduce the country’s dependence on 
energy exports and deepening the reform process remain key policy challenges. 
Economic performance
Turkmenistan recorded strong growth in 2011, driven largely by 
hydrocarbon exports and an ambitious public investment program. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) put growth at 9.9% (Figure 3.7.1).
On the demand side, the government reported that gas exports—
the mainstay of the economy—shot up by 75.2%, reflecting a 42.5% rise 
in production and the expansion of pipeline capacity to the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Total 
investment under the National Program of Socio-Economic Development 
2011–30, a long-term program to modernize the country’s economy, rose 
by 23.2%, according to government estimates. The IMF estimated that 
gross investment reached 60% of GDP (Figure 3.7.2).
On the supply side, the government reported all sectors showing 
growth. Industry grew fastest (24.2%), followed by construction (12.5%), 
trade (8.9%), services (8.1%), and transport and communications (8.0%). 
Agriculture also expanded.
Expansionary fiscal policies and higher global commodity prices 
augmented inflationary pressures, although price controls and subsidies 
for basic goods and utilities, along with a stable exchange rate, kept 
inflation to an estimated 6.1%.
An accurate assessment of the fiscal situation is difficult because of 
sizable extrabudgetary operations, including funding for public investment. 
Nevertheless, the state budget was reported to have recorded a surplus 
(Figure 3.7.3). The government reported a 48% rise in revenue, reflecting 
the growth in gas exports, while spending was reported to have climbed by 
37%, with three-fourths of budget expenditure devoted to the social sector. 
Control by the government over monetary policy and commercial bank 
activity remains significant. Banks and the government receive central 
bank credit at concessional interest rates, and directed lending is extensive.
The IMF estimates that the surge in gas exports narrowed the external 
current account deficit to about 2.9% of GDP from an estimated 11.7% in 
2010, despite a large rise in imports, particularly for public investment. 
Although the country accumulates substantial foreign exchange reserves, 
external debt is believed to have risen sharply, from 2.6% of GDP at 
end-2009 to 20.5% at end-2011.
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Economic prospects
Hydrocarbon exports will remain the chief source of growth and 
development project financing. GDP growth of 10.0% is forecast in 2012, 
reflecting further expansion of pipeline capacity to the PRC and large public 
investment. Somewhat slower growth (about 9%) is anticipated in 2013.
The government intends to widen its export destinations, and a 
private firm’s audit of gas deposits, released in October 2011, confirmed 
reserves of up to 26.2 trillion cubic meters, among the world’s largest. 
Besides existing pipelines to the PRC, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and 
the Russian Federation, a new pipeline under construction since 2010 
is intended to connect the country’s eastern fields with the Caspian Sea 
and facilitate exports to Europe. Plans are also under way for a pipeline 
project from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India agreed in 
December 2010, although security remains an issue.
Over time Turkmenistan will benefit from enhanced cooperation 
and trade with neighboring countries. The North–South railway line, 
scheduled for completion by 2014, will improve its access to Kazakhstan, 
the Gulf, the Russian Federation, and South Asia. This line could become 
the region’s main route for transporting goods such as petroleum, 
minerals, agricultural products, and textiles.
The state budget for 2012 projects a small deficit—financed 
by transferring the 2011 surplus—caused by increased spending. 
Expansionary fiscal policies will likely add to inflation, which is forecast 
to reach 7.0% by 2013 (Figure 3.7.4). Continued growth in gas exports is 
expected to move the current account to a surplus of 3.4% of GDP in 2012 
and 2013 (Figure 3.7.5).
Policy challenge highlights
Hydrocarbon products account for over 90% of exports, and high 
specialization in energy exports entails risks for sustainable economic 
development. The government has already taken some steps through 
the National Program of Socio-Economic Development to diversify the 
economy, aiming to develop agriculture, food processing and other agro-
industry, textiles, chemicals and petrochemicals, electricity generation, 
tourism, and construction materials.
Substantial diversification will require extensive supply-side reforms. 
Numerous structural measures will be needed to free private firms 
from the state planning system’s disincentives. An adequate legal and 
regulatory framework for private businesses must be in place, along with 
an expanded and restructured banking sector that can provide financial 
capital and channel profits and savings from hydrocarbons to investment 
in other sectors.
Efficient resource allocation is also crucial. A long-term investment 
plan, with careful prioritization and sequencing of investments and 
cost-benefit analysis, must ensure that resource wealth is allocated to 
viable projects.
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Uzbekistan
Growth accelerated in 2011, driven by net exports, state-led investments, and remittances. With lower 
non-oil commodity prices in 2012, economic growth will be sustained by public investment and increasing 
foreign investment. The key downside risk is a deteriorating economic environment in the euro 20 and the 
Russian Federation. To reduce risks from reliance on commodity exports, the economy needs to diversify 
beyond the natural resources sectors and expand the private sector.
Economic performance
Reflecting the favorable external environment, sustained public 
investment, and rising private consumption bolstered by remittances, 
Uzbekistan’s strong economic performance continued in 2011 with GDP 
growth of 8.3% (Figure 3.8.1). As in previous years, industry (including 
construction) and services were the main contributors to GDP growth, 
with estimated growth rates of 6.7% and 12.7%, respectively.
Industrial growth declined to 6.7% from 8.3% in 2010, mainly due to a 
slowdown in the fuel subsector, where a decline in natural gas output kept 
growth to 0.3%. Nevertheless, all subsectors grew collectively by 11.9%, 
in particular machinery and equipment, chemicals and petrochemicals, 
construction materials, and the food industry, reflecting strong external 
demand for metals and petrochemicals and continued industrial 
development. Construction grew by 8.5%, reflecting higher public 
construction, which offset a slowdown in foreign investment-related 
construction activities.
As in 2010, services were again a main source of growth, with retail 
trade, communications, and financial services recording a combined 
growth rate of 22.3%, supported by strong domestic demand, in 
particular, rising private consumption. The agricultural sector grew 
by 6.6%, supported by fruit and vegetable production and livestock 
breeding.
On the demand side, rising remittances, increased domestic lending, 
and wage and pension hikes boosted private consumption. Gross fixed 
capital formation increased by 11% in nominal terms, to 26% of GDP, 
as bank lending for investment rose by one-third (Figure 3.8.2). Most 
investment went to industry, for purchases of capital goods.
Estimates of inflation range from the government’s 7–9% to 13.1% 
from the International Monetary Fund, with the latter above 2010’s 
outturn of 9.4%. Inflation in 2011 reflected public sector and pension 
increases in August and December, totaling 26.5% since December 2010, 
with high foreign exchange inflows, rapid credit growth, local currency 
depreciation, and increased private and public spending.
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It is believed that 0.3% output growth of the fuel sector in 2011 and 
subsequent substantial increases in fuel costs have provided additional 
inflationary pressures.
The central bank attempted to curb inflation by issuing certificates 
of deposit (equivalent to 40% of the existing stock) in order to 
sterilize excess liquidity, while the government absorbed $1.6 billion of
export revenues into the Fund for Reconstruction and Development, 
Uzbekistan’s sovereign wealth fund.
The augmented budget, which comprises the official budget plus the 
surplus from this fund, is estimated to have recorded a surplus of 3.2% 
of GDP. Revenue gains from higher commodity prices and improved tax 
administration (taking revenue to an estimated 38.5% of GDP, from 37.1% 
in 2010) offset the impact on spending of wage and pension increases, 
higher social outlays, and the rural development program (overall 
expenditure climbed to 35.3% of GDP, from 34.4% in 2010).
The central bank’s issuance of certificates of deposit helped reduce 
broad money growth from 52.4% in 2010 to a still high 27.7%. Banks 
benefited from heavy government injections aimed at strengthening 
their capital and increasing lending. Bank lending to small and medium-
sized enterprises and private entrepreneurs reached $2.8 billion, a 50%
increase from 2010. In August 2011, Moody’s reconfirmed its rating for the 
banking system as stable, following an upgrade a year earlier.
The central bank continued to intervene in the foreign exchange 
market, with the aim of depreciating the local currency—the sum—to 
promote competitiveness. Depreciation of the Russian ruble and Kazakh 
tenge against the US dollar added downward pressure on the exchange 
rate. By year-end the sum depreciated by 8.6% against the dollar, more 
than in 2009 and 2010 (Figure 3.8.3).
An improved trade balance and higher remittances helped raise the 
current account surplus to 8.1% of GDP from 6.6% in 2010 (Figure 3.8.4). 
Exports of goods and services rose by 28.6% to $15.6 billion, as
international prices for gold, cotton, copper, and natural gas reached 
record levels, and strong consumer demand in the Russian Federation 
contributed to a 25% rise in automobile exports by GM Uzbekistan.
Imports of goods and services rose by 26.5% to $14.0 billion, as
continued state-led public infrastructure development and industrial 
modernization required more imported capital goods. Remittances 
grew sharply, particularly from the Russian Federation, as the Russian 
economy improved.
The government reported foreign investment inflows of $2.9 billion,
of which 79% was for foreign direct investment (FDI), mainly in the fuel, 
energy, petrochemical, and automobile manufacturing sectors. External 
debt is estimated to have risen to 17.5% of GDP from 14.7% of GDP at 
end-2010, as the public investment program is increasingly being financed 
with foreign loans (Figure 3.8.5).
Economic prospects
GDP is forecast to grow by 8.0% in 2012 and 7.9% in 2013, as rising 
state-led investments are expected to offset a decline in exports. Industry 
and services are expected to be the major contributors to economic 
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growth. Industrial output will be supported by higher domestic lending 
and foreign investment, while services will be driven by higher domestic 
demand, especially from the public sector. Higher vegetable and fruit 
output should boost agriculture relative to 2011.
On the demand side, continued public investment should be a 
key driver. Gross fixed capital formation is forecast to rise by 9.3% in 
2012 in nominal terms, with investment exceeding 30% of GDP. The 
government is implementing a $47.3 billion Industrial Modernization
and Infrastructure Development Program in 2011–2015, with significant 
investment planned in oil and gas, electricity generation, chemicals, 
metallurgy, and other strategic sectors.
Domestic consumption will be supported by expected increases in 
public sector wages and pensions, and additional measures—probably 
further wage increases and welfare payments—are likely to be taken if 
the slowdown in the eurozone and the Russian Federation appears to 
be hampering growth. Nevertheless, lower remittances are expected to 
moderate growth in private consumption, which is forecast to rise, in 
nominal terms, by 8.0% in 2012 and 9.0% in 2013.
Inflation is expected to come in at about 9.5% in 2012 and 9.0% in 
2013, as global commodity prices decline, although continuing currency 
depreciation will keep import prices high (Figure 3.8.6). The authorities 
are also expected to limit measured inflation through sterilization 
operations and domestic price controls.
The official government budget, adopted in November 2011, projects a 
deficit of around 1% of GDP in 2012; the augmented budget is forecast to 
show surpluses of 4.0% in 2012 and 3.2% in 2013 (Figure 3.8.7). The official 
budget envisages substantial tax reductions, with the goal of reducing the 
ratio of tax revenue to GDP by 0.7 percentage points in 2012, although 
commodity-based revenue is expected to grow strongly, and additional 
revenue will come from new excise taxes on imported vegetable oil and 
domestically produced jewelry. Augmented budget revenue is forecast 
at 39.0% of GDP in 2012 and 38.3% in 2013. Almost 60% of expenditures 
will go to social security, welfare, health care, education, and culture. 
Augmented budget expenditures are projected at 35.0% of GDP in 2012 
and 35.1% in 2013.
Money growth is expected to accelerate to 30% in 2012 and 33.6% 
in 2013, as public wages and pensions rise and banks increase their 
lending. Further increases in official reserves (at least in 2012) and 
continued foreign exchange intervention to depreciate the currency will 
increase reserve money, offset partly by further central bank sterilization 
operations.
The current account surplus is forecast to decrease to 7.5% of GDP in 
2012 and 6.0% of GDP in 2013, as the trade balance weakens (Figure 3.8.8). 
Declining international prices for the country’s main exports, excluding 
natural gas, coupled with weaker external demand, will hamper export 
performance, with exports forecast to rise moderately in 2012 and decline 
in 2013. Recession in the European Union will likely lower growth in the 
Russian Federation, Uzbekistan’s main trading partner, reducing exports, 
especially for automobiles and food, and remittances. Moreover, an 
expected growth slowdown in the People’s Republic of China is expected 
to reduce key metal and cotton exports.
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Import growth is forecast to slow to 8.3% in 2012 and 2.8% in 2013, 
despite infrastructure spending and the industrial modernization 
program, because of the projected moderation in imported food prices 
and tighter import controls, particularly on imported consumer goods. 
Gross international reserves are forecast to increase further in 2012 and 
2013 (to $23.0 billion and $25 billion, respectively), according to ADB
estimates, reflecting continuing current account surpluses and net capital 
inflows.
Reflecting increasing foreign borrowing for industrial modernization 
and infrastructure development, external debt is forecast to reach 20.2% 
of GDP at end-2012 and 22.8% a year later.
Policy challenge—developing the private sector
Uzbekistan’s private sector will play a greater role in economic 
development as the economy moves toward middle-income status. The 
government has reported that small businesses accounted for 54% of 
GDP in 2011, which is at par with international averages, but the role 
of entrepreneurs in key areas of economic activity has yet to develop 
(Figure 3.8.9).
Policies and investment to improve the business climate, promote 
the private sector, and strengthen infrastructure and trade need to be 
reinforced for a more diversified and sophisticated export sector and to 
accelerate the economy’s transformation.
Improving the business climate is urgently required to develop the 
private sector, especially for the many small businesses that represent 
the overwhelming share of legal entities and provide most national 
employment. A more favorable business climate would promote 
diversification and the growth of new firms. It would also facilitate private 
sector participation in the infrastructure and other strategic sectors, as 
these are gradually opened to private firms. (The private sector is already 
involved in repairing and maintaining public roads, and its share in road 
freight transport reached 72.2% in 2010 from 58.7% in 2005.)
Uzbekistan is ranked overall 166 out of 183 economies in the World 
Bank’s 2012 Doing Business report (and lowest in the trading across 
borders category). Accelerating regulatory reforms to attract investors, 
ensuring access to finance and foreign exchange, simplifying customs 
procedures, and continuing the efforts to offer competitive factor prices 
would help transform the national economic landscape and sustain 
economic growth.
Other key measures include further steps to reform the tax regime, 
liberalize regulations for small firms, increase access to external financing 
in the banking and nonbank sectors, and develop the securities market. 
Finally, the country has taken steps toward decentralizing some activities 
in public administration, and further reforms in this area will multiply 
the benefits of economic growth.
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Domestic demand rather than exports was the driving force behind 2011’s strong performance, with high 
investment and consumption. The outlook for 2012 and 2013, despite uncertain global prospects, is for 
only moderately slower growth. The economy is gradually diversifying, with imports rising rapidly and 
the trade surplus now much less as a percentage of economic output. Currency appreciation, rising wage 
rates, increasing income disparities, and environmental concerns underscore the need for modifying the 
country’s growth model. With a strong fiscal position and declining inflation, the government is well 
positioned to implement the 12th Five-Year Plan, designed to further transform the economy. 
Economic performance
GDP of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) grew at 9.2% in 2011, despite 
subdued external demand for exports and the effects of domestic policy 
tightening. Although growth came in more than 1 percentage point 
less than in 2010, it far exceeded that in most other countries, further 
consolidating the country’s status as the world’s second-largest economy. 
The main factors continuing to drive the economy were high domestic 
and foreign investment, brisk government expenditure, and increased 
domestic consumption.
Investment and consumption accounted for all the growth in 2011 
(Figure 3.9.1). Net exports were a marginally negative contributor, as real 
imports grew faster than real exports. 
Fixed asset investment increased by almost 24%, slightly slower 
than in 2010 on the policy-induced slowdown in real estate investment 
to curb speculation (Figure 3.9.2). Local government expenditure on 
infrastructure also stayed strong, although again at a slower rate than in 
2010. 
Rising urban and rural per capita incomes (up 8.4% and 11.4% in real 
terms) bolstered consumption, reflecting wage and pension increases. 
Retail sales (a proxy for consumption) increased by 17% in nominal terms, 
somewhat slower than in 2010. Sales of furniture, household appliances, 
and audiovisual equipment registered the highest growth, while car sales 
grew much more slowly, showing the impacts of restricted licensing to 
control traffic congestion and of the end of subsidies and rebates.
By sector, agricultural output benefited from an abundant grain 
harvest in the second half of the year and increased overall by 4.5%, 
slightly above the pace set in 2010. Slowing investment and exports 
caused growth of industrial output to slow to 10.6% from 12.3% the 
previous year; the sector was still the main contributor to growth 
(Figure 3.9.3). Services increased by 8.9%, slower than the 9.8% growth in 
2010, driven by retail sales and financial services.
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Reflecting the turmoil in global markets, the bellwether Shanghai 
A-share stock index dropped by more than 20% in 2011. Investors, 
concerned about the international outlook and earnings prospects of 
listed companies, exited risk assets. Total market capitalization during 
2011 fell by $486 billion, or to 31% of GDP from 45% in 2010.
Inflation—measured by the consumer price index—peaked at a 3-year 
high of 6.5% in July, falling to 4.1% by December (Figure 3.9.4). The 
second-half improvement reflected monetary tightening in the first half 
of the year, government measures to regulate the housing market, and 
favorable harvests in the autumn that curbed hikes in food prices. Still, 
the inflation rate in 2011 was 5.4%, up from 3.3% the prior year, reflecting 
primarily food and fuel prices and residential housing costs. Supply 
shocks, such as surging pork prices and supply shortfalls as a result of 
poor harvests in the first half of the year, accounted for much of the food 
inflation. Residential housing prices started to grow more slowly or fall 
marginally in some areas; transactions were fewer. 
Fiscal policy was expansionary. Government expenditure grew by 
24.7%, revenue by 26.7%, and the government incurred a fiscal deficit 
equal to 1.8% of GDP (including local government debt). At 44% of GDP, 
total public debt remains manageable. Increased budget shares were made 
in support of medical reform, educational programs for migrant workers’ 
children in urban areas, and poverty relief. The government revised the 
poverty line from about $0.50 to $1 a day, thereby classifying another
100 million people as poor. 
Monetary policy tightened in 2011 to dampen inflation pressures. The 
central bank increased the banks’ reserve requirement ratio six times in 
the first half, to 21.5% for big lenders. It raised benchmark 1-year interest 
rates three times in the year, to 6.56%. As inflation pressures eased and 
the consumer price index fell, it started easing monetary policy first in 
December, by lowering the reserve requirement by 50 basis points and 
then by another 50 basis points in February (Figure 3.9.5). Money supply 
growth was 13.6% in 2011, below the government target of 16.0%. New 
credit amounted to CNY7.5 trillion ($1.2 trillion) in 2011, about the same
increase as the year earlier. 
Restricted access to credit, and persistent negative real interest rates 
(bank deposit rates were lower than the inflation rate), encouraged heavy 
off-balance sheet credit activities and informal lending. This undermined 
government efforts to stabilize liquidity and control inflation, prompting 
increased supervision by regulatory agencies. Of particular focus were 
macro-prudential measures to regulate rapidly expanding wealth 
management products.
As reported by the central bank, foreign exchange reserves increased 
to $3.18 trillion in 2011, compared with $2.85 trillion in 2010. In a break
from the seemingly continuous increase in reserves, they declined (by 
$21 billion) in the fourth quarter of 2011 for the first time since 1998, due
to increased repatriation of foreign capital, capital flight, and valuation 
losses. On the exchange rate, the yuan appreciated during 2011 by 4.7% 
against the United States (US) dollar, and by 7.9% against the euro.
Due to the weak global economy, trade slowed: export growth 
decelerated to 20% from 31% and imports to 25% from 39% (Figure 3.9.6). 
The trade surplus on a customs basis narrowed to $158 billion from
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$181 billion (2.2% of GDP in 2011 versus 3.1% in 2010, and down from a
high of 7.5% in 2007). The current account surplus fell to 2.8% of GDP 
in 2011. Foreign direct investment in the PRC increased, however, from 
$106 billion in 2010 to a record $116 billion. Declining investment by US
and European Union investors were more than offset by increased inflows 
from Asia.
Economic prospects
The outlook assumes that the US economy will continue its slow recovery, 
that the eurozone sovereign debt crisis will not worsen, and that the 
PRC’s policy stance will remain accommodative. 
During the Annual Central Economic Work Conference in December 
2011—a major economic policy forum—the government announced the 
main policy guidelines for 2012. These include a shift in emphasis from 
curbing inflation to maintaining stable and relatively fast economic 
growth, promoting restructuring, and managing inflation expectations. 
These objectives will be addressed through fiscal and financial reforms 
supporting domestic demand as well as emerging and strategic industries, 
and structural reform to rebalance the sources of growth, in line with the 
main guidelines of the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015).
Fiscal policy is expected to remain broadly expansionary in the 
forecast period, with higher spending on education, health care, pensions, 
public housing, and other social security programs (including a 40% 
increase in the 2012 budget allocation for poverty relief). The overall fiscal 
deficit is expected to be 1.7% of GDP in 2012 and 2.0% in 2013. To ease the 
tax burden on consumers and small and medium-sized enterprises, the 
government may again raise the minimum income tax exemption level 
and replicate nationwide the Shanghai pilot tax reform of shifting from 
the business tax to a value-added tax (Box 3.9.1). Plans have also been 
announced for improved support of small businesses, including tax relief 
and easier access to capital markets. 
Monetary policy will accommodate a continued high rate of economic 
growth. Money supply (M2) is set to grow by 14% in 2012, with new 
lending targeted at CNY8 trillion ($1.3 trillion) and a similar target
for 2013. Financial sector reform will continue, including prudential 
regulation of off-balance sheet credit activities that could destabilize 
the real economy. A cornerstone reform in this context would be a 
more market-based approach to setting interest rates, leading to a more 
effective allocation of capital and savings.
In view of exchange rate movements in 2011 and earlier, and 
the effects of increased labor and other domestic costs on export 
competitiveness, continued appreciation of the yuan against the US dollar 
may slow. 
Fixed asset investment is projected to remain the major engine 
of growth, increasing by 20% or more in 2012 and 2013. Investment 
in infrastructure (such as railways, rural irrigation, and urban public 
transport) is expected to continue at a high level. As part of the current 
five-year plan, 7 million housing units are to be constructed in 2012, 
which will partly offset the slowdown in real estate investment by the 
private sector. Consistent with government efforts to narrow regional 
3.9.1 Tax reforms
The authorities introduced new tax 
policies in 2011. In a step designed 
to improve energy efficiency and 
strengthen local government finances, 
a national resource tax system 
was launched in November 2011. 
Following a trial period in Xinjiang 
Uygur Autonomous region, oil and gas 
producers now face a 5% tax on sales 
value. The reform does not cover coal, 
however—the source of about 70% of 
the country’s total energy. 
A trial program for the services 
sector began in January 2012, in 
Shanghai, to replace the business tax 
(on gross revenue) with a value-added 
tax (VAT). 
The trial will focus on selected 
service providers and will be extended 
nationwide if effective. As part of the 
program, the Shanghai government 
announced new brackets of lower VAT 
rates for transport and certain service 
industries. The reform is expected to 
lower the tax burden for the service 
sector and support development of the 
country’s modern service industry. 
To bolster development of small 
and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs)—which employ a large 
proportion of the country’s work 
force, especially in urban centers—the 
government raised the minimum 
threshold of the VAT and business tax 
for SMEs. 
It also abolished the stamp tax 
on loan contracts between financial 
institutions and micro and small 
enterprises. Government departments 
have been requested to allocate at least 
30% of their purchasing quota to SMEs.
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disparities, the central and western provinces will continue to receive the 
highest rate of public investment growth. 
Nominal private consumption is expected to grow by almost 12% in 
both 2012 and 2013, boosted by continued employment and wage growth 
as well as increased government social expenditure. Inclusive-growth 
measures under the five-year plan target the rural–urban income gap 
(see below). Exports and imports are expected to increase by around 15% 
and 18% in 2012, edging up in 2013. The contribution of net exports to 
GDP growth is projected to remain negative, and the trade surplus to 
continue narrowing. The current account surplus is set to fall to 2.1% and 
1.7% of GDP in 2012 and 2013 (Figure 3.9.7). Factors weighing on these 
trade prospects include deteriorating terms of trade and a gloomy world 
economic outlook, particularly for the eurozone. 
In a signal that it will accommodate somewhat slower growth in 
order to make it more inclusive and environmentally sustainable, the 
government announced that it has reduced the 2012 growth target from 
8.0% to 7.5%. As in previous years, though, it is expected that actual 
growth will exceed this target. On the above estimates, GDP growth is 
forecast at 8.5% in 2012 (Figure 3.9.8) driven by robust investment and 
private consumption, and 8.7% in 2013, supported by stronger global 
growth momentum.
Inflation is forecast to decline to about 4.0% (Figure 3.9.9), as 
indicated by the combined annual rate of 3.9% for January and February. 
With world economic growth expected to remain modest, global 
commodity prices—except for oil—will likely moderate, easing pressures 
from imported inflation. Continued policy restraint on property markets 
will help control domestic inflation pressures, although bad weather or 
other setbacks could disproportionately affect inflation. Other inflation 
risks stem from rising labor costs and possible increases in energy and 
utility prices, reflecting the need for stringent compliance with the 
environmental targets of the current five-year plan. 
The main downside risk is uncertainty over external demand, 
including the slow recovery in the US, fiscal and debt concerns in the 
European Union, and Japan’s economic setbacks—among the country’s 
largest trading partners. Nevertheless, progress in diversifying its export 
markets, and in rebalancing the sources of growth toward domestic 
demand, should help maintain economic momentum. 
Potential increases in nonperforming loans of local government 
could be a domestic risk, stemming from large debt issues during 
implementation of the stimulus program introduced in 2009 to counter 
the effects of the global financial crisis. The concern relates to the 
mismatch between short- and medium-term maturity (over 50% of debt 
will mature within the next 3 years) and the long-term nature and limited 
profitability of most of the infrastructure projects undertaken as part 
of the stimulus program. However, this risk is unlikely to cause major 
disturbances to the economy given the overall soundness of the financial 
sector. 
In October 2011, the Ministry of Finance announced a trial program 
to allow four local authorities—including the city governments of 
Shanghai and Shenzhen—to sell bonds directly, a move to help local 
governments repay loans of more than $1 trillion.
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Another domestic consideration is the transition to a new generation 
of political leaders. The 12th plan focus on deemphasizing exports in 
favor of domestic demand will require strong leadership and consensus. 
Further, new impetus is needed for inclusive growth and environmental 
sustainability. 
Policy challenge—tackling income inequality
In the transition to a more market-based economy, 3 decades of rapid 
growth have lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty, but more than a 
hundred million are still severely poor, and income inequality has sharply 
widened. As acknowledged in the 12th plan, such inequality will hinder 
future growth as it undermines consumption, constrains development in 
poorer regions, and generates social tensions. 
Different measures show how much income inequality has risen. The 
widely used Gini coefficient worsened (on a scale of 0–100) from around 
25 in the mid-1980s to 41 in 2000, the last year the government published 
findings. Since then, several independent PRC scholars, using various 
methods and data, have placed the coefficient in a range of 45 to more 
than 50—among the highest in the world. 
Other research suggests that the income of the top 10% of households 
relative to the bottom 10% in 2005 was 15.5 times, against 7.3 times in 1998. 
In contrast, the ratio was 10 or less for Indonesia, India, Pakistan, and 
Viet Nam in 2005 or more recent years (Figure 3.9.10).
Urban–rural income differences are very large: urban households’ 
incomes are on average almost three and a half times as high than rural 
households’ (Figure 3.9.11). The gap persists for two main reasons. First, 
rural areas have much less investment in physical and human capital. 
Second, the return on investment and assets is typically much lower in 
rural areas. Other overlapping factors include special economic zones 
concentrated in coastal areas, decentralization of public services provision 
to local government without a corresponding increase in fiscal resources, 
and regressive taxes. Further, the social support network was set up 
initially for urban households—a rural pension system only started in 
2009. Finally, fiscal disparities are steep: per capita public spending in the 
richest county is 48 times that in the poorest.
The first reason is the dominating factor in the PRC. The 
consequences of underinvestment in rural areas are strikingly 
illustrated in the returns to education. In 1988, education and individual 
characteristics (other than age) explained little of the variation in 
income among workers. Some 20 years later, household and individual 
characteristics accounted for 50% of the urban–rural income gap, and 
education alone for about 25% of that gap. Urban–rural income disparities 
are likely to further widen. 
Income redistribution and social security thus need to be 
strengthened for inclusive and sustainable growth. A comprehensive 
social security system would help reduce income inequality. Although the 
PRC’s social policies have made great strides in recent years—including 
the long-awaited Social Insurance Law in July 2011—further social 
security reform is vital. The social security framework is still segmented, 
operating through a complex system of insufficiently coordinated schemes 
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that result in inadequate coverage of benefits and beneficiaries. Further, 
its dual nature—parallel rural and urban programs—resulting from the 
household registration system or hukou, is no longer suitable. A much 
more unified system, as envisaged under the Social Insurance Law, is 
required to address the needs arising from increased labor mobility 
(including those of migrant workers), the challenges of accelerated 
urbanization, and the implications of a rapidly aging population.
Central–local fiscal arrangements must also be strengthened. 
Although transfer payments from the central government have been 
increased, the capacity of local governments to provide public services 
has not improved in tandem. Equally, revenue sharing and expenditure 
responsibilities between the central and local governments need to be 
better aligned.
Beyond challenges of inclusive growth and income inequality are 
many others, notably water resource management and energy use. The 
country needs to manage its water better, as water scarcity and pollution 
are threatening the agricultural base. (The 12th plan aims to reduce water 
consumption per unit of industrial value added by 30%.) 
The PRC is now the world’s biggest energy consumer and since 2007 
the largest source of energy-related greenhouse gas emissions; its energy 
intensity (energy consumption per unit of GDP) is nearly double the 
average of countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (Figure 3.9.12). (The 12th plan has set a target of cutting 
energy intensity by 17%.)
As the world’s second-largest economy, the PRC will increasingly 
influence the rate and manner of world economic growth. Global 
interdependence requires the eurozone crisis to be resolved, a repeat 
recession in industrial countries to be avoided, trade protectionism to be 
rejected, and international consensus to be secured on actions on climate 
change and other issues. The PRC’s growth in 2012 and 2013 is heavily 
dependent on the global context, as are its longer-term prospects. 
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Hong Kong, China
The economy’s sensitivity to a downturn in global trade and financial markets, as during 2008–2009, 
was again in evidence in 2011 when it slipped from robustness to worrying signs of another slowdown. 
Although 2012 began with a lift in the world outlook, Hong Kong, China’s merchandise exports are 
expected to languish and its overall growth to slow sharply. Provided overseas markets pick up, however, 
a rebound should be experienced in 2013.
Economic performance
This economy had a mixed year of yin and yang. While it slowed to 5.0% 
for the full year (from 7.0% in 2010), growth momentum of 7.6% at the 
start of the year moderated progressively to only 3% by the end. Further, 
moderating growth in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was a 
concern, compounded by the reemergence of the eurozone sovereign debt 
crisis and faltering demand in advanced economies.
The dominant source of growth for Hong Kong, China was domestic 
demand. Private consumption expenditure increased by 8.6%, buoyed by 
strong employment and rising real incomes (Figure 3.10.1). Retail sales 
and visitor spending went up by 18% and 25%, powered by a jump in 
tourist arrivals.
The other potential sources of growth—government consumption, 
investment, and net exports—made little impact. Government 
consumption increased by 2% and investment by only 1%. Investment 
actually fell in the first quarter but recovered during later quarters, 
led by machinery and equipment acquisition and public sector works. 
Merchandise exports rose much less rapidly than in 2010 and slightly less 
than merchandise imports, such that net exports subtracted from growth 
in 2011. This outcome was in marked contrast to the first quarter, when 
the net export position was strongly positive.
Accounting for nearly 90% of output, services set the pace for the 
economy as a whole. Professional and business services grew strongly, as 
did services related to tourism and cross-border commercial and financial 
services. Trade-related and transport services, however, slipped with the 
slowdown in merchandise trade.
Full employment characterized much of the economy. Unemployment 
fell to 3.3% by year-end, underemployment was less than 2%, and job 
vacancies surged. Wages and earnings scored their biggest gains since 
the mid-1990s, boosted by the tightness in the labor market and the 
introduction of a statutory minimum wage (Figure 3.10.2).
Inflation climbed sharply, to 5.3% from 2.3% in 2010, due to 
domestic cost pressures and imported inflation (notably for food and 
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oil) (Figure 3.10.3). Housing prices stabilized in the second half but 
showed steep appreciation (7.2%) for the year as a whole. Government 
interventions, such as increased land supply and restrictions to mortgage 
availability, helped cool the property market (Figure 3.10.4).
Macroeconomic policy focused on investing in the future, as well 
as fighting inflation and the risk of an asset bubble. Fiscal policy helped 
low-income groups deal with the rising cost of living, especially food and 
housing-related costs, as these account for two-thirds of such groups’ 
overall spending. Measures to moderate the cost of living included 
electricity subsidies and rate concessions on property taxes and public 
housing rentals. Netting out the effects of the government’s one-time 
measures, underlying inflation rose at the same rate as headline inflation.
Fiscal policy for FY2011 (1 April–31 March 2012) was consolidative. 
Expenditure was up 22% and revenue 15%, with the result that the budget 
surplus narrowed to 3.5% of GDP (from 4.5% in FY2010). 
Monetary policy reflected the pegged exchange rate to the United 
States (US) dollar and the accommodative policy of the US Federal 
Reserve, including low interest rates that helped maintain strong domestic 
demand. Similar to the US dollar, the nominal trade-weighted effective 
exchange rate index of the Hong Kong dollar depreciated by 2.4% in 
December from a year earlier.
Trade activity was deflated by the eurozone crisis, the sluggish US 
economy, and disruptions to global supply chains resulting from Japan’s 
earthquake in March. Merchandise exports rose (in nominal terms) 
by only 11.2%, or less than half the rate of the previous year. Although 
the PRC accounts for over half of Hong Kong, China’s exports and 
reexports of goods, slackening demand in the advanced markets became 
increasingly evident in Asian markets (Figure 3.10.5).
Services exports increased by 14%, a sharp deceleration from the gain 
of 23% the previous year. Tourism boomed but transport and trade-related 
services weakened appreciably. Despite the 20% slump in the Hang Seng 
index during 2011, the economy retained its rank as the world’s top initial 
public offering center.
Merchandise imports climbed by 12%, again around half the rate of 
2010. Retained imports, which account for one-fourth of total imports, 
increased by 16%, reflecting strong domestic demand and tourist spending.
Hong Kong, China continued to have a large current account surplus, 
equivalent to 5.1% of GDP. The positive balance for trade in services more 
than offset the deficit in trade in goods. The capital account was negative, 
with heavy portfolio investment outflows. Net foreign direct investment 
was substantially positive, despite outflows in the latter part of the year. 
Official reserves increased by US$16.7 billion to US$285.4 billion.
Economic prospects
The economy is highly open and trade dependent, hence growth is 
critically dependent on conditions of its major economic partners. The 
business outlook is uncertain and growth of only 3.0% is forecast for 
Hong Kong, China in 2012, well below the 5-year average before the global 
financial crisis. The forecast for 2013 is much stronger, with growth of 
4.5%. This is premised on a continued, gradually improving US economy, 
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easing of the eurozone crisis, and slowing but still strong growth of the 
PRC economy.
Private consumption will remain the main source of stimulus, 
supported by full or near full employment and continued income growth. 
A decline in investor confidence is expected to cause investment to slow 
sharply in 2012 but then to strengthen in 2013 as the global outlook 
improves. Net exports are projected to be negative in the first half of 
2012—a drag on economic growth—before becoming positive toward 
year-end.
Most of the four “pillar industries”—financial services, tourism, trade 
and logistics, and producer and professional services—are expected to 
continue expanding at a healthy rate, abetted by the PRC. Trade and 
logistics, however will slow in 2012 as a result of weak growth globally.
During the forecast period Hong Kong, China will continue to deepen 
its economic integration with the PRC through the Closer Economic 
Partnership Agreement and Pan-Pearl River Delta region platforms, and 
continue to expand its role as an international financial and trade center. 
It will also continue to expand its yuan business, supported by measures 
that encourage citizens of the PRC to invest in Hong Kong, China stocks, 
that allow repatriation of the yuan, and that increase yuan-denominated 
bond issuance in the territory (Figure 3.10.6).
Growth of tourism will provide an important injection to the 
economy, helping offset weakness in the trade and logistics sector. Visitor 
arrivals from the PRC surged by 24% to 28.1 million in 2011, accounting 
for 67% of the total (Figure 3.10.7).
External trade is expected to remain sluggish in 2012. In view of 
weak external demand, merchandise exports will show little growth and 
could even decline if the PRC, US, and European Union experience an 
unexpected setback. Since advanced economies account for close to 30% 
of East Asia’s total export value, their import demand directly bears on 
demand for Hong Kong, China’s exports. Service exports should remain 
buoyant, aided by tourism and the growth of professional services to the 
PRC. The current account surplus is forecast to narrow to the equivalent 
of 5.0% of GDP in 2012 and 2013.
Average annual inflation is expected to decline to 3.8% for the year 
as a whole, reflecting more stable food prices and lower commodity 
prices, except for oil. Also, the short-term price effects of government 
intervention in rental housing will have worked through, with a 
consequent drop in the housing component in the inflation index. 
Inflation is expected to drop further in 2013, to 3.3%, as food and housing 
prices continue to stabilize.
Fiscal policy is being realigned, from fighting inflation to ensuring 
stability of employment and income growth. For FY2012 (ending 31 March 
2013), six priority areas have been identified for budget support and 
government action: supporting enterprises; preserving employment; 
caring for people; stabilizing the financial system; increasing land supply; 
and strengthening social capital. 
The 2012 budget indicates increased government expenditure of 7.5%, 
but a decrease in revenues in part because of one-time reductions in 
taxes on profits and salaries, waiving of business registration fees, and 
halving charges for import and export declarations. A budget deficit of 
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about 0.2% of GDP is forecast (Figure 3.10.8). The government has a large 
accumulation of reserves in various funds established under the Public 
Finance Ordinance, projected to total HK$658.7 billion by the end of
FY2012 (ending 31 March 2013), or the equivalent of 34% of GDP.
Monetary policy will continue to track closely that of the US Federal 
Reserve, so as to maintain the currency peg with the US dollar. Low 
interest rates will parallel those in the US, helping to stimulate growth 
during the weak global environment.
The main risk to the forecast for Hong Kong, China is the possibility 
of a marked slowdown of the PRC economy. A jump in oil prices could 
also be highly disruptive of global recovery.
Policy challenge—more equitable income 
distribution
Hong Kong, China has one of the highest degrees of income inequality 
among “very high human development countries,” according to the 
Human Development Report 2010. Singapore ranks closely behind. Both 
economies compare more to developing than to developed countries.
Initial results from the 2011 Population Census for Hong Kong, China 
provide more up-to-date information on income distribution. There was 
a decline in the absolute number of low-income households and a general 
increase in the number of households with high incomes (Figure 3.10.9). 
In real terms, the median income of households increased by an 
estimated HK$2,564 from 2006 to 2011. Even then, the median income of
HK$19,472 in 2011 was just a few hundred Hong Kong dollars more than
what it was a decade earlier. Further analysis of the census and other data 
is needed to better discern recent income distribution trends in Hong 
Kong, China. 
Government expenditure for social services as a percentage of GDP 
has varied slightly over the past decade. Government expenditure for 
education was equivalent to 4.0% of GDP in 2000 but 3.6% in 2011. 
Expenditure on health declined from 2.5% of GDP to 2.4%. Social welfare 
expenditures, however, increased from 2.1% to 2.3%. The 2012 budget, 
which includes taxation and other forms of relief for low-income groups 
(e.g., public housing rental waivers), shows higher provision for social 
spending as a share of GDP except for housing and community amenities 
(Figure 3.10.10).
Strains on social services are illustrated by the long queue for public 
rental housing. Applicants for public rental apartments totaled 152,000 
in FY2010, with an average waiting time of 2 years. According to a 2011 
report by the Civic Exchange, the lowest income groups experienced 
deteriorating social services, housing, and employment conditions.
Conservative fiscal management and substantial accumulation of 
reserves allow for the provision of greater government expenditure for 
social services and housing—an effective means of reducing income 
inequality. The sound fiscal position provides scope for strategic 
government intervention in addressing the income distribution issue.
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Republic of Korea
The export sector was surprisingly strong in 2011, but domestic demand wilted, resulting in economic 
growth below potential. Subpar growth is expected again this year, with the uncertain global outlook 
restraining trade and investment. Excessive household debt weighs heavily, prompting deleveraging 
but hampering efforts to lift the economy and reduce income disparities. Policy makers face the dual 
challenge of how best to shelter the economy from external risk and strengthen inclusive growth. 
Economic performance
After surging by 6.2% in 2010, economic growth in the Republic of Korea 
slowed to 3.6% in 2011. As indicated by the economic performance prior 
to the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, a rate around 4% is closer to 
potential. A slowdown was expected—given the exceptionally high rate in 
2010—but not to this degree. The underlying cause was sluggish domestic 
demand, particularly with respect to investment. Manufacturing output 
expanded by 7.1% and services by 2.6%, but construction contracted by 
5.6%. The strength of manufacturing relates to exports as the mainstay 
of growth in 2011, a contrast with 2010, when high levels of consumption 
and investment spurred growth while the trade sector acted as a drag. 
More precisely, net exports were strongly positive in 2011 (exports 
increased faster than imports) and accounted for over half GDP growth 
(Figure 3.11.1). Despite a much less rapid rise than in the previous year, 
private consumption added another third. Government consumption 
accounted for little, reflecting the completion of fiscal stimulus. 
Investment contributed even less as plant and equipment expenditures 
were relatively flat; facilities investment increased by less than 4%, down 
from 25% in 2010. Construction fell deeper into negative territory. 
Growth momentum slowed during the year. Year on year, output 
was up 4.2% in the first quarter but then fell to the 3.5% range in the 
subsequent 3 quarters. Softening of growth was more evident quarter on 
quarter (Figure 3.11.2): reflecting the growing weakness of the economy, 
all the main components of GDP expenditure contracted in the fourth. 
This drop-off was especially pronounced for plant and equipment 
investment, but also extended to exports. The decelerating growth 
momentum closely paralleled the deteriorating global outlook.
Merchandise exports increased in nominal terms by a subdued but 
still-healthy 20.0% in 2011 (versus 28.8% in 2010), underscoring exports’ 
resilience. Export growth year on year, however, slowed steadily from 
26.5% in the first quarter to 12.1% in the fourth (Figure 3.11.3). A flurry 
of ship orders and March’s earthquake in Japan initially buttressed 
exports, but as the year progressed, softening demand—notably from the 
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European Union—markedly dented the momentum of export-led growth. 
Robust exports to developing Asia only partly offset weakening demand 
from advanced economies. In turn, import growth fell steadily over the 
year, indicative of softening domestic demand. Merchandise imports 
rose by 23.8%, down from 31.5% in 2010. The pattern for services trade 
was broadly similar. The current account surplus is estimated to be the 
equivalent of 2.5% of GDP, slightly lower than in 2010. The won exchange 
rate against the dollar remained essentially unchanged at 1,100 (it was 
1,150 in 2010).
Private consumption climbed by only 2.2% in 2011, half the year-
earlier rate. As was the case with the export sector, it also weakened 
progressively during the year, starting with growth of almost 3% but 
falling to just over 1% by the fourth quarter (Figure 3.11.4). Consumer 
confidence fell in tandem, eroded by inflation and declining real 
household purchasing power. Further, gross domestic income increased 
by only 1%, as higher oil prices and a deterioration of the terms of trade 
cut into disposable income. The one positive note was a large pickup in 
employment of some 400,000, much higher than the usual 250,000.
The sharp investment slowdown is reflected in the industrial 
production index and the ratio of producer’s shipments to inventory 
(Figure 3.11.5). Investment in export-oriented industries such as 
automobiles and semiconductors fell in parallel with the global outlook. 
The slowdown also partly reflects normalization from the exceptionally 
rapid investment growth of 2010. Construction investment contracted, 
reflecting the weak housing market and subdued public works activity. 
Inflation, as measured by the consumer price index, rose to 4.0%, 
the upper limit of the Bank of Korea’s inflation target band. Supply-side 
factors included domestic food prices as well as oil and other commodity 
prices. The spike in domestic food prices was caused by bad weather. 
While supply-side factors were the immediate catalyst of higher inflation 
in 2011, aggregate demand pressures also played a role. The central bank 
raised the policy interest rate during the first half of the year, then held 
monetary policy steady in light of the global outlook (Figure 3.11.6). 
The government continued to consolidate its financial position, which 
had been sharply expansionary in response to the global financial crisis. 
The fiscal deficit narrowed progressively, to 0.7% of GDP from 4.8% in 
2009 and 1.5% in 2010. Government expenditure rose to 21.2% of GDP and 
revenue even more significantly to 20.5%; the ratio of public debt to GDP 
fell marginally to 35%.
In summary, the country’s overall economic performance in 2011 
was worse than expected, largely due to the deteriorating global outlook 
as the year unfolded. Even though export growth slowed progressively 
during the year, it remained the main driver. Private consumption was 
supportive while investment lost steam. 
Economic prospects
Growth for 2012 is forecast at 3.4% (below potential), rising moderately in 
2013 to 4.0%. These rates are based on the expectation that the Republic of 
Korea’s main export markets, including the European Union, the United 
States (US), and Japan, will experience slow growth at best. Thus the 
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pessimistic global outlook that so hampered the country’s performance in 
the second half of 2011 will set the tone for the forecast period.
Exports in nominal terms are expected to increase by about 8% in 
2012, or less than half last year’s rate. Export unit prices are expected to 
remain flat, in contrast to significant gains in 2011. The fragile state of 
economic recovery in advanced countries is constraining demand for key 
exports from the Republic of Korea, such as automobiles, electronics, and 
other consumer durables. Demand for key ICT parts, such as memory 
chips used in personal computers, has also been affected. 
More positively, exports of general machinery and other goods to 
the People’s Republic of China and other emerging markets in Asia are 
expected to remain strong. Petrochemical exports will also be robust, 
including those to Japan. Overall export growth is projected to strengthen 
gradually during 2012 and into 2013, in line with a gradually improving 
global outlook. Imports will likely climb faster than exports, and the 
current account surplus to decline to around 2.0% of GDP. The US dollar 
exchange rate is unlikely to change much either way. 
Investment is forecast to increase by little more than 2% in 2012. 
Subdued investment, especially in the export sector, has mirrored the 
worsening external environment. Corporate investment surveys indicate 
that major Korean firms plan to reduce investment relative to their levels 
in 2011 by 5–10%. Beyond weak business sentiment, an impediment to 
stronger investment is the decline in corporate profitability, notably 
among ICT firms. Another negative element for equipment investment 
is the recent fall in capacity utilization (Figure 3.11.7). Construction 
investment, including housing, which contracted in both 2010 and 2011, is 
expected to increase, but only moderately. Overall investment is expected 
to strengthen in the second half of 2012 as the global outlook picks up.
Private consumption is projected to increase by about 3% in 2012, 
or somewhat more strongly than in 2011. Various factors constrain its 
growth, though. Consumer confidence is weak (Figure 3.11.8) and is 
unlikely to strengthen until the global outlook improves convincingly. 
Purchases of consumer durables, especially automobiles, may be 
constrained by the prospective free trade agreement with the US, which is 
expected to lower prices. Further, sluggish exports will limit wage growth 
and ultimately private consumption. Real wage growth has lagged GDP 
growth since the mid-2000s and this trend is likely to continue. Excessive 
household debt also constrains increased private consumption, especially 
among low-income groups. On the positive side, inflation pressures are 
expected to ease and to help raise household purchasing power. 
Inflation is forecast to decline to 3.0%, a full percentage lower than in 
2011. It is anticipated that the ratcheting down of global growth predictions 
for 2012 and 2013 will be tracked by moderating commodity prices and help 
ease core inflation. However, international oil and food prices are volatile; 
they were high in the first part of 2011 then eased, but oil prices have again 
risen sharply. Supply shocks—such as a spike in oil prices—could prove 
highly disruptive. A firmer basis for optimism on inflation is the abatement 
of domestic demand pressures and the projected disappearance of the small 
inflationary gap that emerged in 2011 (Figure 3.11.9). 
Employment is forecast to increase by 250,000—healthy but far short 
of the exceptional gain in 2011. The elasticity of employment growth 
3.11.7 Capacity utilization
70
75
80
85
 Oct Jul AprJan
2011
%
Source: CEIC Data Company (accessed 6 March 2012).
Click here for figure data
3.11.8 Consumer confidence
95
100
105
110
115
Feb
12
Oct Jul  AprJan
11
Oct Jul  AprJan
2010
Index
Source: Bank of Korea. Economic Statistics System. http://
ecos.bok.or.kr (accessed 6 March 2012).
Click here for figure data
3.11.1 Selected economic indicators (%)
2012 2013
GDP growth 3.4 4.0
Inflation 3.0 3.0
Current account balance 
(share of GDP)
2.0 2.0
Source: ADB estimates. 
144  Asian Development Outlook 2012
relative to GDP growth in recent years reflects the large expansion of 
labor supply. This, in turn, stems from the reentry of retired 50-plus 
baby boomers into the workforce, usually self-employed, to cope with 
insufficient retirement income. “Silver workers”—those 60 and over—
now constitute around 12% of the workforce. For those 65 and older, the 
employment rate is more than double the OECD average. Except for 
professionals, these workers are typically unskilled, on low wages and 
with little job security. Self-employment in small, scarcely profitable retail 
outlets is common. Strong employment growth therefore masks questions 
about the quality of employment. 
The current basic monetary and fiscal policy framework is likely to 
continue—that is, to lower inflation while supporting growth. The policy 
interest rate is expected to remain largely unchanged. Although the 
adverse global environment may call for stimulus—including yet lower 
interest rates—the current policy rate of 3.25% is already accommodative. 
High and growing household debt further weakens the case for monetary 
loosening (Figure 3.11.10). The Bank of Korea will closely monitor 
developments, tightening monetary policy if inflationary pressures revive 
but loosening it if the economic outlook deteriorates further. 
The fiscal position is fundamentally sound, as indicated by the public 
debt-to-GDP ratio of 35%, which is far lower than the OECD average. 
The relatively favorable fiscal conditions support continued consolidation 
within a medium-term fiscal framework. Public expenditure requirements 
associated with the country’s aging population, among other pressures, 
call for a gradual buildup in the fiscal position. The government is 
targeting fiscal balance by 2014, if not sooner. 
Summarizing the above considerations, GDP growth is likely to 
remain slightly below potential in the short term (Figure 3.11.11). Although 
domestic demand will help cushion some of the loss of momentum since 
the exceptional growth in 2010, the recovery will be gradual—tracking 
the global outlook. 
The main short-term downside risk for the economy stems from 
the eurozone’s sovereign debt issue: the speed and effectiveness of its 
resolution bear heavily on the global outlook and hence prospects 
for Korean exporters. If the situation deteriorates into another global 
financial crisis, exports and GDP growth would be hard hit, as in 2008–
2009. Alternatively, if the eurozone crisis is resolved faster and better 
than expected, growth could surprise on the upside. 
Another source of external uncertainty is the potential impact on 
global oil prices of Middle Eastern geopolitical tensions. Concern over 
the change of political leadership in the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea has abated. A domestic risk is the high and growing level of 
household debt. 
Policy challenge—household debt
Household debt has continued to climb rapidly, despite regulatory efforts. 
However, the current surge in household debt appears to be driven by 
financing of consumption rather than purchases of homes, and the 
ratio of nonhousing to housing loans is rising (Figure 3.11.12). Further, 
household debt rose by 9% in 2011 whereas financial assets and real 
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estate owned by households went up by only 7.1%. This supports the view 
that households, in response to shrinking real disposable incomes, are 
borrowing more to finance consumption. It is expected that increases in 
household debt will slow in 2012, as the financial authorities are likely 
to clamp down on household borrowing to protect the soundness of the 
financial sector. The weak housing market will weigh on household loans 
and should act to help constrain the growth of household debt.
High and growing household debt may be a domestic risk for the 
economy, but the probability of it causing a macro financial crisis is 
quite small. The ratio of nonperforming household loans stood at 0.8% 
at end-2011. The banking sector’s improved profitability and stronger 
capacity to absorb losses further reduces the likelihood of a financial 
crisis. Stringent loan-to-value regulations minimize the risk of a vicious 
cycle of falling housing prices and rising numbers of nonperforming 
loans. Household debt repayment pressures still affect macroeconomic 
performance though, because they crimp disposable income, private 
consumption, and aggregate demand. 
Household debt also seriously affects certain groups of households 
and components of the financial sector. Low-income households may 
face financial difficulties for two reasons. First, slow economic and hence 
income growth limits their repayment capacity. Second, repayment 
pressures are likely to intensify owing to government efforts to rein in 
household debt. Financial institutions will become more cautious in 
rolling over loans and demand quicker repayment of the principal. For 
households in the bottom 20% by income, the ratio of debt to disposable 
income rose sharply in 2011 (Figure 3.11.13). Low-income households 
earning less than 20 million won annually accounted for about 40% of 
total loans, and these loans are more at risk of becoming nonperforming. 
A related area of concern is the so-called secondary financial sector. 
This sector consists of financial institutions that deal extensively with 
borrowers with poor credit ratings and that have only limited capacity 
to absorb losses. The ratio of subprime loans and nonperforming loans 
has already risen sharply for these institutions. If the risk premium 
rises in response, borrowers’ repayment ability will decline, setting in 
train a potentially intensifying cycle of nonrepayment by borrowers and 
worsening balance sheets in the secondary financial sector. 
In 2011, authorities introduced several measures to address household 
debt. These included reinstatement of debt-to-income limits for mortgage 
loans and various measures to ensure low-income households’ access 
to loans through the primary financial sector. While these measures 
are encouraging, authorities will need to closely monitor the growth of 
household debt, especially loans from the secondary financial sector to 
low-income households, and to take further cautionary measures. 
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Mongolia
Medium-term economic prospects are excellent, with a very large mining project expected to begin 
production early next year and another in the initial stage of development. Growth has been driven 
both by the booming mining sector and by too rapidly increasing government expenditure. There are 
signs of overheating, reflected in double-digit inflation. As already scheduled by the government, a 
substantial fiscal reserve needs to be built so as to protect against contingencies, including a drop in 
global commodity prices.
Economic performance
The economy grew by 17.3% in 2011, driven mainly by infrastructure 
spending related to mining activity (Figure 3.12.1). Gross capital formation 
increased by about 60%, including for equipment, buildings and 
intermediate goods, and public infrastructure. Investment in the world-
scale Oyu Tolgoi copper and gold mine is projected to total $5 billion. The
mine is nearing commercial production.
Domestic consumption was another important driver, rising by 14.5% 
in real terms. Private consumption was up strongly, supported by rising 
employment and incomes.
A surge in exports, almost entirely to the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), was driven by increases in the volume and value of coal output. 
Imports, however, surged even more, largely reflecting the equipment and 
machinery needs of mining. Net exports were negative and, therefore, 
heavily reduced the national accounts measure of overall growth.
Economic growth primarily originated in mining, but was quite 
broad-based (Figure 3.12.2). Domestic trade (wholesale and retail) rose 
by 42.5%, stimulated by large government cash payments to all citizens. 
Mining rose by 8.7%, manufacturing by 16.0%, and construction by 14.3%. 
Agriculture, which accounts for more than a third of total employment, 
increased by only 0.3%—disappointing progress in view of the sharp 
contraction in 2010. While official unemployment was less than 5%, labor 
force surveys indicate that the overall rate was about 9%, down from 13% 
at end-2010.
Macroeconomic management of the economy has been mixed. The 
government completed successfully a stand-by arrangement with the 
International Monetary Fund in October 2010 but since then fiscal 
policy has become more expansionary and pro-cyclical. Government 
expenditure in fiscal 2011 (1 January–31 December) surged by 55.6% to the 
equivalent of 44.2% of GDP as spending on social transfers, wages and 
cash transfers surged. Government revenue jumped by 40.9%, supported 
by sharply higher receipts from import duties on mining-related 
equipment and corporate and personal income taxes.
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Late in the year, Parliament amended the budget to raise revenue 
and expenditure—by some 20% over the initial budget estimates for 
both revenue and expenditure. Compounding the inflationary effects 
of the spending increase, 20% of total budgetary expenditures were 
in December. The budget deficit was the equivalent of 3.6% of GDP, 
compared with a small surplus in 2010 (Figure 3.12.3). While excess 
mineral revenues were placed in a stabilization fund, as provided for 
by the Fiscal Stability Law (FSL) adopted in 2010, the overall budgetary 
framework was inappropriate for 2011 given the inflationary pressures.
The Bank of Mongolia (the central bank) tightened monetary policy 
throughout the year. It increased the reserve requirement for banks from 
5% at the start of 2011 to 11% in August. It has raised the policy rate four 
times since early 2010 by a total of 1.75 percentage points to 12.75% by 
year-end. Adjusting for inflation, the slightly positive real interest rate 
indicates a modest contractionary monetary policy stance, although 
insufficient to offset excessive fiscal stimulus.
The official exchange rate of the local currency (the togrog) against 
the US dollar depreciated by about 11% during August–December 
2011, reflecting global risk aversion and declining commodity prices, 
which similarly affected the currencies of other emerging, mineral-rich 
economies. The real effective exchange rate of the togrog was broadly 
stable over the year (Figure 3.12.4).
The institutional framework for monetary policy has been 
strengthened. The broadly flexible exchange rate system adopted since 
2009 helps control inflation, provides an absorber against external 
shocks, and facilitates the real exchange rate changes that are likely 
to take place over the medium term in view of the rapid growth of 
the mineral sector. The new Central Bank Law, enacted in early 2010, 
mandates the Bank of Mongolia to concentrate solely on price stability. 
The real effective exchange rate does not seem to be out of line with 
medium-term fundamentals.
Broad money supply (M2) grew by nearly 40% through December 
2011, too rapidly given the need to restrain inflationary pressures. The 
commercial banking system in Mongolia has structural weaknesses, 
with weak supervision and regulation. Several small to medium-sized 
banks are highly vulnerable. Year-on-year bank lending was up by more 
than 70% in December. The rapid acceleration in bank lending is fueling 
aggregate demand, heightening the vulnerability of banks and putting 
stress on the financial system.
For the year as whole, inflation was 9.2%, but varied widely with 
fluctuations in food prices and increased to 10.2% in December year on 
year (Figure 3.12.5). Inflation in Mongolia is volatile, making it hard to 
discern underlying inflationary pressures, which is crucial for guiding 
macroeconomic policy. The drop in inflation in early 2011 was largely 
due to a decline in meat prices through government-managed sales of 
meat reserves at below-market prices. (Meat constitutes about 40% of the 
food basket.) Core inflation (excluding food and energy) averaged 9.7%, 
indicating overheating of the economy.
External trade soared in 2011. The value of exports, largely minerals, 
rose by 64.4% to $4.8 billion, attributable to demand from the PRC
(Figure 3.12.6). Imports more than doubled to $6.5 billion, driven by
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purchases of equipment for mining as well as higher prices for oil and food. 
The current account deficit widened to $2.6 billion, which corresponded
to about 30.0% of GDP in 2011 (as against 14% of GDP in 2010). The main 
source of financing of the current account deficit was foreign direct 
investment, which more than doubled to $3.7 billion. Gross international
reserves by year-end totaled $2.5 billion, equivalent to 29% of GDP.
Economic prospects
The economy is forecast to continue growing at double digit rates: 15.0% 
in 2012 and 17.5% in 2013. The drivers of growth are expected to remain 
the same, notably mining-related investment and output. Commercial 
production from the Oyu Tolgoi mine is scheduled to begin in early 
2013, accounting for the boost in growth that year. The time frame for 
developing the Tavan Tolgoi coal deposit, one of the world’s largest 
untapped reserves, is less certain. Growth is likely to be further supported 
by strong growth in construction and services activity associated with 
mining, and by rising government spending.
With an estimated budget deficit of 1.0% in 2012, fiscal policy is 
expected to remain pro-cyclical. Government revenue is projected to 
rise by about 40% and expenditure by about 32%. Contingent liabilities 
may also increase significantly, reflecting the government’s guarantee of 
bond issuances by the Development Bank of Mongolia and scheduled 
public–private projects. Under the amendments to the Social Welfare Law 
enacted in January 2012, a means-tested poverty benefit will be introduced 
at midyear, replacing the universal cash transfers from the Human 
Development Fund. This represents a major step toward setting up a 
fiscally sustainable social protection system while supporting the poor.
Inflation is expected to remain in double digits—15.0% in 2012 and 
12.0% in 2013—owing to very high public spending and large pay rises 
for public-sector workers in 2012, as well as the emergence of supply 
bottlenecks in the mining industry and shortages in the labor market
(Figure 3.12.7). Adherence to the FSL, in particular the phasing out of 
cash payments in mid-2012, will put the central bank in a better position 
to contain inflation in 2013. If, however, public spending growth does not 
moderate (as prescribed by the FSL), inflation may continue to accelerate 
beyond 2012. The recent exchange rate depreciation will further stoke 
inflationary pressure due to the high import content of consumer goods.
Monetary policy may need to play a more active role in countering 
inflationary pressures. The central bank’s target for 2012 is an inflation 
rate below 10%, which will require further tightening of monetary policy. 
Containing credit growth, which is increasing systemic risks in the 
banking sector, will require strict enforcement of prudential regulation.
Export growth is projected to be robust in the forecast period, based 
on strong demand from the PRC and continued high commodity prices. 
Export earnings will also be boosted when the Oyu Tolgoi mine starts 
commercial production. 
Imports will continue to be driven by investments linked to mining and 
strong growth in private consumption. As new mines come on stream and 
mineral exports surge, the current account deficit is expected to narrow 
to an estimated 25.0% and 15.0% of GDP in 2012 and 2013 (Figure 3.12.8). 
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With committed investments for the Oyu Tolgoi mine and pre-operation 
activities related to the Tavan Tolgoi mine, foreign direct investment is set 
to remain high and to fully finance the current account deficit.
Downside risks to the forecast reflect Mongolia’s small, open, mining-
dependent economy. Because of the heavy dependence on mineral 
development and exports, and associated government revenue, the 
current account and state finances are highly vulnerable to commodity 
price fluctuations. Another risk is the possibility of a sharp slowdown in 
the PRC’s growth, the destination for more than 90% of exports.
Domestically, weak corporate governance and regulation and 
supervision have resulted in the banking sector being vulnerable to 
external shocks; it could—as during the 2008–2009 crisis—generate 
severe financial stress.
Policy challenges—institutional strengthening 
and public finance management
Worldwide, countries have shown that, paradoxically, an abundance of 
natural resources can hinder their long-term development by increasing 
macroeconomic volatility, thus reducing incentives to invest in physical 
and human capital and undermining economic and political institutions. 
Resource dependence often leads to widening income disparities, as 
resource extraction creates relatively few jobs and a small proportion of 
the population may secure most of the income.
Mongolia, which historically had comparatively balanced income 
distribution, has in recent years seen a clear trend toward increasing 
inequality that could undermine its social cohesion and stability. An 
important medium-term challenge will be to improve its economic 
and political institutions so as to ensure transparent, accountable, and 
equitable management of natural resource revenue.
Macroeconomic management of an economy characterized by very 
rapid development of its natural resources often leads to what is called 
“Dutch Disease”—that is, high inflationary pressures, upward pressure 
on the exchange rate, crowding out of the private sector, and increasing 
vulnerability to external shocks. Recognizing the possible risks, the 
government strengthened the legal framework for fiscal policy and 
budget management through enactment of the FSL (in June 2010) and the 
Integrated Budget Law in early 2012.
The FSL aims to ensure that mining revenues are better managed 
by putting in place three complementary rules (Box 3.12.1). The FSL—if 
properly enforced—will make an important contribution to insulating 
fiscal policy from commodity price shocks and smoothing the economy’s 
adjustment to higher mineral output. In turn, conservative management 
of fiscal resources will facilitate development of the nonmineral economy.
While the 2012 government budget appears to be overly expansionary, 
the authorities are expressing their commitment to the FSL. The 
Integrated Budget Law is a comprehensive law which aims to reform the 
entire budget process, from investment planning to budget execution and 
auditing, and puts in place a new framework for fiscal decentralization. It 
is vital that both these laws be implemented in spirit and practice.
3.12.1 Fiscal rules for budget 
discipline
Good fiscal policy is critical for 
helping to ensure that mineral wealth 
contributes to sustainable economic 
prosperity. The Fiscal Stability Law 
will promote needed budget discipline 
through three fiscal rules: 
•	 Ceiling on structural budget deficit 
of 2% of GDP. The structural deficit 
adjusts the budget deficit to take 
account of trends in major mineral 
prices (currently copper and coal) 
and their impact on government 
revenues. The structural balance 
is calculated by using the moving 
average price of major minerals 
over 16 years (past 12 years, current 
year, and future 3 years). This 
provision takes effect in 2013.
•	 Ceiling on expenditure growth. 
Spending growth that is too fast 
leads to overheating and inflation 
and, from a budget perspective, is 
difficult to manage efficiently. The 
ceiling is the greater of the non-
mineral GDP growth rate of the 
particular year or the average of the 
non-mineral GDP growth rate for 
the 12 consecutive preceding years. 
This provision takes effect in 2013.
•	 Net present value of public debt 
must not exceed 40% of GDP. 
This provision takes effect from 
2014, with a transition period 
specified for the preceding years. It 
excludes any borrowing in which 
the government has agreed to 
contribute into the paid-in capital 
of a foreign mining entity and 
which is repayable from the future 
profits of the entity.
Taipei,China
Forward-looking business indicators are now more positive than in late 2011 but weak global conditions will 
limit export growth in this trade-heavy economy. Domestic demand should continue to provide a relatively 
strong base, supported by rising incomes reaching around US$21,000 per capita this year. A gradually 
improving global outlook will boost growth in 2013, but longer term, increased R&D and investment is 
needed to secure broad-based, stable growth through diversification and restructuring of the economy.
Economic performance
Following the post-recession rebound, economic growth slowed to 4.0% 
in 2011 (Figure 3.13.1). Growth decelerated to 1.9% in the fourth quarter, 
reflecting the slump in gross capital formation and investor concerns 
about the global outlook. 
Positive net exports accounted for most of the increase in output, 
despite weak external demand, as the slowdown in exports was less 
marked than that for imports. 
Domestic demand was mixed, as domestic consumption was 
relatively strong but investment declined. Private consumption rose by 
3.0% in 2011, supported by robust job growth, low unemployment (4.4%), 
and rising earnings. Government consumption picked up by about 2%. 
Private investment, however, fell by 2.3%, more sharply so in the second 
half of the year as business enterprises, especially in electronics, put their 
investment plans on hold. Public investment declined even faster, by 
8.4%, as stimulus-related infrastructure outlays were gradually completed 
(Figure 3.13.2). 
Growth was almost evenly distributed between industry and services. 
The former grew by 4.4% for the year—in contrast to 2010 when it 
jumped by 23%—slowing sharply in the fourth quarter. Manufacturing 
rose by 4.9% but construction activity was flat, in line with a slowing 
property market. Services saw modest gains in wholesale and retail 
trade, finance and insurance, information and communications, and 
strong gains in hotel and restaurant services. Agriculture grew by 1.9%, 
but accounts for less than 2% of GDP.
Inflation of 1.4% was well within the central bank’s target. Measures 
to curb mortgage lending, as in the previous year, continued to slow 
residential property price increases. The appreciating local currency 
against the United States (US) dollar—up 7.4% through end-December 
2011, taking it to near the rate before the global financial crisis—also 
helped curb inflation. 
Monetary policy continued tightening in 2011 (Figure 3.13.3). 
However, from September 2011 the central bank kept the discount rate 
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unchanged at 1.875%, as concerns mounted about the risk of another 
global economic slowdown. Money supply and bank credit expansion 
climbed only slowly, although loans to the private sector increased faster 
than in 2010, at 8.1%. 
Fiscal policy remained accommodative, with a deficit of 2.5%. Overall 
government expenditure increased by 4.4%, reflecting rising social 
welfare payments and development-related initiatives. Revenue rose by 
10%, supported by a healthy rate of expansion in nominal GDP. Public 
debt is projected to rise to the equivalent of 37% of GDP, still below the 
limit of 40% set by law. 
Trade decelerated (Figure 3.13.4). Growth of goods exports slowed to 
12.1%, on a combination of weakening external demand and adjustment 
from the unsustainable 34.6% postcrisis rebound of 2010. Exports to 
advanced countries slumped while developing Asian markets remained 
relatively strong. In particular, the Economic Cooperation Framework 
Agreement with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) resulted in 
rapid growth in exports of products included under the Early Harvest 
Program. 
Merchandise import growth contracted to 13.0% from 43.1% in 2010, 
as imports of capital goods fell sharply. The trade surplus increased by 
4.5% to US$27.6 billion.
The services account was in surplus, boosted by strong growth in 
tourist arrivals from the PRC. The income account remained positive as 
repatriated profits and dividends from Taipei,China’s investments abroad 
exceeded its payments to nonresidents. A current account surplus of 
US$41.3 billion was recorded, equivalent to 8.8% of GDP.
Direct investment recorded a net outflow of US$14.8 billion
(Figure 3.13.5), due mainly to firm expansions abroad and relocation of 
less advanced parts of the manufacturing base to the PRC. Portfolio 
investment registered a net outflow of US$35.7 billion, much higher than
the previous year, reflecting both concern about the global outlook and 
safe-haven capital flight. The decline in the capital account more than 
offset the rise in the current account, bringing foreign reserves down to 
82.6% of GDP, from 89% in 2010.
Economic prospects
Growth is forecast to slow further in 2012 to an annual 3.4%, on the 
uncertain world outlook and moderating rate of expansion of the PRC, 
the island’s largest trading partner. Improvement to 4.6% is forecast for 
2013, as both domestic and external demand strengthen. 
Growth of exports of goods is forecast to weaken to about 4% in 
2012, or a third of the year-earlier rate. Exports of services will be more 
robust, growing by more than 7%, supported by greater tourist arrivals 
from the PRC as visa restrictions are relaxed further. Continued growth 
of exports to developing Asian markets in 2012 and 2013 will compensate 
in part for the slow growth of exports to developed countries. 
Imports of goods and services will also slow sharply, but less so than 
exports, in part because of the rising cost of oil imports. Net exports 
will remain positive. Both exports and imports will strengthen as the 
economy strengthens in the latter half of 2012 and into 2013. The current 
3.13.3 Credit indicators
-1
0
1
2
3
4
-3
0
3
6
9
12
M2 growthPolicy rate
Private credit growth
DecJulJan
11
JulJan
10
JulJan
09
JulJan
2008
% %
Source: CEIC Data Company (accessed 16 March 2012).
Click here for figure data
3.13.4 Trade indicators
-6
0
6
12
-50
0
50
100
Import growth
Export growth
Trade balance
 Q3 Q1
11
 Q3 Q1
10
 Q3 Q1
09
 Q3 Q1
08
 Q3 Q1
2007
$ billion %
Sources: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and 
Statistics. http://eng.stat.gov.tw; CEIC Data Company (both 
accessed 15 March 2012).
Click here for figure data
3.13.5 Net investment flows
-45
-36
-27
-18
-9
0
PortfolioDirect
111009082007
$ billion
Sources: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and 
Statistics. http://eng.stat.gov.tw; CEIC Data Company (both 
accessed 15 March 2012).
Click here for figure data
152  Asian Development Outlook 2012
account surplus is expected to decline to about 8.0% of GDP for this year 
and next. 
Private consumption is forecast to increase by 2.5% this year, 
supported by relatively low unemployment, low interest rates, and 
recovering consumer confidence (Figure 3.13.6), which had fallen at 
end-2011 following cutbacks in overtime work and encouragement for 
employees to take leave. 
Investment is expected to register little growth in 2012, reflecting 
the high degree of uncertainty about global demand for information-
technology products. Opening the semiconductor and flat-panel 
subsectors to foreign investment (announced in March 2011) has so far 
not met expectations. However, another round of liberalization, which 
began in March 2012, together with the expected gradual resurgence of 
growth in the US and other major markets, should lead to a pickup in 
investment later this year and during 2013. 
The National Development Plan for 2012, announced in December 
2011, is also expected to lift investment in the second half of 2012 and in 
2013. 
Fiscal policy, however, will be less stimulative than last year. Overall 
expenditure is budgeted to drop marginally, as spending under the 
Special Budget will fall to almost zero—with the winding up of crisis 
measures in response to the 2009 typhoon and the stimulus measures 
related to the 2008–2009 recession. Revenue is expected to increase 
by 5%, resulting in a narrowing of the deficit to about 1–2% of GDP, 
consistent with the government’s policy of gradual fiscal consolidation.
Inflation is expected to remain little changed in 2012 and 2013, at 1.5% 
and 1.6%. Oil prices are forecast to be marginally higher than last year 
but slow growth, both domestically and internationally, will in general 
ease commodity and other prices, including those for food. Property 
prices have started to decelerate, a result of the monetary authority’s 
policies on curbing speculative activities. The upsurge in consumer 
prices in December–January is considered a short-term aberration, 
attributable to bad weather and increased demand during the Chinese 
New Year. 
In January, authorities announced that investors from the PRC 
would be allowed to acquire stakes in local banks and financial holding 
companies, helping the local stock market rise (by 14%) and the national 
currency to appreciate against the US dollar (by 2.5%) from end-2011 to 
mid-March 2012. Uncertainties about the global economy will, however, 
encourage the central bank to closely monitor exchange rate movements 
and to keep interest rates at their current levels, while ensuring that 
inflation stays in check. Monetary policy is expected to tighten in 2013.
Risks to the economic forecast stem primarily from the eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis and the consequences for the global economy if it 
were to deepen. Another risk is instability in the Middle East, with the 
possibility of an oil spike and derailment of economic recovery in the US 
and elsewhere.
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Policy challenge—industrial diversification and 
competitiveness
A major policy challenge for Taipei,China is diversifying the economy 
and achieving a more broad-based, resilient growth model. It is 
highly dependent on exports, which equal about 70% of total output. 
Further, more than 40% of its exports are based on electronics products 
(Figure 3.13.7). As an export-led-economy, it is highly susceptible to 
conditions in its main markets, notably the PRC; Hong Kong, China; the 
US; European Union; and Japan (Figure 3.13.8). 
The competitiveness of the electronics sector is a further concern. 
Although the sector has evolved over several decades from pure assembly 
to a high-tech, well-integrated industry, international competition has 
increased relentlessly, notably from the Republic of Korea. The growing 
scarcity of low-cost labor in Taipei,China over the past decade or more 
has prompted some companies to relocate manufacturing plants to the 
PRC and elsewhere. In turn, this has raised concern that the migration 
of industry will “hollow out” the economy. Financial difficulties of 
Taipei,China’s leading memory-chip makers since the global financial 
crisis, as indicated in their declining share prices (Figure 3.13.9), have 
underscored the need for restructuring and innovation.
Taipei,China’s competitive position has been further challenged by 
bilateral trade agreements. Of particular significance, the Republic of 
Korea–US Free Trade Agreement signed in March 2012 poses stepped-up 
competition in a wide range of industries, including electronics. Beyond 
that, the Republic of Korea is scheduled to start negotiations on free trade 
with the PRC and Japan in May this year.
Recognizing the need for industrial restructuring and strengthened 
competitiveness, in 2011 the government stepped up efforts to enhance 
technological innovation, cultural and creative industries, R&D activities, 
and traditional industries. It also includes investment incentives 
for innovative foreign and domestic investors. Diversification into 
rising industries, such as biotechnology, renewable energy, ecological 
agriculture, and medical care, will require stronger R&D support: 
according to IMD’s World Competitiveness Yearbook, total R&D spending 
in 2009 was equal to 2.9% of GDP, less than the 3.4% for the Republic of 
Korea and 3.5% for Japan.
The response of the private sector to diversifying and making itself 
more competitive will be critical. Innovation in products and processes 
will be essential, as well as deciding on what products to get out of or to 
avoid. From a public policy perspective, perhaps the most important focus 
should be on improving the investment regime and on opening more 
sectors to investment, thereby creating more opportunities for domestic 
and foreign investors. 
One spur may be that Taipei,China’s rank in Doing Business 2012 was 
25—far behind both Singapore and Hong Kong, China (first and second), 
and the Republic of Korea (eighth, up from 15 in 2010). The government, 
in partnership with the private sector, needs to improve in those areas 
where the economy ranks poorly and to ease regulatory impediments in 
key sectors. 
3.13.8 Export shares, by destination
0
20
40
60
80
100
PRC and Hong Kong, China
ASEAN-6
United States
European Union
Japan
Rest of the world
111009082007
% share
Note: ASEAN-6 = Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam; PRC = People’s 
Republic of China.
Sources: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and 
Statistics. http://eng.stat.gov.tw; CEIC Data Company (both 
accessed 15 March 2012).
Click here for figure data
3.13.9 Selected share price movements, 
electronics 
-70
0
70
140
Optoelectronics
Computer and peripheral equipment
Semiconductors
Electronic parts or components
Electronics
Feb
12
OctJulAprJan
11
OctJulAprJan
2010
year-on-year % change
Note: The data refer to subindexes in TWSE.
Sources: CEIC Data Company; TWSE. http://www.twse.com.
tw (both accessed 15 March 2012). 
Click here for figure data
3.13.7 Export shares, by product
0
20
40
60
80
100
Electronic products and equipment
Base metals
Rubbers and plastics
Chemicals
Machineries
Textiles
Other products
111009082007
% share
Sources: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and 
Statistics. http://eng.stat.gov.tw; CEIC Data Company (both 
accessed 15 March 2012).
Click here for figure data
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Afghanistan
Full responsibility for security is to be handed over to the government by end-2014 as international 
troops are withdrawn. Since economic development (as well as security) has depended heavily on aid and 
international military spending, the transition will require the country to find new sources of growth and 
ways to achieve fiscal sustainability, in an uncertain security environment. These challenges will require 
major domestic efforts and reforms alongside substantial external support by donors if development 
momentum is to be sustained.
Economic performance
GDP growth is estimated to have slowed to 5.7% in FY2011 (ending 
20 March 2012)—following an 8.4% expansion the previous year—mainly 
because of a large fall in agricultural foodgrain production owing to 
unfavorable weather conditions for a second year (Figure 3.14.1).
Private consumption remained the main source of economic growth, 
fueled by the large aid inflows that underpin most of the demand for 
goods and services. Growth in services activity, which accounted for 
53% of GDP, moderated during the year, reflecting lower foreign inflows. 
Domestic investment is estimated at 22.6% of GDP, including private 
investment of just over a third of that.
Opium production increased by 61% in 2011, rebounding from a 
disease the year earlier that wiped out much of the crop, and farmers 
responded to high prices offered by traffickers. Farm income for opium in 
2011 is estimated to exceed $1.4 billion, equivalent to nearly 8% of GDP;
export value may be as much as $2.4 billion. Opium is not counted as
part of GDP, but earnings generated by it and then retained and spent in 
the country boost domestic demand.
Consumer prices are highly volatile because of heavy import 
dependence, including food and fuel (Figure 3.14.2). Overall (year-on 
-year) inflation, which peaked at 18.2% in January 2011, receded to 9.2% in 
February 2012, mainly due to a fall in food inflation, which dropped from 
21.0% to 7.1% mainly because of declining global food prices. Nonfood 
inflation was fairly stable in this period—varying around 14%—kept high by 
price adjustments for electricity and fuel, construction materials, transport, 
and housing rents. Average inflation in FY2011 is estimated at 10.5%.
Revenue collection is estimated to have met the FY2011 budget target 
of AF98.8 billion (11.5% of GDP), reflecting tax administration reforms, 
improved tax compliance, and new tax measures such as a business 
receipts tax (Figure 3.14.3). Operating expenditure is estimated to have 
increased by 37.0% in FY2011, mainly because of growing security 
expenditure taken on to the budget and rapid implementation of pay 
and grading reforms for civil servants. Domestic revenue coverage of 
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operating expenditure therefore fell, to about 65% from 73% a year earlier; 
the balance of operating expenditure was financed through donor grants.
The government tightened its policy on new project additions to the 
development budget in view of the low execution rate, which has been 
a major concern for the government and donors in recent years. The 
government has been struggling to meet its budgetary targets to achieve 
the Millennium Development Goals, for example.
The central bank adopted a relatively tight monetary policy during 
FY2011 to contain inflation pressures, although they largely stemmed 
from global price increases. Growth in currency in circulation was cut by 
nearly half to 17.8% from 34.2% in FY2010. The afghani remained broadly 
stable in real effective terms; it depreciated by about 8% against the dollar 
during FY2011 (Figure 3.14.4).
The current account deficit (excluding grants) is estimated to have 
narrowed by about 5.5% of GDP to a deficit of 34.3% of GDP in FY2011 
(Figure 3.14.5). The narrowing trend reflects the fact that grant financing 
has remained broadly stable in dollar terms at about $6.3 billion in
recent years but is falling in relation to a growing nominal GDP. 
Including grants, the current account is expected to run a surplus of 0.1% 
of GDP in FY2011, down from the 1.7% surplus in FY2010 due to a much 
smaller expansion in exports. The financial account improved slightly 
on increased foreign direct investment as a result of initial investment 
in mining industry. Gross international reserves are estimated to have 
increased to $6.1 billion, equivalent to cover 8.4 months of imports.
Economic prospects
Economic activity will continue to be driven mainly by consumption 
expenditure and is expected to pick up to 7.1% in FY2012 (assuming more 
favorable weather for agriculture). A slowdown to 5.8% is expected in 
FY2013, though, because of declining local spending from foreign security 
forces as they gradually withdraw and waning grant-financed development 
spending that is not channeled through the government budget. An 
economic program with the IMF under its Extended Credit Facility was 
agreed in November 2011 and it provides an overall macroeconomic 
adjustment framework for the next 3 years, as well as guidance to reform 
banking regulations after the failure of Kabul Bank (Box 3.14.1).
The government’s operating budget deficit will come under pressure 
in the next 2 years because of increases in security spending, continuing 
pay and grading reforms in the civil service, absorption of the public 
servants paid by donors, and operation and maintenance cost of projects 
handed over by donors. Projections indicate that recurrent spending will 
rise to 18.6% of GDP, while domestic revenues will stay at about 11.5% of 
GDP over the next 2 years, thus domestic revenue will fall by another 
3 percentage points to finance about 62% of recurrent expenditures. 
Increases in operating and development grants, however, are expected to 
keep total budget expenditure higher at over 25% of GDP in FY2012 and 
FY2013, or about 1.5–2 percentage points above that in FY2011.
Monetary policy aims to bring down inflation to about 5% in the next 
2 years. While the main drivers of prices are external and out of direct 
control, the Asian Development Outlook 2012 baseline assumes broadly 
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stable global commodity prices, indicating that this objective is attainable. 
The monetary authorities also intend, as in the past, to operate to smooth 
out volatility in the exchange rate and strengthen international reserves. 
Donors’ projected substantial, though declining, aid inflows will facilitate 
meeting these objectives.
Foreign aid will continue to finance most of the balance-of-payments 
deficit, though pressures here will begin to emerge in the next 2 years. 
The current account deficit (excluding grants) as a share of GDP is 
projected to fall to 33.2% in FY2012 to 31.5% in FY2013 as responsibility for 
security is handed over to the government. Mainly because of reduced 
(export) sales to nonresidents and also some fall off in public grants, the 
current account balance (including grants) will turn to a deficit estimated 
at 1.1% of GDP in FY2012 and 2.5% of GDP in FY2013. Because domestic 
exports are so small, the country has very limited debt-carrying capacity 
and will be forced to rely on foreign direct investment and highly 
concessional loan assistance to cover these deficits.
Policy challenge—coping with the transition
The planned foreign troop pullout by end-2014 is seen lowering annual 
growth by at least 2–3 percentage points after that date, due to reduced 
local spending by these forces and by foreign civilian organizations with 
international and national staff. Unemployment will go up when local 
staff hired by foreign security and civilian organizations are laid off.
The fiscal impact of the transition will come mainly from increasing 
pressure on the government to take over externally financed operating 
expenditures (security and nonsecurity); declining grants to the 
government’s development budget; and donors’ continuously declining 
externally financed development budgets (some of their projects will 
be brought on budget). Over the next 10 years, fiscal policy will have to 
balance the takeover of externally financed security spending and other 
expenditures, while increasing propoor and development outlays within 
a very tight budget constraint. The transition will lead to limited fiscal 
space, thereby pushing back fiscal sustainability (defined as domestic 
revenue funding the government’s recurrent expenditure). Without 
sustained, high grant assistance, the concept of fiscal sustainability is 
reduced to fiscal survival.
Afghanistan’s debt burden could rise substantially in the near future. 
Current public sector debt is around 12.1% of GDP, but with a heavy 
reliance on external grants to finance its budget, a rapid reduction in 
grants could require the government to assume new loans to meet its 
financing needs. A worsening security environment could exacerbate 
these financing requirements and reduce the government’s ability even to 
collect domestic revenue.
The external sector will be affected through pressures on the current 
account balance and the exchange rate due to declining aid inflows. But 
a weak policy, regulatory, and institutional framework seems to be more 
challenging for Afghanistan’s competitiveness than the exchange rate, 
as shown by the World Bank’s Doing Business Report 2012. Afghanistan 
stands at 160 out of 183 countries, showing further degradation from 154 
the previous year. 
3.14.1 Kabul Bank crisis update
Fraudulent loans came to light at 
Kabul Bank, the largest bank in 
the country, in September 2010, 
triggering a run on deposits. The 
central bank initially placed the bank 
under conservatorship, appointed 
new management and guaranteed all 
deposits. Subsequently, Kabul Bank 
was placed under receivership and its 
assets have been split into “good” and 
“bad” banks.
The bank’s deposits and good 
assets are with a bridge bank called 
New Kabul Bank, which will likely be 
privatized in FY2012. The bad assets 
have been retained by the receiver, 
appointed and overseen by a newly 
created independent Financial Dispute 
Resolution Committee. Based on the 
latest estimates, around $935 million 
(principal and interest) are receivable, 
although this amount is likely to 
increase when an audit is completed. 
Formal charges have been brought 
against two shareholders who represent 
over 50% of the assets sought for 
recovery and seven bank officers, but 
the legal process is moving slowly.
This crisis exemplifies the risks 
of rapid banking sector growth with 
weak governance and rule of law, and 
a lack of capacity and experience in 
supervision at the central bank. In 
November 2011, the government and 
IMF agreed to a new 3-year Extended 
Credit Facility that includes measures 
to address corruption and strengthen 
regulation and supervision over the 
banking system.
Bangladesh
Economic growth in FY2011 continued strong. Macroeconomic imbalances, however, have emerged: 
the balance of payments is under strain from high commodity prices, increased oil imports for power 
generation, and weakened exports; rising subsidy costs, mainly for fuel, are intensifying fiscal pressures and 
domestic borrowing, and inflation is at a multiyear high. Growth is expected to slow as the country grapples 
with these imbalances. Lifting growth in the medium term entails removing infrastructure bottlenecks, 
mobilizing additional budget resources, attracting greater investment, and upgrading labor skills.
Economic performance
Growth picked up slightly to 6.7% in FY2011 (ended June 2011) from 6.1% 
(Figure 3.15.1). The upturn reflected a robust industrial expansion at 8.2% 
because of a strong rebound in export-oriented manufacturing and better 
performance by domestic market-based industries. More reliable power 
supply to industry helped performance, as contracted, private small plants 
began supplying power to the national grid. Agriculture maintained 
strong growth of 5.0%, aided by favorable weather and better access to 
credit and extension services. An expansion in trade activities helped 
maintain services growth of 6.6%.
On the demand side, private consumption, supported by a surge in 
credit, was the key growth driver in FY2011. Total fixed investment rose 
only slightly to 24.7% of GDP, from 24.4% in the previous year. Foreign 
direct investment (FDI) remained very low, at less than $1 billion.
Average annual inflation rose to 8.8% from 7.3% in FY2010 owing to 
the marked rise in global food and commodity prices, a strong expansion 
in domestic credit, and depreciation of the taka in the latter half of the 
fiscal year. Price pressures have intensified in FY2012 and year-on-year 
inflation climbed slightly from 10.2% in June 2011 to 10.4% in February 
2012; nonfood inflation more than doubled to 13.6% but food inflation 
edged down to 8.9% (Figure 3.15.2). In addition to the rapid expansion 
in credit, stronger price pressures came from upward adjustments in 
domestic administered fuel and electricity prices, and from sharper taka 
depreciation because of continued high import demand, especially fuel 
imports.
Net credit to government, which grew rapidly by 35.0% in FY2011, shot 
up to 62.4% in the 12 months to January 2012 (Figure 3.15.3), coinciding 
with a rapid rise in the cost of subsidies financed by the budget. Credit 
to the private sector, which climbed by 25.8% in FY2011, slowed to 18.9% 
by January 2012, although it remained higher than the annual monetary 
program target of 18.0%. The central bank raised policy rates to rein in 
the credit expansion and attendant domestic demand pressures, but it 
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also provided occasional liquidity support to the commercial banks, 
partly countering these measures’ impact.
Revenue collection was buoyant in FY2011, with the revenue-
to-GDP ratio rising to 11.6% from 10.9% in FY2010, owing to the pickup 
in economic activity and improvement in tax administration. Total 
government spending increased by nearly 25% to 15.9% of GDP from 
14.6% in the previous year, as current spending mounted because of a rise 
in subsidies for food, fuel, fertilizer, and electricity. The budget deficit 
(4.3% of GDP) nonetheless, remained below target (5.0%), largely because 
implementation of the annual development program was weak, reflecting 
continued capacity constraints in key line agencies. The bulk of the 
budget financing came from domestic sources (3.4% of GDP), mostly from 
the banking system (Figure 3.15.4), as sales of national saving certificates 
fell off from the high level a year earlier and foreign financing was lower 
than expected (0.9%).
Export growth jumped to 41.7% in FY2011, reflecting a sharp recovery 
in garment demand in the main markets in the European Union (EU) 
and the United States (US) and a pickup in garment exports to new 
markets though these remain a small part of total sales. Garment export 
earnings grew by 43.4%, buoyed in part by higher export prices following 
the rise in prices of cotton, yarn, and accessories. Exports of other 
products also grew rapidly with a rise in demand and also reflecting the 
low base in the previous year.
Imports grew in step by 41.8% owing to larger import costs of raw 
materials for the garment industry, higher global commodity prices—
especially for foodgrains, fertilizer, and fuel—and the generally strong 
domestic demand conditions. Foodgrain imports rose very steeply, 
buoyed by larger volumes as well as price, as the government sought to 
build large stocks to bolster food security. Because the base for imports 
is much larger than that for exports, even with similar growth rates, the 
trade deficit widened by 2.0% of GDP. Worker remittances, the main 
offset to the trade deficit, expanded by only 6.0% however, down from 
13.4% the previous year.
The larger trade deficit and slower growth in remittances took the 
current account surplus down sharply to only $995.0 million (0.9% of
GDP) in FY2011 from $3.7 billion (3.7%) the previous year (Figure 3.15.5).
The combined capital and financial accounts recorded a deficit of 
$984.0 million in FY2011, versus the deficit of $139.0 million in FY2010,
because of the larger outflows on account of trade credit and lower net 
inflows of foreign assistance. The overall deficit was $925.0 million in
FY2011, a sharp turnaround from the surplus of $2.9 billion in FY2010.
Because of rapidly growing import demand, the exchange rate 
came under pressure, especially in the second half of FY2011, and the 
taka depreciated by 6.3% against the dollar during the year. Balance-
of-payments pressures continued in the first 7 months of FY2012 and 
the taka depreciated further by 12.2% (Figure 3.15.6). The real effective 
exchange rate depreciated by 9.0% in the year to January 2012, implying 
some gain in export competitiveness, as nominal depreciation of the 
currency offset higher inflation than in major trading partners.
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Economic prospects
The forecasts for FY2012 and FY2013 assume that it will be hard to 
contain inflation in FY2012, despite policy tightening. It is expected that 
credit tightening measures announced in the central bank’s January 
2012 Monetary Policy Statement would more effectively damp inflation 
in FY2013. It is also assumed that the government will further raise fuel 
and electricity prices, and mobilize more foreign financing of the budget, 
as part of its efforts to eliminate external and domestic imbalances and 
put the economy on a sustainable higher growth path. Finally, political 
stability and normal weather are expected to prevail.
GDP growth in FY2012 is projected to slow to 6.2%. The performance 
of exports, a key growth driver, is weakening as the year progresses, 
largely because of weaknesses in its key market, the eurozone, which is in 
a prolonged period of adjustment to its debt crisis. Export growth slowed 
sharply to 13.0% in the first 8 months of FY2012, from 40.3% in the year-
earlier period, which will also affect production in export-linked domestic 
industries. The rise in interest rates is expected to moderate domestic 
demand. GDP growth in FY2013 is expected to slip to 6.0% as interest rates 
are raised to bring down inflation, and as export growth slows further.
Agricultural growth in FY2012 will moderate to 4.4%, crimped by 
rising irrigation costs (reflecting higher fuel and electricity prices) and 
because of the high base in the previous year. In FY2013, sector growth is 
projected to rise slightly to 4.5% in response to better procurement prices, 
as the government steps up food procurement programs and strengthens 
policy support.
Industrial growth is expected to slow to 7.8% in FY2012, mainly 
reflecting falling export demand. Higher interest rates and labor costs 
as well as the expected increases in fuel and electricity prices will 
further raise the cost of production and squeeze profit margins. Higher 
interest rates will also weaken the construction industry and investment 
activity. Industrial growth is projected to ease to 7.5% in FY2013 reflecting 
policies to eliminate imbalances in the economy taking greater hold, and 
weakening domestic and external demand conditions.
In FY2012, services growth will slip to 6.2%, as growth in agriculture 
and industry slows. With industry activity slowing further in FY2013, 
expansion in services will ease to 6.0%.
Annual average inflation will edge up to 11.0% in FY2012. While food 
inflation has traditionally driven up the headline rate, the sharp rise in 
nonfood prices from July 2011 has emerged as a major policy concern. To 
rein in inflation, the central bank continued the previous year’s credit-
tightening measures and raised its policy rates in September 2011 and 
January 2012 by 100 basis points each, to 7.75% and 5.75%, respectively. 
They are expected to be raised more. In January 2012, the central bank 
abolished the cap on commercial bank lending rates to more effectively 
transmit its policy to the private sector. Inflation is projected to slow to 
8.5% in FY2013 as monetary tightening takes greater hold.
Overseas workers remitted $8.4 billion in the first 8 months of FY2012,
12.2% more than in the equivalent period a year earlier, reflecting a steep 
rise in the number of workers leaving for overseas jobs since June 2011 
(Figure 3.15.7). The upturn in worker placements and remittances is a 
welcome financial development that will both help sustain family incomes 
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and domestic consumption, and contain the current account deficit. 
Most Bangladeshi overseas workers go to Gulf countries and are largely 
recruited to fill low-skill jobs. Remittances are expected to grow by 10.0% 
in FY2012, from 6.0% a year earlier, and rise further by 12.0% in FY2013.
Export growth is projected to slow to 12.0% in FY2012 and further 
to 10.0% in FY2013, mainly reflecting weak demand for garments (over 
three-fourths of exports) from the eurozone and from the US, which is 
experiencing a slow recovery from its financial crisis. In the first 8 months 
of FY2012, growth in knitwear exports declined sharply to 8.7%, from 
43.9% in the year-earlier period, although growth in woven fabric exports 
held up well at 22.2% (Figure 3.15.8), benefiting from the EU’s relaxed rules 
of origin (from January 2011). Growth in other export items also slowed 
markedly. While taka depreciation should favor exporters, the benefits are 
being largely negated by the lower prices negotiated by garment buyers. 
Although garment exports to new (mainly developing country) markets are 
becoming more important, they are yet to become major markets to offset 
declining exports to the EU and US, the two dominant traditional markets.
Imports grew by 15.6% in the first 7 months of FY2012. Growth in 
imports of foodgrains, consumer goods, capital machinery and industrial 
raw materials moderated from a year ago, although some intermediate 
goods, especially fuel and fertilizer, grew very strongly. Imports are 
forecast to grow by 17.0% in FY2012 and stay robust at 15.0% in FY2013 
to cover fuel requirements for what is becoming a more reliable power 
generation, even as economic growth moderates.
The current account is projected to move to a deficit of 0.5% of GDP 
in FY2012 and to 1.0% in FY2013 as the trade deficit widens further 
(Figure 3.15.9). Foreign exchange reserves declined further in the first 
8 months of FY2012 (Figure 3.15.10) as the current account surplus nearly 
halved and a large deficit was still recorded in the capital and financial 
accounts. Net inflows of foreign assistance declined, although FDI inflows 
rose marginally. Pressure on the balance of payments is expected to 
intensify in the forecast period, with larger import payments relative 
to export and remittance receipts. The government is seeking to adopt 
policies to address the growing imbalances, including discussing a 3-year 
program with the International Monetary Fund under its Extended 
Credit Facility.
The FY2012 budget aimed at revenue growth of 24.4%, although 
revenue collection in the first 7 months of the fiscal year indicates that 
this target is unlikely to be met. The budget set growth in public spending 
at 25.8%. While current spending is likely to greatly exceed the budgeted 
amount because of the rapid rise in subsidies, utilization of the annual 
development program will again fall short of allocation, which is expected 
to keep the fiscal deficit within the budgeted 5.0% of GDP (Figure 3.15.11). 
Domestic financing, mainly from banks, was set to cover 3.7% of GDP, 
while the remaining 1.3% was planned to come from foreign financing.
Subsidies are putting increasing pressure on the budget. The 
government has raised fuel and electricity prices in phases to cut 
them, but these adjustments are too small to cover rising costs. Indeed, 
spending on subsidies is expected to increase from the previous year’s 
2.2% of GDP to 3.4% in FY2012, or more than a quarter of projected 
revenue collection for the year.
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The state-owned Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation is facing 
challenges in mobilizing foreign exchange to pay for its fuel import bill, 
which is projected to rise by more than half in FY2013. It has obtained a 
$2.5 billion loan from the Islamic Development Bank, but unless further
timely adjustments in fuel prices are made, this loan will ultimately have 
to be repaid from budgetary resources.
The projections are subject to various downside risks. The global 
economic slowdown may be more severe than expected, while policy 
tightening could be compromised by political considerations: the 
government may find it politically costly to further raise fuel and 
electricity prices.
Policy challenge—strengthening growth policies
In the short term, Bangladesh needs to reduce its growing fiscal and 
external imbalances. It needs to cut subsidies by adjusting fuel and 
electricity prices, creating space for more—acutely needed—outlays 
on infrastructure and human development, and reducing the budget’s 
excessive domestic borrowing. The effort to expand the economy’s 
productive capacity will also require higher domestic revenue, which 
could be raised by strengthening tax reforms and attracting more 
concessional financing. Monetary policy tightening would need to 
continue to reduce inflation and eliminate pressure on reserves through 
reducing import demand. Exports need to be raised through broadening 
the export base and deepening access to new markets.
Over the long term, the government needs to substantially improve 
the business climate (Figure 3.15.12) in order to scale up private 
investment, including FDI, as highlighted in the World Bank’s Doing 
Business 2012. As shown in the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Report 2011–12, Bangladesh lags far behind other 
countries in South Asia in infrastructure (Table 3.15.2). To mobilize 
resources needed for closing these wide infrastructure gaps, greater 
private participation in infrastructure development, including public–
private partnerships, is essential to supplement finite public resources. 
The capital market also needs to be developed as a source of long-term 
infrastructure financing.
Bangladesh has a raft of strategic advantages, including cheap labor 
and a location in a fast-growing region, which can help attract large 
FDI inflows into light industry. In 
several countries in Asia, labor costs 
are rising fast, opening up prospects 
for foreign investors to relocate 
investment to Bangladesh. To attract 
greater FDI, however, it is essential 
to remove infrastructure bottlenecks, 
make land readily available, upgrade 
skills of the labor force, and 
remove administrative delays and 
impediments.
3.15.11 Government budget trends
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3.15.2 Comparison of infrastructure quality, 2011
Country 
rankinga
Overall 
infrastructure
Electricity Roads Railroads Ports Air 
transport
1 = extremely underdeveloped, 7 = extensive and efficient  
(by international standards) 
Bangladesh 129 2.8 1.6 2.9 2.5 3.4 3.5
China, People’s Rep. of 69 4.2 5.5 4.4 4.6 4.5 4.6
India 86 3.8 3.1 3.4 4.4 3.9 4.7
Pakistan 109 3.5 2.2 3.7 2.8 4.1 4.3
Sri Lanka 48 4.7 5.0 4.5 3.8 4.9 4.9
a Ranking out of 142 countries, 1 = best.
Source: 2011 World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2011–2012.
Bhutan
After a solid year, the outlook remains favorable with growth staying robust, in part driven by the 
construction of large hydropower projects. Current account deficits will remain high, though, reflecting the 
projects’ import requirements—but associated capital inflows are expected to keep the overall balance 
of payments in surplus. A main challenge for government is to implement policies that would rapidly 
expand private sector activity to boost job opportunities and broaden the country’s economic base.
Economic performance
Growth is estimated to have moderated slightly to 8.3% in FY2011 (ended 
30 June 2011) from 9.3% a year earlier (Figure 3.16.1). Reflecting the 
country’s hydropower project cycle, the construction phase is under way 
on four large projects that would more than double power capacity, thus 
construction and manufacturing (cement mainly) are the main drivers 
of expansion. Electricity generation capacity has not risen since 2007, so 
power production provided little impetus to growth—sales to India rose 
by only about 4% during the year. Expansion in services eased solely on 
community services while the rest of the components remained robust.
Agriculture has been unable to record significant growth in the past 
7 fiscal years, and is gradually losing its overall share of output, because it 
is hard to provide development services to raise productivity to the many 
small villages in the remote mountainous parts of the country.
Broad money (M2) growth moderated—along with the economy—to 
21.2% in FY2011, mainly due to small expansion in net foreign assets. 
Private sector credit grew 31.9% in FY2011, broadly in line with its 
long-term average of 32%, concentrated in housing and construction and 
in personal loans. The ratio of nonperforming loans declined to 8.5% at 
end-FY2011 from 10.2% a year earlier.
Local price movements continue to follow India’s because Bhutan’s 
currency is pegged to India’s and because the country keeps strong 
trading ties with its giant neighbor (taking about 90% of exports and 
providing 75% of imports). Bhutan’s average inflation, therefore, rose to 
8.6% in FY2011, almost twice the FY2010 rate. (Food prices rose by 9.3% 
and nonfood prices by 8.0%—Figure 3.16.2.)
The government revenue-to-GDP ratio fell to 39.1% in FY2011 from 
46.4% a year earlier as nontax revenue growth slowed (Figure 3.16.3). 
Expenditures (43.8% of GDP) rose by 14.4% in FY2011 on the back of 
rising capital expenditures reflecting hydropower construction and a pay 
hike for public servants from January 2011. The fiscal deficit was 4.7% of 
GDP in FY2011 (from a surplus equivalent to 1.6% of GDP in FY2010) and 
was financed mostly from domestic borrowing.
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According to the Royal Monetary Authority (RMA), public external 
debt amounted to 76.2% of GDP at end-FY2011. By currency, nearly three-
fifths was in Indian rupees; by use, just over two-fifths of the total had been 
allotted for hydropower loans and the balance for development projects.
Even though the current account deficit widened from 9.9% of GDP 
in FY2010 to about 20.6% in FY2011 as trade deficit widened from 20.9% 
of GDP to 30.2%, the overall balance of payments recorded a sizable 
surplus equivalent to 5.7% of GDP as loans and capital grants more than 
compensated for the current account deficit (Figure 3.16.4). However, 
Bhutan’s external position with India has weakened greatly because 
export growth to it has slowed, given that power sales have reached 
generation capacity and that import demand has accelerated because 
of the power construction program and strong economic growth. At 
end-FY2011 Bhutan’s rupee reserves amounted to about one week of 
imports, although convertible currency reserves were high at nearly 
$890 million, equivalent to about 9 months of total (essential and
inessential) imports (Figure 3.16.5).
Economic prospects
Growth is forecast at 8.0% for FY2012 and 8.5% for FY2013 largely on 
the account of continued hydropower construction. The FY2012 budget 
will continue to support high growth with total planned expenditure to 
increase by about 11%. More than half the budget is allocated to capital 
expenditure, which rises by about 13%, with about two-thirds of it financed 
by grants. Current expenditure is slated to grow by 9%, mainly on account 
of public servants’ salary revisions and higher operations and maintenance 
expenses. The overall deficit is projected to rise to 6% of GDP.
Inflation is expected to moderate to 7.3% in FY2012 and 6.5% in 
FY2013, broadly in line with assumed price developments in India. The 
Asian Development Outlook baseline forecast of relative stable global oil 
and food prices underpins a favorable outlook.
The current account deficit is projected to stay high at 20.0% and 
22.2% of GDP in FY2012 and FY2013, mainly owing to continued high 
imports for power plant construction. The overall balance of payments 
is expected to remain in surplus reflecting continued substantial project 
loans and capital grants. The tight overall balance with India is not 
expected to improve and pressures on rupee liquidity will persist.
In recent years the RMA has borrowed through an overdraft facility 
(at relatively steep rates) with the State Bank of India and through a credit 
line with the government of India to keep an adequate working balance. 
Its borrowing from the overdraft exceeded Rs8 billion as well as reaching 
the Rs3 billion credit line limit with the government before end-2011. The 
RMA sold $200 million of its convertible currency reserves in November
2011 to eliminate this expensive overdraft and to partly pay other rupee 
debt. However, liquidity pressures caused the RMA in March 2012 to clamp 
down on import spending and to restrict the use of reserves to importing 
priority items, including fuel. Because Bhutan’s constitution requires 
foreign reserves to provide 12 months of cover for essential imports and 
they are about at this level, there is limited scope to sell additional reserves. 
To avoid disrupting the economy, the RMA is, therefore, expected by 
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April 2012 to negotiate a higher ceiling on the credit line with the Indian 
government and, possibly, carry out a currency swap arrangement through 
the facilitation of the SAARCFINANCE. Power exports from the plants 
under construction will, of course, provide an enduring solution.
The RMA and the Reserve Bank of India are working to establish 
guidelines to create a base-rate system for Bhutanese financial institutions, 
expected to come in this fiscal year, which would make loan pricing more 
transparent and foster competition in the sector. This is a precursor to the 
RMA’s carrying out monetary policy by setting policy rates, a change that 
would be a more effective mechanism for monetary policy.
Policy challenge—broadening the economic base
The private sector needs to expand to tackle rising unemployment. The 
unemployment rate has averaged 3.5% in the last 3 years, well above the 
government target of 2.5% set for 2013. Unemployment is an especially 
serious problem among those aged 15 to 24 years—over 45% of the 
unemployed, this group has a 9.4% jobless rate (Figure 3.16.6). This stems 
from limited job openings and deficiencies in labor skills necessary for 
employability in various sectors. The government is the employer of 
choice especially among the young but the absorptive capacity of the 
public sector to hire more staff is nearing saturation. Hydropower—the 
industrial mainstay—offers very few jobs.
The government recognizes the problem. Its Economic Development 
Policy, issued in 2010, specified fiscal incentives to attract foreign direct 
investment (FDI). It has, therefore, drafted new FDI regulations that 
include clearer provisions for owning land as well as liberalizing other 
features of current regulations. The policy also identified niche business 
opportunities for cottage and small industries and tourism, where the 
government believes it can promote local entrepreneurship.
The government has identified the information and communication 
technology industry as a promising niche sector. The country’s first park 
for this, the Thimpu Techpark, was inaugurated in 2011 and is expected to 
attract FDI and provide some high-skilled jobs. The industry is, however, 
still at a very early stage.
According to the World Bank’s 2010 Bhutan Investment Climate 
Assessment Report, the top constraint for small firms is access to 
finance. In an effort to ease it, the government has recently adopted 
expanded microfinance policies, including subsidized interest rates, new 
credit products suitable for small firms, and incentives for socially and 
environmentally friendly lending.
The same report notes that the major constraint for large firms is 
inadequate education. The 2011 Labor Force Survey Report noted that 
only 6% of the work force has received higher secondary education (and 
3% has tertiary education) (Figure 3.16.7). The government has introduced 
competency-based training programs for five trades, namely, auto-
mechanics, construction carpentry, plumbing, masonry, and industrial 
electrical. It has also launched a grant program to train tertiary graduates 
working in the private sector. Other constraints faced by large firms 
include the difficulty in hiring foreign workers, transport difficulties, high 
tax rates, and restrictive labor regulations.
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GDP growth slowed markedly in FY2011 as industrial and investment activity slumped and the current 
account deficit widened. A combination of tight monetary policy to counter persistently high inflation, 
strained global economic conditions, larger subsidies that pushed up the budget deficit, and lack of 
political consensus on resolving the policy impediments to growth were factors in the downdraft. Boosting 
investment and growth to match the strong performance of recent years will hinge on reaching agreement 
on measures to deal with long-standing and challenging policy issues. The outlook is for a moderate pickup.
Economic performance
Economic growth fell to 6.9% in FY2011 (ended 31 March 2012) from 8.4% in 
FY2010 according to the government’s advance estimates. The pace slowed 
as the year progressed (Figure 3.17.1). The slowdown was concentrated in 
industry and driven by slumping investment activity, falling exports in the 
latter months, and attendant weakening in consumer spending.
Investment growth recovered quickly from its low point in the depths 
of the global financial crisis, although the trend reversed once more to 
a marked decline over the past 2 fiscal years (Figure 3.17.2). Notably, in 
the first 3 quarters of FY2011, fixed investment is estimated to have fallen 
by 0.25% from the corresponding period a year earlier, although the 
government’s advance estimates of GDP for the full fiscal year show an 
increase of 5.6%.
However the final data for the year turn out, the downward trend is 
evident—as is the need to reverse it to get the country back on its recent-
year high growth path. The causes of investment’s sharp deceleration are 
multiple, including the slump in the global economy and trade, tighter 
monetary policy and higher nominal interest rates (to combat persistent 
high inflation), a larger than expected budget deficit in FY2011 (adding to 
uncertainty over the direction of the economy), and a growing sense of 
a national policy paralysis (due to political parties’ inability to agree on 
certain issues, including structural measures). 
Industrial growth dropped to a decade-low 3.9%. Slumping investment 
took its toll: manufacturing growth fell by half to 3.9%, largely reflecting 
weak capital goods output, and construction growth fell to 4.8% from 
8.0% a year earlier. In industry, mining contracted by 2.2%, partly due 
to uncertainty over land and environmental clearances. Coal production 
continued its slowing-growth trend of recent years, shrinking by 1.5%. 
The controlling state monopoly is unable to ramp up production to meet 
rapidly growing demand from new power plants, thereby increasing 
reliance on more costly imports. Natural gas production fell by 8.8%, 
owing to technical problems at a large new field and pricing issues. 
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On a brighter note, services continued to grow rapidly, at 
9.4%, accounting for nearly 80% of overall GDP growth and 
reflecting continued strong performance in trade, hotels, transport, 
communications, and financial services. With good monsoons, rice and 
wheat production is estimated to have hit records. Agriculture’s 2.5% 
expansion was low compared with the previous year’s weather-related 
7.0% recovery, but still came in close to trend (3%).
Inflation, which persisted at 9.5–10% through most of FY2011 despite 
earlier rounds of monetary tightening, eased to 7.0% by February 2012 
(Figure 3.17.3). This moderation largely reflected a drop in food prices. 
A proxy for the core rate, nonfood manufactured goods inflation 
remained at around 8% then fell to 5.5% in February 2012. Since monetary 
tightening aimed to stabilize this measure, the central bank has seen 
progress in bringing it down to its historical average of 4%, consistent 
with maintaining stable inflationary expectations.
After 13 consecutive policy rate hikes since March 2010, the Reserve 
Bank of India (RBI) left rates on hold at its December 2011 and February 
2012 policy review meetings (Figure 3.17.4). With progress on slowing 
nonfood inflation, as of late-March 2012 it was expected to relax monetary 
policy for the new fiscal year when the deficit-reduction measures 
announced in the FY2012 budget in mid-March are passed by Parliament. 
Credit growth moderated in FY2011 across a broad spectrum of 
activities, reflecting slowing economic activity, monetary tightening, and 
banks’ risk aversion. Asset quality of banks deteriorated moderately due 
to weaker business conditions.
The RBI deregulated the savings deposit rate—allowing banks to set 
differential interest rates on savings deposits over a minimum amount—
and, to a large degree, interest rates on the various nonresident Indian 
deposit facilities.
A revenue shortfall and expenditure overshoot, relative to target, 
pushed the central government budget deficit to an estimated 5.9% of 
GDP in FY2011, as against the 4.6% budget target. Revenue was down by 
3.3% from the previous year when it was bolstered by large receipts from 
auctions of third-generation telecommunications spectrum. It was also 
5.7% short of target, about equally due to a shortfall in the planned sale of 
government-held stock in public sector corporations because of weak stock 
market conditions and to the economic slowdown denting tax collections.
Expenditure grew by 10.1% in FY2011 and was nearly 5% above the 
budget target, mainly owing to greater subsidies. Higher global prices 
and a weaker currency led to an increase in fuel (190%) and fertilizer 
(34%) subsidies, while higher minimum agricultural support prices helped 
raise the cost of food subsidies (20%) over the budget targets. All these 
subsidies amounted to 2.3% of GDP in FY2011. 
The current account deficit widened to an estimated 3.6% of GDP 
(Figure 3.17.5). The very rapid growth in exports in the first half of FY2011 
was not sustained in the second owing to slowing demand from advanced 
economies, restricting growth to 21.0% at $303 billion. Higher commodity
prices and an increase in import volume, including large imports of gold, 
generated a 24.0% rise in imports to $473 billion, expanding the trade
deficit to 9.1% of GDP (from 7.6% in FY2010), partly offset by a strong 
services trade surplus and larger remittances. 
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The heavy current account deficit was mostly financed by financial 
inflows. With concerns over sovereign debt and fiscal prospects in the 
United States and eurozone, net portfolio inflows were slight for much of 
the year but picked up after November to reach an estimated $15 billion
in FY2011, about half that of a year earlier. Improved foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and larger commercial borrowing and bank loans by 
the private sector rounded out the financing. 
Official gross international reserves fell by about $10 billion (to about
$295 billion), mainly in the latter months of the year (Figure 3.17.6) on
intervention by the RBI to prevent excessive downward drift (and volatility) 
in the exchange rate. Over FY2011, the rupee depreciated by about 12% 
against the US dollar; the real effective exchange rate weakened by about 
4% (Figure 3.17.7). Stock market prices drifted lower for most of FY2011 and 
then strengthened in early 2012, helped by a marked increase in portfolio 
investment. Nevertheless, the BSE Sensex was down about 10% in FY2011.
Economic prospects
Investment is likely to remain lackluster for some time because new 
project announcements continued to decline during the third quarter of 
FY2011 (Figure 3.17.8). Data on planned capital spending from the Centre 
for Monitoring Indian Economy also point toward a sharp increase in 
the number of stalled projects, reflecting a host of structural bottlenecks 
related to fuel and power shortages, delays in environmental clearance, 
and other policy hurdles. 
Business sentiment has deteriorated on various indicators in the 
RBI’s Business Expectation Index (Figure 3.17.9), and in similar surveys 
conducted by chambers of commerce. On balance, these business 
indicators suggest that investment will remain subdued in FY2012. 
The impact of monetary easing and lower interest rates, improving 
external conditions, and some progress on stalled reforms and removal 
of the bottlenecks should lead to a revival of industrial activity starting 
in the second half of FY2012 and into FY2013. But their effect is likely 
to be limited until the government eliminates the policy issues. Recent 
steps, such as increasing the pace of road building as well as fast-track 
clearances for coal and power projects, are encouraging, though many 
other issues remain in the wings. 
A normal monsoon would help agriculture expand at its trend rate 
(around 3%), in turn bolstering rural incomes and private consumption. 
The services sector, which has so far been resilient to the domestic 
slowdown, is expected to maintain its solid growth, supported by robust 
trends in private consumption spending and in urbanization. The global 
slowdown is, however, likely to trim growth in software and business 
services. 
Based on assumptions for growth in industrial countries and oil prices, 
as well as expected moves toward monetary easing coupled with budget 
deficit reduction, GDP growth in FY2012 is forecast to nudge up to 7.0%. 
Recovery in the global economy and resolution of some of the structural 
bottlenecks are expected to increase GDP growth to 7.5% in FY2013.
Sustaining the progress against inflation in FY2012 depends on 
macroeconomic policies and structural reforms. Much of the past 
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2 years’ inflation stemmed from increases in the prices of high-protein 
foods, fruits, and vegetables rather than foodgrains. With rising 
incomes, demand has increased faster than supply for these, thus 
agricultural policies will need to be directed to improving the efficiency 
of the regulatory, production, and distribution systems. There is also 
considerable suppressed inflation, as the administered prices of diesel, 
kerosene, and liquefied petroleum gas—significantly below global oil 
prices—require heavy budget subsidies. Adjusting domestic prices will 
push up inflation but is necessary to align fiscal policy with the needs of 
expanding infrastructure investment.
Inflation is expected to continue to decline in FY2012 due to the strong 
base effect, normal monsoons in FY2011, weakening global commodity 
prices, and lagged impact of monetary policy on expectations suppressing 
demand-side inflation. Consequently, inflation is expected to ease to 7.0% 
in FY2012. The rate in FY2013 will depend on tackling structural food price 
pressures and the extent of fiscal consolidation, as FY2013 is a pre-election 
year. An easing of crude oil prices and supply-side bottlenecks is likely to 
contribute to inflation falling further to 6.5% in FY2013.
Increasing tax rates, widening the tax net, and capping the subsidy 
bill are expected to reduce the fiscal deficit to 5.1% of GDP in FY2012, 
signaling a return to fiscal consolidation (Figure 3.17.10). The increase in 
excise duty and service tax from 10% to 12% as well as the introduction 
of a negative list for the service tax is expected to take revenue growth 
to 23%. However, the actual realization of revenue from asset sales, such 
as disinvestment of publicly owned companies and auction of telecom 
spectrum, which are expected to generate 0.7% of GDP, will crucially 
depend on market conditions. 
The budget has expenditure rising moderately by 13.1% and subsidies 
falling by 12.2%—fuel’s by 36.3% (Figure 3.17.11). These targets seem 
optimistic, given elevated oil prices and the limited pass-through to 
domestic retail prices. 
Still-high global oil prices and softening external demand will 
continue to exert pressure on the current account deficit in FY2012. 
However, sluggish investment and industrial activity will help damp 
non-oil import growth. Moreover, gold imports, which boosted imports 
in FY2011, are expected to be trimmed by a higher tax this year. Overall, 
imports are expected to grow by 15% in FY2012. 
Moderation of growth in the advanced economies will adversely 
impact exports as well as receipts on account of software and business 
services. Export growth is forecast to slip to 14.0% in FY2012. Remittances 
are expected to show strong growth as banks are now free to set rates 
in response to market forces. The current account deficit is forecast to 
improve marginally to 3.3% of GDP in FY2012. 
Improved economic prospects in the advanced economies are 
expected to boost export growth to 19.0% in FY2013. At the same time, 
an uptick in domestic growth will increase import demand, leading 
to imports growing by 18.0%. Strengthening economic activity in the 
advanced countries is seen encouraging services exports, leading to the 
current account deficit moderating to 3.0% of GDP in FY2013.
Portfolio investment is expected to be relatively volatile, and be 
influenced by the extent of investor risk aversion, global liquidity, and 
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improvement in domestic fundamentals. FDI is likely to increase only 
modestly; however, external borrowings are set to remain healthy given 
the interest rate differential with advanced economies. The current 
account deficit is expected to be financed by capital flows. 
The above forecasts are subject to a number of risks. The global 
environment remains fragile and a worsening of the situation in the 
eurozone would have a significant adverse impact. A poor monsoon, 
fiscal slippage, or a continued policy logjam to resolve some of the long-
standing issues would also prove detrimental to growth. 
Policy challenge—attracting FDI
In view of the large investment needs of the economy, especially 
infrastructure, a reasonable current account deficit is appropriate, 
notwithstanding India’s high savings rate. The government’s clear 
preference is for the deficit to be financed by equity flows rather than debt 
flows and for FDI over volatile portfolio flows. 
FDI has increased in recent years from the 1990s’ negligible levels, but 
remains small relative to comparable destinations: according to UNCTAD’s 
World Investment Report 2011, in 2010 it came to only $24.6 billion,
compared with $105.7 billion for the People’s Republic of China, $48.4 billion
for Brazil, and $41.2 billion for the Russian Federation (Figure 3.17.12).
A key issue confronting FDI is acquisition of land for economic 
activity as it involves a number of complex issues. These include use of 
agricultural land for nonagricultural purposes, adequate compensation, 
displacement of people—including indigenous tribal populations—and 
the dichotomy between state and center laws, which in many cases 
has impeded investment. The Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and 
Resettlement Bill, introduced in Parliament in 2011, addresses some 
of these issues, although reaching a consensus among the various 
stakeholders is likely to be arduous.
Environmental issues such as high ecological costs and concerns 
about tribal rights have held up some foreign projects. In mining, for 
example, securing licenses and clearances has become contentious, given 
that most mineral deposits are in forested areas, home to the country’s 
indigenous tribes. The draft Mining and Minerals Development and 
Regulation Bill is deemed by the industry as taxing it too heavily. 
Similarly, government initiatives, like guidelines for the Comprehensive 
Environmental Pollution Index and demarcation of stretches of 
ecologically sensitive coastline, need to ensure that they do not deter 
investment in critical sectors.
Certain elements of labor laws deter investment, and need to be 
revisited if India is to attract FDI into labor-intensive manufacturing. The 
need for labor market reforms has been long recognized by policy makers 
but the issue is highly fraught, lacking the necessary political support for 
change. Weak infrastructure, especially in the areas of transport, power, 
and education and training, has also reduced India’s attractiveness to FDI. 
Finally, inconsistent policy making can also damp investor confidence by 
raising transaction costs and uncertainty about the business environment. 
Reducing the number of clearances and introducing single-window nodal 
agencies can help to remove regulatory hurdles and fast-track projects.
3.17.1 Selected economic indicators (%)
2012 2013
GDP growth 7.0 7.5
Inflation 7.0 6.5
Current account balance 
(share of GDP)
-3.3 -3.0
Source: ADB estimates. 
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Maldives
The economy grew fast in 2011 owing to continued strong growth in mainly Asia-sourced tourism, but 
still has to grapple with hefty fiscal and external imbalances. A devaluation of the local currency in 
April 2011 should help, over the longer term, counter dollar shortages, though it has pushed inflation 
higher. The resignation of the president in February 2012—succeeded by the vice president, from the 
opposition—was met with unrest and has raised uncertainty for the outlook. The impact on tourism, 
however, is expected to be limited. 
Economic performance 
The economy grew by 7.5% in 2011, supported by continued buoyant 
growth in tourism and related sectors such as construction, transport, 
and communications (Figure 3.18.1). Tourism, accounting for about 30% 
of GDP, saw a second year of strong recovery with arrivals up by 17.6% 
(Figure 3.18.2). An influx of visitors from the Peoples’ Republic of China 
(up by 67%) and elsewhere in Asia (up 13%) again drove the expansion, 
while growth of European tourists slowed to 6%. Asian visitors now make 
up a third of the market. 
Fisheries, the main source of employment in the outer atolls, has 
steadily declined from its peak in 2006. The total catch declined by about 
5% in 2011, although the value of fish exports posted a strong gain on 
increases in price and volume of sales. The volume of the fish catch is not 
expected to improve, given the continued decline of fish resources in the 
Indian Ocean.
Inflation in 2011 moved to double digits, reflecting a steep rise 
in prices of fish, a staple, and increases in global food and oil prices, 
exacerbated by a 16% devaluation of the local currency against the US 
dollar (Figure 3.18.3). 
The budget deficit improved substantially to 10.2% of GDP (16.1% in 
2010). Although further tax reform was delayed, the Tourist General 
Service Tax (T-GST) that came into effect during the year helped lift 
revenue by 38.9%. Growth in expenditure was kept to 12.4% in line with 
the expansion in nominal GDP, holding expenditure to just over 40% of 
GDP. 
Broad money supply (M2) increased by about 20%, driven by the rise 
of government claims and expansion of private sector credits. Credit to 
the private sector grew by 6%, largely owing to an increase in wholesale 
and retail trade and investment in resort development. 
The current account deficit is estimated to have widened to 
$647 million (31.9% of GDP) from $463 million the previous year,
reflecting the economic recovery, much higher commodity prices, and 
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improved tourism receipts. Preliminary estimates indicate that financing 
fell short of the deficit and gross international reserves went down by 
about $15 million to $335 million.
Economic prospects
The economic outlook is of course tightly interwoven with developments 
in tourism. The political instability and unrest in the capital Malé and 
other atolls in early 2012, which were widely reported in the foreign 
media, caused some cancellations and will likely hold back the growth 
in bookings in 2012. Still, the Maldives has an established reputation as 
a high-quality destination and has traditionally strong marketing links 
with Europe and demand is fast growing among Asia’s increasingly 
affluent middle class. 
Assuming no major incidents of unrest in the lead-up to the 
presidential election (the date has yet to be set) tourism should stay 
robust. With the outlook underpinned by a sizable expansion in 
government expenditure, economic growth is expected to moderate to 
3.5% in 2012 and then pick up to 4.5% in 2013. 
The budget deficit for 2012 is set to ease slightly, but remains heavy at 
9.7% of GDP. Total budget revenue in 2012 is expected to rise substantially 
despite reduced import tariff rates provided in the 2012 budget. Large 
deficits have been financed both domestically, mainly by issuance of 
Treasury bills and privatization of state-owned assets over the past several 
years, and externally by borrowings. But the privatizing approach is 
reaching a limit, and Treasury-bill financing cannot be sustained in the 
long term. 
A more immediate complication for the budget is that already-
programmed multilateral financing could be postponed due to the delays 
in completing the program because of unmet performance criteria. The 
GST Act that was approved by Parliament had a lower T-GST rate for 2013 
and beyond. 
On the expenditure side, the second phase of the redundancy plan of 
further downsizing the civil service will be difficult to implement in 2012 
due to political conditions. 
Inflation is expected to moderate in 2012 and then move higher in 
2013 on domestic demand pressures, pacing global commodity prices. 
Pressure from the persistently large fiscal deficit remains, though 
tightening of monetary policy will be partly offsetting. 
With likely slower growth in tourist arrivals, earnings are expected to 
moderate. Slower growth and an expected modest fall in global oil prices 
will ease the import bill a little, although the current account deficit will 
widen and as a share of GDP climb to about 38.0% in 2012 and 2013. 
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3.18.1 Policy challenge—reducing 
the budget deficit
Since 2009, the government has 
sought to implement an economic 
program aimed at reducing the large 
fiscal deficit, but with Parliament and 
presidency in the hands of different 
political parties, progress has been slow. 
It looks set to remain that way 
in the medium term, too, because, 
although an initial voluntary 
redundancy plan for government staff 
and the first phase of a detailed plan 
for staff reduction has been carried 
out, the second phase (or raising taxes) 
faces strong political resistance. 
Expanding the tax base could be 
one outcome of creating regional 
economic and commercial centers in 
larger islands outside Malé, with the 
right policy incentives for population 
consolidation. 
Such moves would also help 
diversify the economy from tourism—
four-fifths of the economy is directly 
or indirectly related to the industry—
and create a more inclusive growth 
model other than expanding resorts. 
The new centers could help bring 
forward myriad opportunities for 
trade, construction, and transport, and 
creating jobs for locals (tourism relies 
heavily on expatriate workers).
Nepal
Growth slowed in FY2011 on weaker remittance inflows, a downdraft in real estate, fuel and power 
shortages, and continued political uncertainty. Inflation stayed hovering around the double-digit threshold, 
and the banking system came under stress. The outlook is for a modest pickup in growth but with some 
progress in bringing down inflation. Timely completion of the peace process, including an agreement on 
a federal structure and on a new constitution, would allow political leaders to focus on spurring growth 
and development.
Economic performance
Economic growth dipped to 3.5% in FY2011 (ended 15 July 2011), restrained 
by slower growth in the worker remittances that underpin consumer 
spending, a deep correction in the real estate market, and continued 
political uncertainties (Figure 3.19.1). Expansion in services slowed sharply 
on hesitant consumer spending and a marked decline in tourism receipts. 
Industrial growth fell by half, reflecting severe fuel and electricity 
shortages, weak construction, and the closure of several manufacturing 
plants owing to labor–management disputes. Favorable weather allowed 
agricultural output to rebound, but the gain was too little to prevent 
overall GDP growth from slowing.
Inflation was high in FY2009–2011, broadly mirroring price 
developments in India, with which Nepal has a pegged exchange rate 
arrangement and tight trade links (Figure 3.19.2). Escalating food prices 
were the main driver in the first half of the year and, as these moderated 
in the second half, nonfood prices picked up, partly because of increases 
in fuel prices by the Nepal Oil Corporation, the state-owned monopoly 
supplier. Prices were adjusted several times (political pressure reversed 
two of the increases), but were inadequate to prevent either a buildup of 
arrears with the India Oil Corporation or supply disruptions, which led to 
frequent fuel shortages and transport strikes.
The budget deficit widened from 1.9% to 2.4% of GDP in FY2011: 
capital spending picked up, marking the government’s moves to improve 
project implementation, and revenue fell short of target. Revenue 
collection as a share of GDP fell for a second year, mainly because of 
sharply weaker growth of customs receipts and value-added tax (VAT) 
(Figure 3.19.3), damped by stagnant non-oil imports and slow growth 
in private consumption (a key source of VAT). The deficit was financed 
mainly by borrowing from banks.
Nepal Rastra Bank, the central bank, focused much of its effort in 
FY2011 on managing vulnerabilities in the financial sector. In recent years 
a growing number of small financial institutions have aggressively 
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attracted deposits from commercial banks to expand their lending, 
especially for real estate. As market prices of property have fallen heavily, 
the share of nonperforming loans has increased throughout the financial 
system, and several small institutions required emergency assistance. 
Balance-sheet problems at banks coupled with too few attractive lending 
opportunities ensured slow growth in credit to the private sector, 
despite abundant bank liquidity that pushed the interbank rate down 
(Figure 3.19.4).
With about half the banking system’s credit collateralized by property, 
the central bank is encouraging bank consolidation through incentives (it 
has approved six merger deals and is reviewing another six) and intends 
to use other measures to assist banks through a troublesome period.
The current account deficit slimmed to 0.9% of GDP in FY2011 after 
widening to 2.7% of GDP a year earlier. Exports, having declined in 
FY2010, grew by 11.7%, thanks to a rebound in the growth of traditional 
exports such as carpets and pashmina (Figure 3.19.5), items that mainly go 
to countries other than India.
Apart from the slower worker remittances—possibly affected by the 
unsettled times in the main employment destination of the Middle East—a 
key hindrance to greater improvement in the current account was the 
higher oil import bill, as non-oil imports were essentially unchanged from 
a year earlier. The Nepal Tourism Year 2011 campaign did attract tourists 
over and above the usual numbers, but as most were budget tourists from 
neighboring countries earnings fell by nearly 10% from a year earlier.
Net capital inflows more than covered the current deficit and 
gross international reserves increased to $3.5 billion in December 2011
(Figure 3.19.6).
Economic prospects
Economic performance in the forecast period depends primarily on 
how the political situation evolves. Timely completion of the peace 
process, including a draft of the constitution ready by the 31 May 
deadline, will help spur growth, but will require an agreement on 
federal restructuring—one of the main contentious issues in the peace 
process. Such closure could allow political leaders to refocus on the 
economic agenda, paving the way for measures ushering in much-needed 
private participation in development, boosting business confidence, and 
improving labor relations. It would also allow them to pursue policies in 
the Immediate Action Plan for Economic Development and Prosperity, 
announced in January 2012.
Assuming that the peace process shows success—and that the 
weather is normal—GDP is projected to grow by 4.5% in FY2012. The 
improvement from a year earlier will come from faster growth in 
agriculture and services. Strengthening remittances and rebounding 
tourism earnings (foreshadowed in the early months of the fiscal year) 
will buttress services. Industry is notable by its absence as a growth 
driver: with no improvement expected in power supply, its performance 
will remain sluggish.
GDP growth will slow to 4.0% in FY2013, around the speed limit for 
an economy inhibited by long-standing structural bottlenecks and policy 
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distortions that can be addressed only gradually. Agriculture’s expansion 
in FY2011 and FY2012 reflects a recovery (from earlier poor weather) that 
provided a fillip to growth in the sector and to GDP, but that upturn 
masks deep-seated problems in raising low productivity and growth to 
the sector’s higher potential.
Inflation gently declined in the first half of FY2012, pointing to an 
annual average of 8.0%. Food inflation is benefiting from better harvests 
as well as mitigated global price pressures. The high base effect of the 
previous year and supportive monetary policies will also keep price rises 
down. Despite pressures from needed upward revisions in fuel prices, 
inflation is expected to ease to 7.0% in FY2013, broadly in line with India’s.
On the monetary side, the central bank will maintain its focus on 
encouraging financial sector consolidation, reforming poorly performing 
banks, enhancing financial inclusion, and strengthening its own 
supervisory capacity. Managing commercial banks’ liquidity will remain 
tricky, given the need to strike a balance between containing inflation 
and supporting growth (for the latter, the central bank has directed 
commercial banks to increase lending to agriculture and energy).
The trade deficit will widen over the next 2 years, with faster growth 
in imports than exports spurred by sustained high oil prices, and by 
a rise in non-oil imports. Yet the current account is projected to move 
to a surplus of 0.5% of GDP in FY2012 and to 1.0% of GDP in FY2013 
owing to stronger remittances and tourism receipts. Remittances will 
accelerate because of the high number of out-migrants in FY2011 and 
wage increments in destination countries; tourism receipts are on the 
rise, apparently reflecting the delayed impact of the Visit Nepal Year 2011 
campaign.
The FY2012 budget, which was announced on time for the first time 
since the Constituent Assembly elections in 2008, targeted growth in 
revenue and expenditure of 19% and 25%, respectively, compared with the 
estimated amounts in FY2011 (Figure 3.19.7). Though ambitious, if these 
targets are met, they would create a domestic borrowing need of about 
2% of GDP—reflecting the government’s continued commitment to fiscal 
prudence.
Yet the government still faces an uphill task in fiscal management. 
Recent years have seen the budget increasingly stretched by subsidies, in 
particular to public enterprises. Such payments in FY2012 are put at about 
one-fifth of budget expenditure, and rolling them back in a politically 
charged environment will be hard. Building the physical infrastructure 
and human resources for the envisaged federal structure will also require 
heavy spending.
The government needs to end such subsidies, and create a fiscal 
cushion, including bringing the informal sector into the formal tax base. 
In addition, expanding the tax base is necessary to reduce dependence 
on foreign aid, which finances about three-fifths of government capital 
spending. Public external debt as a share of GDP has stabilized in 
recent years primarily because the World Bank and ADB (the two largest 
donors) have been providing a significant share of their contribution 
in the form of grants, but at more than one-third of GDP, it warrants 
prudent debt management.
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Policy challenge—politically induced market 
distortions
In recent years, the economy has suffered from several market 
distortions, originating mainly in the fragile political environment and 
compounded by poor law enforcement (Table 3.19.2). These distortions—
seen most clearly in electricity theft and technical leakages (estimated 
at 29% of total output), business cartels, fuel hoarding and frequent 
shortages, and transport syndicates—are responsible for keeping prices 
high and for exacerbating the already-poor investment climate.
Fuel shortages are a direct result of the slow reform of Nepal Oil 
Corporation. It subsidizes petrol, diesel fuel, and liquefied petroleum 
gas. The subsidies are partly financed by profits on sales of kerosene and 
aviation turbine fuel, which are sold above the international price. The 
prices of subsidized items are being adjusted upward, but there is strong 
political pressure to maintain high subsidies. The corporation’s losses 
came to NRs11 billion (0.8% of GDP) in FY2011.
The government’s decision to recruit a professional managing director 
for the corporation is a step in the right direction, but wholesale reform, 
accompanied by complete deregulation of oil prices and legal provisions 
to allow private service providers in the market, is needed. (Well-directed 
social protection measures would, of course, be required.) Ultimately, the 
corporation should cover its own operating costs and make a reasonable 
return on the government’s invested capital.
The country reels under severe power shortages, lasting up to 16 hours 
a day during the winter months of low hydropower generation, because 
potential demand is twice current supply. Fixing this situation to provide 
a foundation for exploiting the country’s vast water resources for power 
generation will be difficult as it requires huge public expenditure as well 
as public–private partnerships for financing. The first step is to reform 
Nepal Electricity Authority, allowing it to set tariffs that would induce 
investment and to tackle its arrears and power theft, without undue 
political friction.
The current reform of Agriculture Development Bank, which was 
originally fully owned by the government, lends credence to the view that 
well-sequenced reforms of human resources, information technology, 
and commercialization can turn a poorly performing institution into 
a financially viable entity without impairing its development mission. 
Nepal has 36 public enterprises, and 11 of them incurred heavy losses in 
FY2011. Many—particularly the ones with many employees, such as the 
Nepal Water Supply Corporation—have losses greater than their assets, 
reflecting the urgent need for public enterprise reform.
3.19.2 The most problematic factors for 
doing business (% of responses)
Government instability/coups 21.8
Inefficient government bureaucracy 11.8
Policy instability 10.4
Corruption 10.0
Inadequate supply of infrastructure 8.6
Restrictive labor regulations 8.1
Access to financing 7.7
Poor work ethic in national labor force 7.2
Inadequately educated workforce 3.4
Inflation 3.4
Tax regulations 2.5
Crime and theft 2.3
Foreign currency regulations 1.1
Tax rates 1.1
Poor public health 0.6
Note: From a list of 15 factors, respondents were 
asked to select the five most problematic factors 
for doing business in their country and to rank 
them between 1 (most problematic) and 5.
Source: World Economic Forum. 2011. The Global 
Competitiveness Report 2011–2012. http://www.
weforum.org/issues/global-competitiveness
Pakistan
The economy continues to be affected by structural problems, including a domestic energy crisis, a 
precipitous decline in investment, persistently high inflation, and security issues. Budget deficits remain 
high, driven by substantial subsidies and losses at state-owned enterprises, and tax revenue below target. 
The slow growth in recent years was exacerbated by widespread floods in FY2011. Unless progress can be 
made in resolving these fundamental problems, the growth outlook will stay modest.
Economic assessment
Severe floods at the start of FY2011 (ended 30 June 2011) disrupted 
economic activity in most sectors in the first half of the year. A slight 
recovery during the second half—supported by higher prices for key 
exports and expanded services activity in part related to flood relief—
kept growth positive at 2.4% for the year (Figure 3.20.1). Solid growth in 
livestock, minor crops, and wheat and sugarcane outweighed a marked 
fall in cotton and rice harvests to allow a 1.2% expansion in agriculture.
Industry, however, stagnated under the weight of energy shortages and 
low investment. Thus for the fourth year the economy was characterized 
by low growth (a period average of 3%), well below the estimated 7% 
needed to provide a firm basis to provide jobs to new labor-force entrants, 
increase per capita income, and reduce poverty.
A surge in workers’ remittances, higher civil service salaries, greater 
farm income from increases in commodity prices, and higher outlays in 
the wake of the floods lifted total consumption expenditure by 7%, which 
accounted for more than 90% of GDP growth in FY2011.
Investment continued to shrink, reflecting structural and security 
issues: gross fixed investment has declined for 4 years, from about 21% of 
GDP in FY2007 to 11.8% in FY2011 (Figure 3.20.2), the lowest rate since 
FY1974. This trend raises concerns that production capacity is being 
eroded, undermining growth prospects for the near and medium term.
Inflation, already under pressure from increasing global commodity 
prices, remained high, reflecting flood-related shortages, especially for 
food, and higher costs due to damaged transport networks. Peaking at 
more than 15% in December 2010, inflation eased modestly in the second 
half, and declined to 13.3% for the year to June 2011.
Responding to price pressures, the central bank tightened monetary 
policy in FY2011, raising the discount rate by 50 basis points in each of 
July, September, and November 2010, bringing it to 14%. As inflation 
stabilized and the balance of payments strengthened in the second half, 
the central bank made no further increases in the rate for the rest of 
FY2011.
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Higher-than-planned budget expenditure and declining foreign 
investment inflows caused the government to rely heavily on the banking 
system to finance the budget deficit in FY2011, continuing its pattern 
of taking the bulk of new bank lending (Figure 3.20.3). Credit to the 
government increased by 23.7% and was the main factor in pushing 
growth in money supply up to about 16% in FY2011, from 12.5% a year 
earlier, underpinning persistent inflationary pressures.
Credit to the private sector continued to expand slowly (4%), and 
was largely directed to higher working-capital requirements in the face 
of much higher prices for cotton and textiles, sugar, and edible oils. The 
vast majority of credit to corporate entities and to small and medium-
sized enterprises apparently went to day-to-day operations rather than 
investment.
Fiscal imbalances grew in FY2011, as revenue shortfalls and 
current expenditure overruns led to a budget deficit of 6.6% of GDP 
(Figure 3.20.4), higher than the 4% target announced in the FY2011 
budget. While the FY2011 deficit was boosted by outlays of PRs120 billion 
(0.6% of GDP) to partly clear accumulated debt in the energy sector, the 
bulk of the overrun from the targeted deficit reflected unrealistic revenue 
targets and underbudgeting for current outlays, particularly for subsidies. 
Revenue rose by 15.9%, well below the 26.2% pace envisaged in the 
budget, as enactment of planned revenue measures encountered political 
resistance. While flood-related tax surcharges (in force March–June 2011) 
helped lift receipts that quarter, general government tax revenue for 
FY2011 declined to 9.8% of GDP from 10.1% a year earlier.
Current expenditure was reduced from 16.7% of GDP to 16.1%, but 
still outstripped budgeted levels by 15.2%. Development spending—
including flood relief—was held to 30% below target in an effort to 
narrow the expenditure–revenue gap. Within current expenditure, 
subsidies surged by 70% from a year earlier, to three times their budgeted 
allocation.
The balance of payments benefited from a doubling of cotton prices 
and higher food sales (mainly surplus wheat) that underlay a 28.9% 
expansion in exports. Imports grew by 14.9%, largely reflecting price rather 
than volume increases. Weak investment activity was mirrored in a decline 
in imports of much needed power generation and electrical equipment. 
Buoyed by a strong expansion of remittances (up 25.8% to $11.2 billion),
by flood-related grants, and by inflows from the United States (US) 
Coalition Support Fund, the current account posted a marginal surplus of 
0.1% of GDP. The financial account recorded a surplus of $2.1 billion.
Foreign exchange assets of the banking system strengthened to 
$18.2 billion, with reserves of the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) peaking
at $14.8 billion at end-June 2011. Positive developments in the balance
of payments helped stabilize the exchange rate against the US dollar: 
the Pakistan rupee depreciated by 2.0% in FY2011, following a 6.3% 
depreciation the year before.
Public debt continued to climb in FY2011 (Figure 3.20.5). Domestic 
debt jumped by 29.2% to PRs6.0 trillion (33.3% of GDP). External debt 
increased to $57.9 billion but declined as a share of GDP (to 27.5%).
Treasury debt sales were concentrated in short maturities for most of the 
year, bringing the average maturity of domestic debt to only 18 months.
3.20.3 Banking sector credit (yearly flows)
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3.20.4 Fiscal indicators
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3.20.5 Public foreign and domestic debt
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Economic prospects
The economy is expected to grow modestly without a more 
predictable energy supply and improved investment flows. Evidence 
from the FY2011 Household Integrated Economic Survey indicates a 
widening income gap between rich and poor, with income for the two 
lowest quintiles (40% of the population) growing more slowly than the 
average. In addition, food inflation has averaged 18% a year for the past 
3 years (much higher than overall inflation), ensuring that a larger share 
of income, particularly for the lower quintiles, is required to meet this 
essential need. With low investment and economic growth below the pace 
needed to accommodate the predominately young population, the rich– 
poor income gap is set to widen further.
Energy outages and damage to the cotton crop from floods (for the 
second consecutive year) in early FY2012 are expected to hold fiscal year 
growth to 3.6%. The impact of substantial gas and power load-shedding 
from December 2011 and continuing into FY2012 is holding down both 
manufacturing output and export performance. 
Moreover, textile manufacturers report substantial reductions in 
orders this year, as unpredictable energy outages prevented many of them 
from meeting their production commitments last year. Manufacturers’ 
associations have expressed concerns that energy outages will nullify 
any potential gains from European Union tariff waiver concessions (on 
75 items, including textiles, approved in February 2012).
With little relief expected for power shortages and assuming no major 
floods similar to those experienced in the past 2 years, economic growth 
in FY2013 is forecast to strengthen marginally to 4.0%. Private and 
government consumption expenditure should continue to drive growth, 
as investment remains depressed.
After slowing to 9.7% in December 2011, inflation (year on year) 
picked up to 11% in February 2012 (Figure 3.20.6). Core inflation remains 
near double digits, pointing to continued persistence of inflationary 
pressures. Increases in energy prices in March 2012 and further expected 
adjustments will keep upward pressure on prices. For FY2012 as a whole, 
average inflation is projected at 12.0%. On assumptions of a strengthened 
budget performance and broad stability in oil and other global 
commodity prices, inflation could ease to 10.0% in FY2013.
Slower inflation and measures by the government to contain 
borrowing from the SBP supported an easing of monetary policy. In 
two separate steps (July and October 2011), the central bank reduced the 
policy rate by 200 basis points to 12%. With a weakening overall balance 
of payments, however, and a decline in reserves, the SBP has kept the 
rate at 12%.
Fiscal developments for FY2012 present a mixed picture. Federal 
Board of Revenue collections are much improved, running a full 33% 
ahead of last year’s performance for the first 6 months (Figure 3.20.7). This 
reflects improved economic activity in the first half of the year, as well 
as extension of the flood-related tax surcharges and improvements to tax 
administration. Yet it is unclear that the overall revenue target for FY2012 
will be achieved, as this in part depends on the sale of third-generation 
telecoms licenses in the latter part of FY2012—a sale already rescheduled 
over the past 2 years.
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Despite the implementation of an automated pass-through of input 
price increases to electricity tariffs, the overrun on energy subsidies is 
expected to be more than triple the amount budgeted, at slightly above 
2% of GDP, as key energy-efficiency measures have been delayed and 
state-owned enterprises continue to absorb the losses. Taken together, 
uncertainties over nontax revenue and higher than targeted current 
expenditure point to a budget deficit in excess of the 4.7% of GDP target.
The external accounts are increasingly fragile, as the current 
account returns to deficit (Figure 3.20.8), with scant cushion from the 
financial and capital accounts. Lower prices for key export commodities, 
particularly cotton, combined with higher import prices, pushed the 
current account from near balance for the first 7 months of FY2011 to 
a deficit of $2.6 billion (1.8% of GDP) by end-January 2012. The deficit
is expected to remain unchanged as a share of GDP over the rest of 
FY2012—as strong growth in remittances continues to offset a widening 
trade balance—increasing slightly to 1.9% in FY2013.
Growth in export receipts slowed to 7.2% for the first 7 months of 
FY2012 from 20.1% for the same period the previous year, as cotton prices 
declined and export industries were hit by increased load-shedding. 
Imports were 17.7% higher, largely reflecting substantial payments for oil. 
The services account showed similar signs of deterioration, with services 
exports contracting by 22.0% as inflows from the US Coalition Support 
Fund declined.
Workers’ remittances expanded by 23.4% during July 2011–February 
2012, slightly slower than the pace for the same period a year earlier.
Official foreign exchange reserves declined by $2.4 billion in the first
7 months of FY2012 (Figure 3.20.9), reflecting the current account deficit 
and a sharp narrowing of the capital and financial account surplus as 
inflows continued to fall and debt service payments mount. Reacting to 
pressure on reserves, the Pakistan rupee depreciated by 5.7% against the 
US dollar in the first 8 months (Figure 3.20.10).
Policy challenge—efficiency constraints
Power is the main constraint for economic growth, as load-shedding 
intensifies and becomes less predictable (Box 3.20.1). Estimates from the 
Planning Commission suggest that losses arising from power and gas 
shortages held down GDP growth by 3–4 percentage points in FY2011 
and FY2012. Improved management of power resources could ameliorate 
predictability of load-shedding to allow the private sector to better 
schedule work and minimize costs.
The current system, with tariff and collections below cost recovery, 
is a major deterrent to investment for capacity expansion in the sector. 
Cost recovery has not yet been achieved despite substantial increases in 
tariffs over the past 2 years, and measures to bring down costs have not 
been effective. For every unit of power sold, there is a loss to the sector 
reflected in the form of subsidies or accumulation of losses in the state-
owned power companies. An outstanding accumulation of PRs220 billion 
was carried into FY2012, and an additional financing of 1–1.5% of GDP is 
likely to be required in FY2012. Implementation of many of the actions 
taken by the government has been complicated by legal challenges. 
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State-owned enterprises represent a heavy drain on fiscal resources. 
Pakistan Railways, Pakistan International Airlines, and Pakistan 
Steel Mills have incurred steep losses for the past several years. The 
challenge of improving efficiency and putting these enterprises on a 
viable commercial footing is formidable. Reforms are needed, including 
a separation of these enterprises from operational interference by 
government ministries.
The power shortage is the main factor constraining 
economic growth. The supply-demand gap at peak 
hours reached over 5,000 megawatts (MW) in FY2011 
(Box figure 1). This reduced economic output, hitting 
manufacturing the hardest. 
The cause of the power sector crisis can be divided into 
three pillars: cost-efficient generation capacity not keeping 
up with demand, financial issues, and management issues. 
The supply–demand gap has widened because of a 
lack of investment in energy. The government has in fact 
added 1,604 MW to the system by commissioning six new 
independent power producers (1,264 MW) and a nuclear 
power plant (340 MW). A 49.5 MW wind power plant has 
recently obtained financing. 
However, other domestic resources (hydro, gas, and 
coal) have not grown enough to cover demand, thereby 
increasing reliance on imported fuel oil. The energy mix 
has changed from predominantly hydro to thermal, which 
consists of domestic gas and imported fuel oil. 
Industrial, retail, and fertilizer users are competing for 
the depleting gas supply, the preferred fuel for existing 
thermal plants. Plans to increase domestic gas production, 
import liquefied natural gas, pipe gas from neighboring 
countries, or bring in electricity from Central Asia have 
yet to materialize.
Financial issues are rooted in the fact that the cost-
recovery tariff determined by the National Electric Power 
Regulatory Authority is not applied to customers. Thus 
the government bears the differential as a subsidy. Losses 
and costs excluded from the tariff formula also accumulate 
at the public sector company level. The lack of financing 
leads to arrears for the power generation and fuel 
companies. 
Timely payment to these companies, essential for the 
sector’s reliability, has become increasingly difficult, partly 
because of increased dependence on imported fuel, which 
is subject to wide price fluctuations. The cost of (oil-based) 
power generation in the country escalated by almost 40% 
in the 2 fiscal years ending FY2011. Despite steep increases 
in tariff and fuel price adjustments, customer tariffs remain 
below cost recovery, requiring large government subsidies 
to keep the system operating (Box figure 2). 
The focus on massively increasing spending on power 
subsidies, reforms, and efficiency measures has been unable 
to remedy the accumulation of arrears in the system. 
To improve management, the government has appointed 
independent boards for the public power companies to 
select chief executive officers for these companies. Efforts 
are also ongoing to decrease commercial and technical 
losses (around 20%). However, these efforts have been 
overshadowed by the increase in costs and unwillingness 
of some customers to pay the higher tariffs. 
For a sustainable and reliable power sector, a multiyear 
plan with solid support from customers and other 
stakeholders needs to be implemented.
3.20.1 Energy challenges
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Sri Lanka
Growth stayed high in 2011 despite bad weather, which affected agriculture. A policy to keep the 
exchange rate stable in the face of credit-fueled strong domestic demand led to a growing trade deficit 
and loss of official reserves, while nonfood prices trended sharply higher. The authorities in response 
adopted in February 2012 more flexible exchange rate and monetary-tightening policies, and made steep 
power and fuel price adjustments. The outlook is for moderate but still strong growth. 
Economic performance
The economy grew at 8.3% in 2011 as the country continued to absorb 
the benefits of the end of its long-running civil conflict in May 2009 
(Figure 3.21.1). Industrial output (accounting for a little less than one-third 
of GDP) expanded by 9.6%. Within that, manufacturing grew by 8.1%, led 
by the export-oriented readymade garment industry. Construction and 
mining came in at double-digit growth, reflecting projects started since 
the conflict ended.
Services, the largest component of GDP (three-fifths), climbed by 
8.8%. Hotel and restaurant activity was up by one-third, reflecting a 
30.8% increase in tourist arrivals. Both transport and communications 
grew with the further integration of the northern and eastern provinces 
(former conflict areas) with the rest of the economy.
Agricultural output, however, was hit by adverse weather and heavy 
flooding in early 2011 and was down in the first half, but it picked up in 
the second to show annual growth of 2.5%.
Private consumption remained the main driver of economic 
expansion, fueled by remittances, greater demand from the northern and 
eastern provinces, and salary increases for civil servants and the defense 
forces. Investment activity also strengthened owing to implementation 
of major infrastructure development initiatives (especially in transport, 
energy, water, sanitation, and irrigation) and rising business investment, 
including international companies seeking a foothold in a fast-expanding 
economy. Private investment focused on tourism, telecommunications, 
manufacturing, and housing.
Overall inflation remained in single digits in 2011, averaging 6.7% and 
little changed from a year earlier (Figure 3.21.2). Food inflation, though, 
was volatile, reflecting flood damage, crop failures, and price pressure 
early in the year and, later, declining prices as production recovered. 
Nonfood inflation trended upward, due to strong demand and price 
increases for diesel, petrol, kerosene, liquefied petroleum gas, and bus 
fares late in 2011 and in February 2012, when it reached 9.2%. Fuel prices 
were suppressed during 2011 as international oil prices shot up by 41% 
3.21.1 Contributions to growth (supply)
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during 2010 and 2011. The government kept rises in petrol and diesel 
prices to 19% and 15%, respectively. Ceylon Petroleum Corporation lost 
a reported SLRs90 billion in 2011 (1.4% of GDP), mainly by selling oil to 
Ceylon Electricity Board below cost.
The central bank kept monetary policy rates low in 2011 to boost 
economic growth through rapidly expanding credit. Growth in credit to 
the private sector has accelerated rapidly since early 2010, fueling the pace 
of economic activity: year-on-year growth reached 34% in midyear and 
then plateaued (Figure 3.21.3). Construction, agriculture, and wholesale 
and retail trade have been prominent recipients. The central bank aimed 
at maintaining inflation at mid-single-digit level and signaled a tightening 
of policy by raising its repurchase and reverse repurchase rate by 50 basis 
points to 7.5% and 9.0%, respectively, in February 2012.
The budget deficit was narrowed in 2011 through a reduction of 
expenditure as a share of GDP, even as the proportion of government 
revenue in GDP fell. The deficit is estimated at 7.0% of GDP, improving 
from 2010’s 8.0% (Figure 3.21.4). Total revenue increased by 12.3% in 2011 
from a year earlier (tax receipts rose by 14.2%). Revenue as a share of GDP, 
however, fell by 0.5 percentage points to 14.3% in 2011, despite a 16.6% rise 
in nominal GDP and strong imports. The weaker performance seems 
largely due to tax holidays and incentives eroding the tax base. Total 
expenditure, which rose by 9.1%, moderated to 21.4% of GDP from 22.9% 
in 2010, reflecting government efforts to rationalize recurrent spending. 
Capital expenditure was maintained at 6.0% of GDP.
While exports expanded strongly, imports jumped because of higher 
oil prices and strong domestic demand, more than doubling the current 
account deficit to 7.3% of GDP in 2011 (Figure 3.21.5). Export earnings 
rose by about 22.4% to $10.5 billion, mainly owing to a 24.6% expansion
in garment sales, a near 60% surge in rubber and rubber products, and 
strong prices for other agricultural products. Imports jumped by 50.4% to 
$20.2 billion, driven mainly by increases in imports of oil, intermediate
goods for the garment industry and other raw materials, and capital 
goods. Export growth was weaker in the second half of 2011 than the first, 
while that of imports stayed high.
Improved workers’ remittances and an increased surplus in the 
services account helped contain the current account deficit. Earnings 
from tourism shot up by 44% to $830 million, even though tourist
arrivals, especially from Europe, slowed during the second half. Workers’ 
remittances, up by 25.0%, remained the single largest foreign exchange 
earner, at $5.1 billion or 8.7% of GDP.
Foreign direct investment inflows exceeded the government target of 
$1 billion in 2011 as there was an influx of investments into the tourism,
apparel, and information technology industries. Net inflows to the capital 
and financial accounts largely offset the current account deficit.
The central bank defended the foreign exchange rate (in a band 
around SLRs110/$1) against downward pressure from the current
account deficit for most of 2011, although the government announced 
a 3% devaluation when presenting the 2012 budget in November 2011 
(Figure 3.21.6). With strong demand pressures, gross official reserves 
fell continuously during the latter part of the year to $5.96 billion by
end-December 2011, covering 3.5 months of imports (Figure 3.21.7). 
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3.21.4 Fiscal indicators
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3.21.5 Current account indicators
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In February 2012, the central bank announced that it would limit its 
intervention in the foreign exchange market, moving toward greater 
market determination of the exchange rate. By end-March the rate 
reached SLRs129.6/$1, a 14% depreciation year on year.
Economic prospects
Although the economy is projected to maintain its strong performance of 
the last 2 years, growth prospects for 2012 are less favorable than in the 
past, and the pace of expansion will moderate. This easing is partly due 
to slower growth in industrial countries and attendant weaker growth 
in global demand and trade, and partly due to domestic factors: the 
rebound has largely run its course and with little slack in production 
capacity signs of overheating have emerged that will require tighter 
demand-management policies to forestall the buildup of serious economic 
imbalances.
Growth is expected to edge down to a still high 7.0% in 2012 as trends 
in investment, exports, tourism, remittances, and consumption remain 
broadly favorable; agriculture growth should be high, assuming normal 
weather. With the expected stronger performance of the global economy 
in 2013, growth is expected to recover to 8.0%, driven mainly by domestic 
and foreign investment.
Fiscal policy will focus on further narrowing the budget deficit in 
2012 to 6.2% of GDP. The budget plans most of this improvement to come 
from an 19.8% increase in revenue and grants, based on assumptions of 
rapid growth (8.5–9%) and inflation in mid-single digits. But with growth 
likely to be slower than this rate, it will be hard to reach the revenue 
target. Expenditure is slated to rise more slowly than revenue: planned 
economies in current spending should allow capital outlays to rise to 6.6% 
of GDP, in line with the target in the government’s Development Policy 
Framework. The government plans to bring the deficit down to 5.8% in 
2013, by improving income tax and value-added tax collection and further 
streamlining current expenditure.
The public debt ratio has been reduced over the last few years, 
although it was still very high at an estimated 78.9% of GDP at 
end-November 2011 (Figure 3.21.8). The impact of currency depreciation 
on external debt, additional budget borrowing, and slower growth is on 
course to worsen the debt-to-GDP ratio in 2012.
Monetary policy will focus on stabilizing inflation in mid-single digits 
and eliminating balance-of-payments pressures and loss of reserves. In 
moving toward this objective the central bank raised policy rates in early 
February 2012 and directed commercial banks to limit credit expansion to 
18% during the year, alongside the moves to liberalize the exchange rate.
While the expected global slowdown and stable commodity prices in 
2012 should curb external inflationary pressure, diesel and petrol prices 
were raised by 37% and 9%, respectively, and a surcharge (25–40%) was 
imposed on household electricity bills, all in February 2012. However, 
currency depreciation will also raise inflation through higher import 
prices. Inflation is forecast to be 8.0% in 2012 and fall marginally to 7.0% 
in 2013 owing to easing pressures from exchange rate depreciation and 
energy price adjustments a year earlier.
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Export growth is expected to fall to 11.0% in 2012, mainly owing to 
weaker demand, especially from Europe. Still, the trade gap is projected 
to stabilize, as import growth will also be much slower as higher interest 
rates, tighter credit, and a marked depreciation in the exchange rate 
are felt, especially for consumer goods. The current account deficit is 
projected to edge down to 6.4% of GDP in 2012, reflecting the more 
stable trade gap and continued large gains in remittance receipts. 
Growth in tourism-related inflows will take a hit but the sector will stay 
a major earner.
With stronger industrial-country growth and a pickup in trade in 
2013, stronger export growth is projected to help narrow the current 
account deficit to 6.0% of GDP.
Policy challenge—boosting private investment
The government’s Development Policy Framework for 2010–2016 aims 
to raise GDP growth to above 8% in the medium term and to nearly 
double per capita income from $2,400 to $4,200 at the end of the
period. The government has therefore embarked on an ambitious plan to 
remove infrastructure bottlenecks. It has already undertaken significant 
investments in some sectors, especially among the major infrastructure 
development initiatives.
The government, as seen in the framework, would like to see a 
greater role for the private sector through increased investment by both 
domestic and foreign investors, as investment is key for increasing supply 
capacity and bolstering growth. The framework also seeks private investor 
participation (beyond the traditional areas of industry and commerce) in 
infrastructure. The framework projects private investment to rise from 
around 21% of GDP in 2011 to about 26–28% in the next few years.
Yet despite the improved political and economic environment, growth 
in private investment—domestic and foreign—is falling below planned 
levels. One reason is that the government has taken only a few steps to 
reduce red tape and improve the business climate, needed to create the 
conditions for ramping up private investment. Although Sri Lanka’s 
position in the World Bank’s Doing Business survey has improved in 2012 
to 89 (out of 183 countries) from 98 in 2011, some challenges still deter 
private investment (Figure 3.21.9), especially paying taxes.
Investor confidence is a key factor in attracting investment and this 
requires a predictable policy environment as articulated and reinforced 
through the legal, regulatory, and institutional framework. Thus the 
lack of such an environment for the private sector is a major obstacle 
to private sector development. Developing that framework will reduce 
uncertainties in the business environment and avoid unplanned actions 
that may send mixed signals to potential investors.
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This hydrocarbon-based economy grew slightly faster in 2011 and is expected to maintain modest growth 
during the forecast period. The pace of inflation lifted last year, but will likely ease in 2012. Substantial 
fiscal and current account surpluses provide a cushion against shocks. Diversifying sources of growth is 
the main challenge.
Economic performance
The economy grew by an estimated 2.9% in 2011, quickening from a 
revised 2.6% in 2010 (Figure 3.22.1). Growth stemmed from production 
and exports of natural gas and crude oil, which account for two-thirds of 
GDP, and a better performance by the nonenergy sector.
The oil and gas sector expanded by 2.2% in the first 3 quarters of the 
year, mainly owing to a 5.1% increase in production of liquefied natural 
gas (LNG). A large methanol plant, opened in May 2010, made its first 
full-year contribution to growth in 2011.
The nonenergy sector grew by 2.8% in the 3 quarters. It comprises—
mainly government—services, and small agriculture and manufacturing 
output. Government services (about one quarter of the economy) grew by 
3.3% in the 3 quarters. Strong growth of about 20% was recorded in air 
transport and hotels and restaurants services. Manufacture of garments 
declined for a fourth consecutive year.
Government price controls and subsidies keep inflation to the 1–2% 
range most years—a bracket again achieved for the full year (2.0% on 
average). Higher global prices for food and other consumer goods nudged 
up inflation to 2.8% year on year in October 2011, before it receded 
(Figure 3.22.2). Tobacco prices jumped after the government raised excise 
duties on tobacco in November 2010.
Helping to contain inflation, the Brunei dollar appreciated against the 
US dollar by 8.4% on average last year, a result of its peg to the Singapore 
dollar through a currency board arrangement.
Merchandise exports, mostly LNG and oil, rose by an estimated 
32.5% to US$12.4 billion in 2011, propelled by higher global prices for
hydrocarbons. According to import data from Japan and the Republic 
of Korea, the biggest LNG customers, in 2011 these countries together 
lifted their purchases from Brunei Darussalam of LNG by 39% (to 
US$5.6 billion) and of oil by 33% (to US$1.9 billion).
Merchandise imports are much lower than exports, reflecting the 
small economy (GDP of about US$17 billion in 2011) and population
(423,000). Imports rose by an estimated 19.3% to US$2.8 billion. The trade
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surplus soared and the current account surplus increased to an estimated 
50% of GDP.
Taxes, dividends, and royalties from hydrocarbons provide the 
government with about 90% of its revenue to fund wages for the large 
public sector and finance public services and subsidies. Rising oil prices 
boosted revenue by 43% in FY2010 (ended 31 March 2011). Government 
spending fell slightly owing to a decline in capital outlays, leaving a fiscal 
surplus equivalent to about 16% of GDP.
The government established the Autoriti Monetari Brunei Darussalam 
in January 2011 to supervise the financial sector and manage monetary 
affairs. It also set up a Deposit Protection Corporation to insure deposits 
up to B$50,000 for individual depositors. A centralized credit bureau is
being formed to help banks assess the creditworthiness of borrowers.
Concerned about rising household debt and banks’ high exposure to 
consumer loans, the authorities required banks to curb consumer lending 
and they tightened limits on credit card debt. The ratio of consumer loans 
to total credit fell sharply to 39% as at September 2011. Lending to the 
private sector fell by 5.3% during the first 7 months of 2011. 
Economic prospects
The economy is expected to maintain modest growth during the forecast 
period (Figure 3.22.1 above), based on solid demand and prices of oil, 
investment in oil exploration, high levels of government spending, and 
gradual development of the nonenergy sector.
Two large export-oriented projects linked to hydrocarbons received 
government approval in 2011—a US$2.8 billion natural gas–based
petrochemical complex and a US$2.5 billion oil refinery and aromatics
cracker. (The country has only one small oil refinery.)
The complex, to be built at the Sungai Liang industrial park by 
Japanese companies, could eventually involve six downstream plants to 
produce chemicals for fertilizers, textiles, and plastics. The refinery and 
cracker project is planned by a firm from the People’s Republic of China 
for the Pulau Muara Besar industrial zone. If it proceeds as proposed, it 
will have capacity of 135,000 barrels of oil a day and produce petroleum 
products and chemicals for textiles. 
Current infrastructure activity includes completing the Pulau Muara 
Besar port and updating the Brunei international air terminal to double 
its capacity to 3 million passengers a year.
Inflation is projected to ease slightly to average 1.8% in 2012 as prices 
of imported food soften. It will edge up in 2013. Large current account 
surpluses are likely to be sustained, mainly on exports of oil and gas, and 
on income flows from the country’s overseas investments.
3.22.1 Policy challenge—
diversifying growth
Heavy reliance on oil and gas leaves 
the economy vulnerable to swings 
in global hydrocarbon prices. It also 
exposes it to dwindling production, 
unless exploration companies find new 
oil and gas fields. Oil output declined 
from a peak of 219,000 barrels a day in 
2006 to 170,000 barrels in 2010.
Moreover, the oil and gas sector 
employs only about 3% of the work 
force. The government provides jobs to 
the majority of those in work, but says 
it can no longer absorb the growing 
number seeking employment.
A government drive to attract 
petrochemicals and other energy-
related industries is having some 
success. Port facilities and an export 
processing zone are being built to 
attract manufacturers. The authorities 
have identified Islamic businesses 
including halal products, financial, 
logistics, and telecommunications 
services, and tourism for development, 
and have allocated funding for public–
private partnerships.
To redress weaknesses in the 
business environment, the government 
plans to further cut the corporate 
income tax rate to 20% (it was 30% in 
2006), to tax income from exports of 
domestically produced goods at just 
1%, to lower excise duties for some 
machinery used in industry, and to set 
up a Business Facilitation Center.
It might also want to consider 
opening more areas for private 
participation and better align public–
private remuneration packages so that 
private business can attract skilled 
workers.
Cambodia
Despite the worst floods in over a decade, economic growth remained robust in 2011, underpinned by 
exports of garments and footwear and by tourism. This year growth is forecast to soften, before picking 
up in 2013. Average inflation, lifted by higher prices for food and fuel in 2011, is projected to moderate 
this year. Better public debt strategies led to an upgrade in the debt sustainability rating. 
Economic performance
Growth picked up to an estimated 6.8% in 2011, largely on increased 
exports of garments, footwear, and milled rice, as well as rising numbers 
of inbound tourists.
Industry remained the primary source of growth, expanding by an 
estimated 13.9% (Figure 3.23.1) and driven mainly by robust export growth 
of garments and footwear to the United States (US) and the European 
Union (EU). US garment and footwear imports from Cambodia in 2011 
climbed by 17.8% to $2.7 billion (Figure 3.23.2). Exports of garments and
footwear to the EU surged by 51.1% to $1.62 billion, largely due to relaxed
rules of origin for imports into the EU that gave Cambodia (and some 
other developing countries) duty-free access to that market from January 
2011.
The number of jobs in the garment industry gradually recovered from 
a little over 319,000 at end-2010 to an estimated 330,000 by end-2011. 
Although this was still below the 353,000 jobs at end-2007—before the 
global recession—industry sources estimate that there were also more 
than 50,000 vacancies.
The strong growth of the industry sector was also supported by 
a steady increase in milled rice exports. A doubling in the value of 
approved construction projects in 2011 suggests a welcome recovery in 
this subsector.
Agriculture, representing about a third of GDP, was disrupted in 
September and October by the most severe flooding in more than a 
decade. Damage and economic losses, mainly to infrastructure and 
agriculture, were estimated at $624 million, some 5% of GDP. The floods
lowered wet-season rice production, though output in the dry season 
increased, and fisheries production rose by 4.5%. Agricultural growth 
overall expanded by an estimated 3.3%.
A buoyant tourism industry supported growth of 5.0% in services. 
Tourist arrivals picked up by 14.8% to 2.9 million in 2011 (Figure 3.23.3), 
with arrivals from Asia particularly strong. Growth in tourism benefited 
the hotels and restaurants, retailing, and transport and communications 
subsectors. Greater public confidence in the financial sector underpinned 
continued expansion there. 
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The surge in global prices for food and fuel pushed inflation from 
3.3% year on year in January 2011 to 7.1% in June and July. Inflation 
then began to ease (Figure 3.23.4), although the floods put some upward 
pressure on rice prices. For the year, inflation averaged 5.5%, up from 
4.0% in 2010.
Reflecting the economic pickup, credit to the private sector 
accelerated from 27% at end-2010 to 31.7% a year later. More than 95% was 
denominated in foreign currency, mostly US dollars. Broad money (M2, 
excluding foreign currency outside banks) increased by 21.5% year on 
year at end-2011, driven by growing foreign currency deposits as a result 
of increased export earnings. The riel appreciated by 2.9% against the US 
dollar during 2011.
An expansionary fiscal stance since 2009 has considerably reduced 
the government’s deposits in the banking system from about 8% of GDP 
in 2008 to around 4% in 2011 (Figure 3.23.5). The overall fiscal deficit 
(excluding grants and other expenditure adjustments), though staying 
high, narrowed to an estimated 7.6% of GDP in 2011 from 8.1% in 2010. 
Most of the gap (6.5 percentage points of GDP) was financed by external 
grants and concessional loans, the rest by drawdowns of government 
deposits.
Domestic revenue, estimated at 12.7% of GDP, fell short of target. 
Property tax, introduced in July 2010, started to generate income in 2011, 
making a small contribution. General government spending was above 
target at 20.2% of GDP.
Concessional assistance from the People’s Republic of China 
(mainly for infrastructure) as well as private investment (especially in 
hydropower) played a greater role in financing infrastructure last year 
than in 2010.
In the external accounts, the rise in shipments of garments, footwear, 
and milled rice propelled merchandise exports 35.8% higher in US dollar 
terms in 2011. Imports increased by an estimated 25.9%, largely reflecting 
purchases of oil, raw materials for garments, and consumer goods. The 
current account deficit (excluding official transfers), at an estimated 
7.1% of GDP, was covered by inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and official loans. Net FDI rose by an estimated 11% to $846.2 million,
with a sharp increase for the garment industry. Gross official reserves of 
$3.0 billion represented about 4.5 months of imports (Figure 3.23.6).
A debt sustainability analysis published in February 2012 by the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank upgraded Cambodia 
from moderate risk of debt distress to low risk. External public debt at 
end-2011 was manageable at 29% of GDP; domestic debt was less than 
1% of GDP. In recent years, the People’s Republic of China has become 
an important creditor, accounting for about two-thirds of total bilateral 
disbursements in 2010, for example.
The Ministry of Economy and Finance estimated that poverty 
incidence declined to 25% as of early 2012, from about 30% in 2007, 
although there are concerns over apparent increases in income inequality. 
The government adopted a national social protection strategy in 2011, 
foreshadowing both an expansion of targeted programs such as free 
health care for the poor and the pilot testing of conditional cash transfers 
and labor-intensive public works.
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Economic prospects
Export-led sectors will remain the main sources of growth during the 
forecast period, with some new manufacturing industries beginning to 
emerge, such as automotive parts and assembly of small electric motors. 
The subdued economic outlook for the EU and US, Cambodia’s main 
export markets, suggests that GDP growth will edge down to 6.5% in 2012 
(Figure 3.23.7). In 2013, growth is seen picking up to 7.0%, tracking the 
expected upturn in the global outlook.
Demand for garment and footwear imports in the EU and US is 
expected to slow this year, mitigated to some extent by Cambodia’s 
privileged import access to the EU and the development of some high 
value-added garment production. Given these trends, the growth in 
industry overall is projected to slow to 11.4%, before picking up to 12.5% 
in 2013.
Construction is expected to strengthen, stimulated by FDI in 
property. The extent and timing of exploitation of oil and gas reserves in 
Cambodia remain unclear, but it is not anticipated to have an impact on 
GDP before 2015.
Growth in services is expected to edge up to 5.3% in 2012 and 5.6% 
in 2013 largely on the back of continued increases in tourist arrivals 
supported by gradual improvement in real estate.
Assuming favorable weather, agriculture is forecast to register higher 
growth of 3.8% in 2012, partly a result of the base effect of last year’s 
floods on the rice crop. It also reflects government support for agriculture, 
in particular rice production.
Fiscal consolidation is expected to continue, as envisaged in the 
2012 budget. The fiscal deficit (excluding grants and other expenditure 
adjustments) is targeted at 5.7% of GDP, to be achieved largely by 
an ambitious domestic revenue target of 13.7% of GDP. Government 
spending is budgeted at 19.4% of GDP. The budget anticipates that 
domestic financing of the deficit will be as low as 0.2% of GDP. This 
indicates an important step toward rebuilding fiscal flexibility, necessary 
to give the government the leeway to spur the economy if needed. 
About $150 million will be spent on flood reconstruction over the
next 2 or 3 years, building on an estimated $60 million of flood-related
humanitarian and infrastructure spending in 2011.
Inflation in 2012 and 2013 is forecast to ease to about 5% on a year-
average basis (Figure 3.23.8), assuming relatively low domestic financing 
of the budget deficit. (High levels of domestic financing would involve 
the injection of large amounts of riels that could put upward pressure on 
inflation.) Rising global oil prices early in 2012 put the inflation forecast 
for this year at risk.
The trade deficit in 2012 is set to widen slightly due to softening 
external demand. Increases in tourism receipts will keep the services 
account in surplus. The current account deficit (excluding official 
transfers) is projected to widen to 7.6% of GDP in 2012 before narrowing a 
little as the global economy picks up (Figure 3.23.9). 
As for policy reforms, the Public Debt Strategy approved by the 
Prime Minister in February 2012 is a step forward in strengthening the 
debt strategy and debt management capacity. The government will set 
an annual borrowing target and aim for concessional loans with tenors 
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of 20–40 years. Yet despite the positive debt sustainability assessment, 
the country remains vulnerable to uncertain contingent liabilities on 
major infrastructure investments, mainly public–private hydropower 
partnerships.
A Public Procurement Law, promulgated in January, laid the 
foundation for improving this element of public financial management. 
An overhaul is planned of policies and regulations covering public–
private partnerships, which should help mobilize private sector finance 
for development projects and improve business governance and 
transparency. Three state-owned enterprises are scheduled to be the first 
listings on the securities exchange.
Policy challenge—skills shortages
Skills shortages are hindering Cambodia’s development. The share of 
firms reporting skills as a major constraint to growth in the World Bank’s 
Investment Climate Surveys increased from 6.5% in 2003 to 15.5% in 2007. 
In a survey of 78 employers by a consulting firm in 2011, 73% said that 
university graduates do not have suitable skills and 62% said the same 
about vocational training graduates. About one-third of the employers 
surveyed found it difficult to train or upgrade their workforce. The 
situation has worsened over the past few years as wage rates have risen, 
pushing manufacturers up the value-added chain and requiring higher 
levels of skills.
Improvements in early childhood nutrition and better primary and 
lower secondary schooling would provide children with a firmer base 
on which to build their educational and skills training. After that, what 
is required is a concerted approach to improving human capital, with 
all stakeholders involved—businesses, the government, development 
partners, and civil society.
On the supply side, the challenge is to strengthen training programs, 
building in responsiveness and flexibility to labor market needs. This 
calls for expansion both of formal programs that are more relevant to 
industry and of nonformal training that can help those with incomplete 
education enter the job market. The overall response should aim to 
manage resources in ways that create incentives for good performance 
and accountability for results, teach soft and technical skills, and bring 
schools and industry closer together to promote quality and relevance to 
market demand.
On the demand side, the focus should be on improving information 
flows and strengthening institutional capacity, particularly in the 
National Training Board and Employment Agency. Employers lack 
channels both to communicate their demands for specific skills and to 
influence skills development policies. 
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Indonesia
Southeast Asia’s biggest economy in 2011 grew at its fastest rate since before the 1997–1998 Asian 
financial crisis. The pace will likely ease in 2012 on weaker external demand, before accelerating again in 
2013 on the expected recovery in trade. Inflation, which receded in 2011, is forecast to quicken when the 
government raises administered fuel prices. The external current account is projected to slip into deficit 
this year as exports soften while robust investment keeps capital-equipment imports high. Addressing a 
major challenge to development, the government is stepping up efforts to improve infrastructure.
Economic performance
Growth of 6.5% in 2011, the highest in 15 years, was based on sustained 
private consumption, stronger investment, and expansion of net exports 
(Figure 3.24.1).
Private consumption grew by 4.7%, contributing 2.7 percentage points 
of total growth. It was driven by rising incomes and employment and by 
easing inflation. In a notably positive development, fixed investment grew 
by 8.8% and contributed 2.1 percentage points of GDP growth. Public 
investment was constrained by weakness in implementing capital works, 
although private investment in construction and machinery was robust, 
supported by increases in foreign direct investment (FDI) and in bank 
lending. The ratio of nominal fixed capital investment to GDP rose to 
32.0% in 2011, up by 7.1 percentage points over 5 years (Figure 3.24.2). Net 
exports contributed 1.5 percentage points of growth.
From the supply side, economic growth was led by services and 
manufacturing. Services grew by 8.5% to account for more than half the 
total GDP increase. Retail and wholesale trading, as well as transport and 
communications, showed double-digit expansions, while financial services 
benefited from a stronger performance in banking.
Manufacturing registered its best performance in 7 years: expanding 
by 6.2% and contributing 1.6 percentage points of overall growth, this 
outturn was based on the country’s large and growing domestic market, 
alongside a better performance from exports. Subsectors to report 
significant production gains in 2011 included iron and basic steel, food 
processing, textiles and footwear, and transport equipment (Figure 3.24.3). 
By contrast, mining and quarrying recorded weak growth of 1.4%, 
reflecting years of underinvestment and production problems in crude oil 
and natural gas.
Agricultural output rose by a modest 3.0%. An increase in production 
of estate crops, such as palm oil and rubber, was partly offset by a decline 
in food crops. Paddy rice output fell by 1.6% during the year, owing to dry 
weather in the second half. 
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About 1.5 million new jobs were generated in 2011, easily exceeding 
the number of new entrants to the labor force (843,000). The quality 
of employment also improved: in the 12 months through August 2011 
formal employment climbed by 16.0%, or 5.7 million positions. Most 
jobs were in construction, manufacturing, and services. Employment 
in the informal sector fell by 5.9%, or 4.2 million, as workers left the 
agricultural labor force. But 62% of the employed labor force (about 
68.2 million people) still work in the informal sector, where wages and 
job security are low.
Poverty incidence fell to 12.4% in September 2011, from 13.3% in March 
2010. (It was 17.6% just before the Asian financial crisis.)
Inflation slowed from 7.0% year on year at the start of 2011 to 3.8% at 
year-end as food price rises moderated (Figure 3.24.4). A good harvest 
in the first half was followed by government moves to suspend import 
duties on some food items and to improve food distribution. Year-average 
inflation was 5.4%, up slightly from 2010.
Bank Indonesia raised its policy interest rate in February 2011 by 
25 basis points to 6.75% to damp inflation expectations. During October 
2011–February 2012, after inflation trended down and the global economic 
outlook dimmed, the central bank lowered this rate by 100 basis points. 
Broad money (M2) growth accelerated to 16.4% and commercial banks’ 
credit expanded by 24.6% in 2011, slightly above Bank Indonesia’s target 
of 23%. Credit for investment jumped by 33.2%, reflecting the improving 
economic conditions and declining interest rates.
Merchandise exports rose by 27.5% to $201.5 billion in 2011
(Figure 3.24.5), although the pace eased in the fourth quarter. Exports of 
hydrocarbons rose by nearly 34%—declining oil exports were more than 
offset by rapid expansion in gas exports, reflecting rising gas prices and 
output. Non-oil and gas exports increased by 26.1%, with large gains for 
coal, palm oil, and rubber. In the other direction, strong demand for raw 
materials, machinery, and consumption goods pushed up merchandise 
imports by 30.3% to $166.1 billion.
Despite the larger trade surplus (which rose because of a higher 
export base), the surplus on the current account fell to the equivalent 
of 0.2% of GDP. That was attributable to a smaller surplus in transfers 
(remittances from workers abroad declined) and wider deficits in 
services (higher outlays on freight and business services) and in the 
income balance (a result of repatriation of investment income by foreign 
companies).
The capital and financial account turned into deficit in the second 
half, owing to portfolio capital outflows caused by global financial 
market anxieties. Net portfolio investment of $4.2 billion in 2011 was
down sharply from 2010 (Figure 3.24.6). FDI inflows, though, shot up by 
31.9% to a record $18.2 billion, reflecting improvements in the domestic
investment environment. The overall balance of payments maintained 
a healthy surplus and gross international reserves rose to $110.1 billion,
equal to 6.4 months of imports and government debt payments 
combined.
In the first 8 months of 2011, the rupiah appreciated by about 5% 
against the US dollar, but it turned weaker when global economic 
concerns heightened, ending the year little changed.
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A strengthening bond market saw the yield on 5-year rupiah 
government bonds fall by 139 basis points to 5.4% during 2011. The 
government stepped in to stabilize the market by buying bonds when 
foreign investors cut their holdings in August–November’s market 
turbulence. Over the year, the stock market edged up 3.2%.
The government aimed for a budget deficit equal to 2.1% of GDP, but 
the outcome was around half that, at 1.1%. One reason was that public 
capital spending fell short of target because of chronic weakness in 
implementing capital projects. Another was buoyant revenue: tax receipts 
increased to 11.8% of GDP (from 11.2% in 2010) owing to a widening tax 
net, improving tax administration, strong economic activity, and high 
commodity prices.
Subsidies for fuel and electricity, however, remained a heavy burden 
on the budget, at 3.4% of GDP, and their cost exceeded the amount 
invested in public capital works. Still, the ratio of national government 
debt to GDP fell to 24.3% in 2011, maintaining a declining trend 
(Figure 3.24.7). 
Reflecting the country’s improved macroeconomic performance, two 
major rating agencies raised Indonesia’s sovereign ratings to investment 
grade: Fitch to BBB minus in December 2011 and Moody’s to Baa3 in 
January 2012.
Economic prospects
Forecasts assume the government will maintain its efforts to improve 
both the investment climate and public financial management, especially 
for budget execution. The forecasts also assume that the authorities 
will pursue major policies outlined in the master plan for economic 
development 2011–2025 (known by its Indonesian acronym MP3EI), 
published last year. The plan calls for raising public investment in 
infrastructure, reducing bottlenecks, and closing the development gap 
between eastern and western regions of the country.
Private consumption is forecast to remain strong this year and next. 
Surveys of households conducted by Bank Indonesia show high consumer 
confidence (Figure 3.24.8), driven mainly by optimism about growth in 
jobs and incomes. Consumption is underpinned by an expanding middle 
class (those with incomes of $2–20 a day in 2005 purchasing power parity
terms, a group increasing by about 7 million a year) and rising labor force 
participation.
Private investment is expected to maintain its upward trend, 
given the country’s solid record of economic growth over recent years 
(averaging 5.7% since 2004), upgrades in sovereign ratings, and an 
improved investment environment. Indonesia’s ranking as an investment 
destination rose two places to seventh in the 2011 World Investment 
Report by the United Nations Commission of Trade and Development. A 
Bank Indonesia Business Survey conducted in the fourth quarter of 2011 
indicated a steady rise in planned business activity and investment in the 
first half of 2012, and the Business Tendency Survey conducted in that 
quarter by the statistics office also suggested optimism over the near-term 
outlook (Figure 3.24.8). 
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The fiscal stance will be accommodative to mitigate the impact on 
economic growth of the global slowdown. In late March 2012, Parliament 
passed a revision to the 2012 budget, widening the fiscal deficit to 2.2% of 
GDP from an originally planned 1.5%. The revised budget contains three 
key components: a provision to increase administered domestic fuel prices 
if the average Indonesian crude oil price exceeds $120.80 over a 6-month
period; an additional $2.8 billion of social spending if fuel prices are
raised; and a further $1.9 billion in capital spending. Public infrastructure
investment is expected to surge by 48.6% in 2012 from that spent in 2011. 
A budget deficit recorded in January 2012, unlike recent years’ surpluses 
for this month, indicates improved budget execution.
Investment in infrastructure by the private sector and state-owned 
firms could start to increase, as outlined in the MP3EI. A Land Law 
for Public Use (approved by Parliament in December 2011) should help 
in acquiring land for public infrastructure, easing a serious constraint. 
Domestic commercial banks, which have excess liquidity, have expressed 
interest in financing infrastructure development, and the sovereign 
investment-grade ratings are expected to facilitate a greater volume of 
long-term financing.
Lending interest rates have come down (Figure 3.24.9, above) since 
Bank Indonesia lowered its policy rate. Credit to the private sector 
is projected to grow by at least 25% this year, financing increases in 
investment and consumption.
Manufacturing output looks set to increase further during the forecast 
period, based on announcements by companies of planned new facilities. 
The expansion has spread to industries such as metal products and 
machinery, which are more export oriented than transport, storage, and 
communications, sectors that previously attracted most investment. This 
diversification of manufactured products contributed to the solid increase 
in output last year (Figure 3.24.10).
Exports, though, face headwinds this year as global trade slows. GDP 
growth is therefore forecast to ease to 6.4%, before stepping up in 2013 
(Figure 3.24.11) when world trade and economic growth pick up and 
infrastructure investment gathers momentum.
Inflation during the forecast period depends in part on the timing 
and size of increases in fuel prices. The year-average rate for 2012 is 
projected at 5.5% (Figure 3.24.12), on the assumption that fuel prices will 
be lifted later this year. If fuel prices are increased later than anticipated, 
inflation would likely be lower than forecast this year and higher than 
projected in 2013. 
Slower growth in exports will likely produce a small current account 
deficit in 2012. Merchandise exports are projected to increase by about 
13.5% and imports by 18.5% (strong investment will spur imports of capital 
equipment). The income deficit will widen, consistent with strengthening 
FDI flows and related repatriation of corporate earnings. In 2013, the 
current account is seen returning to a small surplus as external demand 
recovers (Figure 3.24.13).
Inflows of foreign direct and portfolio investment are expected to 
keep the overall balance of payments in surplus through the forecast 
period. The rupiah could soften this year against the US dollar in light of 
the current account deficit and higher inflation.
3.24.10 Manufacturing production index
85
95
105
115
Jan
12
OctJulAprJan
11
OctJulAprJan
2010
2010 = 100
Source: CEIC Data Company (accessed 13 March 2012).
Click here for figure data
3.24.11 GDP growth
0
2
4
6
8
1312111009082007
%
Forecast
Source: Asian Development Outlook database.
Click here for figure data
3.24.1 Selected economic indicators (%)
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Uncertainties in the global economic outlook mean that risks to 
the forecasts are tilted to the downside. A sharper deterioration than 
anticipated in major export markets would translate into even lower 
export growth. Further, Indonesia is vulnerable to financial-market 
volatility because of its relatively open capital account and heavy foreign 
presence in its stock and bond markets (about two-thirds of equities and 
one-third of sovereign bonds are foreign held). 
The government’s gross financing needs remain high, despite its low 
budget deficit and declining debt-to-GDP ratio. The share of financing 
from market sources is expected to increase to about 85% this year, from 
60% in 2009, in line with official policies to develop the capital market. 
This suggests the financing of the budget could be disrupted in the event 
of large capital outflows.
Anticipating such risks, the government included provisions in its 
2012 budget that enable it, in an economic emergency, to get approval 
from Parliament within 24 hours, to raise spending above the budgeted 
level, and to switch spending priorities. That is in addition to the 
additional capital and social spending added to the budget in March 
that should provide a buffer to weaker external demand. Contingency 
plans also include the bond stabilization program that provides for the 
government to tap funds from its current budget, accumulated budget 
surpluses, and state-owned enterprises to steady a volatile market.
Moreover, the central bank has upgraded macroprudential measures 
to reduce short-term and speculative capital inflows and mitigate the risks 
of sudden outflows. These include gradually replacing short-term Bank 
Indonesia certificates with government bonds for liquidity management, 
reinstating limits on short-term offshore borrowing by banks to a 
maximum of 30% of their capital, increasing banks’ foreign currency 
reserve requirements, and requiring an underlying economic exchange for 
any foreign currency transaction above $100,000.
Policy challenge—strengthening infrastructure
Lagging development of infrastructure—transport and 
telecommunications networks, electricity, and water supply—is a 
prime constraint on economic growth. The quality of infrastructure is 
ranked below that of, for example, Malaysia and Thailand (Table 3.24.2). 
Indonesia’s logistics costs (including transportation, warehousing, and 
distribution) are about 14% of total production costs, much higher than 
Japan’s roughly 5%.
The government has made infrastructure development a key priority 
in both its Medium-Term Development Plan 2010–2014 and the longer-
term MP3EI. Several transport projects financed through the budget are 
scheduled to get under way this year, including expansion of Jakarta’s 
main airport, construction of highways and ports, and the building of 
transport infrastructure in eastern provinces.
Indeed, budget allocations for infrastructure have increased 
significantly since 2010, but the execution of capital projects has lagged 
(Figure 3.24.14) because of capacity and other constraints. In efforts to 
address this issue, officials are simplifying procedures and strengthening 
procurement capacity in the spending agencies: the Ministry of Public 
3.24.2 Rank in Global Competitiveness 
Index
2010–2011 
(out of 139)
2011–2012 
(out of 142)
Overall ranking
Singapore 3 2
Malaysia 26 21
Thailand 38 39
Indonesia 44 46
Philippines 85 75
Infrastructure
Singapore 5 3
Malaysia 30 26
Thailand 35 42
Indonesia 82 76
Philippines 104 105
Source: World Economic Forum. 2011. The Global 
Competitiveness Report 2011–2012. http://www.
weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness-
report-2011-2012 (accessed 22 March 2012).
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Works, for example, is introducing electronic bidding and procurement 
systems. Further, a new task force to accelerate budget execution reports 
directly to the President. Coordination between the central and local 
governments will also need to improve and local governments’ weak 
capacity to implement infrastructure projects has to be addressed.
As for private participation in infrastructure development, the Land 
Law for Public Use will provide greater certainty on land acquisition 
for infrastructure projects. Moves to refine regulations and institutions 
to support public–private partnerships are starting to produce results. 
Agreements were signed in October 2011 for private investors to build a 
$3 billion power plant in Central Java, guaranteed by the government. The
Rajabasa and Muaralaboh geothermal projects, involving total investment 
of $1.4 billion, were approved under a similar arrangement in March 2012.
Also in March, the government issued a blueprint for the development 
of a national logistics system that aims to attract considerable private 
sector participation.
However, to ensure sustained private investment in infrastructure, 
further efforts are needed to improve governance, develop a more 
consistent legal and regulatory framework, and address government 
capacity constraints in preparing projects for private participation.
The subdued external economic environment in 2012 should provide 
an incentive for a stronger push on infrastructure development to support 
growth in the near term, as well as raise the country’s potential in the 
medium term.
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Lao People’s Democratic Republic
Resource-based industries, manufacturing, and services generated robust growth in 2011, and are 
expected to drive similar growth rates during the forecast period. Inflation, after speeding up last year, 
is projected to moderate. The country signed agreements that bring it closer to joining the World Trade 
Organization. However, generating well-paying jobs remains a major challenge.
Economic performance
Despite severe flooding that damaged agriculture in 2011, the economy 
grew by 7.8% (Figure 3.25.1), mainly owing to expansion of hydropower, 
manufacturing, mining, and services.
Typhoons in the second half of the year brought floods that took 
down rice output by 11% to about 2.9 million tons. Production of corn, 
beans, and vegetables also fell, although sugarcane, fisheries, and 
poultry performed better than in 2010. Output of timber declined as 
the government curbed illegal logging and restricted logging quotas. 
Agriculture as a whole, which accounts for just under one third of GDP, 
was virtually flat in 2011.
By contrast, industry expanded by 15.6%. Production of copper 
from the country’s two biggest mines—Phu Bia and Sepon—rose by 
about 5% to 139,000 tons. Silver production also gained, by about 
6% to 538,000 ounces, though output of gold fell by about 22% to 
128,000 ounces.
Hydropower output rose by 18.5% in 2011, spurred by new plants 
coming online, including the 615 megawatt Nam Ngum 2 in April 2011, 
and by heavy rainfall during parts of the year. Most of the electricity 
generated is exported to Thailand. Investment in mining and power 
plants contributed to growth: several mines, including the Ban Houayxai 
gold and silver mine as well as eight hydropower plants and a lignite 
power plant were being built. Other construction focused on housing; 
commercial buildings; and hotels in Vientiane, Luang Prabang, and 
Savannakhet. Construction overall increased by about 6%.
Garment manufacturing benefited from the European Union’s 
relaxation, from January 2011, of rules of origin for imports of garments 
from certain developing countries, including the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic (the Lao PDR) (Figure 3.25.2). Garment exports to the European 
Union and the United States, the two main markets, rose by about 17% to 
$225.6 million.
The services sector grew by 7.9% last year. Tourist arrivals went 
up by 9% to 2.7 million (Figure 3.25.3), supporting the hotels and 
restaurants as well as transport subsectors. The rollout of third-generation 
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mobile telephone and internet services contributed to growth of 
telecommunications and banking continued to expand.
Inflation peaked at 9.8% in May (Figure 3.25.4) and averaged 7.6% 
for the year (up from 6.0% in 2010). Rising global oil prices drove up 
domestic fuel costs, and the disruption to supplies of food during the 
floods pushed up prices of food. Higher inflation in neighboring countries 
that supply consumer goods—the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
Thailand, and Viet Nam—added to pressure on prices.
Growth in credit moderated from very high rates in recent years 
to a still high 34.2% in December 2011 (Figure 3.25.5). The deceleration 
stemmed from reduced direct lending by the central bank for 
infrastructure projects and steps the bank took to curb lending for real 
estate speculation. A shortage of longer-term bank deposits constrained 
commercial bank lending to the private sector.
The central bank also maintained its policy of keeping the kip 
broadly stable against the US dollar and Thai baht. During 2011 the kip 
appreciated by 2.7% against the US dollar and by 1.6% against the baht. 
Dollarization has gradually declined from 79% in 1999 to about 45% last 
year.
Strong flows of revenue to the government from mining and 
hydropower, coupled with reduced off-budget spending, brought down the 
overall fiscal deficit to about 2.0% of GDP in FY2011 (ended 30 September 
2011) from 5% the previous year. A value-added tax introduced in 2010 
supported growth in total revenue, which is estimated to have reached the 
equivalent of 19.4% of GDP (including grants). Government spending is 
estimated at 21.4%.
Merchandise exports, mainly minerals, hydropower, garments, and 
wood products, rose by an estimated 24.0% to $2.7 billion in 2011. Imports
increased by 19.4% to $4.3 billion, bolstered by purchases of capital
equipment for the resource industries and two Airbus aircraft for Lao 
Airlines. After dividend and profit repatriation and interest payments by 
resource-based companies, the current account deficit was estimated at 
15.9% of GDP. 
Accounting for foreign direct investment and other capital flows, 
gross international reserves fell to $679 million in 2011, sufficient for about
2.5 months of nonresource imports.
The Lao PDR has moved closer to joining the World Trade 
Organization, after reaching bilateral agreements with major trading 
partners. (It has sought membership in that body since 1997 to foster 
trade and investment.) Under the market access agreement signed last 
year with Australia, for example, the government agreed to an average 
ceiling on import tariffs of about 25%, and as low as 5% on some goods. It 
committed to allow market access for suppliers of a range of services and 
to allow majority foreign ownership of joint ventures. 
In another market-opening development, the government sold 
stakes of about 30% in two state-owned companies—power company 
EDL-Generation Co. and Banque Pour Le Commerce Exterieur Lao—
through initial public share offerings, and listed the shares on the new 
Lao Securities Exchange last year. Further such listings are planned.
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Economic prospects
Growth looks likely to continue in 2012–2013 at similar rates to last 
year. Construction is gathering momentum on the $3.7 billion Hongsa
lignite thermal power plant (1,878 megawatts) and associated coal mine. 
Work will get under way this year on Nam Ngum 3 (440 megawatts), 
joining eight other hydro plants under construction. Expansion of Theun 
Hinboun (280 megawatts) is due to be completed in July 2012.
The Ban Houayxai mine is scheduled to start production in the first 
half of 2012, at a full-year rate of 100,000 ounces of gold and 700,000 
ounces of silver, and the Phu Kham copper–gold project, one of the 
biggest in the country, is being expanded. A potash mine and processing 
plant costing $94 million is expected to be completed this year and a
company from Viet Nam has started work on a larger potash project 
(costing $450 million) to be completed by 2015. Most fertilizer from these
potash plants will be exported.
In the capital Vientiane, the government is investing more than 
$180 million on building facilities for the 2012 Asia–Europe meeting of
senior officials from 50 countries to be held in November 2012. The PRC is 
providing loans for conference facilities and airport expansion.
Tourism will get a lift from international promotion of 2012 as 
Visit Laos Year and from the ASEAN University Games to be held in 
December 2012. Lao Airlines has launched flights between Vientiane and 
Singapore after acquiring the Airbus planes in late 2011.
Rice production is expected to recover from last year’s flood-
suppressed level. Agricultural output is seen increasing by 2–3% in 2012, 
depending on the weather. The government is repairing irrigation systems 
damaged by the floods and building new irrigation systems to support 
dry-season crops.
Fiscal policy is more expansionary in FY2012, and the fiscal deficit 
is projected to widen to 4.6% of GDP. The government has budgeted 
to increase spending considerably, in part to repair the flood-damaged 
infrastructure. The central bank is targeting 25% growth in M2 money 
supply and aims to curtail expansion of credit to 28% (such targets have 
been missed in recent years, though).
Inflation is forecast to moderate to average 6.7% this year and 6.0% in 
2013. Lower global food prices and a better domestic harvest will ease the 
pressures on food, which has a large share in the consumer price index. 
There will be some upward impact on prices from an increase of about 
18% in administered electricity tariffs in the first half of 2012.
Sluggish global economic growth is expected to weigh on prices of 
copper, holding back merchandise export growth to about 19% in 2012. 
Imports of capital equipment needed for new mining and power projects 
will underpin an increase of about 17% in merchandise imports. The 
current account deficit is forecast to widen to 21.0% of GDP.
External public debt rose to an estimated $3.7 billion dollars in
2011, although as a ratio to GDP it fell to about 47%. An external-debt 
sustainability analysis by the International Monetary Fund in 2011 found 
that the country still faces a high risk of debt distress, and that the 
projected rate of debt accumulation could increase in the next few years, 
reflecting borrowings mainly from the PRC.
3.9.1 Policy challenge—generating 
more jobs
Poverty incidence declined from 46% 
of the population in 1993 to a still 
high 27% in 2008. Consequently, 
major development goals are to sustain 
growth of income and employment, 
and better distribute income and 
wealth.
Central to these tasks is raising 
productivity and incomes in agriculture, 
which employs about three-fifths of 
the workforce. Rural areas are home to 
the majority of the poor. As improved 
productivity reduces the number 
of workers in agriculture, however, 
industry and services must grow if the 
surplus workers are to find jobs.
Investment in recent years has 
focused on mining and hydropower. 
They have indeed driven much of the 
growth, but, being capital intensive, 
have not generated enough jobs to take 
in all the workers leaving agriculture.
Industries that could create many 
well-paid jobs include:
Agribusiness. Processing crops like 
rice, corn, and natural rubber adds 
value and is labor intensive. As links 
strengthen between the Lao PDR and 
its neighbors Cambodia, the PRC, 
Myanmar, Thailand, and Viet Nam, 
market access for agribusiness 
production will expand.
Tourism. This group of countries 
also offers a cluster of tourism 
destinations that could be developed 
and promoted to achieve faster growth. 
Services associated with tourism, such 
as hotels, have a strong employment 
response to growth in output.
Services. It is efficient to cluster 
development of services in towns and 
cities to capture economies of scale and 
agglomeration. Moves in this direction 
require the government to address 
issues including inadequate urban 
planning and provision of water and 
sewerage systems.
More broadly, development of 
these and other industries depends 
on bringing down the high cost of 
finance, expanding education and 
skills training, building transport 
infrastructure, and addressing 
weaknesses in governance.
Malaysia
Strong private consumption drove economic growth in 2011, supported by government spending and, less 
so, by fixed investment. The weaker global environment is forecast to slow growth in this highly open 
economy in 2012, but the better global backdrop next year should help lift its performance. Moderating 
growth this year suggests that inflation will also ease. The external current account surplus will remain 
buoyant.
Economic performance
Expansion of 5.1% in 2011 was fueled mainly by private and government 
consumption on the demand side and by an expansion of the services 
sector on the production side. Slower global trade and growth weighed on 
exports and manufacturing.
Private consumption rose by 6.9%, accelerating from 2010 and 
contributing about two-thirds of total GDP growth in 2011 (Figure 3.26.1). 
This reflected a robust labor market (employment increased by 3.2% 
and unemployment fell to an 11-year low of 3.1%), favorable prices for 
agricultural commodities (supporting farm incomes), and availability of 
credit (household borrowing rose by 12.5%). Government consumption, 
too, made a significant contribution to growth. It surged by 16.8% as the 
government raised outlays on supplies and services, increased public 
service wages, and paid a 1-month bonus.
Fixed capital investment growth moderated to 6.0% in 2011. While 
private investment was strong for much of the year, government 
investment fell, reflecting the phasing out in 2010 of a fiscal stimulus 
package. Gross fixed capital investment as a ratio to GDP was flat at 
around 20%, well below levels seen in the mid-1990s (Figure 3.26.2). This 
reflects, in large part, rising costs of production and limited progress in 
attracting higher valued-added industries.
Imports of goods and services in real terms rose faster than exports, 
holding back GDP growth from the demand perspective.
In supply-side terms, services contributed the vast bulk of growth, 
expanding by 6.8%. The robust private consumption drove a solid gain 
in retail and wholesale trading. Finance and insurance services benefited 
from strength in bank lending and insurance sales, and real estate 
services from an upturn in the housing market. 
Manufacturing grew by only 4.5% as demand weakened in major 
industrial countries for manufactured products, particularly electronics. 
Supply disruptions caused by the March earthquake and tsunami in 
Japan and second-half floods in Thailand also dented manufacturing 
output (Figure 3.26.3). The electronics and electrical subsector contracted 
by 2.4% last year. 
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Construction increased by a modest 3.5%, reflecting the end of the fiscal 
stimulus in 2010. The mining subsector (mainly oil), contracted by 5.7%, a 
result of maintenance shutdowns and output declines in mature fields.
The performance of agriculture—5.6% growth—was the strongest 
in 8 years. This was largely based on a sharp increase in crude palm oil 
production, which accounts for about one-third of the sector. Palm oil 
output rose by 11.3% to 18.9 million tons owing to good weather and firm 
international prices.
Higher food costs and increases in administered prices of electricity, 
fuel, and sugar nudged up inflation to 3.5% year on year in June 
(Figure 3.26.4). On a year-average basis, it accelerated to a 3-year high of 
3.2%. House prices also turned up, by 8.6% in the first 3 quarters, a pace 
more than double the average of 2000–2010.
To lean against inflation, Bank Negara Malaysia, the central bank, 
raised its policy interest rate in May 2011 by 25 basis points to 3.0%. It also 
lifted the reserve requirement for banks from 1.0% to 4.0% to drain excess 
liquidity from the banking system.
The government boosted public expenditure by about 13% in 2011 (it 
had declined slightly in the prior year). Revenue rose by 15%, propelled by 
the surge in oil prices, so that the federal budget deficit narrowed slightly 
to 5.3% of GDP (Figure 3.26.5). The ratio of federal government debt to 
GDP edged higher to 53.5%. 
Growth in M2 money supply rose by 14.6% year on year in December 
2011, double the rate of the prior-year month. Credit to the private sector 
accelerated to 12.2% in 2011.
The external position remained strong. Merchandise exports climbed 
by 14.5% to US$227.5 billion, largely a result of higher prices for export
commodities. The value of palm oil shipments jumped by 32.6% and that 
of minerals (mainly oil) by just over 22%. By contrast, the weakness in 
global demand for electronics and electrical products, alongside supply 
disruptions, took down their exports by 5.4%. After a 13.9% increase in 
imports to US$178.7 billion, the trade surplus rose to US$48.8 billion
(Figure 3.26.6). The current account surplus as a share of GDP remained 
large at 11.5%.
In the capital and financial accounts, net portfolio investment of 
US$9.9 billion in 2011 was lower than in 2010 owing to global investor
risk aversion caused by the eurozone and the United States fiscal and debt 
concerns in the second half of the year. Inward direct investment rose 
by nearly 19% to US$10.8 billion, exceeded by outward direct investment
that rose by 11% to US$14.8 billion. Other investment outflows moderated
and the overall balance of payments recorded a surplus of US$31.0 billion.
That lifted international reserves to $138.4 billion at end-2011, sufficient
to finance about 8 months of retained imports and 4.1 times short-term 
external debt. The ringgit depreciated against the US dollar by about 3% 
during the year.
Concerned about high levels of household debt (equivalent to 76.6% 
of GDP in 2011), the central bank moved to damp speculation in housing 
and to tighten credit card issuance. For housing loans, it imposed a 70% 
loan-to-value ratio on individual borrowers with more than two housing 
loans, and ruled that housing loan approvals be based on net rather than 
gross household income. Capital charges on commercial banks were 
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increased for housing loans with loan-to-value ratios exceeding 90%, and 
on personal loans of more than 5 years.
On credit cards, the central bank put limits on the number of 
cards and the amount of credit available for people earning less than 
RM36,000 (US$11,760) a year. That comes on top of a RM50 annual tax
on credit cards.
Economic prospects
Given the country’s close integration with the world economy—exports 
and imports of goods and services are equivalent to over 100% of GDP—
weakness in the global outlook clouds Malaysia’s prospects in 2012. 
Growth is seen moderating to about 4.0%, then quickening in 2013 as the 
external environment improves (Figure 3.26.7).
Domestic demand will again anchor growth. Private consumption 
will get support from government decisions in the 2012 budget to raise 
wages for the public sector and to make a one-time cash payment to low- 
and middle-income groups (53% of all households). Government plans to 
introduce a minimum wage in 2012 are expected to lift incomes for the 
low paid.
Still, the labor market is likely to soften, particularly in trade-exposed 
industries. Job vacancies in January 2012 declined steeply from the prior-
year period. Consumer sentiment weakened late in 2011 (Figure 3.26.8).
Private investment in export-oriented industries such as electrical and 
electronics products will be subdued by the weak global outlook this year, 
although investment will likely be relatively buoyant in industries that 
depend on domestic demand.
The government is pressing ahead with its Economic Transformation 
Programme, launched in 2010, to develop higher value-added industries 
and infrastructure in partnership with private investors. According 
to government officials, investment totaling US$58 billion has been
committed through 2020 under the program. Several large projects 
associated with this initiative will start construction during the forecast 
period, including an $11.5 billion mass rapid transit rail system in Kuala
Lumpur and redevelopment of the Sungai Besi military airbase and a 
large site near the center of the capital for residential and commercial 
purposes. 
The leading index of economic activity in January 2012 suggested 
slower economic growth in the near term, and the forward-looking 
Business Conditions Index, compiled from a survey of manufacturers, fell 
late last year (Figure 3.26.8).
From the production side, services are likely to continue to drive 
growth in 2012. The government is relaxing some restrictions on foreign 
investment in 17 services subsectors, including accounting, education, 
legal, and medical services, following a similar easing for 27 services 
subsectors in 2009. Tax breaks have been offered to encourage treasury 
management, as well as Islamic and other financial services.
Construction will gain from work on major projects and 
on a US$2.0 billion off-budget government program to upgrade
infrastructure. The impact on construction from the curbs on credit 
for speculation in housing and an increase in the tax on profits from 
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selling properties within 5 years of acquisition is expected to be modest. 
Sluggish external demand will weigh on manufacturing and on trade-
related services. Growth of agriculture will decelerate from the rapid 
pace seen last year.
Fiscal policy is targeted at stimulating domestic demand again 
this year. The federal deficit is expected to be broadly similar to that 
recorded for 2011 as a share of GDP. The central bank has signaled that 
it has the flexibility to increase monetary stimulus if the global economy 
deteriorates.
Inflation is forecast to recede to 2.4% (Figure 3.26.9) in light of 
moderating domestic demand and generally lower prices for imported 
commodities. This forecast assumes that subsidies on electricity, food, and 
fuel will not be cut ahead of national elections due in 2013. The ringgit 
appreciated by 3.4% against the US dollar in the first quarter of 2012, 
helping to damp inflation. In 2013, inflation is seen picking up to 2.8%, in 
line with domestic demand.
Growth in merchandise exports is expected to be subdued in 2012 
owing to torpid global trade and softer prices for export commodities, 
including palm oil. Similarly, imports will increase at a modest rate, in 
tandem with weakness in manufacturing industries and more moderate 
growth in private domestic demand. The current account will continue to 
record substantial surpluses through the forecast period.
Lower than expected growth in global trade would put the 2012 
growth forecast at risk, given the country’s reliance on exports. 
Domestically, the high level of household debt poses a risk if the labor 
market is weaker than anticipated.
Policy challenge—reining in subsidies
The cost of government subsidies on fuel, staple foods, electricity, health, 
and education has climbed from 1.3% of total government spending in 
1990 to 14.3% in 2011 (about 4% of GDP). Fuel subsidies alone amounted 
to 4.7% of total government spending in 2010 (Figure 3.26.10). Mainly 
for this reason, Malaysians consume 450 liters of fuel a head each year, 
4.5 times as much as Thais and nine times Indonesians, according to the 
government. 
Subsidies suppress inflation, but also contribute to the chronic 
fiscal deficit, reduce budget funding available for social and economic 
development, and distort resource allocation. The vast bulk of the 
subsidies benefit consumers, students, and companies in general, rather 
than the poor, because of inadequate targeting.
The government started to gradually reduce subsidies in 2010 on 
gasoline, cooking gas, electricity, and road tolls, and committed to better 
target remaining subsidies to lower income groups. It offered partial 
compensation for the upward impact on inflation, including cash rebates 
to owners of motorcycles and small cars (below 1,000cc). Budget savings 
estimated at about US$33 billion in the 5 years that subsidies were to be
phased down were to have been applied to reining in the fiscal deficit. 
However the phase-down plan has since been suspended and it is unclear 
when it will resume.
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Myanmar
Economic growth picked up in FY2011, based largely on foreign investment in energy and exports of 
commodities and natural gas. That trend is forecast to continue, assisted by policy reforms and higher gas 
exports in 2013. Inflation is expected to quicken, after receding in 2011. The government has taken steps 
to revitalize the economy, but the agenda of required reforms is long.
Economic performance
GDP growth edged up to an estimated 5.5% in FY2011 (ended 31 March 
2012), from an average of 4.9% over the previous 4 years, based mainly 
on investment in hydropower, natural gas, and oil. Agriculture remained 
subdued owing to flooding and currency appreciation that hurt exports.
International tourist arrivals rose by an estimated 26% (Figure 3.27.1), 
in part a response to initial political and economic reforms after national 
elections in November 2010.
(Official GDP growth figures, which are considerably higher than 
these unofficial estimates, are inconsistent with variables that are closely 
correlated with economic growth, such as energy use.)
The exchange rate of the kyat on the unofficial market appreciated to 
about MK800/$1 in 2011, maintaining an upward trend from MK1,000
in 2009. The appreciation was driven largely by foreign investment. (The 
official exchange rate was maintained at MK5.4/$1 in FY2011.)
One outcome of the stronger market exchange rate was to reduce rice 
exports, which created a surplus in the domestic market and brought 
down rice prices. That helped slow inflation to 4.2% on average in FY2011, 
from 7.3% in the previous fiscal year.
Exports of gas increased by nearly 15% to an estimated $3 billion
(Figure 3.27.2). Gemstone and jade exports, however, likely declined after 
doubling in FY2010. Higher levels of imports, particularly construction 
materials and machinery, widened the current account deficit to an 
estimated 2.7% of GDP in FY2011, from 0.9% in FY2010.
Increased foreign investment in energy and hydropower, estimated at 
$2.8 billion in FY2011, lifted international reserves to about $8 billion by
March 2012, equivalent to 9.4 months of imports (Figure 3.27.3). Foreign 
investment in other industries is insignificant owing to barriers to entry 
and a poor business environment. Total external debt is estimated at 
$11 billion, with about half in arrears.
The consolidated fiscal deficit—covering the central government 
and state economic enterprises—is estimated at 5.5% of GDP in FY2011 
(Figure 3.27.4). Revenue collection remained low because of weak tax 
administration and a reduction of export taxes implemented to support 
This chapter was written by Alfredo Perdiguero of the Thailand Resident Mission, ADB, 
Bangkok.
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agricultural exports. The phasing down of construction of the new capital 
Naypyidaw helped rein in growth of government spending.
The monetary authorities lowered administered bank interest rates 
by 4 percentage points from 17% to 13% for lending and from 12% to 8% 
for deposits in FY2011, though banks were also given some flexibility in 
setting deposit rates. Yields on Treasury bonds made them attractive 
investments for banks, which reduced central bank monetization of the 
fiscal deficit in FY2011.
Economic prospects
The government that took office in March 2011 has an opportunity 
to rejuvenate the economy after more than 50 years of stagnation. 
In a promising start, the authorities took steps to unify the multiple 
exchange rates and are preparing other reforms, including a new national 
development plan.
New currency arrangements from 1 April 2012 involve a managed float 
of the kyat with a reference exchange rate of MK818/$1. The government
plans to establish a formal interbank market and relax exchange 
restrictions on current international payments and transfers. Fiscal policy 
in FY2012 targets a modest fiscal deficit equivalent to 4.6% of GDP.
Among planned reforms is a land law giving farmers the right to 
own, sell, and mortgage their land. Credit to the farm sector remains 
inadequate, even though the Myanmar Agriculture Development Bank 
has doubled its funding for farmers in each of the past 2 years. A 
microfinance law was approved in November 2011 to expand microcredit 
to farmers.
The government is preparing a foreign investment law that is expected 
to offer tax breaks to investors and allow them to lease private land and 
repatriate investment proceeds using market exchange rates. Special 
economic zones in Dawei in southern Myanmar, Thilawa near Yangon, 
and Kyaukphyu on the west coast will be established to attract industry.
While the government last year ordered that work be suspended on 
the large Myitsone hydropower project owing to environmental concerns, 
investment is picking up on other hydropower and coal-powered plants, 
gas fields, and oil and gas pipelines.
Gas production and exports are scheduled to increase sharply in 
FY2013 when the Shwe and Zawtika gas fields and pipelines to the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) and Thailand, now under construction, come 
on line. However, a market-determined exchange rate will threaten the 
viability of state economic enterprises that long benefited from importing 
inputs at the official exchange rate, abolished on 1 April this year.
GDP is forecast to grow by about 6.0% in FY2012 and 6.3% in FY2013 
(Figure 3.27.5). Inflation is seen quickening to just over 6% (Figure 3.27.6). 
The authorities raised administered electricity prices in late 2011 and fuel 
prices in early 2012. A government plan to help farmers by supporting 
rice prices is likely to lead to higher retail prices of rice.
Relaxing foreign exchange controls is expected to propel imports 
upward and contribute to widening the current account deficit 
(Figure 3.27.7).
Easing of economic sanctions imposed on Myanmar by industrial 
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countries would lead to higher levels of trade and investment, as well as 
the resumption of assistance and concessionary financing both from these 
countries and from international financial institutions.
Policy challenge highlights
A key challenge is to maintain macroeconomic stability as the country 
opens to increased flows of trade and investment.
As for policy reforms, the agenda is extensive, given the low level of 
economic and social development. Per capita GDP is one of the lowest 
in Southeast Asia at about $715 (Figure 3.27.8), and 26% of the country’s
60 million people live in poverty. Myanmar’s ranking on the United 
Nations Human Development Index is near the bottom of the list (149 
of 187 countries). The country needs to embark on a comprehensive and 
well-sequenced program of reforms if it is to realize its potential.
Public institutions, the financial system, and workforce skills are 
focuses for strengthening. Developing the private sector depends on 
opening more areas to its participation and upgrading the regulatory, 
legal, and policy environment.
The government needs to generate adequate fiscal resources to expand 
infrastructure (75% of the population do not have access to electricity) 
and improve health, education, and social protection systems. A simpler 
and broader tax structure and greater emphasis on direct (rather than 
indirect) taxes would bolster fiscal resources and be fairer to the poor.
Extending transport networks to link Myanmar more closely with 
neighbors would enable its businesses to participate in East and Southeast 
Asian, as well as global, production chains.
Unifying the exchange rate will expose the inefficiencies and losses 
of state enterprises, which dominate parts of the economy. That is likely 
to require reforms to put state enterprises on a more commercial basis, 
including privatizing some and possibly closing others. Thus, temporary 
and transparent subsidies will have to be introduced to minimize the 
impact on the poor as state enterprises raise prices and lay off employees.
Expanded access to formal finance is another key challenge that will 
require a phasing out of bank deposit-to-capital ratios and an easing 
of collateral requirements. Upgrading the central bank would involve 
granting it operational autonomy and strengthening its capacity to 
supervise the financial sector. Consolidating the domestic banking sector 
and developing partnerships with foreign banks would strengthen the 
banking system.
Agriculture, which employs over half the population, has great 
potential for improvement. The distribution of land ownership certificates 
under the new land law is a step forward, but will require careful 
implementation to ensure that the poor benefit. This measure should be 
complemented by an expansion of credit to farmers, increased public 
investment in rural infrastructure, and better seeds, fertilizers, extension 
services, and post-harvest facilities.
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Philippines
Slumping exports and a fall in government spending undercut the impact on economic growth of strong 
private consumption in 2011. This year, the authorities have stepped up public spending and relaxed 
monetary policy, laying the ground for an upturn in GDP growth that is projected to continue through 
2013. Inflation is seen at moderate levels through the forecast period. Nevertheless, considerably stronger 
economic growth is needed to make substantial reductions in unemployment and poverty. 
Economic performance
A decline in exports of electronic products and in government spending 
curtailed GDP growth to 3.7% in 2011. Most of the growth (Figure 3.28.1) 
came from a 6.1% increase in private consumption, which was again 
supported by remittances from overseas Filipino workers (up by 7.2% to 
$20.8 billion, or by 3.0% in peso terms) and by lower lending rates.
Fixed capital investment decelerated because of sluggish public 
construction and slower growth in private investment. As a share of 
GDP, fixed capital investment declined to 19.3% from a 7-year peak of 
20.5% in 2010. 
Government consumption and capital spending fell, reflecting a high 
base in 2010 (when expenditure had risen ahead of national elections) and 
the introduction of governance reforms in 2011 (which delayed spending 
by government agencies). As the economy softened, the government 
accelerated budget disbursements late in the year, mitigating the impact 
on the economy of a steep slide in exports. 
Lower than planned government spending, coupled with some 
improvement in tax revenue, narrowed the fiscal deficit to 2.0% of GDP 
(Figure 3.28.2), well within the 3.0% deficit target. Expenditure rose by 
just 2.3% (in nominal terms), with significant shortfalls in infrastructure 
outlays. The tax-to-GDP ratio rose slightly to 12.3%. One impact of these 
developments was to reduce national government debt to the equivalent 
of 50.9% of GDP, the lowest since 1998.
From the production aspect, services grew by 5.0% in 2011 and 
provided three-fourths of total GDP growth. Retail trade, business 
process outsourcing (BPO), and financial and real estate services were 
the main contributors. Industry grew by only 1.9% owing to weak public 
construction and subdued manufacturing, caused mainly by a slump in 
electronics exports. Some other manufacturing subsectors, such as food, 
chemicals, and furniture, drew support from the expanding domestic 
consumption. Private construction growth eased from the rapid pace 
in 2010. Agriculture, after 2 years of contraction due to bad weather, 
recovered by 2.6%. 
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Employment improved by 3.2% in 2011, or about 1.2 million new 
jobs, although most were part time. The new jobs slightly exceeded the 
increase in the labor force. The unemployment rate eased to 7.0% from 
7.4%, but the rate of underemployment rose to 19.3% while other labor 
market indicators remained weak: youth unemployment was high at 16.3% 
and employment in manufacturing was low at 8.3% of total employment. 
About 20% of the unemployed were college graduates, indicating a 
mismatch between their skills and the needs of the labor market. 
Higher global oil and food prices lifted average inflation to 4.8%, just 
within the central bank’s 3–5% target range. A good harvest helped slow 
inflation from October (Figure 3.28.3). Earlier concerns over inflation 
prompted Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to lift its policy interest rates 
by 50 basis points in early 2011, to 4.5% for overnight borrowing and 
6.5% for overnight lending. It also raised bank reserve requirements, by 
2 percentage points to 21.0%. As inflation moderated, the central bank 
kept policy rates steady for the rest of the year. The pace of lending to 
the private sector almost doubled to 15.7%, and growth in total domestic 
credit rose sharply to nearly 15%.
A slump in exports widened the trade deficit in 2011, eroding the 
current account surplus (Figure 3.28.4). Merchandise exports fell by 6.9% 
to $47.2 billion, reflecting soft global demand coupled with supply chain
disruptions in electronics caused by the March earthquake in Japan 
and floods in Thailand later in the year. Electronic products (mainly 
semiconductors), which make up about half of total exports, plunged 
by 23.4%, although the impact was cushioned by double-digit growth in 
shipments of clothing, chemicals, and agricultural commodities. Exports 
of minerals also posted strong gains, helped by high world mineral prices. 
Imports rose by 1.6% to $62.7 billion, with substantial increases in oil
(reflecting much higher oil prices), and in durable consumer goods and 
industrial machinery. By contrast, imports of electronics fell, in line with 
electronics exports, and imports of automobiles were disrupted by the 
flooding in Thailand that closed factories there. 
Trade in services produced a larger surplus, mainly owing to 
income from BPO. Remittances also contributed to the current account 
surplus. Net inflows of portfolio investment rose by 26.6% to $5.5 billion
and inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) were broadly steady at 
$1.3 billion, producing a surplus in the capital and financial account
(Figure 3.28.5). 
Relatively low levels of FDI reflect deficiencies in the investment 
environment. The country’s ranking in the World Economic Forum’s 
Global Competitiveness Report 2011–2012 rose by 10 places to 75 (of 142 
countries), mainly due to the lower public deficit and debt, improved 
credit ratings, and moderate inflation. However, the Philippines 
scored low marks for infrastructure, quality of public institutions, and 
corruption, so that its overall competitiveness ranking lagged behind 
neighbors such as Indonesia (46) and Viet Nam (65). 
Gross international reserves increased by 21% to $75.3 billion, cover
for 11.1 months of imports. Domestic financial markets strengthened, with 
stock prices up by 4% over the year and yields declining on government 
bonds. The peso ended 2011 little changed against the United States (US) 
dollar from a year earlier. 
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Economic prospects
Forecasts for 2012 and 2013 assume that the government will raise 
spending, follow through on its commitment to improve the business 
environment, and carry out some of the planned public–private 
partnerships, which include airports, highways, and water supply 
operations (they were delayed in 2011).
GDP growth is forecast to recover to 4.8% in 2012 (Figure 3.28.6), 
underpinned by strong private consumption and a pickup in public and 
private investment. Household consumption will benefit from inflows of 
remittances, lower average inflation, and positive consumer sentiment. 
Remittances in US dollars will increase by about 5% in 2012, the central 
bank projects. 
Business sentiment is positive, too, according to a survey by the 
central bank in the first quarter of 2012 (Figure 3.28.7). Respondents cited 
increasing orders, new contracts and projects, and higher government 
spending. Investment commitments approved by state agencies rose 
by 37.6% in 2011. Bank credit has been on an upward trend and the 
stock market index reached a record high in March 2012, spurred by 
expectations of better corporate earnings. 
Sovereign rating upgrades support the investment outlook. Moody’s 
raised the country’s foreign and local currency long-term bond ratings in 
2011 from Ba3 to Ba2 (two notches below investment grade), while Fitch 
lifted the long-term foreign currency rating from BB to BB plus (one 
notch below investment grade). Standard & Poor’s late last year raised 
the rating outlook to positive from stable (its long-term foreign currency 
rating is two notches below investment grade).
Fiscal policy is set to be more expansionary in 2012. Budget 
allocations for social services and infrastructure are up sharply from 2011 
(Figure 3.28.8) and the budget deficit target is widened to 2.6% of GDP 
from last year’s actual deficit of 2.0%. The pickup in budget spending 
that started late last year continued into January 2012, and in that month 
the government released to its agencies a large portion of the 2012 
infrastructure budget, signifying early project implementation. 
Monetary policy has been relaxed to support growth. Early in 2012, 
the central bank cut policy rates by 50 basis points to the low levels set 
during the 2009 global recession—4.0% for overnight borrowing and 
6.0% for overnight lending. It also reduced bank reserve requirements 
by 3 percentage points, though this was primarily to offset the impact of 
other changes in the reserve requirements. 
The drag on economic growth exerted by weakness in net exports 
is expected to diminish in 2012. Modest growth is seen for merchandise 
exports (about 5%), on a pickup in economic growth in the US and 
Japan (which together take about a third of exports) and solid growth 
in Southeast Asia (about a sixth). Problems in Europe and moderating 
growth in the People’s Republic of China (each absorbing about 
one-eighth of exports) will temper export growth.
Reversing an 8-month slide, exports in January 2012 rose by 3.0% year 
on year (21% month on month). Electronics exports picked up, and the 
outlook for semiconductor sales to the US showed improving signs. 
Merchandise imports will likely rise faster than exports, given robust 
consumer demand and the expected lift in investment. The current 
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account surplus is forecast at 2.1% of GDP, after taking into account 
increases in remittances and income from BPO.
Services will remain the main contributor to growth on the supply 
side. BPO export revenue rose by an estimated 22% to $11 billion in 2011,
and this industry continues to expand. Construction will benefit from the 
anticipated ramping up of infrastructure projects. 
In 2013, GDP growth is projected to quicken to about 5% on 
expectations of a more favorable external environment and gathering 
momentum in infrastructure investment. 
Inflation is forecast to be lower in 2012 than last year (Figure 3.28.9), 
assuming global food and oil prices on average change little this year 
relative to 2011. The peso is expected to be broadly stable against the US 
dollar. 
The government aims to rein in the 2013 budget deficit to 2.0% of 
GDP, which is likely to require a sizable increase in revenue. Thus, in 
addition to efforts on tax administration, the authorities are seeking 
higher tax revenue from alcohol and tobacco products and an overhaul 
of incentives to attract direct investment. Revenue increases are also 
needed if the country is to achieve key Millennium Development Goals. 
The Philippines is making slow progress on the goals related to poverty, 
primary education, and maternal and child health. 
Policy challenge—securing inclusive growth
Economic growth in 2000–2011 averaged 4.7%, well above 2.9% in the 
1990s and 1.7% in the 1980s. The pickup in growth was driven mainly 
by private consumption, backed by remittance inflows, and on the 
production side by services. Inflation has generally been moderate at an 
average of 5.1% in 2000–2011, and the external position has strengthened. 
Despite this better performance, however, structural weaknesses have 
frustrated the achievement of inclusive growth.
Weak link between growth and development. Unemployment 
and underemployment remained high in 2011. Many workers are in 
low-productivity jobs and real average wages have declined. With a Gini 
coefficient of over 40, income inequality is also high. The incidence of 
poverty fell from 33.1% in 1991 to 24.9% in 2003, but then turned up to 
26.4% in 2006 and stayed around that rate in 2009. About 9.5 million 
Filipinos, or nearly 10% of the population, work abroad because of a lack 
of good jobs at home.
Rising growth and declining investment. Although growth quickened 
in 2000–2011, fixed investment as a share of GDP declined to 19% in the 
most recent years (it was 19.3% in 2011, for example), from slightly above 
20% in 2000 (Figure 3.38.10). In Indonesia, by contrast, the investment 
rate has climbed from about 19% to 32% over the same period. 
Limited diversification of exports. Merchandise exports are highly 
concentrated in electronics (60% of total exports in 2010), particularly 
semiconductors (about 77% of total electronics exports). This structure 
makes the economy vulnerable to downturns in global electronics 
demand and to disrupted electronics production chains, as happened in 
2011. Philippine merchandise exports fell in the second half of 2011, while 
exports generally increased in other Southeast Asian countries.
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The root cause—industry has stagnated. The main growth engine 
of high-performing Asian economies has been dynamic structural 
transformation: output shifts from low-productivity goods into high-
productivity ones, particularly manufactures; labor moves from 
agriculture to industry; and exports become more diversified. Industry 
in these economies has maintained productivity gains by upgrading 
technology and manufactured products. This transformation sustains 
growth and generates better-paying jobs to reduce poverty.
But in the Philippines, industry’s share of GDP declined from 39% 
in 1980 to 32% in 2011. Manufacturing accounted for just 22.4% of GDP 
and 8.3% of employment that year. Growth has instead relied on services 
(Figure 3.28.11), a trend accelerated by rapid expansion of BPO services 
over the past 7 years (Figure 3.28.12).
Sluggish growth in industry has suppressed economy-wide 
labor productivity, which rose by only 10% over the past 30 years 
(Figure 3.28.13). Labor productivity in services has been less than half 
that of industry over this period. This implies that, although services has 
made the greatest contribution to economic growth and job creation, it is 
not necessarily associated with a rise in high-productivity employment on 
aggregate.
The BPO industry employs only about 1% of the labor force and it 
hires relatively skilled workers. Given the large, and increasing, number 
of underutilized workers with moderate skills, it is unlikely that BPO 
alone can drive inclusive growth. 
Underlying reasons for the industrial stagnation can be traced to 
the 1980s, when global manufacturers relocated production to East 
and Southeast Asia. They sidestepped the Philippines largely because 
of domestic political instability. Later success at attracting electronics, 
mainly assembly work, in the 1990s raised the promise of a deepening 
of industrial capabilities. However, the electronics industry has not 
upgraded and diversified its products and its presence has not spurred 
significant development in fields such as machinery, chemicals, and 
metals processing, owing to the underprovision of infrastructure 
(particularly transport networks and electricity supply) and an unfriendly 
business environment (poor governance, weak contract enforcement and 
property rights, and cumbersome business regulations).
Policy actions. A first step is to resolve pervasive constraints by 
accelerating development of the physical, institutional, and social 
infrastructure; instituting good governance; and improving the business 
environment. 
Specifically for industry, the government could consider support for 
diversification and value addition. Decisions on restructuring, innovation, 
and product mixes are matters for the private sector. Still, the government 
can play a strategic and coordinating role in creating incentives for 
industrial development and providing targeted support for selected 
products, with benchmarks for success and sunset clauses for phasing out 
support. Such measures would involve close government–private sector 
cooperation to identify promising products and to diagnose and address 
impediments to their development. 
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Singapore
Economic growth is volatile—slumping during the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, rebounding strongly 
in 2010, slowing to a more sustainable level in 2011, and decelerating further in 2012. Singapore’s vital 
trade in manufactured goods and financial services will not fully stabilize until the world economic 
outlook improves, forecast for the latter part of this year and into 2013. Still, strong domestic demand 
is helping offset the weak external sector. In 2013, the growth rate should pick up pace as the recovery 
in the United States (US) strengthens and the eurozone situation improves.
Economic performance
Following a record 14.8% jump in 2010, economic growth eased to 4.9% 
in 2011. The main contributor to growth was domestic demand, notably 
private consumption and investment (Figure 3.29.1). Private consumption 
rose by 4.1% and accounted for 30% of overall growth. Supporting this 
was strong employment: the unemployment rate dipped as low as 2% 
after a tightening of foreign worker levies was announced in February. 
Investment increased by almost 10%, contributing 40% of overall growth. 
Gross fixed capital formation rose by only 3.3% but, because of a much 
diminished rundown of inventories, investment was higher. Government 
consumption nudged up by less than 1%.
Even though external trade was so weak, especially toward the end 
of the year (Figure 3.29.2), net exports still accounted for 25% of overall 
growth. Exports climbed by only 2.6%. The weak trade performance was 
in contrast to that in 2010, when net exports rose by 40% (versus 3.4% in 
2011) and accounted for the bulk of a much higher overall growth rate.
The main supply contributors to growth were manufacturing and 
financial services (Figure 3.29.3). Manufacturing output increased by 7.6%, 
a healthy rate buoyed by biomedical exports, but this was a big pullback 
from the exceptional 30% growth seen in 2010. The electronics subsector 
slumped, as global demand dropped for semiconductors and related 
equipment. The impact was severe in the last quarter, as falling business 
confidence combined with a general inventory overhang.
Despite the uncertain global context, financial services grew by 9%; 
they now directly account for 12% of GDP and support a large number of 
related subsectors. The accommodation and food services subsector rose 
by 6%, driven by fast-growing tourist arrivals, although the wholesale 
and retail trade subsector grew only marginally, reflecting the weak 
trade performance. Transport and storage and business services climbed 
strongly in the first half but fell flat in the second.
Construction activity was slow, particularly in the fourth quarter, 
mainly reflecting a decline in residential building. Although property 
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prices have risen by more than 50% since mid-2009, they have slowed for 
eight consecutive quarters, in part due to government measures to curb 
speculation.
Inflation averaged 5.2%, double 2010’s rate, mainly because of higher 
costs of housing, transport, and food (Figure 3.29.4). Housing costs rose 
by 8.3% and transport costs by 12% (reflecting tightening of certificates 
of entitlement designed to reduce traffic congestion). Imported inflation 
associated with food and fuel prices was also a contributing factor, 
although the general strength of the Singapore dollar helped lessen 
imported price pressures. Core inflation was around half the headline rate.
After the rebound of economic activity in 2010, fiscal consolidation 
has replaced fiscal stimulus introduced in response to the global financial 
crisis. Although the FY2011 budget (1 April–31 March 2012) projected a 
small deficit, a substantial surplus is now expected of about S$2.3 billion
or 0.7% of GDP. Revenue was higher than expected owing to strong 
corporate income and property-related tax receipts.
Monetary policy was relatively tight during the year, designed to 
reduce inflation. Money supply (M2) rose by 10.0%, or slightly more 
than in 2010. As the year progressed, however, policy makers became 
increasingly concerned about the deteriorating global and domestic 
economic outlook. As in the past, the main lever of monetary policy was 
the exchange rate. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) eased 
monetary policy a little in October 2011 by lowering the gradient of the 
trading band within which the Singapore dollar is allowed to trade. The 
average exchange rate for the year was S$1.26/US$1, an appreciation of
8.4% from the average in 2010 (Figure 3.29.5).
The overall balance-of-payments surplus was US$17.1 billion, the result
of a decline in net outflows in the capital and financial account, and a 
slight increase in the current account surplus. International financial 
turbulence in the second half of 2011 prompted a sharp fall in Singapore’s 
equity and currency markets, prompting the MAS to cushion the impact 
through injecting dollar liquidity.
Exports grew at a diminishing rate in 2011. In the case of non-oil 
exports and reexports, exports actually contracted in the second half; 
weakening external demand was compounded by the natural disasters 
in Japan and Thailand that severely disrupted global supply chains for 
electronics and other key sectors in which Singapore plays a significant 
role. As noted, while imports also experienced diminishing growth, they 
grew more rapidly than exports. Singapore nonetheless maintained a large 
surplus in its transactions with the rest of the world, and its international 
reserves increased to US$238 billion.
Economic prospects
Despite strong domestic demand, economic growth is forecast to slow 
further in 2012 to 2.8%. Weak external demand stemming from the 
possibility of a recession in the eurozone, a slow US recovery, and the 
moderating growth in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will continue 
to hold back exports and investment in trade-related sectors. Growth is 
forecast to recover to 4.5% in 2013, assuming that the global economic 
outlook improves.
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Private consumption is expected to be high, with the labor force 
benefiting from tight supply conditions as the government endeavors 
to reduce the country’s reliance on foreign workers. Private sector 
investment will likely be anemic on concern over global prospects. 
Public infrastructure investment, though, will remain a priority of the 
government, even as it continues its policy of fiscal consolidation. 
The FY2012 budget announced in February indicated a surplus of 0.4% 
of GDP for the current fiscal year (ending 31 March 2013). The budget 
focuses on measures to reduce the dependence on foreign workers and to 
strengthen productivity and innovation, following the recommendations 
last year of the Economic Strategies Committee of the Prime Minister’s 
Office. The government is in a solid position to introduce new fiscal 
stimuli, if they are needed, to act early against any early signs of a 
developing economic setback.
Manufacturing, especially its electronics subsector, will continue to 
run into the headwinds that have not fully dissipated from the second 
half of 2011 (Figure 3.29.6). The sector is highly dependent on final 
demand in the US and Europe, neither of which is expected to show 
strength this year. 
Also, Singaporean electronics firms have to restructure and seek 
higher value-added development opportunities. Firms are continuing to 
hire and expand, but cautiously in light of the uncertain global outlook. 
Although trade within Asia, notably with the PRC, has continued to 
expand rapidly, it is heavily based on global value chains and final 
demand in advanced countries. The biomedical manufacturing subsector 
is, however, less sensitive than the electronics industry to variations in 
external demand, and appears to have strong growth potential.
Similar to manufacturing, financial services are expected to face 
continued headwinds during the next couple of years, but recently 
international equity markets have seen a big lift, including those in 
Singapore, one of Asia’s biggest wealth management centers. Demand 
from the region for services such as finance, logistics, and tourism is 
likely to continue growing. 
The conditions driving Singapore property prices higher in 
recent years—notably brisk demand and tight supply—are expected to 
continue easing, mainly because the measures taken last year by the 
government to cool the property market appear to have been effective 
(Figure 3.29.7). The continued slowdown in the economy should help cool 
demand further, contributing to a correction in home prices and sales 
volume this year.
Inflation is forecast to decline to 3.0% and 2.5% in 2012 and 2013, 
abetted by slow domestic and global growth. The strength of the 
Singapore dollar will also help contain imported inflation, as will the 
expected easing of world commodity prices (apart from oil). As inflation 
recedes, the MAS will likely take further steps to loosen monetary policy.
Singapore will continue to have very large current account surpluses, 
the equivalent of 18.0% and 16.0% of GDP in 2012 and 2013. Merchandise 
exports, although with subdued growth, will remain an important 
source of growth. The services account will likely remain in surplus, 
boosted by tourism receipts and strong external demand for Singapore’s 
financial services. By contrast, the income account will remain in deficit. 
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Although income from abroad is expected to grow as local companies 
make increased returns on investments abroad, income payments will 
also mount, in line with steady profits made by foreign companies with 
subsidiaries in Singapore.
Forecast risks are on the downside, as the global economic outlook is 
so uncertain. The biggest risk lies in the eurozone and possible worsening 
of its sovereign debt crisis. Independently of that, a sharper than expected 
slowdown in the PRC would weaken Singapore’s growth prospects. Yet 
another risk is a possible spike in oil prices caused by Middle East tensions.
Policy challenge—Foreign workers/productivity 
tradeoff
Foreign workers account for over one-third of the labor force 
(Figure 3.29.8), reflecting the aging structure of the population and 
declining birth rates (Figure 3.29.9). The large presence of foreign workers 
has enabled Singapore to expand its manufacturing, financial services, 
and other key sectors. Further, skilled foreign workers have helped it 
maintain its cost competitiveness in high-end products.
Their prevalence may, however, have lowered the wages of local 
low-skilled workers. There has also been concern that such a large presence 
may have discouraged technology adoption and lowered labor productivity. 
Housing pressures and other consequences are further areas of concern.
In this slow-growth period, policy makers are concentrating on ways to 
mitigate some of these effects, especially the intensifying competition with 
foreign workers for unskilled jobs. The Economic Strategies Committee 
has recommended restricting the number of foreign workers and targeting 
productivity growth of 2–3% annually, leading to an economy of highly 
skilled workers employed in innovative services and industry sectors.
Thus foreign worker levies, paid by employers, are being raised at 
6-month intervals, starting in January 2012 through July 2013. Increases 
in the levies vary by sector, generally higher for low-skilled work (e.g., 
construction) and lower for high-skilled work (manufacturing and 
financial services). Dependency ratio ceilings are also being reduced, 
which specify the maximum proportion of foreign workers that 
companies can hire. Concurrently, the government is encouraging 
businesses to invest in productivity and to reduce their reliance on 
low-skilled foreign workers. Multinational and large companies should 
adjust to the higher levies and lower quotas without much difficulty, but 
small and medium-sized companies (SMEs) relying heavily on foreign 
workers will find it hard to restructure.
To facilitate the transition, a S$2 billion National Productivity Fund has
been established. Further, the government has introduced specific initiatives 
to help SMEs restructure their operations, such as the SME Productivity 
Roadmap, which provides a systematic approach for improving productive 
capacity. The Continuing Education and Training system is designed to 
ensure that Singaporeans’ skills are regularly upgraded.
Singapore has determined that it must reduce its dependence on 
foreign workers and transition to higher value-added activities. The 
structural realignment will be gradual, but potentially far-reaching.
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Thailand
Devastating floods disrupted manufacturing and other industries in the second half of 2011, leaving 
the economy virtually flat over the 12  months. This year, reconstruction and policy stimulus will spark 
a rebound in growth, despite sluggish exports, and inflation, which quickened in 2011, is forecast to 
moderate. Rebuilding factories and infrastructure, as well as investor confidence, will be a major task 
during the forecast period.
Economic performance
Widespread flooding in August–November 2011, the worst in more than 
50 years, devastated the economy. The floods across central and northern 
Thailand disrupted industries, including agriculture, construction, 
transport, and retailing, for months. The economy contracted by 9.0% 
year on year in the fourth quarter (Figure 3.30.1), leaving GDP for the year 
just 0.1% higher than in 2010.
Manufacturing slumped by 21.8% in the fourth quarter when the 
floods submerged factories making automobiles, hard-disk drives, 
electrical appliances, semiconductors, and textiles. As Thailand is the 
world’s 12th biggest automobile maker and accounts for 25% of global 
hard-disk drives, the factory closures caused economic dislocation far 
beyond its borders.
Earlier in the year, the Japanese earthquake and tsunami had caused 
supply shortages for the Thai auto and hard-disk drive industries, 
reducing output. For the whole year, overall manufacturing production 
fell by 4.3%.
Construction was also hit on two fronts—public projects were delayed 
by national elections and a change of government in the third quarter, 
and private activity was curtailed during the flooding. Total construction 
activity for the year fell by 5.1%.
Services contracted in the fourth quarter, largely because of the 
floods, although grew by 3.8% over the whole year and were the main 
contributor to the marginal rise in GDP. Tourist arrivals fell by 4.7% 
in October–December (but still rose by 17.9% to 18.8 million in 2011 
from 2010, a year in which arrivals fell because of 2 months of violent 
demonstrations).
Flooding reduced agricultural yields in the second half, though for 
the full year farm output increased by 3.8% owing to a rebound in the 
first half from a weak prior-year performance.
Private consumption was subdued in 2011 (Figure 3.30.2), in part a 
result of the floods, which dented consumer confidence and lowered 
incomes in affected areas. Farm incomes were hurt in the second half, 
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both by the impact of flooding and lower prices for some agricultural 
commodities. Rising inflation contributed to weakness in private 
consumption, which grew by just 1.3% in 2011.
Government consumption was similarly sluggish. The government 
that took office in August 2011 reviewed and adjusted the budget for the 
fiscal year starting October 2011 (FY2012), which held up some spending.
Private fixed investment, robust for most of 2011, suffered when 
the floods hit, but still rose by 7.2% for the year. Public investment, by 
contrast, fell by 8.7% owing to a combination of the floods, postponement 
of decisions on public works during the election period, and the delay in 
completing the FY2012 budget.
Growth in merchandise exports slowed to 16.4% in US dollar terms 
from 28.4% in 2010. The inundation of many export-oriented factories cut 
merchandise exports by nearly 5.2% in the fourth quarter (Figure 3.30.3). 
Rice exports turned down late in the year because of the impact of floods 
and a new government policy to pay higher prices to farmers for rice, 
reducing its competitiveness in export markets.
Closure of factories during the floods and supply disruptions from the 
earthquake in Japan also damped growth in imports, despite much higher 
prices for imported oil. The surplus in goods trade fell, but the deficit 
in services narrowed slightly, reflecting higher receipts from tourism 
and insurance (from flood claims). That left a current account surplus 
equivalent to 3.4% of GDP, a decline of about a half percentage point from 
the previous year.
The capital and financial account recorded a net outflow of 
$7.2 billion, the effect of an increase in outward direct investment and
withdrawal of portfolio investment from emerging markets in the 
second half of last year. Foreign direct investment into Thailand fell by 
13% to $8.4 billion in 2011. Outward direct investment nearly doubled to
$10.8 million, in part a result of relaxed regulations on Thai investment
abroad. Gross international reserves edged up by 1.7% to $175.1 billion,
cover for 10 months of imports.
Higher oil prices and flood-induced disruptions to supplies of food 
and other consumer goods lifted average inflation to 3.8% in 2011. The 
pace of food price inflation reached a 3-year high of 10.2% in November 
(Figure 3.30.4).
In response to upward pressure on prices and inflation expectations, 
the Bank of Thailand raised its policy interest rate six times in the 
first 8 months of the year, to 3.5%. It then reversed course when the 
flooding hit, the economy contracted, and the global economic outlook 
deteriorated, lowering the policy rate in November and again in January 
2012, to 3.0% (Figure 3.30.5). Commercial bank lending slowed toward 
end-2011, though still rose by 14.9% for the year. The baht depreciated by 
3.9% on average against the US dollar during 2011.
The fiscal deficit narrowed to 1.5% of GDP in FY2011 and public debt 
declined to 40.3% of GDP. Spending on the Thai Khem Kaeng (Strong 
Thailand) infrastructure program fell short of target (about 86% of its 
budgeted funding was disbursed).
To support farmers, the new government committed to purchase 
unmilled rice at B15,000 ($500) a ton from October 2011—well above the
market price—and budgeted B400 billion ($13.2 billion) in FY2012 for this
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purpose. The policy drove up both the domestic price of this staple food 
and the price set by Thai exporters. 
Overseas buyers were not, however, prepared to pay the higher 
prices, at a time that rice exporters in Cambodia, India, Myanmar, and 
Viet Nam were eager to sell, so that Thai rice exports fell by 29% in the 
first 2 months of 2012 from the prior-year period. The government, facing 
heavy costs as rice inventories build, is seeking bilateral government sales. 
It has had some success with Indonesia, which agreed to buy 1 million 
tons of milled rice annually over 5 years.
Economic prospects
Reconstruction of flood-damaged areas and substantial policy stimulus 
will drive a rebound in economic growth in 2012, despite the torpid 
global outlook. GDP growth is expected to recover from last year’s 
marginal 0.1% to 5.5% through the forecast period (Figure 3.30.6).
Private consumption growth will be underpinned by a tight labor 
market, civil service salary increases in January 2012, and a 40% boost in 
minimum wages in April. The government has also introduced incentives 
for first-time buyers of houses (tax breaks) and automobiles (cash rebates). 
Consequently, consumer confidence has started to pick up (Figure 3.30.7) 
after plunging during the floods.
 Sales of consumer durables are getting a lift from the replacement 
of household appliances and furniture damaged during the inundations. 
Automobile sales, which had slumped by 62% year on year in the worst 
month, November, rebounded in January and February this year.
Investment will benefit from extensive private and public reconstruction 
work in flood-hit areas coupled with replacement of capital equipment. 
Small and medium-sized businesses affected by the floods have access to a 
$10 billion low-interest loan program set up by the Bank of Thailand.
In signs of recovery, the industrial capacity utilization rate recovered 
to 62.3% in February, well up from 40.1% at its lowest point in November 
2011 (Figure 3.30.8), and indexes for private consumption and private 
investment surpassed preflood levels. Tourist arrivals rose by 5.2% year on 
year in the first 2 months of 2012.
Half the factories flooded in 2011 had resumed full production by the 
end of February, but some are not expected to get back to that until the 
second or third quarters.
Fiscal and monetary policies have been set to spur growth. Flood-
relief measures rolled out in the last quarter of 2011 included a debt 
moratorium and low-interest loans for farmers and low-income 
households; payments of B5,000 ($165) for households affected by the
floods plus B20,000 ($645) for house repairs; and tax exemptions for
businesses that invest in new production facilities. Businesses get a cut 
in the corporate income tax rate to 23% this year and 20% in 2013, from 
30% in 2011.
In addition to budget outlays, the authorities will spend large amounts 
off budget on reconstruction and flood prevention. Parliament approved 
an emergency decree allowing the government to borrow the equivalent 
of $11.3 billion by June 2013 for flood prevention and water management
projects over the next few years.
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To pave the way for this borrowing, the government shifted 
responsibility for paying interest on about $46 billion of the debt of the
Financial Institutions Development Fund from its budget to the Bank of 
Thailand, effective September 2013. That debt was issued during the late 
1990s’ Asian financial crisis to recapitalize Thai banks.
Further, the government set up a $1.6 billion disaster insurance fund
to help households and businesses buy insurance (premiums charged 
by reinsurers rose sharply after the floods), and it outlined an ambitious 
infrastructure program including roads and railways that could cost up to 
$70 billion over 5–10 years. (Similar infrastructure initiatives by previous
administrations have seen projects delayed or rolled over into later 
programs.)
The ramping up of spending to deal with the impact of the floods is 
expected to raise the fiscal deficit of the central government, including 
budget and off-budget spending, to about 5% of GDP in FY2012, before 
the gap narrows as GDP grows. Monetary policy is accommodative, with 
the policy interest rate at 3.0%, below inflation.
Recovery in manufacturing and agriculture will support growth 
in merchandise exports this year, despite sluggish world trade and 
uncertainties over Thai rice exports. Merchandise exports are projected 
to increase by 15.0%. Imports will increase faster than exports, by 
about 23.0% in 2012, reflecting purchases of capital equipment for 
reconstruction and robust consumer spending. The current account 
will likely slip into deficit next year, equivalent to about 0.5% of GDP 
(Figure 3.30.9).
Net foreign inflows into Thai bonds totaled B50 billion in the first 
2 months of 2012, and the Thai Bond Market Association predicts a 20% 
increase for this year as international investors seek higher yields.
Food price inflation has receded, along with the floods. Nevertheless, 
upward pressure on prices will come from stronger domestic demand, 
rising minimum wages, heavy government spending, and a planned 
reintroduction of excise tax on diesel fuel. Inflation is forecast to average 
3.4% in 2012 and 3.3% in 2013 (Figure 3.30.10).
Government borrowing to fund water management projects is 
projected to lift the public debt to 48.6% of GDP this year and 50.4% 
in 2013 (Figure 3.30.11). While these levels are manageable, the large 
outlays planned on infrastructure, coupled with cuts in corporate taxes 
and diminishing revenue from import taxes owing to trade agreements, 
suggest the debt may continue to rise without new revenue sources such 
as a broader personal income tax base or an environmental tax.
The anticipated rebound in growth this year depends on the 
government reconstructing flood-damaged infrastructure and making 
a significant start on longer-term projects involving flood-prevention 
and water management. Funding is allocated for this work, but the 
government’s ability to implement projects poses a risk: the rate of 
disbursement of the capital budget has fallen to under 60% in recent 
years.
Other risks to the outlook include a deeper than assumed recession 
in the eurozone—the market for nearly 10% of Thai exports and source of 
about 27% of its tourists. Higher than projected global oil prices are also a 
downside risk. Flooding and drought are a perennial threat. 
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Policy challenge—after the deluge
The expansion of industrial zones, often on former low-lying farm land, 
has increased chances that heavy floods will have a really severe impact 
on the economy, as in 2011.
Resulting prolonged closures of factories and extensive damage to a 
broad range of businesses (Figure 3.30.12) also raises the risk that foreign 
firms could become reluctant to expand manufacturing and warehousing 
in Thailand. Maintaining investor confidence depends on rebuilding 
flood-damaged infrastructure promptly, carrying out flood prevention 
and mitigation projects, and establishing a better institutional structure 
to handle crises.
By January 2012, the government had approved a master plan for 
water management that, among other things, covers upgrading warning 
systems, flood protection and management infrastructure, and a central 
agency for water resource management.
Further, the cabinet cleared 246 flood management projects costing 
B24.8 billion ($818.5 million) during the first quarter of this year. These
projects include raising highway levels in flood-prone areas and building 
dikes and drainage systems. Line agencies are scrambling to get as many 
projects as possible completed or under way before the next wet season. 
Officials are identifying land to be set aside as floodways.
Thailand’s ability to assuage investor sentiment will also depend on 
the replacement infrastructure being better able to manage the impact of 
prolonged heavy rainfall and floods than the former structures.
Moreover, although reconstruction must be pursued quickly, it will 
be important to address longer-term water management issues as well, 
and to ensure that water-related projects in one region take into account 
their impact on other regions. For example, Bangkok and surrounding 
industrial areas at the lower reaches of the Chao Phraya river basin 
depend on good water management in the basin’s upper reaches to 
prevent floods that later affect the heavily populated lower regions.
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Viet Nam
The policy tightening adopted to curb high inflation in 2011 also slowed economic growth. The authorities 
loosened monetary policy in early 2012, and signaled that further easing is likely if inflation trends down. 
It is indeed seen receding this year, but then edging up again next year. GDP growth is forecast to remain 
subdued, before picking up in 2013. Beyond macroeconomic stabilization, the government needs to 
address risks in the financial sector.
Economic performance
Confronted at the start of 2011 with soaring inflation and rapidly 
depleting foreign reserves, the government adopted a package of 
monetary and fiscal tightening measures—Resolution 11—that were 
sustained through the year. Policy tightening started to rein in inflation 
and damped economic growth, to 5.9% for the year (Figure 3.31.1) as 
investment fell and consumption growth moderated, more than offsetting 
an improvement in net exports.
Investment declined by 9.2% owing to high lending rates and cuts in 
public infrastructure investment, both elements of the policy tightening. 
Gross capital formation as a ratio to GDP moderated to 38.7%, the lowest 
in 4 years.
Private consumption decelerated to 4.4% as high inflation eroded real 
incomes. Public consumption growth slowed to 7.2%, reflecting the firmer 
fiscal stance. Net exports, by contrast, strengthened in 2011 as exports 
grew faster than imports, making a major contribution to GDP growth.
From the production side, a 7.0% expansion in services made the 
biggest contribution to total growth (2.9 percentage points). Wholesale 
and retail trading and hotels and restaurants both grew by about 7.5%, the 
latter supported by a 19% increase in visitor arrivals.
Stronger exports of manufactured goods underpinned an 8.3% 
expansion in manufacturing. However, construction fell by 1.0% due 
to cuts in public investment and curbs on lending for property. Better 
weather, strong commodity prices, and solid export demand for high-
quality rice drove a 4.0% pickup in agriculture.
Inflation climbed to a 2011 peak of 23.0% year on year in August 
(Figure 3.31.2). It was driven by rising food prices, the lagged impact of 
high credit growth in 2010, exchange rate devaluations, and hikes in 
administrative prices of electricity and fuel. Food prices shot up by 34.1% 
year on year in August. Subsequently, food prices eased and, coupled with 
the impact of the policy tightening, brought inflation down, although it 
was still high at 14.2% in March 2012.
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Policy tightening by the State Bank of Viet Nam (SBV, the central 
bank) was a combination of curbs on credit and money supply, hikes 
in bank reserve requirements and interest rates, and open-market 
operations. The repo rate—the cost of borrowing by commercial banks 
from the SBV on short-term open market operations—was ratcheted up 
from 10% to 14% in 2011, and the refinancing rate from 9% to 15%. The 
reserve ratio for banks’ United States (US) dollar deposits was doubled 
to 8.0% for terms of less than 12 months and tripled to 6.0% for terms of 
12 months or more.
As inflation trended down, real interest rates on dong deposits rose 
but remained negative. Liquidity shortages at some banks prompted them 
to offer deposit interest rates close to 20%, above a 14% cap imposed by 
the SBV. The average rate for borrowing in dong rose to 22% in July 2011, 
before easing to 19% by March 2012.
High borrowing costs, central bank administrative controls, and weak 
business sentiment pulled back growth in credit to 14.3% year on year by 
the end of 2011, from a rapid 32.4% in 2010 (Figure 3.31.3). Tighter liquidity 
contained growth in M2 money supply to 12.1%, slowing from 33.3% the 
previous year.
Most commercial banks met a year-end deadline to limit 
credit outstanding to “discouraged” activities including property, 
marketable securities, and consumer credit to 16% of total lending. The 
overall portion of credit to discouraged activities was estimated at 11.3% at 
end-2011.
The government stabilized the dong exchange rate through monetary 
tightening, coupled with a large one-step devaluation in February 
2011 and administrative measures such as caps on US dollar deposit 
interest rates and restrictions on the use of gold and foreign currency. 
Still, over the year, the dong depreciated by 10% against the US dollar 
(Figure 3.31.4).
Fiscal tightening involved cuts in expenditures, mainly capital works, 
and gains in revenue. The government raised operating expenditure on 
education, health, and social security, but total spending, both on-budget 
and off-budget, is estimated to have declined in real terms last year. 
High prices for domestically produced oil contributed to the increase in 
revenue, as did the impact of inflation and exchange-rate movements. As 
a result, the budget deficit narrowed to 4.4% of GDP, from 5.6% in 2010 
(Figure 3.31.5). Using an international fiscal definition, the deficit was 
estimated at 4.0% of GDP. 
With robust exports, the government met its objective of greatly 
shrinking the trade deficit in 2011. Merchandise exports (up by 34% on a 
balance-of-payments basis) and imports (up by 26%) each totaled about 
$97 billion. High oil prices propelled exports of crude oil by 46% (using
customs data) and exports of agricultural products by 30%. Shipments 
of manufactured goods rose by 35%, shielded from the impact of the 
global downturn because they are mainly low-value added manufactures. 
Currency depreciation buffered exports from rising domestic costs.
Imports decelerated owing to lower demand for raw materials and 
other production inputs for export industries, the cooling of private 
consumption, and currency depreciation. Also, the government restricted 
imports of some consumer goods.
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The current account turned to a small surplus (0.2% of GDP), the 
first surplus in 10 years. That reflected the smaller trade deficit and a 
10% increase in remittances (to about $8.7 billion). Portfolio investment
inflows were below 2010 levels at an estimated $1.4 billion (the VN index
of share prices dropped by 27% in 2011) and foreign direct investment was 
slightly lower at about $6.5 billion.
These capital inflows contributed to a rebuilding of international 
reserves by an estimated $1.4 billion to $13.8 billion in 2011. Favorable
foreign exchange market conditions in the first quarter of 2012 enabled 
the SBV to further increase reserves, to an estimated $16.8 billion,
equivalent to about 2 months of import cover (Figure 3.31.6).
Monetary tightening led to liquidity stress in some banks last year. 
Three small banks facing liquidity problems merged in December 2011 
under the supervision of the SBV, which provided liquidity support to the 
merged entity and instructed a state-owned commercial bank to provide 
it with credit.
Economic prospects
The government, attempting to expand the economy while bringing 
down high inflation, targets a modest acceleration in GDP growth in 
2012 (to 6.0–6.5%) and much lower inflation (under 10%). Fiscal and 
monetary statements suggest some easing in policy settings. The budget 
indicates that on-budget public spending could rise by about 6% in real 
terms (compared with a decline in 2011) and the fiscal deficit target in 
2012 is widened slightly from last year to 4.8% of GDP.
The SBV is targeting credit growth of 15–17% in 2012, slightly faster 
than 14.3% recorded in 2011, and the goal for growth in M2 money 
supply is 14–16%, up from last year’s outcome of 12.1%. The authorities 
have directed banks to continue to limit lending for property, securities, 
and consumer credit to 16% of loan portfolios.
Credit growth ceilings this year are bank-specific, depending on 
a range of financial soundness indicators. Weaker banks have a lower 
ceiling for credit growth than others. Strong banks with higher credit 
growth ceilings hold an estimated 90% of total banking assets.
In March 2012, the SBV responded to the gradual easing of inflation 
by lowering the refinancing, discount, and repo rates by 100 basis points 
(Figure 3.31.7) and reducing the ceiling on dong deposit rates from 14.0% 
to 13.0%. The monetary authorities indicated that further easing depends 
on inflation trending down toward the target (and the forecasts below 
assume this will be the case).
The SBV introduced central bank bills of 1–6-month terms to 
improve liquidity management, and used these securities to sterilize 
bank reserves created by foreign exchange purchases.
Preliminary data indicate that GDP grew by 4.0% in the first quarter 
of 2012, decelerating from 6.1% in the fourth quarter of 2011. Industrial 
production increased by 4.1% year on year. Credit contracted by 2.5% 
during the first 2 months of this year. In further signs of sluggish 
economic activity, merchandise imports grew by 7% in the first quarter.
Private consumption in 2012 will get support from easing inflation. 
Investment will likely remain subdued, given uncertainties about 
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the health of the financial sector, and government capital spending 
is expected to be flat. Growth in exports will slow from 2011, owing 
to weaker world trade, although Viet Nam should benefit from the 
expected gradual pickup in the United States, its biggest export market. 
On the balance of these factors, GDP is forecast to grow by 5.7% 
in 2012 (Figure 3.31.8). Growth is expected to pick up to 6.2% in 2013, 
owing to the improved global outlook for trade and investment and 
likelihood of easier monetary policy next year.
Inflation is forecast to trend down this year, reflecting the policy 
tightening and high base set for the consumer price index in 2011. 
Food price inflation is abating. Weather conditions for agriculture 
were generally favorable in the first quarter of 2012 and global food 
prices are projected to ease this year. However, the government raised 
administered fuel prices by 3–12% in March. Average inflation this 
year could ease to just under double digits, provided policy settings 
are kept sufficiently firm. (Core inflation, which excludes food and 
energy, will be more persistent, though.) Year average inflation in 2013 
is seen quickening to 11.5%, in tandem with economic growth and 
on expectations of higher global food prices and hikes in domestic 
electricity and fuel costs.
The current account is forecast to record a deficit equivalent to 1.5% 
of GDP in 2012 and 2.2% in 2013, largely due to subdued exports.
This outlook would be at risk if the government were to ease policies 
at a pace unsettling the foreign exchange market. Real savings of dong 
depositors have been eroded by negative interest rates over a prolonged 
period. The cumulative “errors and omissions” in the balance of 
payments, estimated at $18 billion in 2009-2011 (Figure 3.31.9), reflects
large volumes of foreign currency and gold outside the banking system.
Lowering interest rates too quickly could put the dong under 
renewed pressure. This would undermine macroeconomic stabilization 
efforts, erode investor and consumer confidence, and undermine 
foreign reserves. Vulnerabilities in the banking system also pose a 
risk. Business confidence and the financial system would be shaken if 
problems at small banks were to spread.
While foreign reserves have been rebuilt, they are still low, making 
the economy vulnerable to external shocks. On the fiscal side, the costs 
of recapitalizing banks, restructuring state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
and raising civil service wages to compensate for rapid inflation puts at 
risk public capital spending. The ratio of current to capital expenditure 
increased significantly last year. Additionally, an increasing proportion 
of government spending is being channeled off budget (Figure 3.31.10), 
raising public financial management risks.
The authorities will need to accelerate reforms of SOEs if they are 
to raise the efficiency of this large sector of the economy, a prerequisite 
for lifting average GDP growth to 7–8%, the target of the Socioeconomic 
Development Strategy 2011-2020. Reform efforts so far have focused on 
small to medium-sized SOEs. The government has committed to draw 
up restructuring plans for 21 large state groups to make them more 
commercially oriented. It wants to reduce by about half the number 
of SOEs to 690 by 2015, and then to 200 by 2020, through full or part 
privatization.
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Concerned about SOEs expanding into areas unrelated to their 
core businesses, the government has banned them from making such 
investments. Increased transparency of the financial performance of 
state enterprises would provide a strong signal to the market that the 
government was committed to reforms.
Policy challenge—financial sector restructuring
Rapid growth in lending over several years, followed by the squeeze on 
credit in 2011 and exacerbated by downturns in property and equities 
markets, have added to stresses for banks. The ratio of nonperforming 
loans to total loans increased to an estimated 3.4% (Figure 3.31.11), 
although it would be much higher under international accounting 
standards. This rising ratio and the risk profile of some bank balance 
sheets, particularly those with exposure to unprofitable and overstretched 
SOEs, raises questions about capital adequacy, particularly for 
small banks. The dangers are compounded by shortcomings in risk 
management at banks and deficiencies in the regulatory and supervisory 
framework.
A 16% increase in US dollar borrowing in 2011 heightened foreign 
exchange risk for banks. This year, the SBV has increased surveillance of 
foreign currency lending. From May 2012, it will restrict foreign currency 
lending only to firms engaged in export and import activity; it will also 
reduce limits on banks’ foreign exchange positions.
Uncertainty over the financial health of banks has unsettled 
investors and hampered interbank market operations. A Financial Sector 
Assessment Program, to be conducted by the International Monetary 
Fund and World Bank at the request of the Vietnamese authorities, 
suggests they intend to address weaknesses in the banking system. The 
assessment, expected in the first half of 2013, will give recommendations 
for financial sector restructuring.
In March 2012, the government outlined a plan that includes injecting 
capital into banks and encouraging strong banks to acquire weaker 
ones. Officials said part-privatization of state-owned commercial banks 
will be accelerated and bank capital requirements raised. Funding and 
timing of the bank recapitalization have not been disclosed in detail. 
The government wants to see, over the next few years, one or two state-
owned commercial banks well placed to compete against other banks in 
Southeast Asia.
Safeguarding the banking sector is the immediate priority. The longer-
term requirement is to develop a diversified and efficient financial system 
that can mobilize funding to meet the 7–8% economic growth target. 
The government has already this year approved a plan to revamp 
the securities market. It covers development of the government and 
corporate bond markets, a restructuring of the two stock exchanges as 
well as securities firms, and an improved payment and settlement system 
for securities. Under the plan, policies are to be formulated to encourage 
more domestic and foreign investors in securities. 
These complex reforms, which will take years to complete, would 
benefit from coordination with the proposed restructuring of SOEs.
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The country continues with weak economic growth, held back by policy uncertainty and structural 
constraints, which have contributed to low levels of private investment. Tourism is performing well, but 
other leading sectors, such as sugar and textiles, are struggling to compete internationally. Economic 
prospects are further clouded by weak global markets. Public expenditure is limited by high levels of 
debt and, longer term, structural reforms are essential for the economy to achieve its growth potential. 
Economic performance 
In 2011, the economy grew by 2.1% after 2 years of contraction. The 
improvement reflects recovery in agriculture, which had been affected 
by cyclone damage in 2010. It also reflects an increase in tourist arrivals 
of 6.8% (Figure 3.32.1). Offsetting these gains, gold output fell by 22% as 
capital works reduced output from the key Vatukoula mine. Electricity 
production was also down more than 4%, because consumption was 
constrained by higher electricity prices.
Exports (through higher earnings from reexports, sugar, gold, 
molasses, and timber) rose by 26.5% in 2011, while merchandise imports 
(largely machinery and transport equipment, food, and mineral fuels) 
climbed by 16.3%.
Inflation reached double digits in midyear but averaged 8.7% for 
the year, up from 7.8% in 2010 (Figure 3.32.2). This reflected higher fuel 
and food prices, an increase in value-added tax, and steeper electricity 
prices.
The budget deficit was equivalent to 3.5% of GDP in 2011, up from 2.1% 
of GDP in 2010. Tax revenue exceeded budget estimates with growth in 
collections from value-added, hotel turnover, and water resource taxes. 
Total revenue fell below budget estimates, however, on delays in selling 
government assets. Expenditure was slightly lower than expected because 
of underspending on the operating and capital budgets. 
Government expenditure in 2011 was dominated by current spending, 
which accounted for 86% of budget outlays. The wage bill remained at 
around 40% of total public spending, or nearly half current outlays. In 
recent years the government has increased spending on infrastructure. 
Capital investment has risen from 9% of total public spending (3.5% of 
GDP) in 2007 to an average of 14% of total public spending (5.2% of GDP) 
in 2008–2011.
Monetary growth was 16.5% in 2011. This reflected a $250 million
foreign bond issue by the government in March 2011 and resulting influx 
of foreign exchange, as well as higher foreign exchange earnings and weak 
import growth.
This chapter was written by Laisiasa Tora of the South Pacific Subregional Office, ADB, 
Suva.
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Since 2008, Fiji’s financial markets have had excess liquidity but, 
despite monetary-policy easing, domestic credit growth has continued 
to slow, rising by just 10% in the 4 years to end-2011. After holding 
steady for 6 months, the Reserve Bank of Fiji (RBF) cut its policy rate in 
October 2011 by 100 basis points, to 0.5%. Although lending to the private 
sector subsequently rose, the RBF is concerned that small and medium-
sized enterprises are being excluded. It has, therefore, introduced a loan 
guarantee scheme, among other measures, to encourage such lending. 
Fiji’s index for the real effective exchange rate rose on an annual basis 
by 5.2% in 2011 due to comparatively high domestic prices. This indicates 
a loss in international competitiveness against major trading partners, as 
well as an erosion of the benefits from devaluation in 2009. 
The current account deficit widened marginally to 11.2% of GDP in 
2011, from 11.0% the previous year. The surplus in the capital and financial 
accounts declined following repayment of a $150 million global bond,
issued in 2006, using part of its March 2011 bond issue. As of end-2011, 
official foreign exchange reserves reached $856 million, equivalent to
around 5 months of imports.
Economic prospects 
The Asian Development Bank projects GDP growth of 1.0% in 2012 
and 1.2% in 2013 (Figure 3.32.3)—lower than government expectations—
reflecting its assessment of likely weak global demand, slow growth in 
bank lending, low levels of private investment, and the effects of the 
floods in early 2012. 
Construction and investments in mining could support modest 
growth. For example, investment to date for the Namosi copper mine 
has been about 2.2% of GDP, or $86.2 million. The impact of further
investment on growth is likely to be muted, however, as equipment will 
be imported.
The government foresees a budget deficit of 1.9% of GDP for 
2012, based largely on expectations of improvements in the economy 
(Figure 3.32.4). Revenue is forecast at $1.1 billion, 12.7% higher than in
2011. Corporate and personal income tax cuts are expected to boost 
spending and investment. Tax revenue will be supplemented by the 
conversion of the 5% hotel turnover tax to a service turnover tax 
applying to most tourism-related services. This is expected to generate 
$32.6 million in revenue in 2012. Other measures include increases in the
airport departure tax, higher excise taxes, and new levies, including voice 
call charges and credit card fees. 
Government expenditure is estimated at $1.2 billion in 2012, up by
5.9% from 2011. Operating spending, which makes up 70% of the total 
(around $840 million) is projected to be 5% higher. Capital expenditure
(around $320 million) is projected to rise by 7.1%. Key features of the 2012
spending program include a 3% salary increase for civil servants and 
an increase of $36.6 million (or 7.0%) in the infrastructure development
budget allocation, to be financed largely by the export-import banks of 
the People’s Republic of China and of Malaysia. The government projects 
a reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio, from 51% in 2012 to around 49% by 
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2014, if its economic and revenue growth targets are met. However, this 
will still exceed the government’s target of 40%. 
Crucially, if these targets are not achieved, the fiscal position could 
deteriorate. This would affect the provision of essential public services 
and increase public debt. There would be little scope for further fiscal 
expansion.
At end-March 2012, the RBF left its policy rate at 0.5% in light of 
continuing uncertainty in the eurozone and the need to support domestic 
investment activity. In February, it required commercial banks to set 
aside 4% and 2% of their deposits for loans for the agriculture and 
renewable energy sectors, respectively. It is important that this measure is 
closely monitored to prevent a rise in nonperforming loans.
Average annual inflation is projected to decline to 5.1% in 2012 
(Figure 3.32.5). This forecast stems from the weak growth outlook, 
projected declines in international food prices, and dissipation of 
one-time price adjustments from last year.
The current account deficit is projected to narrow to 9.6% of GDP in 
2012 (Figure 3.32.6), despite lower sugar production, primarily because of 
lower prices of imported commodities. Foreign reserves are expected to 
remain above the targeted 3–4 months of imports in 2012.
Policy challenge highlights 
Fiji has experienced low economic growth, rising emigration, and high 
poverty over the past decade, mainly because of low domestic investment. 
Private investment is low, there has been little new domestic lending, and 
public investment has been constrained by poor implementation. Since 
2005, gross domestic investment has averaged 13.1% of GDP a year, well 
below the government’s target of 25%. The ratio of private investment to 
GDP declined from an average of 11.3% in 2000–2005 to 7.5% in 2006–
2010; in 2011 it was around 2%.
The government recognizes that the economy operates below its 
growth potential because of an array of difficult macroeconomic, 
structural, and sector policy constraints. State-owned enterprise reform 
is progressing, and the government is seeking to divest its holdings in 
several enterprises. Yet the pace of reform is constrained by fiscal limits, 
a lack of technical capacity, limited stakeholder buy-in and consultation, 
and inconsistencies in the way reform principles are applied. The 
medium-term macroeconomic outlook is weak and foreshadows greater 
poverty challenges—unless structural reforms are carried out in a 
coherent and coordinated manner. 
Business confidence is unlikely to be restored until progress is made 
on political reform. The drafting of a new constitution this year and the 
holding of national elections in 2014 will be crucial in this respect. 
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Papua New Guinea
High international commodity prices boosted economic growth in 2011. Restrained expenditure 
growth allowed the government to accumulate public trust fund savings. GDP growth will remain 
high in 2012 as construction of a large resource project reaches its peak. The following year, economic 
pressures will emerge as construction of that project winds down and government revenues from 
existing mining operations decline. A major challenge is to ensure that the poor benefit from the 
country’s higher income.
Economic performance
The economy continued its strong performance in 2011, with GDP 
growth of 8.9% marking a decade of uninterrupted expansion. Industry 
made the largest contribution to growth owing to resource investments, 
including the construction of a $16 billion liquefied natural gas (LNG)
project and high government spending that boosted demand in the sector 
(Figure 3.33.1). Construction was also supported by property developments 
as investors responded to very high rental demand in urban centers.
The contribution of industry to overall growth was partly offset 
by the mining and oil sector, which contracted by 8.7% as a result of 
declining output from maturing mining and oil operations. Agricultural 
output rose by 4.5% as producers responded to higher commodity and 
food prices.
Strong economic growth continued to create income-earning 
opportunities. The Central Bank Business Liaison Survey showed a 7.1% 
increase in formal employment in the first half of 2011.
The deficit on the current account of the balance of payments widened 
to 36.8% of GDP in 2011. Higher commodity prices raised the US dollar 
value of merchandise exports by 27.8%. Mineral exports climbed by 17%, 
as rising copper and gold sales more than offset an 11% decline in oil 
revenue. The value of agricultural exports, which make up roughly a 
quarter of export revenue, rose by about 51% in 2011, primarily as a result 
of 63% growth in palm oil exports, an 88% jump in coffee sales, and a 
100% surge in marine products.
Increased exports were, however, outweighed by a rise in imports, 
particularly those related to construction of resource projects. Yet 
because resource-project imports are financed mainly through foreign 
direct investment, the large current account deficit does not jeopardize 
external stability. High foreign exchange reserves held by the central 
bank, which totaled 15 months of nonmineral import cover in 2011 
(reaching 18 months in October), also support external stability 
(Figure 3.33.2).
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The 2011 budget recorded a small deficit of $40 million (equivalent to
0.3% of GDP) (Figure 3.33.3). Adjusting official numbers for net trust fund 
deposits, though, gives an effective budget surplus equal to 2% of GDP. 
This difference arises owing to the government’s classification of trust 
fund deposits as spending, while international government accounting 
standards treat them as savings.
Strong growth and high commodity prices took domestic 
revenue collection 6.6% above projections (Figure 3.33.4). A midyear 
supplementary budget allocated an extra $359.6 million in expenditure to
infrastructure, health centers, and prefunding for a new commitment to 
achieve universal primary and secondary education.
High levels of government expenditure, large resource investments, 
and rising international food prices spurred inflation in the first half of 
2011, with the consumer price index increasing year on year by 9.6% at 
end-June 2011. Price increases slowed in the second half, mainly reflecting 
strong exchange rate appreciation.
Also supporting moderating price growth was monetary intervention: 
the central bank issued a net $0.6 billion in central bank bills, raised the
policy interest rate (the kina facility rate) by 75 basis points to 7.75%, and 
lifted the capital-adequacy requirement for banks from 4.0% to 6.0%.
A significant policy development in 2011 was the announcement of 
a new sovereign wealth fund to manage all future mineral revenue. The 
fund aims to encourage stable and sustainable increases in government 
expenditure by establishing a maximum drawdown rule and channeling 
all mineral funds through the budget. The fund also aims to protect local 
export industries by investing unspent mineral revenue in offshore assets.
One challenge, however, is that the proposed new agencies that will 
use mineral revenue to finance infrastructure and state-owned enterprise 
investments have the potential to replicate existing government structures 
and complicate public financial management.
Economic prospects
Growth is seen moderating to 7.5% in 2012 and more sharply to 4.5% in 
2013 (Figure 3.33.5). This year growth will be supported by higher prices 
for the country’s key export commodities, heavy government spending, 
and rising domestic employment, at the same time as the LNG project’s 
construction phase reaches its peak. Growth will also be supported by 
a 20% expansion of the mineral sector as production starts at the Ramu 
nickel and cobalt mine, although this will be partly offset by a 9.9% 
reduction in oil production.
The slowdown in 2013 will stem from the winding down of LNG 
project construction, which will hit demand in a range of sectors, 
including construction itself, transport, and aviation. This effect will spill 
over into the wholesale and retail sectors. Adding to this shock will be 
further declines in oil production, which is predicted to contract by 17% 
in 2013.
Inflation is expected to remain high in 2012 (Figure 3.33.6). Record 
public and private investment will leave many areas of the economy, 
including construction, shipping, and port facilities, operating at close 
to full capacity. Offsetting these pressures is the kina exchange rate, 
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which is likely to remain high against those of major trading partners in 
2012, after appreciating by 21% against the US dollar and 18% against the 
Australian dollar in 2011. On balance, price growth in 2012 is expected to 
ease slightly to 7.0% and to 6.0% in 2013 as the economy slows further and 
LNG-related construction activity declines.
In the external accounts, resource-project imports will maintain a 
large current account deficit, of around 33.2% of GDP in 2012 and 29.7% in 
2013 (Figure 3.33.7). Foreign direct investment will continue to finance this 
gap. Foreign reserves are expected to remain adequate in terms of import 
cover over the forecast period.
The 2012 budget targets a balanced position, with an expected 
9.5% increase in domestic revenue collection. As in previous years, the 
budget excludes net trust fund expenditure. Pressure to draw on these 
accumulated savings will be raised in the lead-up to national elections 
in mid-2012. Given existing capacity constraints, any large trust-fund 
drawdowns would add to inflationary pressures and crowd out private 
sector activity.
Fiscal stress will mount in 2013 as revenues from maturing mining 
and oil operations continue to decline. Combined with slowing growth, 
this is expected to begin a 2-year period of stagnant revenue collection, 
until LNG revenue begins in 2015.
Low public debt—about 24% of GDP in 2011—will enable measured 
government borrowing to maintain expenditure without compromising 
macroeconomic stability, although public finances face some risks, and 
a decline in international commodity prices would be painful. Revenue 
projections in the 2012 budget are predicated on an optimistic outlook for 
commodities: cocoa, coffee, palm oil, rubber, and tea prices are expected 
to moderate only slightly but remain near record highs, while prices of 
copra, copra oil, and copper are all expected to rise. The price of gold in 
particular, which makes up almost half of export earnings, is forecast to 
be 20% higher in 2012 than in 2011. 
If commodity prices decline significantly this year, the government 
will face pressures to meet expenditure commitments without 
undermining the fiscal discipline that has underpinned the last decade of 
macroeconomic stability.
Another risk to the economic outlook is the government’s growing 
off-balance sheet contingent liabilities related to resource-project 
guarantees and unfunded superannuation liabilities, now totaling 32% 
of GDP. Of particular concern is the potential for unresolved landowner 
compensation issues to delay LNG project construction, which may result 
in the government being obliged to meet its project-completion guarantees.
On the upside, medium-term projections do not incorporate some 
potential new mining investments, including extending the lifespan of the 
Ok Tedi mine and a second LNG project.
Policy challenge—tackling inequalities
The last decade of economic growth has led to rising inequalities. 
Mineral exports and resource-project construction have underpinned a 
30% increase in real per capita incomes from $1,398 in 2002 to $1,850 in
2011. But the link between economic growth and the welfare of the poor 
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is weak—the country is not expected to meet any of the Millennium 
Development Goals by 2015, and is ranked 153 out of 187 countries in 
the 2011 human development index compiled by the United Nations 
Development Programme.
A major challenge is the limited ability of the public sector to 
translate higher revenue into improved public services. A lack of 
socioeconomic data makes tracking performance difficult, but anecdotal 
evidence suggests that, despite a 120% increase in government expenditure 
since 2002, the quality of service delivery has remained stagnant and in 
some cases even declined, particularly in rural areas.
The effects of growth on employment creation are also restricted by 
the business environment. The country ranked 101 out of 183 countries 
on the World Bank’s 2012 Doing Business survey, the lowest in the 
South Pacific and well behind regional partners in Southeast Asia. So, 
despite some growth in recent years, the formal private sector remains 
small, employing less than 10% of the economically active population 
(Figure 3.33.8) and concentrated in just a few industries such as mining 
and agriculture.
High inflation has also undermined the inclusiveness of growth. 
Although wage earners can negotiate higher wages when costs rise, 
the roughly 85% of the population reliant on cash crops for their semi-
subsistence livelihoods have seen their purchasing power deteriorate 
rapidly in recent years. Further, structural constraints in land and 
housing markets have restricted the supply response to rising property 
demand, and contributed to rising rental prices. As a result, an increasing 
portion of urban residents are now forced to live in informal urban 
settlements, which have poor access to power and sanitation facilities and 
which pose significant personal security risks.
Inequality is also growing in villages, reflecting rising compensation 
payments to incorporated landowner groups made by mining companies 
for use of land. With low educational and financial literacy levels, 
members of these groups can rarely hold leaders to account for the 
equitable distribution of royalty payments.
The government will have a major opportunity to improve living 
standards when revenue starts to flow to the budget from LNG exports. 
Inclusive growth will, however, require substantial reforms to public 
financial management to ensure that higher expenditure improves 
service delivery. A rejuvenated public sector is also needed to create a 
more diversified private sector able to create jobs on a broad base, by 
rehabilitating infrastructure and by pursuing an aggressive structural 
reform agenda that addresses the pervasively high cost of doing business.
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Timor-Leste
Economic growth remained high in 2011, supported by another large increase in government expenditure. 
Double-digit growth is forecast for 2012, before a moderation in fiscal expansion sees some easing in 
economic growth. Inflation climbed sharply, and is expected to remain internationally high in 2012 and 
2013. The key economic challenge is to move from an economy driven by public sector activity to one in 
which the private sector plays a key role.
Economic performance
The economy’s strong growth performance continued in 2011, with GDP, 
excluding the offshore petroleum sector and the United Nations (the 
measure of GDP used hereafter), expanding by 10.0%. The spending of 
petroleum revenue continued to drive the economy. Although the full 
2011 budget allocation was not spent, government expenditure, including 
development partner–funded activities, reached $1.4 billion. This was an
increase of 36.4% from 2010, and saw the ratio of government expenditure 
to GDP reach 185.5% in 2011.
The government’s capital spending more than doubled in 2011 
(Figure 3.34.1), while recurrent expenditure rose by only 2.2%. Expenditure 
on wages and salaries rose by 22.6% in 2011 to $112 million, primarily
because a large number of temporary civil service positions were converted 
to permanent positions during the year (Figure 3.34.2). This moved 
expenditure out of goods and services and this category was therefore 
below both the budgeted level and the outturn for 2010. Overall, 88.3% of 
the budget was spent in 2011, a similar ratio to the previous 2 years.
The national electrification program begun in 2008 accounted 
for most of the capital spending in 2011. Around half the total cost of 
$0.9 billion was spent during the year. The program will provide two new
power stations and a new transmission system, and will greatly extend the 
distribution system. The first major milestone was met in late 2011, when 
the first power station entered operation.
A large budget surplus was again recorded. The steep rise in the world 
oil price boosted petroleum revenue to a new high of $3.5 billion over
the year, dwarfing the $0.1 billion raised domestically. The overall budget
surplus of $2.5 billion was more than three times GDP. Public savings
of $2.5 billion boosted the balance in the Petroleum Fund to $9.3 billion,
around 12 times GDP.
Average annual inflation was 13.1%. Inflation rose rapidly in the 
first quarter of 2011 as higher world oil and food prices fed through 
the economy. Other contributing factors to the first quarter rise were a 
reduction in rice subsidies, and disruption to the harvest cycle because of 
excessive rain in 2010. There was little additional inflation in the second 
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and third quarters, despite strong domestic demand. But in the final 
quarter, year-on-year inflation reached 15.4%.
Increased demand in the lead-up to end-of-year celebrations and 
the loss of capacity at the international port in Dili from October as 
new navy vessels occupied one of three berths were the key contributors 
to the fourth quarter jump in inflation (Figure 3.34.3). This jump was 
despite the deflationary effects of some easing in world food prices and an 
appreciation of the United States dollar (which is used by Timor-Leste as 
its official currency) against key currencies.
After 5 years of almost no change, lending levels rose by 18.5% in 2011 
(Figure 3.34.4), helped by a shift in lending policy at one of the larger 
commercial banks toward more risk sharing. The July inauguration of the 
country’s fourth commercial bank and the first locally owned bank, the 
Banco Nacional Comércio de Timor-Leste, also contributed to the rise 
in lending. Deposits with the banking system increased by 6.0% in 2011, 
while the broad money measure of money supply expanded by 9.3%.
The data show a large increase in imports during 2011, consistent with 
the high import content of heavy government expenditure. Merchandise 
imports were almost double the previous year’s. Nonpetroleum 
merchandise exports, predominately coffee, declined by 18.5% and 
remained a small fraction of merchandise imports. The surplus on the 
income account attributable to petroleum revenue continued to outweigh 
the wide trade deficit in 2011, providing for a large current account 
surplus of more than three times GDP.
Economic prospects
The continuing rise in government spending is projected to see the 
economy stay strong. But the rate of economic growth is expected to ease, 
from around 10.0% in 2012 to 8.0% in 2013, as the rate of fiscal expansion 
begins to moderate (Figure 3.34.5). Government expenditure is projected 
to expand by 25.7% in 2012, but by only 10.3% in 2013.
Inflation is seen remaining high in the first half of 2012. The 
temporary loss of capacity at Dili port, and extra demand arising from 
preparations for the Parliamentary elections due midyear, are expected 
to maintain upward pressure on prices. Inflationary pressures are 
expected to decline over the second half of 2012 as these effects pass, 
and as the departure of the United Nations mission (to be completed by 
30 December) helps slow the expansion in aggregate demand. Inflation is 
projected to average 10.2% in 2012 before declining to 7.4% in 2013.
The budget for 2012 provides for a further large increase in 
government expenditure to $1.8 billion, of which $1.6 billion will be from 
the Petroleum Fund and domestic revenue, with the remainder from 
development partners. The ratio of expenditure to GDP is projected to 
remain close to 200% in 2012.
Big-ticket capital expenditure items funded from the multiyear 
Infrastructure Fund are again prominent in the budget. Capital spending 
is budgeted to rise to 100% of GDP. Outlays on the national electrification 
program are tapering off, but will remain high at $280 million. A
large allocation is to be made for infrastructure designed to trigger 
industrial development on the south coast—the Tasi Mane program—and 
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$170 million is allocated for road projects. Road investments will be partly
funded by the government’s first loans. A total of $150 million in loans
from development partners is proposed to support a multiyear project to 
begin upgrading the country’s major roads.
World oil prices are projected to remain around current levels in 
2012 and 2013, underpinning high petroleum revenue (Figure 3.34.6) as 
well as large budget and current account surpluses. These surpluses are 
projected to remain close to 200% of GDP in 2012, before easing in 2013 
(Figure 3.34.7).
Longer-term prospects for private sector development and the 
economy more broadly have been strengthened by the early 2012 
government approval of a framework for public–private partnerships. 
The framework identifies the type of public infrastructure that may be 
considered for such partnerships, and how such projects will be evaluated, 
provisioned, and managed. It is now important to bring forward the 
best candidate projects to address looming infrastructure bottlenecks. 
Priorities are operating and maintaining the expanding electricity system, 
rehabilitating the only international airport, building a new international 
sea port, and upgrading the degraded water supply system in Dili.
A large step forward was also taken through Parliament’s approval 
in early 2012 of a land law that provides a framework for land ownership 
and resolution of conflicting claims. Complementary laws that allow the 
state to acquire land for public purposes were also approved. These new 
laws extend a legal process established in 2011 for registering land claims 
and confirming those that are undisputed (so far, 92% of 47,000 registered 
claims have been undisputed). A Civil Code that came into force in 
March 2012 also includes a section governing day-to-day decisions 
such as the sale and lease of land. Such legal reforms are an essential 
underpinning of private sector development because they provide greater 
certainty over property rights.
Policy challenge highlights
A key issue facing Timor-Leste is whether the economy should be slowed in 
an effort to reduce inflation. While some farmers have benefited from the 
boost to their income provided by higher food prices, many of the urban 
poor are suffering from the increased cost of living. Other policy responses 
also warrant consideration. Notably, enhanced targeting of the government’s 
sizable public social safety net, which received another large funding 
increase in the 2012 budget, could help alleviate pressures on the poor. It is 
also important to keep infrastructure investment high, as this is needed to 
alleviate supply bottlenecks and reduce the cost of local production.
The major economic challenge remains moving from an economy in 
which growth has been primarily dependent on public sector activity to 
one in which the private sector plays a key role. The inaugural Business 
Activity Survey, covering 2010, has provided a reminder of the nascent 
state of the private sector. The survey confirmed the concentration of the 
formal business sector in Dili—more than 80% of employment and value-
added was earned by Dili-based businesses—and its shallow structure—the 
retail and wholesale, construction, and accommodation and food services 
accounted for about 60% of total employment and value added.
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3.34.1 Selected economic indicators (%)
2012 2013
GDP growth 10.0 8.0
Inflation 10.2 7.4
Current account balance 
(share of GDP)
229.4 153.7
Source: ADB estimates. 
Small Pacific countries
Overall growth among the 11 small Pacific countries was faster in 2011 than in 2010. All of them except 
Tonga expanded. In three, the growth in gross domestic product (GDP) was 5.0% or more and the 
Solomon Islands—at 9.3%—was one of the fastest-growing economies in developing Asia.
The growth in tourism evident in 2010 continued in 2011, particularly in the Cook Islands, Palau, and Samoa, 
and the number of tourist arrivals hit records. Construction had an important influence on growth in many 
of the small economies, notably the Cook Islands, the Marshall Islands, Samoa, and Vanuatu, but in the 
Federated States of Micronesia a winding down of large public construction projects led to slower growth.
The outlook for these small economies is positive. Most of them are expected to have faster growth in 
2012 than in 2011. The main exception is Solomon Islands where growth is likely to decelerate because 
of a decline in logging. All of them are expected to continue expanding in 2013, but all—apart from 
Vanuatu—at a slower pace than in 2012.
Stable  oil and lower food prices will keep inflation generally lower in 2012 than in 2011, but several 
countries will have higher inflation on increased domestic demand and domestic constraints. In 2013, 
most of these economies face the prospect of slightly higher inflation, because food prices are expected 
to pick up.
Improving government fiscal management and public sector efficiency, as well as maintaining basic public 
services by investing in vital infrastructure, are priority needs to support sustained growth in the small 
Pacific countries.
Cook Islands
After several years of negative or slow growth, the Cook Islands recovered 
in FY2011 (ended 30 June 2011) with GDP growth of 3.4% (Figure 3.35.1). 
This reflected expansion in tourism and fisheries, as well as increased 
construction associated with upgrading of Avatiu port. Tourism accounts 
for about two-thirds of GDP and an improved economic outlook in 
Australia and New Zealand (the source of four-fifths of arrivals) helped 
push visitor arrivals to over 108,000 in FY2011, a new fiscal year high. 
During July–December 2011, arrivals increased by 6.4% relative to the 
same 6 months in 2010 (Figure 3.35.2).
In FY2011, inflation slipped to 0.6% from 1.8% in FY2010, driven 
primarily by declines in housing and household costs, such as rent and 
utilities.
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Government operating revenue was 1.9% higher in FY2011 than in 
FY2010, primarily because of the increased receipts from tourism. With 
operating expenditure edging up by 0.1%, the fiscal deficit narrowed 
slightly to 1.4% of GDP.
The trade deficit widened to US$286 million in FY2011. The value of
merchandise imports increased by 7.7% but exports fell by 10.5%, largely 
owing to decreased pearl exports.
The economy is expected to grow at 5.4% in FY2012. This reflects 
increased visitor arrivals, particularly from Australia on the new 
Sydney–Rarotonga direct flights that began in July 2011. The start of large 
infrastructure works (roads, water, and energy) will help the expansion 
continue, with the economy projected to grow by 3.0% in FY2013.
In FY2012, government operating revenue is expected to increase by 
3.2%. Tax revenue is forecast to rise by about 6.6% because of growth 
in tourism and the introduction of a withholding tax. Government 
operating expenses are expected to rise by 3.1% in FY2012. A budget 
deficit of 1.4% of GDP is forecast.
The government in 2011 carried out a functional review, which 
recommended that it should focus on its core business and its regulatory 
and enabling roles. The government will take a phased approach to 
implementing the recommendations for public sector reform, reflecting 
capacity constraints. Although the review was silent on the appropriate 
size of the public sector, it is an issue that the government will have to 
address if it is to manage spending. 
Kiribati
The economy grew by 3.0% in 2011 largely due to stronger retail activity. 
Inflation was 7.7% (compared with deflation of 2.8% in 2010) because of 
increased food and fuel prices (Figure 3.35.3).
Government revenue collection in 2011 was about 20% lower than 
in the previous year and 9% below budget estimates. This fall stemmed 
from a decline in the value of income from fishing licenses and a poor 
fishing season. (Licenses are paid in United States (US) dollars, which 
depreciated against the Australian dollar, used by Kiribati as its currency.) 
Expenditure rose by about 10% because of increased spending on 
infrastructure projects. 
The fiscal deficit thus widened from 8.1% of GDP in 2010 to 17.7% in 
2011. The gap was partially funded by concessional borrowing, but also 
by a drawdown of capital from the Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund 
(RERF), a sovereign wealth fund, the earnings from which are intended 
to balance recurrent financing needs. 
GDP is projected to climb by 3.5% in 2012 with the start of major 
development partner–funded infrastructure projects, such as road 
building, as well as airport and seaport reconstruction. In 2013 growth is 
expected to come off a little to 3.0% (Figure 3.35.4). Over the next 2 years, 
inflation is projected to drop to 5.5% and then increase to 6.0%, reflecting 
expected movements in international food prices.
A new government took office in January 2012. Its first budget, which 
should be presented in April, is likely to see a widening of the fiscal 
deficit, reflecting a scheduled increase in infrastructure spending. The 
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deficit will be partly funded by an RERF drawdown, raising concerns 
about the fund’s long-term sustainability after drawdowns averaging 
around A$17 million in the last four years.
Growth of the RERF is the key to ensuring long-term fiscal 
sustainability. Reducing the annual demands on the fund to a level that 
can be met from its income will require extensive fiscal consolidation. 
Over the medium term, the government should aim to stabilize the value 
of the RERF, by keeping budget deficits to 5–6% of GDP. Stronger control 
of expenditure on personnel costs is one option it could investigate. 
Marshall Islands
Economic growth slowed slightly to 5.0% in FY2011 (ended 30 September 
2011). This solid performance was supported by fishing activity, continued 
high spending related to US military operations under the Kwajalein Land 
Use Agreement, and the upgrade of the international airport in Majuro.
Inflation shot up to 9.5% (from 1.6% in FY2010). Steep rises in the 
prices of commodities (which have a weighting of nearly 50% in the 
consumer price index), high transport costs arising from the country’s 
remote location, and the pickup in domestic demand drove this increase.
The fiscal surplus fell from 4.6% of GDP in FY2010 to 1.4%. Although 
grants declined, domestic revenue—mainly from fishing license fees—
rose. Public expenditure climbed by 6.1%, reflecting, primarily, increased 
purchases of goods and services.
The current account remained in deficit (12.6% of GDP). Although 
merchandise exports expanded by 26.5% to US$40.8 million, imports
reached US$114.5 million.
Economic growth is foreseen to reach 5.4% in FY2012, boosted by 
continued growth in fisheries and airport-related construction, before 
slowing to 2.6% in FY2013 (Figure 3.35.5). FY2013 is likely to see a fiscal 
surplus of slightly over 1% of GDP. A projected step-up in grants will 
finance about 70% of the budget and contribute to a 5.1% gain in total 
receipts. Total government expenditure will rise by 5.7%, partly due to 
greater subsidies to state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
Inflation is projected to slow to 2.5% in FY2012 before accelerating 
to 3.0% in FY2013, in line with expected trends in global food prices 
(Figure 3.35.6).
The current account deficit is forecast to widen to 30.3% of GDP in 
FY2012. Although merchandise exports will grow by 14.8%, imports are 
expected to jump by 29.8% owing to continued demand from the airport 
upgrade and expansion of fisheries.
The country has to build up the Compact Trust Fund to prepare 
for fiscal self-sufficiency once US Compact grants expire in 2023, while 
paying down the high government debt. It also needs to generate 
sustainable economic growth. Fiscal and structural reforms are needed to 
stimulate private sector economic activity, generate domestic employment 
and income, and broaden the local tax base. Tax reforms are required to 
increase government revenue and offset planned reductions in grants. In 
addition, SOE reforms and cutbacks in public expenditure are needed to 
improve the fiscal balance.
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Federated States of Micronesia
Public infrastructure construction continued to support economic growth 
in FY2011 (ended 30 September 2011). This was the third consecutive year 
of growth supported by airport improvement projects funded through 
US Federal Aviation Authority grants. However, as some projects reached 
their final stages, growth fell from 3.1% to 1.4% (Figure 3.35.7). Consumer 
spending appears to have recovered in FY2011, with the value of food 
imports from the US—the country’s largest trading partner—increasing 
by about 8%.
Inflation rose to 7.9% in FY2011, due mainly to higher oil prices. The 
retail gasoline price was 30% higher in March 2011 than a year earlier.
Progress in fiscal consolidation resulted in a small budget surplus, 
equivalent to about 0.4% of GDP in FY2011 (Figure 3.35.8). This is the third 
year of surplus following years of earlier deficits. Capital expenditure was 
cut by about 13% after the completion of some public works projects, and 
the reduction in government spending was about 2% for the year.
The modest pace of economic expansion is expected to moderate 
further to 1.0% in FY2012 as some infrastructure projects such as the 
Pohnpei airport runway extension are finished. In FY2013, GDP growth 
is forecast to tail off to 0.5% as more projects are completed. Weak 
private activity and annual declines in grants under the Compact of Free 
Association with the US also contribute to a subdued growth outlook.
Inflation of 3.5% is projected for FY2012 as prices of internationally 
traded commodities, other than oil, decline. In FY2013, inflation is expected 
to rise slightly to 4.0%, reflecting an assumed rise in global demand.
Small fiscal surpluses are projected for FY2012 and FY2013 but 
these fall short of target levels. In order to achieve savings in the FSM 
Compact Trust Fund to generate sufficient income to replace annual 
compact grants, which expire in FY2023, further fiscal consolidation is 
needed. This might involve a reduction in the public sector wage bill 
and revenue-raising measures (i.e., tax reforms and improvements in tax 
administration) to maintain fiscal surpluses over the long run. 
Nauru
The economy grew by 4.0% in FY2011 (ending 30 June 2011) largely because 
phosphate exports increased by more than 20% (Figure 3.35.9). The country 
has been experiencing deflation for the last few years and in FY2011 the 
consumer price index declined by 3.5%, in part because of appreciation of 
the Australian dollar (which Nauru uses as its official currency).
Government revenue in FY2012 is expected to be A$31.6 million and
expenditure A$32.5 million, yielding a small deficit of A$0.9 million. Cash
reserves brought forward from FY2011 will, however, result in a small 
surplus.
The Australian Agency for International Development estimated 
that in 2006 government debt obligations to external and internal debt 
holders were A$371.4 million, and A$264.8 million respectively, an
enormous burden relative to GDP. By September 2010, overall debt had 
been reduced—external A$69 million and internal A$481 million. Nauru
generally runs large current account deficits funded by development-
partner inflows.
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Recently improved phosphate-loading facilities are expected to lift 
phosphate exports to 450,000 tons in FY2012 from 350,000 tons in FY2011, 
taking economic growth to 4.8% in FY2012 and 4.2% in FY2013.
The level of national debt precludes sovereign borrowing, so 
Nauru will maintain near-balanced budgets in the forecast period. 
Recent reforms to the phosphate export enterprise may improve fiscal 
performance gradually. Inflation is expected to turn positive, as currency 
appreciation effects wash through, and average 1.5% and 2.0% in the next 
2 fiscal years.
The limited growth prospects for very small Pacific countries, such 
as Nauru, were acknowledged in a recent review of Australia’s official 
development assistance (ODA). A planned increase in ODA, to offset the 
lack of private sector activity, is likely to be delivered through program-
based approaches. This will require improvements to the country’s public 
financial management strategies in order to efficiently absorb and manage 
higher ODA levels and translate this into economic growth. 
Palau
The economy grew by 5.8% in FY2011 (ended 30 September 2011), up from 
0.3% the previous year. Growth reflected strong data for tourism, which 
accounts for about half GDP. Arrivals from Asia, particularly East Asia, 
rose steeply (Figure 3.35.10), aided by the addition of Delta Airlines flights 
between Palau and Japan. In FY2011, visitor arrivals increased by over 25% 
and exceeded 100,000 for the first time. 
Rising food and transport costs raised inflation to 2.1% in FY2011, 
from 1.2% in FY2010. Inflation largely tracks price developments in the 
US—Palau’s primary trading partner—in the absence of any major 
domestic inflationary factors.
The government continued to reduce expenditure (by 3.1% during 
FY2011), with cuts focused on publicly provided goods and services. 
Public sector wages and salaries, which account for over a third of total 
government spending, rose by about 5% in FY2011. The fiscal deficit 
widened to 2.3% of GDP as lower grants from the US outweighed an 
increase in domestic revenue associated with the economic recovery.
Tourism will remain the key source of growth for the foreseeable 
future, and visitor arrivals will continue to depend on developments 
abroad—particularly in Japan; Republic of Korea; and Taipei,China. 
Palau’s visitor arrivals are projected to go up by 7.5% and 6.0% in 
the next 2 fiscal years, supporting GDP growth of 3.0% and 2.0% 
(Figure 3.35.11).
Inflation is projected to fall to 2.0% in FY2012 and to edge up to 2.5% 
the following year, in line with expected international commodity price 
trends.
The government is expected to maintain its contractionary fiscal 
stance on concerns about its fiscal position. Comprehensive civil service 
reform is needed to reduce the public sector wage bill. New revenue-
raising measures, including increased tax rates for high-income earners 
and a steeper hotel-room tax, are under consideration and are likely to be 
adopted this fiscal year. Further tax reforms, such as a value-added tax, 
may also be required.
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Palau’s tourism-oriented economy relies heavily on basic public 
goods like transport infrastructure and reliable service delivery. These 
facilities are, though, approaching full capacity and need to be expanded. 
Sustaining tourism growth would also benefit from improvements in 
the business environment, such as simplifying licensing procedures and 
expanding access to skilled labor and credit.
Samoa
Growth picked up to 2.1% in FY2011 (ended 30 June 2011), from 0.2% 
the previous year (Figure 3.35.12), reflecting growth in construction as 
infrastructure projects were continued or initiated. Higher consumer 
spending also contributed, fueled by rising remittances (particularly 
from Australia and New Zealand). Construction-related industries like 
transport and communications posted modest growth, as did tourism. 
Average annual inflation rose to 2.9% in FY2011, driven by higher 
prices for imported food (mainly rice, flour, and chicken) and fuel.
Government revenue and expenditure were generally in line 
with budget targets, except development spending. This category was 
underspent by 18.9%, given slow activity at several construction projects. 
The fiscal deficit was 6.5% of GDP, lower than the budget estimate of 9.6% 
and the FY2010 outturn of 7.4%. The narrower deficit was in line with the 
recommendation of the International Monetary Fund to move toward a 
medium-term target of no more than 3% of GDP by FY2013. Although 
Samoa remains at low risk of debt distress, public debt is rising and is 
close to 40% of GDP in present value terms. Accelerating the pace of 
fiscal consolidation would ensure adequate capacity to absorb shocks in 
the future and accommodate rising debt repayments. 
The Central Bank of Samoa continued easing monetary policy to 
stimulate economic activity and stabilize the economy. It reduced its 
policy rate, and through its credit line facility lowered lending rates to the 
Development Bank of Samoa and the Samoa Housing Corporation. Credit 
to the private sector recovered but grew by only 6.5% in FY2011, in line 
with weak economic activity and despite ample financial sector liquidity 
and low nonperforming loans. 
The current account deficit remained at about 9.3% GDP in FY2011 
(Figure 3.35.13) as some recovery in incomes from tourism and remittances 
offset a wider merchandise trade deficit (due to higher petroleum 
payments and increased imports associated with post-September 2009 
tsunami reconstruction). Total imports rose by 11.4% (in US dollar terms), 
and exports of fresh fish, beer, and nonu juice fell by 5% due to weakening 
demand in major markets, including Japan and New Zealand. 
The economy is expected to grow by 2.5% and 2.4% in the next 2 fiscal 
years, driven mainly by tourism and remittances. Tourism earnings in 
the first 6 months of FY2012 were 2% higher than the equivalent FY2011 
period. Private remittances rose by 3% to US$86.7 million during the
same period. This expansion, however, will not be enough to fully offset 
the withdrawal of fiscal stimulus. 
Medium-term prospects will depend on how the US, Australian, and 
New Zealand economies perform; these countries are Samoa’s largest 
trading partners and main sources of remittances and tourist arrivals. 
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Also, manufacturing output is likely to decline given the scaling down 
of production at the Yazaki auto-part plant due to a reduction in wire 
harness orders from Toyota Australia.
The FY2012 budget projects the fiscal deficit to remain at 6.5% of GDP. 
Inflation is expected to continue rising to about 5.0% in FY2012—
as strong domestic demand counteracts increased local agricultural 
production and falling international commodity prices—but then to fall 
back to 3.3% in FY2013. 
The balance of payments is projected to record an overall surplus 
in FY2012 due to the anticipated heavy influx of donor funds (about 
US$100 million in external grants and loans). Exports of artesian water,
fish, and nonu juice are likely to benefit, as the People’s Republic of China 
phases in duty-free entry of a greater range of Samoan products in line 
with a July 2010 trade agreement. 
Continued efforts to advance fiscal consolidation and to lower public 
debt are essential to create the fiscal flexibility necessary to enable the 
government to respond to external shocks. 
Solomon Islands
The economy grew at 9.3% in 2011–the fastest of the Pacific island 
countries. As in previous years, the major contributor to growth was log 
production, where output was more than 1.9 million cubic meters, around 
one-third more than in 2010. This reflected continued high demand in 
Asia. The country also benefited from high international prices for other 
commodities such as palm oil, cocoa, copra, and fish, as well as renewed 
gold exports from the Gold Ridge mine in Guadalcanal, which resumed 
production after closing in June 2000 due to civil conflict. 
After falling to 1.0% in 2010, inflation jumped to 7.4%, largely 
reflecting strong growth and higher global food and energy prices. In 
2011, the central bank allowed the Solomon Islands dollar to appreciate 
vis-à-vis the US dollar by 8.7% in an explicit effort to contain inflation. 
It also resumed issuing its own short-term bills to reduce liquidity in the 
banking system. After contracting in 2010 and the first 9 months of 2011, 
credit growth increased to 7.2% in the last quarter of the year.
A budget surplus equivalent to 2.1% of GDP was recorded in 2011. 
Revenue increased by almost 25% from 2010. Strong production of 
logs and favorable prices in 2011 boosted customs duties, while strong 
economic activity and elevated fuel prices led to higher inland revenues 
(i.e., goods and sales taxes, personal and corporate income taxes). 
Overall recurrent expenditure grew by 1.2% in 2011, with payrolls 
growing by 4.2% owing to cost-of-living adjustments to public service 
salaries. Development expenditure grew by 54% during the year. Public 
debt declined from 24.0% of GDP in 2010 to 21.6% in late 2011, related to 
debt repayments and an increase in nominal GDP.
The current account deficit narrowed to 11.2% of GDP, from 27.6% 
in 2010 on higher exports and reduced imports of capital equipment 
following the reopening of the Gold Ridge mine. The deficit has been 
funded through donor inflows and foreign investment. Foreign reserve 
cover improved to over 9 months of imports as of December 2011.
Growth is expected to moderate to 6.0% and 5.0% over the next 
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2 years (Figure 3.35.14). Reduced logging output, due to overexploitation 
of the native forest, will be partly offset by increased value of gold 
output, as the Gold Ridge mine reaches full output, and by strengthening 
commodities such as palm oil, copra, and vanilla.
The 2012 budget is balanced. Expenditure is to increase by 47%, which 
will be covered by a 22.4% gain in revenue, a drawdown on the National 
Transport Fund for development projects, and by using grants from 
the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). To help 
preserve the budgetary position if the strong revenue growth does not 
continue, much of the increase in spending is in one-time items such as 
the hosting of the Pacific Arts Festival, or items that can be scaled back, 
including a planned doubling of debt repayments in late 2012. 
This rate of expenditure growth, however, is unsustainable and will 
need to be reduced in future budgets.
Inflation is expected to moderate over the next 2 years as growth 
and global commodity prices ease. Average inflation of 5.5% and 5.0% are 
forecast (Figure 3.35.15). The central bank will likely continue to let the 
exchange rate appreciate modestly if inflation does not moderate.
The current account deficit is forecast to widen to around 15.0% of 
GDP in 2012 and 2013 as a result of slower export growth. The gap will be 
funded through continued donor inflows and foreign investment. Foreign 
reserves should remain at around 7–8 months of imports.
The private sector faces numerous challenges to doing business. It 
must compete with SOEs, which receive preferential access to resources 
and operate in markets reserved for them, such as power and water 
supply. The SOEs hold nearly a quarter of the nation’s fixed assets, absorb 
large amounts of scarce capital, and generally yield negative returns on 
their fixed assets and investments, thereby increasing costs for private 
enterprises. 
A State Owned Enterprise Act, passed in 2007, and its accompanying 
regulations, issued in 2010, now provide a robust framework for SOE 
governance and monitoring. Implementation of this act—including 
improving the accuracy and timeliness of the financial information 
prepared by SOEs as well as requiring proper costing, funding, and 
documentation of all community service obligations—is essential to 
improving efficiency and accountability. 
Major gaps exist in access to infrastructure across the country. A 
majority of the nation’s rural population does not, for example, have 
access to paved roads, regular electricity supplies, or telecommunications. 
Tonga
The economy contracted by 0.3% in FY2011 (ended 30 June 2011) 
after growth of 0.3% the previous year (Figure 3.35.16). Remittances, 
coming largely from the US, continued to decline, and, coupled with 
banks’ steps to repair their balance sheets, affected both business and 
household investment and consumption. Tourism, and particularly the 
cruise liner market segment, was the bright spot in the economy, with 
tourism receipts growing by 14.8% (in real terms) in FY2011 from the 
previous year.
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Inflation rose to about 6.1%, reflecting the surge in global fuel and 
food prices and higher excise taxes on tobacco and alcohol.
Revenue in FY2011 was 5.8% more than in FY2010, but despite this and 
receipt of budget support grants from development partners, the FY2011 
fiscal deficit widened to 7.9% of GDP, financed mainly by loans from the 
EXIM Bank of China and drawdowns on domestic cash balances. The 
share of public debt to GDP rose to 56.1% (including the undisbursed 
portion of loans) by end-FY2011, exceeding the government’s target ceiling 
of 40%. 
To boost commercial bank lending, the central bank continued to 
ease monetary policy, although lending to businesses and households in 
2011 continued declining, by 11.1% and 4.6%, respectively. 
In the external account, fish and squash exports (which account 
for more than half of all exports) grew by only 1.9% in FY2011 (after 
more than doubling in FY2010) given problems in meeting quarantine 
requirements for New Zealand, and unfavorable weather. Imports, 
dominated by basic consumption goods, increased by 16.6%, largely due 
to higher oil prices as well as increased imports of wholesale and retail 
goods and construction materials.
Foreign reserves remained at comfortable levels, reaching 7.7 months 
of imports, reflecting receipts of development-partner funds, ample 
liquidity in the financial system, and weak business and household 
activity.
The economy is forecast to show virtually zero growth in the next 
2 years. Domestic economic activity is expected to remain weak despite 
donor-funded public construction, in view of declining remittances and 
flat credit growth, which will affect household consumption and private 
sector investment.
A bleak outlook on remittances is also foreseen given the slow 
recovery in the US and continuing high unemployment in other 
source economies such as New Zealand. Government analysis suggests 
remittances are likely to be permanently lower than in the past 
(Figure 3.35.17). Exports, which are around 3% of GDP, could, however, 
lead a stronger expansion of the economy if supply-side constraints are 
addressed and compliance with export market quarantine standards 
improves.
The central bank is expected to continue its loose monetary policy 
stance, unless global commodity prices rise further. Inflation is likely to 
hover around 6.0% in FY2012.
Tonga is classified by the International Monetary Fund as at high risk 
of debt distress. The high public debt and its composition pose serious 
challenges. Debt repayments are expected to increase by 70% in FY2014, 
when repayments start on a loan from the EXIM Bank of China. It is 
critical that the government uses year-end cash surpluses, reprioritizes 
expenditure, and raises the tax effort to build cash reserves, which could 
provide a buffer against cross-currency foreign exchange risks and 
safeguard the government’s expenditure programs. 
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Tuvalu
After 2 years of contraction, the economy grew by 1.0% in 2011 
(Figure 3.35.18), largely due to higher remittances. The consumer price 
index increased by 0.5% in 2011, which was lower than in most other 
Pacific economies, reflecting the appreciation of the Australian dollar 
(which Tuvalu uses as its currency) against the US dollar.
Total revenues and grants for 2011 were slightly below budget but 
about 20% higher than in 2010. The increase was mainly due to the 
grants. Government expenditure fell by more than 7% as subsidies were 
reduced and spending on capital projects declined. These developments 
led to a reduction in the fiscal deficit from over 30% of GDP in 2010 to 
about 8% in 2011. However, weakly controlled spending on the Tuvalu 
Medical Treatment Scheme remains a heavy drain on the budget with 
actual expenditure 70% above budget in 2011. Total government debt 
was estimated at 44.3% of GDP in 2010, and may be higher with the 
status of contingent liabilities from joint-venture fishing companies to be 
determined (Figure 3.35.19).
The market value of the Tuvalu Trust Fund stood at A$115.1 million as
of 30 September 2011. As this was 9.7% below its prescribed maintained 
value, nothing was distributed from the fund to the Consolidated 
Investment Fund (CIF—the vehicle through which budget deficits are 
financed). 
Growth is expected to edge up to 1.4% and 1.3% in the next 2 years, 
supported by development partner–financed upgrading of the Tuvalu 
airfield and airport. Increases in remittances are also expected.
Total revenue and grants are budgeted at A$24.1 million in 2012, 7%
less than the 2011 outturn, due to a projected 3.3% reduction in receipts 
from fisheries licenses and lower grant funds. Government expenditure is 
estimated at A$29.2 million (13% below the 2011 projected outturn) as the
government tries to control spending. At A$5.1 million, the budget deficit
is forecast at 14.3% of GDP. The CIF held A$3.1 million in December 2011
and, given the expected deficit, is likely to be exhausted this year. Further 
distribution from trust fund earnings is not expected until 2014 at the 
earliest. 
The fiscal situation remains precarious. With the likely exhaustion 
of the CIF in 2012, development partners will become the primary 
avenue for budget financing, underlining the importance of reforms and 
expenditure controls. 
Vanuatu
Growth nearly doubled in 2011 to 4.3%, reflecting strong agricultural 
exports (notably copra and coconut oil), high international commodity 
prices, and growth in construction. Tourist arrivals fell, however, by 3.5% 
from the 2010 level, which had been inflated because flooding in Fiji 
diverted tourists to other destinations (Figure 3.35.20). 
Despite high global energy and food prices, the consumer price index 
rose by just 0.8% in 2011. This was partly explained by a slowdown in 
growth of private credit.
The current account deficit was steady at 5.9% of GDP in 2011, and 
was more than covered by foreign investment and donor inflows. By 
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December 2011, foreign exchange reserves had risen to 6.3 months of 
import cover, from 5.8 months in March 2011.
Economic growth of 4.5–5.0% is forecast over the next 2 years 
(Figure 3.35.21). This will be driven by increasing construction, continuing 
strength in agricultural production, and recovering tourism (additional 
flights are planned from Australia and Fiji).
Small fiscal deficits of 1.5% and 2.7% of GDP are expected as the 
government increases borrowing to fund improvements to infrastructure. 
Public debt as a share of GDP is expected to remain around 20%, as 
higher debt is offset by growth in nominal GDP. If, however, contingent 
liabilities associated with past losses of some of the poorer performing 
SOEs were included, debt as a share of GDP would likely exceed the 
government’s ceiling of 40%.
Inflation is expected to pick up as the economy grows, to around 
3.0–4.0% in the next 2 years. 
The current account deficit is forecast to widen a little to 6.3–6.5% 
of GDP over the next 2 years, as a result of stronger imports related to 
infrastructure projects. The gap will be funded through continued donor 
inflows and foreign investment. Foreign exchange reserves are expected to 
remain at levels needed to finance 5–6 months of imports. 
Vanuatu became WTO’s 154th member in November 2011. Joining 
required reductions in tariffs but the resulting loss in revenue will be 
partly offset by excise tax increases. Taxes as a share of GDP are already 
relatively low at around 19% of GDP. Thus, as the indirect tax base erodes, 
the government will need to consider bringing in measures to broaden 
the tax base, such as a progressive income tax. 
Statistical 
appendix
Statistical notes
The statistical appendix presents selected economic indicators for 44 
developing member economies of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and 
for Brunei Darussalam, an unclassified regional member, in a total of 18 
tables. The economies are grouped into five subregions: Central Asia, East 
Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific. Most of the tables contain 
historical data from 2007 to 2011; some have forecasts for 2012 and 2013.
The data were standardized to the degree possible in order to allow 
comparability over time and across economies, but differences in statistical 
methodology, definitions, coverage, and practices make full comparability 
impossible. The national income accounts section is based on the United 
Nations System of National Accounts, while the balance-of-payments data are 
based on International Monetary Fund (IMF) accounting standards. Historical 
data were obtained from official sources, statistical publications and databases, 
and documents of ADB, IMF, and World Bank. Projections for 2012 and 
2013 are generally staff estimates made on the basis of available quarterly or 
monthly data, although some projections are from governments.
Most countries report on a calendar-year basis. Some economies record 
their government finance data on a fiscal year basis, such as Armenia; 
Azerbaijan; Cook Islands; Hong Kong, China; Kazakhstan; the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic (Lao PDR); Samoa; Singapore; Taipei,China; Thailand; 
and Uzbekistan. Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Republic of Marshall 
Islands, and Republic of Palau (hereafter Palau) report government finance 
and balance-of-payments data on a fiscal year basis. South Asian countries 
(except for Maldives and Sri Lanka), Myanmar, Samoa, and Tonga report all 
variables on a fiscal year basis.
Regional and subregional averages/totals are provided for seven tables (A1, 
A2, A6, A11, A12, A13, and A14). For tables A1, A2, A6, and A14, the averages 
are computed using weights derived from levels of gross national income 
(GNI) in current United States dollars (US$) following the World Bank Atlas
method. The GNI data for 2007–2010 were obtained from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators online. Weights for 2010 were carried over 
through 2013. The GNI data for Cook Islands were estimated using the Atlas 
conversion factor. Myanmar and Nauru have no GNI data. For tables A11 and 
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A12, the regional and subregional averages were computed on the basis of a 
consistent sum, which means that if there are missing country data for a given 
year, the sum of the prior year used for computing the growth rate excludes 
the corresponding country data. Data for Myanmar and Nauru are excluded 
from the computation of all subregional averages/totals.
Tables A1, A2, A3, A4, and A5. These tables show related data on output 
growth, production, and demand. Changes to the national income accounts 
series for some countries have been made owing to a change in source, 
methodology, and/or base year. The series for Bhutan and India reflects fiscal 
rather than calendar year data, while those for Timor-Leste reflects non-oil, 
non-United Nations GDP. 
Table A1: Growth rate of GDP (% per year). The table shows annual 
growth rates of GDP valued at constant market prices, factor costs, or basic 
prices. GDP at market prices is the aggregation of the value added of all 
resident producers at producers’ prices including taxes less subsidies on 
imports plus all nondeductible value-added or similar taxes. Constant factor 
cost measures differ from market price measures in that they exclude taxes 
on production and include subsidies. Basic price valuation is the factor cost 
plus some taxes on production, such as property and payroll taxes, and 
less some subsidies, such as labor-related subsidies but not product-related 
subsidies. Most countries use constant market price valuation. Fiji, India, 
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka use constant factor costs, while Maldives and Nepal 
use basic prices. GDP data up to 2009 were excluded for Nauru because of 
consistency issues.
Table A2: Growth rate of per capita GDP (% per year). The table provides 
the growth rates of real per capita GDP, which is defined as GDP at constant 
prices divided by the population. The series for most of the Pacific countries 
were revised due to a change in source of population data. Data on per capita 
gross national product in US$ terms for 2010, sourced from the World Bank,
World Development Indicators online, are also shown. Per capita GNP for 
Cook Islands and Tuvalu are estimated based on derived GNI data.
Table A3: Growth rate of value added in agriculture (% per year).
The table shows the growth rates of value added in agriculture and its 
corresponding share in 2010. The agriculture sector comprises agricultural 
crops, livestock, poultry, fisheries, and forestry.
Table A4: Growth rate of value added in industry (% per year). The table 
provides the growth rates of value added in industry and its corresponding 
share in 2010. This sector comprises manufacturing, mining and quarrying, 
construction, and utilities. However, construction in Uzbekistan is included in 
the services sector.
Table A5: Growth rate of value added in services (% per year). The table 
gives the growth rates of value added in services, as well as its corresponding 
share in 2010. Subsectors generally include trade, banking, finance, real estate, 
public administration, and other services.
Table A6: Inflation (% per year). Data on inflation rates represent period 
averages. Except for India, which reports the wholesale price index, inflation 
rates presented are based on consumer price indexes. The consumer price 
indexes of the following countries are for a given city or group of consumers 
only: Afghanistan is for Kabul, Cambodia is for Phnom Penh, Marshall 
Islands is for Majuro, Solomon Islands is for Honiara, and Nepal is for urban 
consumers. 
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Table A7: Growth in money supply (% per year). This table tracks the 
annual percentage change in the end-of-period supply of broad money as 
represented by M2 (for most countries). M2 is defined as the sum of M1 and 
quasi-money where M1 denotes currency in circulation plus demand deposits 
and quasi-money consists of time and savings deposits including foreign 
currency deposits.
Tables A8, A9, and A10: Government finance. This set of tables refers 
to the revenue and expenditure transactions as well as the fiscal balance of 
the central government expressed as a percentage of GDP in nominal terms. 
For Cambodia, the PRC, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, 
Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, transactions are those reported by the general 
government. 
Table A8: Central government revenues (% of GDP). Central government 
revenues comprise all nonrepayable receipts, both current and capital, plus 
grants. These amounts are computed as a percentage of GDP at current prices. 
For the Republic of Korea, revenues exclude social security contributions. 
For Singapore, revenues refer to receipts credited to the three accounts listed 
for the previous table, including investment income, capital receipts, and 
investment adjustments. For Kazakhstan, revenues include transfers from 
the national fund. Grants are excluded in Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Thailand; revenues from disinvestment are included for 
India; only current revenues are included for Bangladesh; and grants and 
privatization proceeds are excluded for Sri Lanka. 
Table A9: Central government expenditures (% of GDP). Central 
government expenditures comprise all nonrepayable payments to both current 
and capital expenses, plus net lending. These amounts are computed as a 
share of GDP at current prices. For Thailand, expenditures refer to budgetary 
expenditures excluding externally financed expenditures and corresponding 
borrowing; while that for Tajikistan includes externally financed public 
investment programs. One-time expenditures are excluded for Pakistan.
Table A10: Fiscal balance of central government (% of GDP). Fiscal 
balance is the difference between central government revenues and 
expenditures. The difference is computed as a share of GDP at current prices. 
Data variations may arise due to statistical discrepancies, e.g., balancing items 
for both central and local governments, and differences in the concept used in 
the individual computations of revenues and expenditures as compared with 
the calculation of the fiscal balance. For Fiji, the fiscal balance excludes total 
loan repayments. For Thailand, the fiscal balance is a cash balance composed 
of the budgetary and nonbudgetary balances. 
Tables A11, A12, A13, and A14: Balance of payments. This set of tables 
show selected international economic transactions of countries as recorded 
in the balance of payments (BOP). These items cover annual flows, except for 
some countries which show data as of a specified period only. 
Tables A11 and A12: Growth rates of merchandise exports and imports 
(% per year). The annual growth rates of exports and imports, in terms of 
merchandise goods only (except for Turkmenistan, which covers both goods 
and services), are shown in these tables. Data are in million US$, primarily
obtained from the balance-of-payments accounts of each country. Exports are 
reported on a free-on-board (f.o.b.) basis. Import data are generally reported 
on an f.o.b. basis, except for Afghanistan, Bhutan, Cambodia, India, the 
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Lao PDR, Myanmar, the Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, and 
Thailand, which value them on a cost, insurance, freight (c.i.f.) basis. 
Table A13: Trade balance (US$ million). The trade balance is the 
difference between merchandise exports and merchandise imports. Figures in 
this table are based on the export and import levels used to generate Tables 
A11 and A12.
Table A14: Current account balance (% of GDP). The current account 
balance is the sum of the balance of trade for merchandise, net trade in 
services and factor income, and net transfers. The values reported are divided 
by GDP at current prices in US$. In the case of Cambodia, the Lao PDR, and
Viet Nam, official transfers are excluded from the current account balance. 
Table A15: Exchange rates to the US dollar (annual average). The annual 
average exchange rates of each economy are quoted in local currencies per US 
dollar. The rate for 2011 for India is for the period April 2011–January 2012. 
The Turkmenistan Manat was redenominated on 1 January 2009 from TMM 
14,250 to TMM 2.8 per US dollar.
Table A16: Gross international reserves (US$ million). Gross international 
reserves are defined as the US$ value of holdings of foreign exchange, special
drawing rights (SDR), reserve position in the IMF, and gold at the end of 
a given period. For the PRC and Turkmenistan, gold is excluded in the 
computation. For the Marshall Islands and Taipei,China, this item refers 
to foreign exchange reserves only. In some countries, the rubric comprises 
foreign assets and reserves of national monetary authorities and national oil 
funds, i.e., foreign assets of the Maldives Monetary Authority, net foreign 
reserves of the State Bank of Pakistan, assets of the National Oil Fund of 
Azerbaijan, and official external assets of Kiribati. The data for India are as of 
23 March 2012.
Table A17: External debt outstanding (US$ million). For most economies, 
external debt outstanding—public and private—includes medium- and 
long-term debt, short-term debt, and IMF credit. For Cambodia, Georgia, 
and the Lao PDR, only public external debt is reported. For Azerbaijan; India; 
Kazakhstan; Kyrgyz Republic; Malaysia, the Philippines; and Singapore the 
figures for 2011 are as of end-September.
Table A18: Debt service ratio (% of exports of goods and services). This 
table generally presents the total debt service payments of each economy, 
which comprise principal repayments (excluding on short-term debt) and 
interest payments on outstanding external debt, as a percentage of exports 
of goods and services. For Cambodia and the Lao PDR, debt service refers 
to external public debt only. For Papua New Guinea, Samoa, and Viet Nam, 
exports of goods are used as the denominator in the calculation of the ratio; 
for the Philippines, exports of goods, services, and income are used as the 
denominator. For Bangladesh, the ratio represents debt service payments on 
medium- and long-term loans as a percentage of exports of goods, nonfactor 
services, and workers’ remittances; while for Azerbaijan, the ratio represents 
public and publicly guaranteed external debt service payments as a percentage 
of exports of goods and nonfactor services. 
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Table A1 Growth rate of GDP (% per year)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Central Asia 12.0 6.5 3.2 6.6 6.2 6.1 6.2
Armenia 13.7 6.9 -14.1 2.1 4.5 3.8 4.2
Azerbaijan 25.1 10.8 9.3 5.0 0.1 4.1 3.5
Georgia 12.3 2.3 -3.8 6.3 7.0 6.0 6.3
Kazakhstan 8.9 3.3 1.2 7.0 7.5 6.0 6.5
Kyrgyz Republic 8.5 8.4 2.9 -0.5 5.7 5.0 5.5
Tajikistan 7.8 7.9 3.9 6.5 7.4 5.5 6.0
Turkmenistan 11.1 14.7 6.1 9.2 9.9 10.0 9.0
Uzbekistan 9.5 9.0 8.1 8.5 8.3 8.0 7.9
East Asia 11.3 7.3 6.7 9.8 8.0 7.4 7.7
China, People’s Rep. of 14.2 9.6 9.2 10.4 9.2 8.5 8.7
Hong Kong, China 6.4 2.3 -2.6 7.0 5.0 3.0 4.5
Korea, Rep. of 5.1 2.3 0.3 6.2 3.6 3.4 4.0
Mongolia 10.2 8.9 -1.3 6.4 17.3 15.0 17.5
Taipei,China 6.0 0.7 -1.8 10.7 4.0 3.4 4.6
South Asia 8.8 6.4 7.5 7.8 6.4 6.6 7.1
Afghanistan 13.7 3.6 21.0 8.4 5.7 7.1 5.8
Bangladesh 6.4 6.2 5.7 6.1 6.7 6.2 6.0
Bhutan 12.6 10.8 5.7 9.3 8.3 8.0 8.5
India 9.3 6.7 8.4 8.4 6.9 7.0 7.5
Maldives 10.6 12.2 -4.7 5.7 7.5 3.5 4.5
Nepal 2.8 5.8 3.8 4.0 3.5 4.5 4.0
Pakistan 6.8 3.7 1.7 3.8 2.4 3.6 4.0
Sri Lanka 6.8 6.0 3.5 8.0 8.3 7.0 8.0
Southeast Asia 6.6 4.4 1.4 7.9 4.6 5.2 5.7
Brunei Darussalam 0.2 -1.9 -1.8 2.6 2.9 2.6 3.2
Cambodia 10.2 6.7 0.1 6.0 6.8 6.5 7.0
Indonesia 6.3 6.0 4.6 6.2 6.5 6.4 6.7
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 7.9 7.2 7.3 7.5 7.8 7.9 7.7
Malaysia 6.5 4.8 -1.6 7.2 5.1 4.0 5.0
Myanmar 5.5 3.6 5.1 5.3 5.5 6.0 6.3
Philippines 6.6 4.2 1.1 7.6 3.7 4.8 5.0
Singapore 8.9 1.7 -1.0 14.8 4.9 2.8 4.5
Thailand 5.0 2.5 -2.3 7.8 0.1 5.5 5.5
Viet Nam 8.5 6.3 5.3 6.8 5.9 5.7 6.2
The Pacific 4.6 6.6 4.2 5.5 7.0 6.0 4.1
Cook Islands -0.2 -3.5 -3.6 0.2 3.4 5.4 3.0
Fiji -0.9 1.0 -1.3 -0.2 2.1 1.0 1.2
Kiribati 0.5 -1.2 -0.6 1.8 3.0 3.5 3.0
Marshall Islands 3.0 -1.9 -1.3 5.2 5.0 5.4 2.6
Micronesia, Fed. States of -2.1 -2.4 0.7 3.1 1.4 1.0 0.5
Nauru - - - 0.0 4.0 4.8 4.2
Palau -0.5 -6.1 -4.6 0.3 5.8 3.0 2.0
Papua New Guinea 7.2 8.9 6.0 7.4 8.9 7.5 4.5
Samoa 2.0 4.3 -5.4 0.2 2.1 2.5 2.4
Solomon Islands 6.8 5.2 -1.0 7.1 9.3 6.0 5.0
Timor-Leste 9.1 12.1 13.0 9.5 10.0 10.0 8.0
Tonga -0.9 2.6 -1.0 0.3 -0.3 0.4 0.2
Tuvalu 5.5 7.6 -1.7 -0.5 1.0 1.4 1.3
Vanuatu 6.5 6.2 3.5 2.2 4.3 4.5 5.0
Average 10.1 6.7 6.0 9.1 7.2 6.9 7.3
- = not available.
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Table A2 Growth rate of per capita GDP (% per year)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Per capita GNP, 
US$, 2010
Central Asia 10.8 5.1 1.4 5.1 4.8 4.9 4.8
Armenia 13.6 6.7 -14.4 1.7 4.3 3.3 3.9 3,200
Azerbaijan 23.6 9.6 7.1 3.8 -1.1 4.2 2.4 5,330
Georgia 12.5 2.6 -3.9 5.0 6.2 5.9 6.1 2,690
Kazakhstan 7.7 1.8 -0.8 5.2 6.0 4.5 5.1 7,590
Kyrgyz Republic 7.8 6.8 0.7 -1.6 4.3 3.6 5.5 840
Tajikistan 5.5 5.6 1.8 5.5 4.6 3.5 4.0 800
Turkmenistan 9.7 13.4 4.7 7.8 8.5 8.6 7.6 3,790
Uzbekistan 8.0 7.3 6.3 6.8 6.6 5.9 5.7 1,280
East Asia 10.7 6.8 6.3 9.3 7.6 6.9 7.2
China, People’s Rep. of 13.6 9.0 8.6 9.9 8.7 8.0 8.2 4,270
Hong Kong, China 5.5 1.7 -2.9 6.3 4.3 2.5 3.9 32,780
Korea, Rep. of 4.8 2.0 0.0 5.9 3.4 3.2 3.8 19,890
Mongolia 8.7 7.1 -3.1 4.5 15.2 11.3 15.9 1,870
Taipei,China 5.6 0.4 -2.2 10.5 4.0 3.2 4.4 19,260
South Asia 7.3 4.8 6.0 5.9 5.0 5.6 5.4
Afghanistan 11.9 1.5 18.6 6.3 3.7 5.0 3.7 410
Bangladesh 5.1 4.8 4.4 4.7 5.4 4.9 4.6 700
Bhutan 10.5 8.7 3.8 7.4 6.3 6.1 6.7 1,870
India 7.8 5.2 6.9 6.9 5.5 6.2 5.8 1,330
Maldives 9.0 10.5 -6.2 4.0 5.7 1.8 2.8 5,750
Nepal 0.8 3.4 1.5 1.4 1.3 3.0 2.6 440
Pakistan 4.9 1.9 0.0 -2.0 0.3 1.9 2.3 1,050
Sri Lanka 6.1 4.9 2.4 6.9 7.2 5.9 6.9 2,240
Southeast Asia 4.8 2.5 -0.1 6.0 2.7 4.1 4.7
Brunei Darussalam -1.6 -3.9 -3.7 0.6 0.9 0.5 1.1 31,800
Cambodia 9.3 3.2 -2.5 6.1 5.5 5.2 5.7 750
Indonesia 5.0 4.7 3.3 3.4 3.6 5.3 5.6 2,500
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 3.6 5.5 7.2 5.9 6.2 5.9 5.9 1,050
Malaysia 5.1 3.5 -2.9 5.9 3.9 3.9 4.9 7,760
Myanmar 3.4 1.6 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.9 4.2 -
Philippines 4.6 2.1 -0.8 5.6 1.8 2.8 3.0 2,060
Singapore 4.4 -3.6 -3.9 12.7 2.7 0.9 2.8 40,070
Thailand 4.3 1.6 -3.1 7.2 -0.4 4.9 5.0 4,150
Viet Nam 7.3 5.2 4.2 5.7 4.8 4.6 5.1 1,160
The Pacific 3.1 4.7 2.4 3.6 5.0 4.1 2.3
Cook Islands 13.1 -7.5 -6.6 -4.0 -4.7 6.4 3.9 -
Fiji -1.2 0.4 -1.9 -0.7 1.6 0.6 0.7 3,630
Kiribati -1.2 -2.8 -2.3 -2.3 1.4 1.9 1.4 2,010
Marshall Islands 2.2 -3.4 -1.7 4.5 3.9 4.4 1.6 3,640
Micronesia, Fed. States of -1.7 -1.9 1.2 3.8 2.0 1.5 1.0 2,730
Nauru - - - 0.5 -0.7 2.7 2.2 -
Palau -1.1 -6.6 -5.2 -0.3 5.2 2.4 1.4 6,560
Papua New Guinea 4.8 6.6 3.8 5.1 6.4 5.0 2.0 1,300
Samoa 1.5 3.9 -5.7 -0.1 1.8 2.2 2.2 3,000
Solomon Islands 4.2 2.9 -3.3 4.7 6.7 3.7 2.6 1,030
Timor-Leste 6.5 9.5 10.3 6.8 7.4 7.4 5.5 2,220
Tonga -1.3 2.2 -1.4 -0.1 -1.2 -0.5 -0.7 3,280
Tuvalu -1.1 8.5 -2.2 -1.0 0.5 - - 4,760
Vanuatu 4.1 3.8 1.3 -0.1 2.0 2.2 2.6 2,640
Average 9.2 5.8 5.2 8.1 6.3 6.3 6.5
- = not available.
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Table A3 Growth rate of value added in agriculture (% per year)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Sector share 2010, %
Central Asia
Armenia 10.4 3.3 6.0 -15.7 12.6 15.7
Azerbaijan 4.0 6.1 3.5 -2.2 5.8 6.2
Georgia 3.3 -4.4 -6.8 -4.8 5.5 10.3
Kazakhstan 9.7 -6.1 13.8 -11.6 26.7 6.6
Kyrgyz Republic 1.6 0.9 6.7 -2.6 2.3 20.6
Tajikistan 6.5 7.8 10.5 6.8 7.9 -
Turkmenistan - - - - - -
Uzbekistan 6.1 4.7 5.7 6.8 6.6 31.8
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 3.7 5.4 4.2 4.3 4.5 8.2
Hong Kong, China -4.3 -16.9 -4.6 3.9 - 0.1
Korea, Rep. of 4.0 5.6 3.2 -4.3 -1.0 3.0
Mongolia 14.4 4.7 3.6 -16.6 0.3 18.5
Taipei,China -2.4 0.1 -3.0 1.2 1.9 1.4
South Asia
Afghanistan 14.7 -14.9 44.6 -6.4 -15.8 23.3
Bangladesh 4.6 3.2 4.1 5.2 5.0 20.3
Bhutan 1.7 0.8 1.7 1.5 0.6 15.6
India 5.8 0.1 1.0 7.0 2.5 14.5
Maldives -11.9 -3.4 -7.4 -6.9 -1.1 3.2
Nepal 1.0 5.8 3.0 1.3 4.1 34.7
Pakistan 4.1 1.0 4.0 0.6 1.2 21.2
Sri Lanka 3.4 7.5 3.2 7.0 2.5 11.9
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam -4.5 3.8 5.6 -5.8 - 1.1
Cambodia 5.0 5.7 5.4 4.0 3.3 29.4
Indonesia 3.5 4.8 4.0 3.0 3.0 13.2
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 6.2 2.0 2.3 2.0 1.0 31.6
Malaysia 1.3 4.3 0.6 2.1 5.6 7.1
Myanmar - - - - - -
Philippines 4.7 3.2 -0.7 -0.2 2.6 11.6
Singapore 0.6 -4.3 -1.8 -3.1 3.0 0.0
Thailand 1.2 4.2 1.3 -2.3 3.8 8.3
Viet Nam 3.8 4.7 1.8 2.8 4.0 16.4
The Pacific
Cook Islands 5.2 -9.9 -5.6 14.4 - 5.9
Fiji -4.9 4.9 -12.9 -5.0 8.3 12.1
Kiribati 0.2 1.8 1.4 - - -
Marshall Islands 7.0 -2.0 13.3 24.8 - 12.3
Micronesia, Fed. States of 4.5 -0.1 -0.7 1.0 - 25.3
Nauru - - - - - -
Palau -14.9 -7.1 6.0 - - -
Papua New Guinea 4.2 4.3 0.7 2.9 4.5 33.5
Samoa -1.7 2.4 -10.8 -3.2 -2.7 9.9
Solomon Islands 4.7 10.5 -1.3 - - -
Timor-Leste -5.4 13.2 12.6 0.4 0.0 28.3
Tonga 1.7 0.6 -1.8 -3.1 0.3 18.8
Tuvalu 3.0 0.4 - - - -
Vanuatu 2.0 3.3 1.7 - - -
- = not available.
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Table A4 Growth rate of value added in industry (% per year)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Sector share 2010, %
Central Asia
Armenia 11.7 7.8 -29.6 6.1 0.3 37.5
Azerbaijan 32.9 9.7 10.6 4.4 -4.3 60.9
Georgia 14.5 -3.9 -3.5 9.1 9.7 26.7
Kazakhstan 9.2 2.7 -0.3 7.2 3.3 45.2
Kyrgyz Republic 10.3 14.0 -0.3 2.5 8.8 27.4
Tajikistan -8.7 -8.9 -6.5 9.7 5.9 -
Turkmenistan - - - - - -
Uzbekistan 8.3 6.5 9.7 8.3 6.7 35.7
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 15.1 9.9 9.9 12.3 10.6 59.5
Hong Kong, China -0.5 2.1 -5.2 7.6 - 7.4
Korea, Rep. of 6.0 2.0 -0.6 11.3 4.2 39.6
Mongolia 7.0 -0.8 -0.4 4.3 10.1 32.2
Taipei,China 9.0 0.2 -4.1 23.0 4.4 35.7
South Asia
Afghanistan 7.6 5.7 6.1 6.3 6.6 26.0
Bangladesh 8.4 6.8 6.5 6.5 8.2 29.9
Bhutan 25.4 20.4 4.8 8.2 8.4 45.7
India 9.7 4.4 8.4 7.2 3.9 27.8
Maldives 22.5 9.5 -26.2 5.2 5.9 14.8
Nepal 3.9 1.7 -1.4 3.3 1.4 15.3
Pakistan 8.8 1.4 -0.1 8.3 -0.1 26.4
Sri Lanka 7.6 5.9 4.2 8.4 9.6 28.7
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam -5.6 -5.4 -5.0 1.7 - 52.5
Cambodia 8.4 4.0 -9.5 13.6 13.9 28.6
Indonesia 4.7 3.7 3.6 4.9 5.3 41.1
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 6.5 10.0 17.0 18.0 15.6 27.7
Malaysia 3.0 0.7 -7.6 8.6 2.5 36.9
Myanmar - - - - - -
Philippines 5.8 4.8 -1.9 11.6 1.9 32.6
Singapore 6.8 -1.5 -1.4 24.8 6.8 32.9
Thailand 5.8 3.2 -5.0 12.8 -3.9 48.7
Viet Nam 10.2 6.0 5.5 7.7 5.5 41.9
The Pacific
Cook Islands 4.6 2.5 -5.0 -2.7 - 9.1
Fiji -5.2 -1.4 -0.4 8.1 0.3 19.3
Kiribati 12.7 -7.1 -1.6 - - -
Marshall Islands -2.7 3.3 -7.3 -6.0 - 10.4
Micronesia, Fed. States of -7.0 8.9 33.5 16.3 - 7.8
Nauru - - - - - -
Palau -24.3 -30.7 -11.6 - - -
Papua New Guinea 7.3 7.0 8.1 10.8 11.1 35.4
Samoa 5.1 5.9 -15.7 3.0 2.9 28.0
Solomon Islands 11.8 13.0 1.3 - - -
Timor-Leste 43.7 19.6 20.5 21.6 - 14.6
Tonga -2.0 4.8 1.7 -0.4 4.4 19.8
Tuvalu 30.8 -8.2 - - - -
Vanuatu 7.7 15.6 9.2 - - -
- = not available.
Statistical appendix  259
Table A5 Growth rate of value added in services (% per year)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Sector share 2010, %
Central Asia
Armenia 13.8 5.0 -3.6 4.4 5.8 46.8
Azerbaijan 12.4 14.0 9.1 7.2 6.5 32.9
Georgia 13.0 7.4 -3.4 7.8 5.6 63.0
Kazakhstan 12.8 4.7 -0.2 7.1 7.7 48.2
Kyrgyz Republic 12.6 11.0 2.3 -1.1 5.2 52.0
Tajikistan 16.5 12.0 9.5 4.6 13.5 -
Turkmenistan - - - - - -
Uzbekistan 17.4 15.3 9.3 11.6 12.7 32.5
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 16.0 10.4 9.6 9.8 8.9 32.3
Hong Kong, China 6.9 2.5 -1.6 7.0 - 92.6
Korea, Rep. of 5.1 2.8 1.1 3.5 2.7 57.4
Mongolia 11.9 16.6 0.8 9.8 17.1 49.3
Taipei,China 4.6 1.3 -0.2 4.7 3.1 62.9
South Asia
Afghanistan 19.3 13.8 17.2 18.1 15.0 50.7
Bangladesh 6.9 6.5 6.3 6.5 6.6 49.8
Bhutan 7.1 5.3 9.1 12.7 9.4 38.8
India 10.3 10.0 10.5 9.3 9.4 57.7
Maldives 9.2 13.5 0.5 6.3 8.0 82.0
Nepal 4.5 7.3 6.0 6.0 3.6 50.0
Pakistan 7.0 6.0 1.7 2.9 4.1 52.4
Sri Lanka 7.1 5.6 3.3 8.0 8.8 59.3
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam 9.2 2.6 2.1 3.8 - 46.3
Cambodia 10.1 9.0 2.3 3.3 5.0 42.0
Indonesia 9.0 8.7 5.8 8.4 8.5 45.7
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 12.1 9.7 4.4 5.0 7.9 40.7
Malaysia 10.2 7.6 3.1 6.8 6.8 56.0
Myanmar - - - - - -
Philippines 7.6 4.0 3.4 7.2 5.0 55.8
Singapore 9.1 4.4 -1.0 10.7 4.3 67.0
Thailand 5.0 1.3 -0.2 4.6 3.8 43.0
Viet Nam 8.9 7.4 6.6 7.5 7.0 41.6
The Pacific 
Cook Islands -1.1 -2.9 -1.6 -0.4 - 85.0
Fiji 1.3 0.9 1.0 -1.4 1.5 68.6
Kiribati -0.1 2.6 -2.2 - - -
Marshall Islands 4.7 -2.4 -0.6 3.2 - 77.3
Micronesia, Fed. States of -3.4 -3.6 -1.7 2.5 - 66.9
Nauru - - - - - -
Palau 4.8 -1.9 -1.8 - - -
Papua New Guinea 10.7 16.4 9.7 8.5 10.4 31.0
Samoa 1.1 3.8 1.0 -0.3 2.4 63.5
Solomon Islands 7.4 1.3 -1.3 - - -
Timor-Leste 12.6 10.0 11.6 11.6 - 57.2
Tonga -1.2 2.1 -1.9 0.9 0.8 61.4
Tuvalu 1.0 3.9 - - - -
Vanuatu 4.7 4.1 6.8 - - -
- = not available.
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Table A6 Inflation (% per year)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Central Asia 11.2 16.4 5.9 7.0 9.0 7.2 7.3
Armenia 4.4 9.0 3.4 8.2 7.7 4.1 4.5
Azerbaijan 16.7 20.8 1.5 5.7 7.9 9.0 8.5
Georgia 9.2 10.0 1.7 7.1 8.5 4.8 6.2
Kazakhstan 10.8 17.0 7.3 7.1 8.3 6.5 6.8
Kyrgyz Republic 10.2 24.5 6.8 8.0 16.6 5.0 5.5
Tajikistan 13.2 20.4 6.5 6.5 12.5 8.5 9.0
Turkmenistan 6.3 14.5 -2.7 4.4 6.1 6.5 7.0
Uzbekistan 12.3 12.7 14.1 9.4 13.1 9.5 9.0
East Asia 4.0 5.5 -0.1 3.1 5.0 3.7 3.7
China, People’s Rep. of 4.8 5.9 -0.7 3.3 5.4 4.0 4.0
Hong Kong, China 2.0 4.3 0.6 2.3 5.3 3.8 3.3
Korea, Rep. of 2.5 4.7 2.8 3.0 4.0 3.0 3.0
Mongolia 9.6 28.0 7.6 10.1 9.2 15.0 12.0
Taipei,China 1.8 3.5 -0.9 1.0 1.4 1.5 1.6
South Asia 5.5 8.0 5.2 9.4 9.4 7.7 6.9
Afghanistan 13.0 26.8 -12.2 7.7 10.5 4.6 5.0
Bangladesh 7.2 9.9 6.7 7.3 8.8 11.0 8.5
Bhutan 5.2 6.4 7.1 4.8 8.6 7.3 6.5
India 4.7 8.1 3.8 9.6 9.0 7.0 6.5
Maldives 7.4 12.3 4.0 4.7 9.7 4.5 7.5
Nepal 6.4 7.7 12.6 9.6 9.6 8.0 7.0
Pakistan 7.8 12.0 17.0 10.1 13.7 12.0 10.0
Sri Lanka 15.8 -20.8 3.5 6.2 6.7 8.0 7.0
Southeast Asia 4.0 8.5 2.7 4.1 5.5 4.4 4.4
Brunei Darussalam 1.0 2.1 1.0 0.4 2.0 1.8 2.0
Cambodia 7.7 25.0 -0.7 4.0 5.5 5.0 5.0
Indonesia 6.4 9.8 4.8 5.1 5.4 5.5 5.0
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 4.5 7.6 0.0 6.0 7.6 6.7 6.0
Malaysia 2.0 5.4 0.6 1.7 3.2 2.4 2.8
Myanmar 32.9 22.5 8.2 7.3 4.2 6.2 6.3
Philippines 2.9 8.2 4.2 3.8 4.8 3.7 4.1
Singapore 2.1 6.6 0.6 2.8 5.2 3.0 2.5
Thailand 2.2 5.4 -0.9 3.3 3.8 3.4 3.3
Viet Nam 8.3 23.0 6.9 9.2 18.7 9.5 11.5
The Pacific 3.4 9.4 5.3 5.5 8.6 6.6 5.4
Cook Islands 2.2 4.3 10.2 1.8 0.6 3.0 4.2
Fiji 4.7 7.8 3.7 7.8 8.7 5.1 3.0
Kiribati 4.2 11.0 8.8 -2.8 7.7 5.5 6.0
Marshall Islands 2.6 14.7 0.5 1.6 9.5 2.5 3.0
Micronesia, Fed. States of 3.6 6.6 8.2 4.3 7.9 3.5 4.0
Nauru 5.6 1.0 21.2 -0.6 -3.5 1.5 2.0
Palau 3.0 9.9 4.6 1.2 2.1 2.0 2.5
Papua New Guinea 0.9 10.8 6.9 6.0 8.7 7.0 6.0
Samoa 4.6 6.1 14.6 -0.2 2.9 5.0 3.3
Solomon Islands 4.8 17.4 7.1 1.0 7.4 5.5 5.0
Timor-Leste 8.9 7.6 0.0 5.6 13.1 10.2 7.4
Tonga 5.8 10.4 1.4 3.6 6.1 6.0 7.5
Tuvalu 2.3 10.4 -0.1 -1.9 0.5 2.6 3.0
Vanuatu 3.9 4.8 4.3 2.8 0.8 3.0 4.0
Average 4.4 6.6 1.4 4.4 5.9 4.6 4.4
- = not available.
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Table A7 Change in money supply (% per year)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Central Asia
Armenia 42.5 2.3 15.1 11.8 23.7
Azerbaijan 71.4 44.0 -0.3 24.3 32.1
Georgia 49.7 6.9 8.2 34.8 17.2
Kazakhstan 25.9 35.3 19.5 13.3 15.0
Kyrgyz Republic 33.3 12.6 20.4 18.6 14.9
Tajikistan 78.8 6.3 38.9 25.7 23.5
Turkmenistan 72.2 62.8 10.9 43.4 42.9
Uzbekistan 49.2 38.7 40.9 52.4 27.7
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 16.7 17.8 28.4 19.7 13.6
Hong Kong, China 20.8 2.6 5.3 8.1 12.9
Korea, Rep. of 10.8 12.0 9.9 6.0 5.5
Mongolia 56.3 -5.5 26.9 62.5 37.0
Taipei,China 0.9 7.0 5.7 5.3 4.8
South Asia
Afghanistan 31.0 35.9 39.1 22.6 18.4
Bangladesh 17.1 17.6 19.2 22.4 21.3
Bhutan 8.6 2.3 24.6 30.1 21.2
India 21.4 19.3 16.8 17.0 18.0
Maldives 24.1 21.8 14.4 14.6 20.0
Nepal 14.0 25.2 27.3 30.2 12.3
Pakistan 19.3 15.3 9.6 12.5 15.9
Sri Lanka 16.6 8.5 18.6 15.8 15.0
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam 4.6 21.6 -16.8 9.4 -
Cambodia 62.9 4.8 36.8 20.0 21.5
Indonesia 19.3 14.9 13.0 15.4 16.4
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 38.7 18.3 31.3 39.1 24.9
Malaysia 9.5 13.4 9.5 7.2 14.6
Myanmar 20.9 23.4 34.2 36.8 33.3
Philippines 10.6 15.6 8.3 10.6 6.3
Singapore 13.4 12.0 11.3 8.6 10.0
Thailand 6.3 9.2 6.8 10.9 15.2
Viet Nam 46.1 20.3 29.0 33.3 12.1
The Pacific
Cook Islands -5.8 4.0 65.9 -2.3 -13.4
Fiji 10.4 -6.9 7.4 3.9 16.5
Kiribati - - - - -
Marshall Islands - - - - -
Micronesia, Fed. States of 4.6 - - - -
Nauru - - - - -
Palau - - - - -
Papua New Guinea 27.8 7.1 22.7 10.2 8.8
Samoa 11.0 5.8 9.1 7.1 -4.6
Solomon Islands 21.7 8.0 16.8 16.6 15.6
Timor-Leste 43.9 34.1 29.6 18.2 9.3
Tonga 14.0 8.4 -1.9 5.1 5.7
Tuvalu - - - - -
Vanuatu 16.1 13.2 0.5 -6.0 1.3
- = not available.
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Table A8 Central government revenues (% of GDP)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Central Asia
Armenia 18.7 22.0 22.0 22.3 23.6
Azerbaijan 21.2 26.8 29.0 26.9 31.4
Georgia 29.3 30.7 29.3 28.3 28.4
Kazakhstan 22.5 25.1 20.6 19.7 19.7
Kyrgyz Republic 30.2 29.9 32.2 30.5 32.2
Tajikistan 22.4 22.0 23.4 23.2 24.4
Turkmenistan 17.3 20.9 22.1 17.8 18.7
Uzbekistan 31.7 34.5 33.8 32.5 31.8
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 19.3 19.5 20.1 20.9 22.3
Hong Kong, China 22.2 18.9 19.6 21.6 22.9
Korea, Rep. of 21.9 21.2 20.8 18.6 20.5
Mongolia 37.9 33.1 30.3 37.1 40.6
Taipei,China 12.7 13.0 12.4 11.0 12.0
South Asia
Afghanistan 19.9 17.5 20.6 22.0 23.7
Bangladesh 10.2 11.1 10.4 10.9 11.6
Bhutan 35.7 35.2 40.4 46.4 39.1
India 22.2 19.9 19.1 21.2 19.9
Maldives 38.4 30.8 23.1 24.6 30.4
Nepal 14.1 15.4 16.7 18.5 18.8
Pakistan 15.0 14.6 13.9 14.0 12.5
Sri Lanka 16.6 15.6 15.0 14.9 14.3
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam 55.1 55.8 40.9 54.2 -
Cambodia 10.4 13.3 11.9 13.2 12.7
Indonesia 17.9 19.8 15.1 15.5 16.1
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 13.6 14.4 14.9 15.7 19.4
Malaysia 21.8 21.5 23.3 20.8 21.5
Myanmar 14.1 13.1 12.1 12.2 11.4
Philippines 16.5 15.6 14.0 13.4 14.0
Singapore 16.0 16.9 17.2 17.2 17.9
Thailand 17.2 16.9 16.0 17.2 17.7
Viet Nam 29.4 29.3 28.1 31.1 30.3
The Pacific
Cook Islands 33.3 32.1 35.3 - -
Fiji 25.4 25.4 25.0 24.7 25.2
Kiribati 66.0 70.5 78.3 83.0 72.7
Marshall Islands 72.3 70.2 69.2 67.0 63.6
Micronesia, Fed. States of 56.4 56.8 65.3 68.1 61.7
Nauru 87.8 69.9 36.5 83.6 64.4
Palau 42.1 39.5 40.4 43.0 37.1
Papua New Guinea 37.3 32.2 29.3 30.6 32.6
Samoa 36.5 31.2 34.6 36.3 37.7
Solomon Islands 28.8 32.8 34.6 - -
Timor-Leste 406.5 552.0 371.7 412.8 511.1
Tonga 28.0 26.0 34.7 28.6 25.7
Tuvalu 70.6 80.4 88.8 75.1 89.1
Vanuatu 22.3 27.6 26.8 25.0 25.1
- = not available.
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Table A9 Central government expenditures (% of GDP)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Central Asia
Armenia 20.2 22.7 29.6 27.3 26.9
Azerbaijan 21.4 26.6 29.7 27.7 30.7
Georgia 34.0 37.0 38.4 34.9 31.3
Kazakhstan 24.1 27.2 23.5 22.1 21.8
Kyrgyz Republic 31.0 29.3 36.1 36.6 39.7
Tajikistan 28.6 27.0 28.6 26.1 27.6
Turkmenistan 13.4 10.9 14.5 15.6 18.2
Uzbekistan 30.2 33.2 34.2 32.8 33.3
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 18.7 19.9 23.0 23.0 24.1
Hong Kong, China 14.5 18.8 18.0 17.3 19.3
Korea, Rep. of 21.5 23.3 25.6 20.1 21.2
Mongolia 35.3 37.6 35.5 36.6 44.2
Taipei,China 12.7 13.9 16.0 14.0 14.5
South Asia
Afghanistan 22.0 21.7 22.1 21.1 23.7
Bangladesh 13.4 15.8 14.3 14.6 15.9
Bhutan 35.1 34.4 38.6 44.7 43.8
India 26.3 28.3 28.6 29.1 26.7
Maldives 42.0 42.0 44.1 40.7 40.6
Nepal 15.9 17.4 20.0 20.4 21.2
Pakistan 20.8 22.2 19.9 19.8 18.9
Sri Lanka 23.5 22.6 24.9 22.9 21.4
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam 32.6 29.3 42.5 36.6 -
Cambodia 14.7 15.9 20.5 21.3 20.2
Indonesia 19.2 19.9 16.7 16.2 17.2
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 19.1 19.4 21.1 20.7 21.4
Malaysia 25.0 26.3 30.3 26.5 26.8
Myanmar 17.9 15.5 16.9 17.9 16.9
Philippines 16.7 16.5 17.7 16.9 16.0
Singapore 13.1 16.8 17.5 16.6 17.2
Thailand 18.1 18.3 18.8 15.8 16.9
Viet Nam 34.0 32.4 37.4 37.7 34.3
The Pacific
Cook Islands 29.9 28.8 37.6 - -
Fiji 27.4 24.8 29.1 26.8 28.7
Kiribati 81.9 90.4 91.0 91.1 90.4
Marshall Islands 72.0 66.4 67.8 62.4 62.1
Micronesia, Fed. States of 58.9 58.5 63.7 66.9 61.3
Nauru 83.0 71.8 36.4 83.6 63.8
Palau 46.1 43.2 46.5 44.5 40.6
Papua New Guinea 34.8 34.4 28.7 30.3 32.9
Samoa 35.9 32.7 38.9 43.7 44.2
Solomon Islands 28.3 32.8 34.5 - -
Timor-Leste 112.7 160.3 142.7 156.4 185.5
Tonga 26.8 24.4 33.9 34.3 33.7
Tuvalu 84.8 80.1 98.1 106.6 97.0
Vanuatu 22.1 25.5 27.7 28.4 26.6
- = not available.
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Table A10 Fiscal balance of central government (% of GDP)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Central Asia
Armenia -1.5 -0.7 -7.6 -5.0 -3.3
Azerbaijan -0.2 0.2 -0.7 -0.9 0.6
Georgia -4.7 -6.3 -9.2 -6.6 -2.9
Kazakhstan -1.7 -2.1 -2.9 -2.4 -2.1
Kyrgyz Republic -0.8 0.0 -3.7 -6.3 -7.6
Tajikistan -6.1 -5.5 -5.4 -3.7 -3.1
Turkmenistan 3.9 10.0 7.6 2.3 0.5
Uzbekistan 2.3 4.5 0.6 1.8 -1.5
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 0.6 -0.4 -2.9 -2.1 -1.8
Hong Kong, China 7.7 0.1 1.6 4.3 3.5
Korea, Rep. of 0.4 -2.0 -4.8 -1.5 -0.7
Mongolia 2.7 -4.5 -5.2 0.5 -3.6
Taipei,China -0.1 -0.9 -3.5 -3.0 -2.5
South Asia
Afghanistan -2.0 -4.1 -1.6 0.9 0.0
Bangladesh -3.2 -4.7 -3.9 -3.7 -4.3
Bhutan 0.6 0.8 1.9 1.6 -4.7
India -4.1 -8.4 -9.4 -7.9 -6.9
Maldives -3.6 -11.2 -21.0 -16.1 -10.2
Nepal -1.8 -2.1 -3.3 -1.9 -2.4
Pakistan -4.4 -7.6 -6.0 -6.3 -6.6
Sri Lanka -6.9 -7.0 -9.9 -8.0 -7.0
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam 22.5 26.5 -1.6 17.5 -
Cambodia -4.3 -2.7 -8.6 -8.1 -7.6
Indonesia -1.3 -0.1 -1.6 -0.7 -1.1
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. -5.5 -5.0 -6.3 -5.0 -2.0
Malaysia -3.2 -4.8 -7.0 -5.6 -5.3
Myanmar -3.8 -2.4 -4.8 -5.7 -5.5
Philippines -0.2 -0.9 -3.7 -3.5 -2.0
Singapore 2.9 0.1 -0.3 0.7 0.7
Thailand -0.9 -1.3 -4.8 -2.0 -1.5
Viet Nam -4.6 -3.1 -9.3 -6.6 -4.0
The Pacific
Cook Islands 3.4 3.3 -2.3 -1.8 -1.4
Fiji -2.0 0.6 -4.1 -2.1 -3.5
Kiribati -15.9 -19.9 -12.7 -8.1 -17.7
Marshall Islands 0.2 3.7 1.4 4.6 1.4
Micronesia, Fed. States of -2.5 -1.7 1.6 1.2 0.4
Nauru 4.8 -1.9 0.1 0.1 0.6
Palau -5.8 -3.1 -2.9 -1.5 -2.3
Papua New Guinea 2.4 -2.2 0.6 0.3 -0.3
Samoa 0.6 -1.5 -4.3 -7.4 -6.5
Solomon Islands 0.5 0.0 0.1 7.1 2.1
Timor-Leste 293.8 391.6 229.1 256.4 325.6
Tonga 1.3 1.6 0.8 -5.7 -7.9
Tuvalu -14.2 0.4 -9.4 -31.5 -7.9
Vanuatu 0.1 2.2 -0.9 -3.4 -1.5
- = not available.
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Table A11 Growth rate of merchandise exports (% per year)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Central Asia 33.8 43.3 -31.9 27.7 33.2 5.5 -6.7
Armenia 16.7 -7.1 -32.7 57.0 20.0 8.0 11.0
Azerbaijan 63.4 43.8 -31.0 25.5 0.4 26.5 -3.5
Georgia 25.3 16.3 -22.0 30.0 42.3 -5.9 5.5
Kazakhstan 24.7 48.9 -39.0 38.5 46.1 -1.1 -14.4
Kyrgyz Republic 47.7 40.1 -9.6 5.0 31.1 11.8 7.7
Tajikistan 10.0 18.7 -10.7 45.6 5.2 -2.0 9.9
Turkmenistan 26.7 29.5 -22.8 8.4 44.7 6.0 16.0
Uzbekistan 43.1 40.5 -4.2 4.7 31.3 9.0 -0.8
East Asia 19.2 13.1 -16.2 29.9 18.2 11.3 15.9
China, People’s Rep. of 25.8 17.6 -16.1 31.4 20.4 15.0 18.0
Hong Kong, China 8.9 5.6 -11.9 22.4 11.2 5.0 10.9
Korea, Rep. of 15.8 11.6 -17.6 28.8 20.0 7.5 15.0
Mongolia 26.3 30.1 -25.6 54.3 64.4 25.0 60.0
Taipei,China 10.1 3.4 -20.2 34.6 12.1 3.9 9.4
South Asia 24.5 14.2 -3.3 31.1 22.5 12.3 17.6
Afghanistan 1.3 34.4 2.1 12.7 2.5 -8.8 -3.4
Bangladesh 15.8 17.4 10.1 4.2 41.7 12.0 10.0
Bhutan 83.7 4.4 -13.8 5.5 22.2 -6.7 10.1
India 28.9 13.7 -3.5 37.3 21.0 14.0 19.0
Maldives 1.2 45.2 -49.0 6.5 -4.3 - -
Nepal 2.6 9.3 -4.7 -6.3 11.7 5.0 5.5
Pakistan 4.4 18.2 -6.4 2.9 28.9 -4.2 7.0
Sri Lanka 11.0 6.2 -12.7 21.0 22.4 11.0 20.0
Southeast Asia 12.4 14.7 -16.7 30.0 18.7 8.5 12.6
Brunei Darussalam 0.3 40.4 -33.0 29.8 32.5 - -
Cambodia -12.1 7.6 -14.2 29.7 35.8 24.0 30.0
Indonesia 14.0 18.3 -14.3 32.1 27.5 13.5 24.3
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 16.6 21.8 -5.5 45.8 24.0 19.0 15.0
Malaysia 9.5 13.1 -21.1 26.4 14.5 2.9 7.0
Myanmar 23.9 12.3 -1.4 25.8 10.1 6.1 8.0
Philippines 6.4 -2.5 -22.1 34.9 -6.9 5.4 9.4
Singapore 11.2 13.5 -18.7 28.7 15.7 2.5 6.7
Thailand 18.2 15.9 -13.9 28.4 16.4 15.0 17.0
Viet Nam 21.9 29.1 -8.9 26.4 34.2 12.0 13.8
The Pacific 22.9 -18.2 -7.2 31.8 29.0 - -
Cook Islands 19.7 -0.8 - - - - -
Fiji 9.5 10.6 -29.8 36.2 26.5 4.3 8.3
Kiribati 21.9 23.1 -16.7 - - - -
Marshall Islands 2.5 10.4 2.7 55.2 26.5 15.0 14.7
Micronesia, Fed. States of 38.8 5.2 -7.8 19.1 - - -
Nauru - - - - - - -
Palau -20.4 12.4 -34.6 -13.3 -5.6 4.4 -
Papua New Guinea 25.4 -24.4 -2.7 31.3 27.8 7.2 -9.7
Samoa 33.7 -18.8 -1.2 15.7 -4.7 35.7 -
Solomon Islands 44.4 27.9 -21.6 37.3 80.7 - -
Timor-Leste -39.7 0.0 -31.5 163.1 -18.5 0.0 22.7
Tonga 26.6 -14.3 -22.3 7.9 4.8 8.9 9.1
Tuvalu 20.0 - - - - - -
Vanuatu -21.2 40.4 32.4 -6.9 - - -
Average 18.0 14.3 -16.0 29.9 19.1 10.5 14.5
- = not available.
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Table A12 Growth rate of merchandise imports (% per year)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Central Asia 36.6 27.1 -15.0 5.5 30.5 9.6 -2.7
Armenia 45.6 35.0 -25.0 13.4 8.8 4.5 6.0
Azerbaijan 14.7 25.3 -14.0 3.6 44.7 15.3 -6.7
Georgia 35.2 25.6 -31.4 17.6 39.8 -8.6 1.1
Kazakhstan 37.9 15.6 -24.7 10.3 31.8 14.1 -11.4
Kyrgyz Republic 45.8 43.6 -25.0 5.9 34.4 10.4 9.2
Tajikistan 54.0 54.4 -24.9 6.7 20.0 7.0 7.0
Turkmenistan 36.1 59.2 44.9 -3.5 23.9 3.7 16.0
Uzbekistan 44.6 48.5 -2.7 -6.8 26.5 8.3 2.8
East Asia 15.8 15.8 -15.6 35.5 21.6 13.2 17.0
China, People’s Rep. of 20.3 18.7 -11.1 39.1 25.1 18.0 20.0
Hong Kong, China 10.3 6.2 -10.2 25.3 13.1 5.2 11.2
Korea, Rep. of 15.5 21.9 -25.4 31.5 23.8 9.0 15.5
Mongolia 43.7 57.4 -34.1 49.7 104.0 20.0 32.0
Taipei,China 8.2 9.4 -26.9 43.1 13.0 5.9 10.3
South Asia 29.6 21.1 -3.8 22.9 24.4 14.2 17.4
Afghanistan 15.7 14.7 -0.8 3.0 0.4 0.0 0.6
Bangladesh 16.6 25.6 4.2 5.4 41.8 17.0 15.0
Bhutan 21.1 27.4 -9.6 39.0 40.5 -0.9 17.6
India 35.1 19.8 -2.6 26.7 24.0 15.0 18.0
Maldives 18.3 26.6 -30.3 14.9 17.4 - -
Nepal 13.9 24.1 8.3 37.0 7.7 12.0 11.0
Pakistan 8.0 31.2 -10.3 -1.7 14.9 9.3 15.1
Sri Lanka 10.2 24.7 -27.6 31.8 50.4 9.0 18.0
Southeast Asia 12.8 21.0 -21.5 33.1 20.8 11.4 14.6
Brunei Darussalam 25.1 44.1 -20.3 2.0 19.3 - -
Cambodia -5.3 12.4 -11.6 21.7 25.9 21.0 24.0
Indonesia 15.4 36.9 -24.0 43.7 30.3 18.5 26.1
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 34.7 31.5 2.0 23.8 19.4 17.0 21.0
Malaysia 12.1 6.7 -20.8 34.1 13.9 2.7 7.5
Myanmar 88.0 25.6 1.9 15.8 23.8 21.1 23.0
Philippines 8.7 5.6 -24.0 32.9 1.6 7.2 10.8
Singapore 10.6 22.5 -23.0 27.7 17.5 2.8 7.1
Thailand 9.1 26.7 -25.1 37.0 24.7 23.0 22.0
Viet Nam 38.5 27.9 -14.3 19.5 25.9 12.5 15.0
The Pacific 17.8 19.6 -16.7 20.6 57.2 - -
Cook Islands 28.2 1.0 - - - - -
Fiji 0.3 20.8 -37.3 24.2 16.3 1.1 14.2
Kiribati 10.5 8.7 -21.3 - - - -
Marshall Islands 7.3 2.4 4.5 33.4 -8.8 29.8 -9.1
Micronesia, Fed. States of 0.7 12.5 4.2 3.1 - - -
Nauru - - - - - - -
Palau -6.7 21.1 -28.6 8.2 23.6 0.2 -
Papua New Guinea 32.5 18.6 -8.5 23.5 84.6 0.8 -2.3
Samoa 3.7 9.9 -8.0 14.1 11.4 16.4 -
Solomon Islands 33.9 11.6 -18.2 50.6 15.0 - -
Timor-Leste 12.9 61.7 9.9 2.8 87.3 15.0 13.0
Tonga 16.8 21.1 -14.6 -16.8 16.6 -4.2 -5.2
Tuvalu 62.4 - - - - - -
Vanuatu 24.6 50.7 -6.9 -0.3 - - -
Average 16.8 17.9 -15.8 32.6 21.9 12.8 16.1
- = not available.
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Table A13 Trade balance (US$ million)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Central Asia 29,365 52,139 22,148 43,235 59,590 59,036 51,030
Armenia -1,600 -2,664 -2,081 -2,033 -2,080 -2,124 -2,175
Azerbaijan 15,224 23,012 14,583 19,730 16,810 22,350 21,940
Georgia -2,896 -3,833 -2,399 -2,586 -3,555 -3,158 -3,044
Kazakhstan 15,091 33,519 14,969 28,881 46,769 39,834 32,682
Kyrgyz Republic -1,276 -1,879 -1,120 -1,202 -1,674 -1,815 -2,022
Tajikistan -1,673 -2,721 -1,980 -1,955 -2,434 -2,661 -2,829
Turkmenistan 4,600 4,500 -1,800 -600 1,400 1,800 2,088
Uzbekistan 1,895 2,205 1,976 3,000 4,354 4,810 4,390
East Asia 363,161 360,511 290,807 277,539 245,740 218,506 214,320
China, People’s Rep. of 315,400 360,700 249,500 254,200 243,800 230,576 232,908
Hong Kong, China -19,699 -23,127 -26,860 -42,965 -56,108 -60,000 -68,000
Korea, Rep. of 37,129 5,170 37,866 40,083 32,100 26,682 27,842
Mongolia -114 -710 -252 -292 -1,747 -1,857 -778
Taipei,China 30,445 18,478 30,553 26,513 27,694 23,104 22,347
South Asia -116,787 -155,652 -148,522 -163,704 -209,220 -245,028 -286,682
Afghanistan -5,968 -6,480 -6,355 -6,303 -6,266 -6,523 -6,672
Bangladesh -3,458 -5,330 -4,710 -5,155 -7,328 -9,724 -12,471
Bhutan 47 -72 -90 -299 -519 -553 -697
India -91,467 -119,519 -118,202 -130,593 -169,449 -197,897 -230,064
Maldives -737 -890 -682 -798 -976 - -
Nepal -1,837 -2,410 -2,733 -4,139 -4,422 -5,020 -5,627
Pakistan -9,711 -14,970 -12,627 -11,536 -10,516 -14,900 -19,099
Sri Lanka -3,656 -5,980 -3,122 -4,881 -9,743 -10,410 -12,051
Southeast Asia 139,780 113,367 137,339 155,624 165,453 137,543 130,246
Brunei Darussalam 5,666 7,879 4,914 7,011 9,595 - -
Cambodia -1,269 -1,584 -1,494 -1,582 -1,603 -1,781 -1,816
Indonesia 32,754 22,906 30,932 30,627 35,347 31,813 36,000
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. -837 -1,228 -1,372 -1,365 -1,528 -1,733 -2,293
Malaysia 37,669 51,540 40,216 41,826 48,831 50,495 53,110
Myanmar 924 507 703 363 -238 -1,773 -3,754
Philippines -8,391 -12,885 -8,842 -10,966 -15,450 -17,413 -19,990
Singapore 57,062 41,666 47,270 63,097 67,446 68,047 71,118
Thailand 26,640 17,348 32,620 31,759 23,502 10,878 313
Viet Nam -10,438 -12,783 -7,607 -5,147 -450 -991 -2,442
The Pacific 1,339 -1,126 -411 160 -1,302 -957 -1,351
Cook Islands 18 13 - - - - -
Fiji -913 -1,177 -676 -772 -820 -799 -971
Kiribati -66 -72 -56 - - - -
Marshall Islands -70 -70 -73 -93 -74 -102 -81
Micronesia, Fed. States of -104 -119 -128 -128 -132 -134 -133
Nauru - - - - - - -
Palau -96 -118 -85 -93 -118 -117 -
Papua New Guinea 3,318 1,373 1,518 2,212 817 1,291 682
Samoa -213 -238 -218 -249 -279 -323 -
Solomon Islands -97 -82 -74 -134 -5 - -
Timor-Leste -153 -261 -295 -280 -565 -654 -736
Tonga -122 -153 -131 -107 -126 -119 -112
Tuvalu -15 - - - - - -
Vanuatu -146 -224 -192 -195 - - -
Total 416,858 369,239 301,361 312,855 260,261 169,100 107,562
- = not available.
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Table A14 Current account balance (% of GDP)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Central Asia 0.4 8.1 0.3 5.1 8.5 4.6 3.9
Armenia -6.4 -11.8 -15.8 -14.7 -12.4 -11.2 -10.0
Azerbaijan 27.3 33.7 23.0 28.4 28.7 22.0 19.0
Georgia -19.7 -22.8 -11.2 -11.5 -13.3 -12.5 -12.0
Kazakhstan -7.9 4.7 -3.5 2.0 7.3 1.0 1.0
Kyrgyz Republic -5.9 -13.7 -2.2 -8.0 -6.8 -6.6 -6.8
Tajikistan -8.6 -7.6 -5.9 2.1 -4.1 -7.0 -6.5
Turkmenistan 15.5 16.5 -16.0 -11.7 -2.9 3.4 3.4
Uzbekistan 7.3 8.9 2.2 6.6 8.1 7.5 6.0
East Asia 8.4 7.5 5.5 5.1 3.1 2.5 2.2
China, People’s Rep. of 10.1 9.1 5.2 5.2 2.8 2.1 1.7
Hong Kong, China 12.3 13.7 8.6 5.5 5.1 5.0 5.0
Korea, Rep. of 2.1 0.3 3.9 2.9 2.5 2.0 2.0
Mongolia 1.8 -12.3 -7.5 -14.3 -30.0 -25.0 -15.0
Taipei,China 8.9 6.9 11.4 9.3 8.8 8.1 7.9
South Asia -1.6 -3.0 -2.7 -2.3 -3.1 -3.1 -2.9
Afghanistan 1.3 0.9 -2.8 1.7 0.1 -1.1 -2.5
Bangladesh 1.4 0.9 2.7 3.7 0.9 -0.5 -1.0
Bhutan 14.2 -2.2 -1.1 -9.9 -20.6 -20.0 -22.2
India -1.3 -2.4 -2.8 -2.7 -3.6 -3.3 -3.0
Maldives -28.4 -34.2 -21.6 -22.3 -31.9 -38.0 -38.0
Nepal -0.1 2.9 4.2 -2.7 -0.9 0.5 1.0
Pakistan -4.8 -8.5 -5.7 -2.2 0.1 -1.8 -1.9
Sri Lanka -4.3 -9.5 -0.5 -2.2 -7.3 -6.4 -6.0
Southeast Asia 8.2 4.3 6.9 6.1 5.6 4.4 4.0
Brunei Darussalam 39.2 48.5 37.3 48.5 50.0 50.0 50.0
Cambodia -7.4 -11.1 -10.3 -10.4 -7.1 -7.6 -7.0
Indonesia 2.4 0.0 2.0 0.7 0.2 -0.1 0.2
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. -16.4 -19.1 -21.0 -17.1 -15.9 -21.0 -22.0
Malaysia 15.9 17.7 16.5 11.5 11.5 12.1 11.9
Myanmar 0.6 -2.2 -1.3 -0.9 -2.7 -4.8 -5.0
Philippines 4.8 2.1 5.6 4.5 3.1 2.1 2.3
Singapore 25.8 13.9 16.2 24.4 21.9 18.0 16.0
Thailand 6.3 0.5 8.3 4.2 3.4 0.5 -0.5
Viet Nam -10.0 -11.9 -6.8 -4.0 0.2 -1.5 -2.2
The Pacific 42.1 61.6 23.1 30.8 25.8 11.9 3.3
Cook Islands 5.8 4.0 - - - - -
Fiji -14.2 -18.1 -7.6 -11.0 -11.2 -9.6 -11.6
Kiribati -29.4 -34.7 -29.8 -23.1 -28.9 -29.2 -
Marshall Islands -2.0 -2.2 -17.0 -24.6 -12.6 -30.3 -
Micronesia, Fed. States of -7.3 -15.6 -18.9 -15.5 -17.1 -17.2 -16.6
Nauru - - - - - - -
Palau -6.2 -17.8 -1.5 2.0 4.1 5.9 -
Papua New Guinea 21.7 -6.1 -7.1 -6.5 -36.8 -33.2 -29.7
Samoa -4.5 -11.1 -5.9 -9.3 -9.3 -8.6 -8.3
Solomon Islands -14.7 -20.3 -20.9 -27.6 -11.2 -15.0 -15.0
Timor-Leste 320.1 430.8 223.4 269.4 339.4 229.4 153.7
Tonga -6.0 -19.0 -16.8 -9.2 -11.0 -11.7 -10.7
Tuvalu - - - - - - -
Vanuatu -7.0 -11.1 -8.1 -6.0 -5.9 -6.3 -6.5
Average 6.5 5.3 4.2 4.0 2.6 1.9 1.7
- = not available.
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Table A15 Exchange rates to the US dollar (annual average)
Currency Symbol 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Central Asia
Armenia Dram AMD 342.1 306.0 363.3 373.7 372.5
Azerbaijan Azerbaijan new manat AZN 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Georgia Lari GEL 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.7
Kazakhstan Tenge T 122.6 120.3 147.5 147.4 146.6
Kyrgyz Republic Som Som 37.3 36.6 42.9 46.0 46.1
Tajikistan Somoni TJS 3.4 3.4 4.1 4.4 4.6
Turkmenistan Turkmen manat TMM 1.0 2.3 2.9 2.9 2.9
Uzbekistan Sum SUM 1,263.5 1,319.6 1,465.6 1,576.8 1,717.8
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of Yuan CNY 7.6 6.9 6.8 6.8 6.5
Hong Kong, China Hong Kong dollar HK$ 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8
Korea, Rep. of Won W 929.1 1,100.5 1,275.0 1,155.4 1,107.4
Mongolia Togrog MNT 1,181.2 1,165.8 1,437.8 1,357.9 1,265.2
Taipei,China NT dollar NT$ 32.8 31.5 33.1 31.6 29.5
South Asia
Afghanistan Afghani AF 49.8 51.0 49.3 45.8 48.4
Bangladesh Taka Tk 69.0 68.6 68.8 69.2 71.2
Bhutan Ngultrum Nu 44.2 40.4 47.8 46.7 45.3
India Indian rupee/s Re/Rs 40.2 45.9 47.4 45.6 47.5
Maldives Rufiyaa Rf 12.8 12.8 12.8 12.8 15.4
Nepal Nepalese rupee/s NRe/NRs 70.2 64.7 76.6 74.2 72.1
Pakistan Pakistan rupee/s PRe/PRs 60.6 62.5 78.5 83.8 85.5
Sri Lanka Sri Lanka rupee/s SLRe/SLRs 110.6 108.3 114.9 113.1 110.6
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam Brunei dollar B$ 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.3
Cambodia Riel KR 4,060.0 4,060.0 4,148.3 4,188.5 4,065.9
Indonesia Rupiah Rp 9,136.2 9,678.3 10,398.6 9,084.6 8,779.5
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. Kip KN 9,581.2 8,734.9 8,501.0 8,254.5 8,029.3
Malaysia Ringgit RM 3.4 3.3 3.5 3.2 3.1
Myanmar Kyat MK 5.6 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.4
Philippines Peso P 46.1 44.5 47.6 45.1 43.3
Singapore Singapore dollar S$ 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.3
Thailand Baht B 34.5 33.3 34.3 32.2 30.5
Viet Nam Dong D 16,105.0 16,302.0 17,065.0 18,621.0 20,490.0
The Pacific
Cook Islands New Zealand dollar NZ$ 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.3
Fiji Fiji dollar F$ 1.6 1.6 2.0 1.9 1.8
Kiribati Australian dollar A$ 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.0
Marshall Islands US dollar US$ 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Micronesia, Fed. States of US dollar US$ 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Nauru Australian dollar A$ 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.0
Palau US dollar US$ 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Papua New Guinea Kina K 3.0 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.2
Samoa Tala ST 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.5 2.3
Solomon Islands Sol. Islands dollar SI$ 7.7 7.8 8.1 8.1 7.7
Timor-Leste US dollar US$ 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Tonga Pa’anga T$ 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 -
Tuvalu Australian dollar A$ 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.0
Vanuatu Vatu Vt 103.2 101.4 105.9 97.3 91.7
- = not available.
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Table A16 Gross international reserves (US$ million)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Central Asia
Armenia 1,659 1,407 2,004 1,866 1,959
Azerbaijan 4,273 6,467 5,364 6,409 10,274
Georgia 1,361 1,480 2,110 2,264 2,795
Kazakhstan 17,629 19,872 23,091 28,291 44,500
Kyrgyz Republic 1,177 1,225 1,588 1,719 1,846
Tajikistan 85 150 278 476 582
Turkmenistan 13,222 - - - -
Uzbekistan 7,510 9,534 12,226 14,580 19,780
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 1,530,280 1,949,260 2,416,040 2,866,080 3,200,000
Hong Kong, China 152,702 182,539 255,816 268,731 285,408
Korea, Rep. of 262,224 201,223 269,995 291,571 306,402
Mongolia 975 637 1,294 2,197 2,457
Taipei,China 270,311 291,707 348,198 382,005 385,547
South Asia
Afghanistan 2,784 3,591 4,209 5,321 6,121
Bangladesh 5,077 6,149 7,471 10,750 10,912
Bhutan 608 589 704 792 906
India 299,230 251,985 278,193 301,838 295,140
Maldives 308 241 261 350 335
Nepal 1,999 2,477 2,872 2,759 3,003
Pakistan 13,393 8,731 9,529 13,112 15,662
Sri Lanka 3,508 1,753 5,097 6,610 5,958
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam 667 751 1,357 1,563 -
Cambodia 1,616 2,164 2,367 2,653 3,032
Indonesia 56,920 51,639 66,105 96,207 110,123
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 528 636 633 727 679
Malaysia 101,532 91,648 96,744 106,590 138,408
Myanmar 3,638 4,042 5,233 6,070 7,903
Philippines 33,751 37,551 44,243 62,373 75,302
Singapore 162,957 174,196 187,809 225,754 237,737
Thailand 87,455 111,008 138,418 172,129 175,124
Viet Nam 20,964 23,022 14,148 12,382 13,800
The Pacific
Cook Islands - - - - -
Fiji 805 559 557 680 852
Kiribati 586 412 414 - -
Marshall Islands 3 2 - - -
Micronesia, Fed. States of 50 45 - - -
Nauru - - - - -
Palau - - - - -
Papua New Guinea 1,998 2,022 2,621 2,600 3,758
Samoa 81 88 94 164 154
Solomon Islands 121 92 146 266 -
Timor-Leste 230 210 238 394 450
Tonga 47 48 68 89 104
Tuvalu 17 26 23 23 28
Vanuatu 120 115 149 161 -
- = not available.
Statistical appendix  271
Table A17 External debt outstanding (US$ million)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Central Asia
Armenia 1,449 1,577 2,967 3,299 3,568
Azerbaijan 2,442 3,001 3,422 3,734 4,841
Georgia 1,790 2,691 3,658 4,219 4,439
Kazakhstan 96,893 107,933 113,239 118,151 122,865
Kyrgyz Republic 2,551 2,569 3,114 3,194 3,427
Tajikistan 1,253 1,498 1,692 1,942 2,041
Turkmenistan 623 535 451 2,196 4,599
Uzbekistan 3,725 3,748 5,022 5,753 7,899
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 373,773 378,245 428,442 548,900 560,000
Hong Kong, China 711,103 663,415 668,527 822,696 916,622
Korea, Rep. of 333,428 317,370 345,677 359,432 398,387
Mongolia 1,742 2,184 2,986 3,997 -
Taipei,China 94,525 90,361 81,963 101,581 126,520
South Asia
Afghanistan 2,001 2,069 1,150 1,272 1,454
Bangladesh 19,355 20,266 20,859 20,336 21,451
Bhutan 725 820 795 874 1,312
India 172,360 224,500 261,014 306,438 326,601
Maldives 828 879 934 963 -
Nepal 3,341 3,197 3,495 3,442 3,655
Pakistan 40,322 46,161 52,331 57,363 61,844
Sri Lanka 14,252 15,077 - - -
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam - - - - -
Cambodia 2,555 2,776 2,946 3,206 3,611
Indonesia 141,180 155,080 172,871 202,413 224,757
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 2,853 2,575 2,694 2,802 3,700
Malaysia 56,681 66,936 68,316 73,652 80,968
Myanmar 7,567 8,103 8,602 11,240 11,841
Philippines 55,470 54,328 54,856 60,048 61,711
Singapore 340,996 420,461 412,504 498,749 641,445
Thailand 74,415 76,102 75,306 100,561 115,605
Viet Nam 19,253 21,816 27,929 32,501 -
The Pacific
Cook Islands - - - - -
Fiji 247 299 269 286 422
Kiribati 14 15 14 - -
Marshall Islands 112 99 96 107 105
Micronesia, Fed. States of 66 68 80 80 80
Nauru - - - 63 -
Palau 72 75 80 78 75
Papua New Guinea 1,062 1,085 1,037 1,041 1,361
Samoa 182 229 211 289 321
Solomon Islands 150 140 134 125 114
Timor-Leste 0 0 0 0 0
Tonga 86 87 105 - -
Tuvalu 11 14 9 10 10
Vanuatu 71 100 102 111 -
- = not available.
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Table A18 Debt service ratio (% of exports of goods and services)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Central Asia
Armenia 2.9 3.1 5.4 4.7 4.6
Azerbaijan 0.6 0.9 1.3 - -
Georgia 3.5 3.4 5.2 4.9 7.1
Kazakhstan 49.0 41.7 63.2 32.4 16.8
Kyrgyz Republic 14.7 18.3 40.9 12.7 7.1
Tajikistan 13.0 19.9 37.5 12.3 -
Turkmenistan 2.1 1.4 1.7 1.5 -
Uzbekistan 8.5 5.7 5.4 7.9 9.7
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 2.4 2.2 3.1 2.9 2.5
Hong Kong, China - - - - -
Korea, Rep. of 6.9 7.9 7.8 6.8 6.9
Mongolia 1.8 1.1 2.0 2.1 -
Taipei,China 2.7 3.9 2.6 1.2 1.7
South Asia
Afghanistan 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.4 0.5
Bangladesh 3.7 3.2 3.2 2.9 2.5
Bhutan 3.6 17.3 30.5 29.8 52.2
India 4.8 4.4 5.5 4.2 4.6
Maldives 4.5 5.0 6.1 5.6 7.2
Nepal 10.3 9.6 10.2 11.5 11.6
Pakistan 8.3 8.1 15.4 19.2 25.0
Sri Lanka 13.1 15.1 19.0 14.8 9.3
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam - - - - -
Cambodia 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.2
Indonesia 19.4 18.1 23.2 21.7 22.5
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 4.3 4.3 4.9 4.5 4.6
Malaysia 3.8 3.8 2.6 6.5 7.4
Myanmar 4.6 5.1 4.3 3.1 3.9
Philippines 10.1 9.7 10.4 8.7 8.9
Singapore - - - - -
Thailand 12.1 8.3 7.6 4.6 2.4
Viet Nam 5.5 6.5 7.5 8.5 -
The Pacific
Cook Islands - - - - -
Fiji 1.5 1.1 1.8 1.3 9.2
Kiribati 2.9 2.1 2.5 - -
Marshall Islands 59.4 24.7 24.8 17.3 14.2
Micronesia, Fed. States of 4.8 5.3 5.9 6.4 7.1
Nauru - 0.6 2.1 - -
Palau 0.9 49.3 69.9 62.4 48.3
Papua New Guinea 3.6 2.9 1.4 1.2 1.2
Samoa 55.6 67.8 62.0 74.5 -
Solomon Islands 5.6 5.6 3.6 3.0 -
Timor-Leste 0 0 0 0 0
Tonga 10.5 - - - -
Tuvalu 16.1 17.2 22.8 39.4 17.9
Vanuatu 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.4 -
- = not available.
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